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FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING

ARABIA

PART 8

January to December 1954

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ARABIA—PART 8

GENERAL CORRESPONDENCE

EA 1081/2

No. 1

ARBITRATION WITH SAUDI ARABIA

Sir John Sterndale Bennett to Mr. Eden. (Received January 3)

(No. 8. Secret)
(Telegraphic)

*British Middle East Office, Fayid,
January 3, 1954.*

Your telegram No. 1512 to Bahrain: Arbitration with Saudi Arabia.

Until I have been able by a visit to the Persian Gulf to appraise the situation there, it is difficult for me to judge, but reading the correspondence which has passed since I arrived here about Buraimi and the frontier arbitration with Saudi Arabia, I cannot help wondering two things:—

- (a) Whether we are not over-estimating the strength of the Saudi position and the dangers to us if they take us to United Nations; and
- (b) Whether we are not under-estimating the dangers of alienating the Rulers and Sheikhs of the Persian Gulf if we appear to them to be failing to protect the interests of one or more of them. It will not look too well, for instance, if we lose by arbitration some of the territory which the Sheikh of Abu Dhabi considers to be his, and yet are found to have safeguarded our own oil interests in the territory thus lost.

2. The first point I realise is problematical and does not permit of categorical answer. But I hope that full weight is being given to the second point, as failure to safeguard the interests of the Sheikh of Abu Dhabi may have repercussions all over the Gulf and weaken confidence in us, whereas in the future we may have need of these Gulf Sheikhs and Rulers and of the facilities which their territories can offer to us.

ES 1011/1

No. 2

SAUDI ARABIA: ANNUAL REVIEW FOR 1953

Mr. Pelham to Mr. Eden. (Received January 14)

(No. 1. Confidential and Guard)

Jedda,

Sir, *January 1, 1954.*

I have the honour in the following paragraphs to review the more important aspects of the internal conditions and external relations of Saudi Arabia during the year 1953. A chronological summary of events is attached as an appendix to this despatch.

2. To the superficial observer probably the outstanding event of the year would be the death of King Ibn Saud on the 9th of November. But in my opinion the era of which he was representative, and which indeed, as the last of the great warrior monarchs, he largely created, began to fade some years ago. As I had expected, the Crown Prince Saud succeeded to the throne

without trouble and appointed his brother Faisal as his heir and Crown Prince. The new King lacks many of the attributes of his father. He could not have conquered the kingdom, but there is little reason to suppose that he will not be able to hold it together. He is well-intentioned, works hard and is genuinely anxious for the title of reformer. Just as his natural vision is myopic in the extreme, so his chief political danger is likely to be a failure to see and understand the forces of change by which he is surrounded. I would not, however, at present labour this danger, for I believe that within the concepts of paternalistic rule the King is amongst Saudi Arabs relatively liberal-minded. There is as yet nothing seriously incongruous between his strict profession of the Wahabi Moslem tenets of faith and his inclination towards modernism. Admitting that assassination can never be allowed for, I would at present consider King Saud's position secure. His accession is not likely to bring surprises or any real changes. I expect a continuation of existing trends which the King could probably not reverse even if he wished.

3. Of these trends, the most important is the growing complexity of Government business. This is the chief problem that the Government faces. Unfortunately, many of the leading officials are unwilling to recognise that they are out of their depth. In 1953 this has already resulted in growing, though involuntary, decentralisation and in an increasingly slack reaction to orders. The old inter-departmental jealousy and confusion still persist. The establishment by royal decree on the 11th of October of a Council of Ministers was an attempt to curb the tendency by centring all authority in the President of the Council, the then Crown Prince, now King Saud. This in part was no more than a formal recognition of an existing fact, but the provisions by which the President is enabled to define the scope of each Ministry and to have the final word on all Government contracts, though essential to the maintenance of a stable central Government, are in fact new. Hitherto, each Minister has done whatever he found within his pleasure and his power. At one time, for example, it seemed as if Saudi Arabia might have two separate Government airlines, simply because the Emirs Mishaal and Talal could not agree as to which of them was nominally to run the existing airline. The constant intrigue and consequent uncertainty over Government contracts has contributed to the vast total of unnecessary

expense and inefficiency. This year, as usual, the left hand, Abdullah Sulaiman's Ministries of Finance and Economics, has neglected to inform the right hand, composed heterogeneously of the rest of the Government, of what it was doing. Meanwhile, that many-headed monster, the Royal Family, has a finger in every pie.

4. It is still doubtful whether the new King will effectively use (or delegate) the powers which he assumed as President of the Council of Ministers. The shape of the new Administration will probably not become obvious for some time, since the King, if he changes his father's advisers (as he is generally expected to do), will, in my opinion, proceed gradually and without ostentation. The most powerful of these advisers and perhaps the most likely to suffer a diminution in influence is Abdullah Sulaiman, the Finance Minister. Sheikh Abdullah, though ageing, is still astute; but he has many enemies, and now that his friend Ibn Saud is dead he can hardly hope to hold on to office indefinitely. If he were to be replaced by someone with a better understanding of modern finance and the needs of the country, who at the same time had the King's confidence, the Government would probably become stronger and more efficient. I do not think this is likely to happen, but it illustrates both the importance of personality in this country and the fact that the Government is basically strong, but stultified by the inefficiency and corruption of its officials.

5. Meanwhile, the Government is saved from some of its own follies by the Monetary Agency, which under the able guidance of an experienced American banker acts as a national bank. During the year under review, this agency made a successful note circulation in the guise of so-called "pilgrim receipts," designed primarily to assist the financial needs of the pilgrims. Americans are also closely connected with most of the main Government projects, such as the proposed, but not yet certain, extension of the Dammam-Riyadh railway, and agricultural schemes at al-Kharj and in the Tihama. Hardly a single project, however, has made progress in 1953, and this is almost entirely due to lack of ready money and the Saudis' own lack of capacity. Nevertheless, amongst the mass of improvements suggested, a little has been done, notably in the field of social services.

6. So far as expenditure of the country's vast unearned income is concerned, a great

deal of the money which should go into capital equipment is still put into businesses supplying luxury goods. With the decline of Government credit, however, trade has been generally dull on the west coast and not too bright on the Persian Gulf. British trade has declined notably from the peak 1952 figures in the face of increased foreign competition, especially from Western Germany and Belgium, although deliveries of the main United Kingdom lines of exports continue fairly steady. Some effort has been made by the Saudi Arabian Government to enforce the decisions of the Arab League Boycott Committee more strictly, and the newly-formed Ministry of Economy appears to be doing what it can to co-ordinate economic policy directed against Israel. The Saudi ban on trade with Cyprus continues despite a modifying Arab League ruling. Since the trade from the Saudi side which is affected is small, the Saudis probably find it convenient to show their zeal for the Arab cause in this inexpensive fashion, besides giving the many influential Syrians and Lebanese in this country an opportunity of fostering their countries' fruit trade with Saudi Arabia. The authorities here have several times told me that the Cyprus ban will be maintained, whatever the other Arab States may do.

7. The strength of the Saudi Arabian Government depends upon keeping the mass of the people reasonably contented. This in turn depends upon the personality of the Ruler and the level of the country's prosperity. Saudi Arabia is at present probably the most stable of all the Arab countries and, as I have already said, King Saud's authority, for the time being at any rate, appears to be sufficient to prevent any serious deterioration. All, therefore, depends on the output and sales of oil. The figures so far available for 1953 from the Arabian-American Oil Company clearly indicate that this will be the first year since large-scale production began after the war, in which the Saudi Arabian Government's revenue from oil will not increase by several million dollars. The probable re-introduction of Persian oil into the market seems to indicate that Saudi production and, therefore, revenue are now near their peak. The realisation of this is unlikely at present seriously to curtail Saudi—and especially princely—spending. In mid-July the Government's debts were authoritatively estimated at £60 to £80 million, and the amount has probably increased since then. This has caused some annoyance, but no serious

perturbation in the ruling circles. The Government continues to pay its debts, only more slowly and more selectively than before. Thus the smaller men without influence find it convenient to sell their claims on the Government at a discount to the more important men whose influence with the Ministry of Finance is strong, but in charging the Government for goods or services these smaller men have made allowance for such a discount and are still left with handsome profits. The result, of course, is that the Government is fleeced, and the big man gets rich quicker than the smaller operator. But the important thing is that most of the merchants are still rich. There is virtually no one in the country who is not better off than he was ten years ago, and who has not expectations (based on the blind assumption that the well is bottomless) of improving his position still further.

8. The vital question for the Government is whether it can maintain this prosperity and achieve a hold on the wealth of the country instead of letting it stream into private hands and into private investment abroad. To maintain prosperity in view of the growing debt means increasing revenue or the unwelcome alternative of curbing expenditure, and the institution of an efficient control, which does not yet seem possible. The obvious source of more revenue is the Arabian-American Oil Company, and the present indications are that, in spite of a year of indecisive negotiation with many postponements, the company is willing to make increased payments to the Saudi Arabian Government. But these payments cannot be increased indefinitely. If the Government is to maintain a strong financial position—on which its stability depends—it must fight against princely extravagance and official corruption. These twin struggles will be exceedingly difficult, but I think King Saud may make an attempt in the right direction. However, this state of affairs shows that the real weakness of the country is inherent in the character of its citizens. Arrogance, ignorance and lack of any idea of self-discipline are outstanding among their qualities.

9. Other stresses are coming to bear on the still medieval fabric of society. In retrospect it may be that a most significant event of the year 1953 in Saudi Arabia will be the general strike in Al-Hasa province, when 13,000 out of the Arabian-American Oil Company's 15,000 Arab employees refused to work during the second half of

October. The scale and excellent organisation of the strike took the Government almost completely by surprise. The main demand of the workers was for equality of conditions with ARAMCO's American employees, but it was notable that the strike actually took place, not in support of this demand, but in protest against the Government's imprisonment of six ringleaders, whom both the Government and ARAMCO had refused to accept as the representatives of the workers. The strikers' successful defiance of a governmental ultimatum to return to work must have been a rude shock to the ruling family. Nevertheless, the Government proceeded with remarkable circumspection and good sense, and the strike eventually ended without force or fuss. ARAMCO is, of course, a convenient whipping-boy, but it is evident that the real purpose of the strike was to create a position of power. It is still not clear who was behind it. Certainly Levantine influence played a part, and there is some evidence of Communist activity. It is most unlikely that it was fomented by anyone in Court circles. The organisation displayed on this occasion suggests that there may be further trouble, but the Government is now on its guard, and the workers are unlikely to strike spontaneously without some powerful directing influence behind them. In short, the strike was a forced, not a natural phenomenon.

10. The strike highlights another deep-seated influence—the growth of Levantine characteristics. There has been a considerable influx into Saudi Arabia of Egyptian and Syrian businessmen, officials and advisers. Though their greed is blatant and unpopular, they possess skills which the Saudis lack, and they are emulated rather than checked. One result of this has been some promotion of an Arab nationalistic spirit in this country. Since the death of Ibn Saud this may accelerate, since it was mainly his enormous prestige which allowed Saudi Arabia to take a view of events different from that of her Arab cousins. Though still notable for the influence her wealth can buy, and for being the guardian of the Holy Cities, Saudi Arabia is becoming merely another member of the Arab League. Her bias against the Hashemites, though weakened, shows no signs of dying, and is likely to keep her in the Egyptian camp at least so long as General Neguib does not obviously look on Saud as just another Farouk.

11. Amongst Western nations American influence in Saudi Arabia is still predominant, and has been strengthened during the year by the introduction of American equipment and of more army and particularly air force officers who are training the Saudi armed forces. But a still more notable event is the substitution of the German firm of Cofinko for the American firm, Michael Baker Incorporated, as the principal Government public works contractors. It seems to be the growing policy of some Saudi officials and merchants (including probably the Minister of Finance himself) to introduce the Germans as a counterweight to the Americans. This amongst other happenings has increased American fears for their own position in Saudi Arabia to what I consider a dangerous degree. Their principal fear is lest the Arabian-American Oil Company should be nationalised or in some way supplanted. To avoid this, both ARAMCO and the United States Government appear to be prepared to make any concessions to the Saudi Arabian Government. Their present policy in this country seems to be to satisfy the Saudis in every way so that they may build up a reserve of goodwill which they hope may see them through. In my opinion this policy only increases Saudi expectations without increasing Saudi goodwill, and the Americans will find it harder to resist the crisis when it comes than if they presented a firm front now. A corollary of their present policy is to avoid supporting the United Kingdom in this country if to do so will antagonise the Saudis.

12. United Kingdom relations with Saudi Arabia have not undergone any overt or significant change in 1953. Yet I fear that the continued political tension which exists over the frontier dispute and the constant anti-British burden of the Arabic press outside Saudi Arabia are creating a belief in Saudi minds (which was largely absent before) that Britain is opposed to the Arabs and that in particular she is throwing over her old friend Saudi Arabia. The position is deteriorating (the Levantine influence to which I have referred in paragraph 10 is a factor), but it is not yet lost. There is still a disposition to be friendly with us and we still command a large fund of respect, especially in the commercial field. A reasonable settlement of the frontier dispute, clear support for the Arabs against Israel when their case warrants it, and a settlement in Egypt, would put us in a good position to regain our losses. Fortunately there is the

prospect that the Saudi Arabian Government will accept a considerably larger quantity of sterling from ARAMCO. If this proves to be the case I should hope we would make a serious effort to secure a major share of it by increased trade against our soft-currency rivals.

13. My views concerning the frontier dispute have been so fully reported that it would be superfluous to dilate upon them here. It is my earnest hope that, since long negotiations in 1953 have so considerably reduced the area of difference between Her Majesty's Government and the Saudi Arabian Government regarding the method of reaching a solution, we will not allow any opportunity of a final settlement to escape us. It is, however, axiomatic in my thinking that to offer the Saudis concessions without simultaneously showing strength is futile.

14. In the year 1953 Saudi Arabia has taken another step into adolescence. Material prosperity is growing, the Government seems to be firmly entrenched, albeit inefficient, the people are contented, the social structure is so far relatively stable; yet all is not well, and it is to be wondered whether the precocious child will ever reach a happy maturity. The waste is appalling, Levantism is growing, corruption continues to flourish on American-produced wealth, and the character of the people does not give promise of early correction of these abuses. I am convinced that in the long run Saudi Arabia would be happier and more stable if she could turn her vast resources of oil into fresh water with which to work and cultivate the land. However, this is a young country and it is possible that it may, before it is too late, acquire sufficient wisdom to provide for the future. I am not so pessimistic as to believe that it will not try. In 1953 I have seen no signs of a near approach of serious trouble, but equally I have not seen those qualities which might prevent Saudi Arabia, once its revenue from oil or other minerals drastically declines, from sinking back into the condition in which it was at the beginning of this century.

15. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Political Resident at Bahrain and the Head of the British Middle East Office.

I have, &c.

G. C. PELHAM.

Appendix

Chronological List of Important Events in Saudi Arabia in 1953

- January 15 to February 20.—Crown Prince Saud's tour of Al-Hasa Province.
- March 24.—News of discovery of oil in the Kuwait-Saudi Arabia Neutral Zone.
- April 9-15.—Crown Prince's visit to the Lebanon.
- April 15-23.—Crown Prince's visit to Syria.
- April 21.—Saudi Arabia agrees to the principle of arbitration for settling the frontier dispute with the United Kingdom.
- April 23-29.—Visit of Japanese Trade Mission.
- May 2.—Crown Prince represents Saudi Arabia at the coronation of King Faisal of Iraq.
- May 3.—Prince Talal represents Saudi Arabia at the coronation of King Hussein of Jordan.
- May 7.—Sir Winston Churchill's proposal to King Ibn Saud that the local situation at Buraimi should be "a matter of honour between us" and that Turki bin Ataishan should be supplied from the local market.
- May 7-13.—Her Majesty's Ambassador's visit to King Ibn Saud at Riyadh to discuss the frontier dispute.
- May 18-19.—Mr. John Foster Dulles's visit to Riyadh. Mr. Adlai Stevenson's visit to Riyadh.
- June 2.—Prince Fahad represents Saudi Arabia at the coronation of Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II.
- June 7-10.—Her Majesty's Ambassador's visit to Riyadh to continue negotiations on the frontier dispute.
- June 9.—King Ibn Saud's proposal, in a letter to Sir W. Churchill, that the blockade of Buraimi be lifted, that when arbitration begins British and Saudi forces in the area be equal, and that a neutral body be there to see fair play.
- July 7.—Establishment of a Ministry of Economy.
- July 12-16.—King Hussein of Jordan's visit.
- July 27.—Issue of "pilgrimage receipts," the first officially supported paper money in Saudi Arabia.
- August 8.—King Ibn Saud moves from Riyadh to Taif for the remainder of the summer.
- August 18-25.—Visit of President Neguib of Egypt to perform the pilgrimage.
- August 19.—Arafat Day—highlight of the pilgrimage.
- September 15-18.—Visit of the 22nd Destroyer Division of the Indian Navy to Jeddah.
- September 24.—Personal proposals (in Jeddah) of the Saudi Arabian Ambassador to the United Kingdom relating to the situation in Buraimi.
- October 16.—Strike of almost all the Arab employees of the Arabian-American Oil Company at Dhahran.
- November 9.—Death of King Ibn Saud at Taif and immediate accession of the Crown Prince as King Saud bin Abdul Aziz.
- December 11-15.—Visit of British Trade Mission to Jeddah.
- December 31.—Departure of Messrs. Michael Baker Inc. from Saudi Arabia, relinquishing their position as Government engineering consultants and public works contractors in favour of the German firm of Cofinko.

ES 1891/1

No. 3

**THE VISIT OF HER MAJESTY'S AMBASSADOR TO RIYADH TO
PRESENT HIS CREDENTIALS TO HIS MAJESTY KING SAUD:
JANUARY 2, 1954**

Mr. Pelham to Mr. Eden. (Received January 14)

(No. 5. Confidential)

Jedda,

Sir,

January 6, 1954.

I have the honour to report that I presented my credentials to His Majesty King Saud on the 2nd of January. That same morning, accompanied by my wife and daughter, who had been invited by the King, I had flown from Jedda to Riyadh as the King's guest in one of the regular Saudi Arabian Airlines Skymaster aircraft on the Asmara-Dhahran run. On arrival at the Riyadh airport we were met by the official interpreter and by the King's *aide-de-camp*, a pleasant and efficient young man who speaks fluent English. I subsequently learned that the King's Chamberlain would also have been there had he not been involved in a car crash on the way to the airport; fortunately no one was seriously hurt.

2. The new guest-house being built near the airport is not yet finished, so once again I found myself in the gimcrack building which forms part of the old Palace, and prepared myself to face the inadequacies of comfort and cuisine that I had learned to expect in the course of my many previous visits to the capital. However, I was pleased on this occasion to find a few improvements: new air-conditioning apparatus, somewhat less tough meals, a few more fluorescent lights, a few less cockroaches. After lunch I donned the traditional Arab robes and head-dress in preparation for the audience of the King. General Said, commander of the King's Bodyguard, accompanied me in a large Cadillac, and, escorted by roaring motorcyclists, we covered the hundred yards or so to the Royal Suite. Outside this I was invited to inspect the usual guard of honour, on which, in spite of its many deficiencies, in duty bound I congratulated the General. There was a short wait in an ante-room where I met Sheikh Yusuf Yasin, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, looking very fit after his rest cure at Bad Neuheim, and Rushdi Bey Malhas who, in spite of his enmity with Sheik Yusef, has so far managed to retain his post as Director of the Political Section of the Royal Diwan.

3. I was then ushered into the audience chamber, which was less primitively furnished than that of the late King. There were fewer flies, and I noticed the absence of a slave bodyguard glittering with golden swords. After the slight ceremonies of bowing and taking coffee, and the more prolix enquiries after health and family, I presented my letter of credence to His Majesty with a declaration of friendship suitable to the occasion. To this the King replied in a most amicable manner. He requested that I should convey to Her Majesty the Queen expressions of his great regard, and added words of confidence in me as Her Majesty's Ambassador and an old friend. This audience was entirely one of ceremony. On taking leave I mentioned that there were one or two matters on which I should like to speak to His Majesty, and he indicated that he would be pleased to discuss them at any time. On these I have reported separately.

4. Later I received an invitation to dine with His Majesty at his palace at Nasariyah, which he much prefers to his late father's palace where the afternoon's audience had taken place. The contrast between the two palaces is considerable, but to suggest that it exactly represents the differences between the old régime and the new would be misleading: forms and traditions change less rapidly than mere architectural fads. Nevertheless, the King's tastes are here at Nasariyah set out for all to see. Instead of the severities and murky passages of the palace of the old warrior King, here are plush-filled suites of rooms, garishly decorated in a style usually associated with the grosser kind of cinema. The late King was surrounded by desert with no greenery or flowers in sight. Nasariyah is set in a neon-lighted fairyland of gardens; a latter-day Ranelagh or Vauxhall; a "pleasure dome," perhaps. The only stateliness lies in the measured tread of the bearded and gowned King and his entourage. Even this is spoilt by the presence of straggling khaki-clad troops who appear not to know what to do with their rifles.

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5. After coffee and compliments, seated beside the swimming pool, we went into dinner, at which (as is the Arab custom) there was little conversation and much eating. The King is a good trencherman. There was talk of the recent rain and of the water prospects of the country, during the discussion of which the King referred to his "German experts" and his desire for the development of his country. He also spoke of his forthcoming trip to Hofuf, Dhahran, the northern frontiers and the Tapline road. Obviously as a courtesy he vaguely invited me to go with him, an invitation which, as was expected of me, I equally courteously declined. I know from other sources that the Arabian-American Oil Company are at their wits' end to know how to accommodate his vast retinue. After dinner and a wash at the plain wash-basins with running water which, together with show-cases of glass and plate, grace the walls of the banqueting hall, we retired to a smaller reception room whence, after the ceremonies of coffee, tea, incense and rose-water, I took my leave.

6. Soon after our arrival at Riyadh my wife and daughter went to pay their respects and offer condolences to Umm Talal (mother of Talal), the favourite wife of the late King. She appeared much changed and still deeply afflicted by the death of King Ibn Saud. However, when her official period of mourning is completed in two months' time she hopes to travel, and particularly to see the sights of London. That evening, my wife and daughter were entertained by the King's three wives in the harem at Nasariyah Palace. After I had

left the palace and after the ladies had dined, some sixty of them, the King paid them a visit, and I understand that his manner was very pleasant and informal. My wife tells me that the harem was an amazing collection of lavishly dressed and jewelled women and children, apparently well content with their existence. The Lebanese woman interpreter told her that they never quarrelled! In her presence many of them petitioned the King for money and jewels, requests which he benevolently dealt with by picking up a telephone and giving instructions.

7. The next morning, while I was again seeing the King, my wife and daughter toured Riyadh by motor-car. As in Jedda, there is a deal of new building in progress, including an ambitiously planned market area and a large new military hospital which was opened while we were in Riyadh. There were also two sets of well-built new barracks which would accommodate a brigade. There is of course besides this the inevitable mushroom growth of new palaces to accommodate the growing Royal family.

8. The King provided one of the Royal Flight of Dakota aircraft for my return journey to Jedda which was made on the afternoon of the 3rd of January.

9. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Head of the British Middle East Office and the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

I have, &c.

G. C. PELHAM.

ES 10345/1

No. 4

**THE ARRIVAL OF THE HONOURABLE GEORGE WADSWORTH AT
JEDDA ON JANUARY 3, 1954, TO ASSUME CHARGE OF THE
UNITED STATES EMBASSY**

Mr. Pelham to Mr. Eden. (Received January 27)

(No. 11. Confidential)

Jedda,

and Guard)

January 9, 1954.

Sir,

With reference to Sir Roger Makins's despatch No. 517 of the 31st of October last to you I have the honour to report that the Honourable George Wadsworth arrived at Jedda on the 3rd of January to assume charge of the Embassy of the United States. He called at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

the next day and is now awaiting the King's pleasure for the presentation of his letter of credence.

2. Mr. Wadsworth, with whom I had very friendly relations when he was Ambassador in Bagdad in 1946, paid an informal call on me as doyen on the evening of the 5th of January and stayed on to dinner. He informed me that his first duties would be

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to look into a Saudi proposal that the American Military Mission should train small mobile units rather than larger formations, and to see if the Saudi Arabian Government would join the World Bank. He was anxious to examine any Saudi plans of development such as the building of the Riyadh-Jedda railway or the resuscitation of the Hejaz railway. He realised that either of these projects might be uneconomical of themselves, but he had understood from the Saudi Ambassador in Washington that the King had plans to reduce the present waste of wealth and develop the country. There was the possibility that railways might run through mineral areas and that water could be found and oases expanded and developed. The United States had experience of building transport systems and then developing along them. The Foreign Operations Administration was exploring these possibilities. He thought that if Saudi Arabia joined the World Bank and straightened out its own finances there might be every

possibility of aiding the country with further financial facility and technical assistance.

3. However much one may discount Mr. Wadsworth's habitual exuberance, there would appear to be no doubt that the present policy of the United States Government is to hold and increase its interest in this country for strategical reasons and for the protection of oil production.

4. Mr. Wadsworth said that as far as the Buraimi and frontier dispute between the Saudis and ourselves was concerned he proposed, if the matter was raised, to say he understood that conversations were proceeding and that he hoped a speedy agreement would ensue.

5. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Washington, the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, and the Head of the British Middle East Office.

I have, &c.

G. C. PELHAM.

EA 1081/47

No. 5

SAUDI ARABIAN FRONTIER DISPUTE

Mr. Pelham to Mr. Eden. (Received January 30)

(No. 23. Confidential)
(Telegraphic)

Jedda,
January 29, 1954.

Frontier dispute.

I have received a long *aide-memoire* from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (text to you by bag on February 2) in the following terms:

1. The Saudi Arabian Government have learned that British Army Commanders from Bahrain and Sharjah, and the Political Officer and Royal Air Force Commander from Sharjah, visited Abdullah Bin Salim at Mahadha and gave him ten thousand rupees and a promise of thirty rifles within ten days.

2. Innocent people are being attacked and killed in the blockade and British cars have deported elders of Naim tribes from Buraimi on the pretext that they support the Saudi Arabian Government. It has been reported through an employee of the British Agency at Sharjah that the object of the actions at Buraimi is to put pressure on the Shawamis so that they may support the British Government, or so that the Emir of the Buraimi may withdraw, or be withdrawn, by the Saudi Arabian Government.

3. In view of this the Saudi Arabian Government inform the British Government frankly that they cannot tolerate the actions of those British forces any more. If the British Government truly desire understanding and friendship the means to that end is a change in behaviour of British forces in the area under dispute.

4. The Saudi Arabian Government have no greater desire than a just and equitable solution to this problem. But if the British Government insist upon

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their present attitude of force the Saudi Arabian Government will be obliged to take such action as will preserve their honour and sovereignty.

5. The Saudi Arabian Government therefore wish an early reply as to whether the British Government are willing to put an end to these affairs and enter into arbitration with a view to a settlement in accordance with their repeated promises. Continuation of the present situation is difficult to put up with.

6. The Saudi Arabian Government wish to inform their friends the British Government of the behaviour adopted by their officials on the spot, which tends to complicate the problem and obstruct the endeavours in hand.

EA 1118/1

No. 6

STATEMENT BY GOVERNMENT OF KUWAIT OF INCOME AND EXPENDITURE FOR 1953

Mr. Pelly to Mr. Eden. (Received February 6)

(No. 9. Confidential)
Sir,

Kuwait,

February 1, 1954.

I have the honour to transmit a confidential note which has been prepared by the Finance Department of the Government of Kuwait for the information of His Highness the Ruler. The note contains a statement of income and expenditure of the State for 1953, estimates the income for 1954 and makes proposals for its allocation.

2. The main items of income during 1953 have been:—

	Rupees	£
1. Kuwait Oil Company royalty payments	132,681,352	9,951,001
2. Income Tax on Kuwait Oil Company profits for 1952	666,459,560	49,987,167
3. Local Revenue (mainly customs)	12,805,421	960,407
4. Interest from Investment Board	5,293,566	397,017
Total	817,275,899	61,295,692

The main items of expenditure were:—

	Millions rupee	Millions £
Public Works Department	72	5.4
Purchase of Land and Property	80	6.0
Education Department	33	2.5
Security Department	11	.8
Post, Capital Expenditure	9	.7
Post, operation and maintenance (net)	9	.7
Electricity Department (net)	10	.75
Development Projects	272	20.4
Total	496	37.25

3. The expenditure on development projects is not shown in much detail, only the following items are given:—

	Millions rupee	Millions £
(i) Schools (for 9 months)	60	4.5
(ii) Labour and supervisory Staff Camps	40	3.0
(iii) Water Distillation Plant and Steam Power Station and Distribution Schemes for Water and Electricity (11 months)...	46	3.4
(iv) Dredging Contract (11 months)	10	.75
Total	156	11.65

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4. The income for 1954 which the Finance Department expect to be available to the State is 850 million rupees (£64 millions). This total does not include the very modest sum which is provided by the State for the expenses of the Ruler and his family. The Finance Department for tactical reasons would not presume to name a figure but in 1953 it amounted to about 5 million rupees or less than £500,000.

5. The Finance Department suggests the following allocation of expenditure for 1954:—

	Millions rupee	Millions £
<i>Ordinary Expenditure</i>		
Public Security	15	1.125
General Police and Sea Police	10	.75
Education	40	3.0
Health	28	2.1
Municipality	15	1.125
Law Courts	1	.075
Awqaf	3	.225
Finance Department	2	.15
Customs	2	.15
Operation of Water Distillation Plant	2	.15
Operation of Electricity Department... ..	5	.375
Administration of Development Projects	15	1.125
Administration, maintenance and minor works of the Public Works Department	50	3.75
Sundry Expenditure	2	.15
Total Ordinary Expenditure	190	14.25
	190	14.25
<i>Capital Expenditure</i>		
Development Projects	220	16.5
P.W.D. Major Works	70	5.25
Electricity Department, Capital works	20	1.5
Capital Improvement to Existing Port	5	.375
Purchase of Land and Property	35	2.625
	350	26.25
Reserves for unforeseen expenditure	70	5.25
Available for Investment	240	18.0
	850	63.75

6. In paragraph 1 (d) of the note the Finance Department have issued a warning that oil revenues may decline and have mentioned, among other reasons, the probability of renewal on a big scale of oil exports from Persia.

7. No indication is given in the note of the deprivations of the Subah family on the finances of the State. In fact in 1953 their income derived mainly from sales of land to the State which cost about £6 millions, though not quite all this went to the Shaikhs. They also benefited from works and buildings undertaken for them by the Public Works Department for which they are unlikely to pay. In the accounts of the Public Works Department there is an item "Sundry Debtors" which amounts to 11 million rupees for the first 11 months of 1953 and 7 million rupees under the same heading brought forward from 1952. Most of this total of £1.35 millions is due from the Shaikhs. One of the results of the reconciliation between Shaikh Fahad and Shaikh Abdullah Mubarak and the sections of the family which they lead is that the minor Shaikhs in Mubarak's following who were hitherto unwilling to come to Shaikh Fahad for favours are now coming forward with plans for new and improved palaces. However the amount of money involved is not great in relation to the total revenues of the State and is probably far less costly than the alternative, a revised and inflated civil list would be. Moreover, it is unlikely that Shaikhs receiving a share of a civil list would refrain from using Departmental facilities without paying. It is not possible to find out precisely

what the value of the free services obtained by the Shaikhs amounts to but at a rough guess it is unlikely to total more than £3 millions a year.

8. The American Independent Oil Company shipped their first consignment of oil from the Neutral Zone at the end of the year but during 1953 only the normal annual sum of \$625,000 was paid into the Ruler's account in the National City Bank of New York. The only drawings from this account have been small amounts on the credits established for the original equipment for the Distillation Plant. The balances in the bank amounts to \$8 millions and the Finance Department recommend that this growing balance should be invested in United States Treasury Bonds which, with no loss of security, would bring in a better rate of interest than the bank account.

9. I think the note indicates that despite the lack of strict budgetary control in Kuwait and the degree of waste and inefficiency which is manifest in the Public Works Department and Security Departments, expenditure in Kuwait is not getting out of hand, a satisfactory proportion of the revenue is being saved, and tangible advantages to the State are apparent for all to see.

10. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Political Resident, Bahrain, to the Head of the British Middle East Office in Fayid, and to the Head of the Development Division of the British Middle East Office in Beirut. I am also enclosing copies for transmission to other Departments of the Government in London.

I have, &c.

C. J. PELLY.

ES 10345/2

No. 7

PRESENTATION OF CREDENTIALS TO KING SAUD BY AMERICAN AMBASSADOR

Mr. Pelham to Mr. Eden. (Received February 10)

(No. 24. Confidential)
Sir,

Jedda,

February 3, 1954.

Mr. George Wadsworth, newly appointed American Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, presented his credentials to King Saud at Dhahran, seat of the headquarters of the Arabian-American Oil Company in this country, on the 9th of January. Rather than defer the ceremony until his return to Riyadh, the capital, the King granted the Ambassador an audience in the course of his current extensive tour of the north-east of the country, and Mr. Wadsworth thereafter took the opportunity to make a short tour of his own in the area. In this he had the help of the United States Consul-General at Dhahran and Military Mission at al-Kharj.

2. Mr. Wadsworth returned to Jedda after about two weeks and called on me the following day. In the course of conversation we elaborated the facts set out in my despatch No. 11 of the 9th of January concerning the military and economic development of this country.

3. According to the Ambassador, the general plan for establishment of the Saudi army up to now had been for three brigades of 5,000 men each. On that basis there were at present 5,000 men under training at Taif and about 1,500 at the big military centre at al-Kharj. But the Saudi Arabian Government had now put forward the new idea that there should instead be thirteen units of not more than 2,500 men each (some probably smaller). There had apparently been no decision as to where these units would be stationed, but the general idea was that they should be distributed at various points. Besides those in Taif and al-Kharj there were now prepared barracks in Dammam for 1,000 men (useful in case of further strikes by oil workers) and barracks nearly finished in Riyadh for another 1,000.

4. Even with this increase in accommodation, however, there would still not be enough for the total army now envisaged by the Saudi Government, which was 25,000 on a first five-year plan of expansion, with an eventual build-up to 50,000. Arrangements had therefore been made for Govengeo, the German public works

contractors now in this country, to extend the existing military centre at al-Kharj. This was originally laid down by Bechtels Incorporated and taken over by Michael Baker Incorporated. The new scheme would cost in all about U.S.\$35 millions, of which U.S.\$2½ millions had already been spent on lay-out and materials. It would take at least three years to complete, and the assembling and training of new troops would have to be co-ordinated with the progress of building. It appeared, however, that 2,000 were soon to be collected for training.

5. Mr. Wadsworth gave me some details of military building expansion in other directions. He said that the arms and ammunition factory installed by the French at al-Kharj would be completed and in production in two months time, when 168 Frenchmen were coming to run it. Annual production would work up to 5 million rounds of .30 and 2 million rounds of .50 rifle ammunition, besides 500,000 mortar shells. Sporting ammunition would also be turned out. In Riyadh a military hospital, staffed by German and Pakistani doctors, was ready, with among other things sumptuous suites for the Royal Family; and a military academy for training up to 600 officers, though no arrangements had yet been made for officer training and it was supposed that foreigners would have to be employed.

6. I had the impression that there was great enthusiasm on the part of the King and the Emir Mishaal, Minister of Defence, for the proposed new military organisation of the country. Mr. Wadsworth said he thought that the American Military Mission for their part were carrying out the training well: the Emir was co-operating, although he complained that he could not get enough money for all these projects out of Sheikh Abdullah Suleiman, the Minister of Finance, and found himself paying for things out of his own pocket. But he was persevering, and his interest extended also to the Saudi air force which was to be developed into three wings—training, light bomber and transport—and the navy which was to be merely a coastguard service.

7. Turning to economic affairs the Ambassador said that the King had expressed interest in the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, but there had only been vague talk about this. Naturally, however, although Mr. Wadsworth would look into the question and see what could be done, neither organisation would take any steps of their own accord to help the Saudi Government. He had apparently suggested that they should invite someone from the Fund to come and discuss with them the question of their joining it. But I sensed the probability that he was in fact prepared to go further, and might well himself suggest to the Fund's regional representative in Beirut that he should come down and talk to the Saudi Government. Mr. Wadsworth thought that if the Saudis shaped up to things the World Bank might participate in development projects that were on a sound basis, but they might not participate far enough. But what better, he thought, than that the Saudis should use their oil wealth for the improvement of their own country? He understood that the parent companies of the Arabian-American Oil Company had guaranteed a certain oil production for a period of eighteen years. He seemed to think that this was a sufficiently comfortable period on which to work, without going further into the future.

8. The King was very keen on all possible economic development projects, and wanted among other things both to build a railway from Riyadh to Medina and Jeddah and to reconstruct the old Hejaz railway—though the former had precedence in his mind because it was purely internal. My American colleague thought that even though the railways themselves might not be economical they might be a big ingredient in the development of a backward country with increasing oil wealth. Water could be found and put to use to develop agriculture wherever possible, and mineral wealth exploited. A great deal of money was being put into building of all kinds in Riyadh and the eastern part of the country, but there was still a tendency for individuals to invest money outside the country. With the scope provided by the railways this could be stopped.

9. In answer to my question after this recital, Mr. Wadsworth said that the King had not raised the subject of Buraimi with him. Sheikh Yusuf Yasin, the Deputy Foreign Minister, had mentioned it only to point out how badly the British were behaving and how highly the Saudi Government valued American friendship—which, as I said to my colleague, is a story that tends to be somewhat reversed when Sheikh Yusuf is speaking to me instead of to him. It is too early yet to expect Mr. Wadsworth to have formed his own opinion on the Saudis and on their attitude to the frontier dispute in particular. For a start he has shown great enthusiasm for

the intelligence of the Saudis he has met and my impression was that he had listened to a lot and seen a little and was vaguely enthusiastic about economic development. But it seemed to me that he had probably concentrated his attention more on ARAMCO as a prime American interest and wealth producer (he had had talks with all the top men, though he said little about this) and on the United States interest in Saudi military development, no doubt as part of American ideas of strategy in the defence of the Middle East.

10. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Washington, the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf and the Head of the British Middle East Office.

I have, &c.

G. C. PELHAM.

ES 1781/4

No. 8

REPORT ON THE PILGRIMAGE TO THE HOLY PLACES IN
THE HEJAZ IN 1953

Mr. Pelham to Mr. Eden. (Received February 26)

(No. 27. Restricted) Jeddah,
Sir, February 15, 1954.

I have the honour to transmit herewith my report on the pilgrimage to the holy places in the Hejaz in 1953 (corresponding to 1372 in the Moslem calendar).

2. I am sending a copy of this report to the Head of the British Middle East Office only. I shall be grateful if (as in previous years) you will arrange for any further distribution of the report which you may consider desirable.

I have, &c.

G. C. PELHAM.

Enclosure

Pilgrimage Report for 1953

In contrast to the confusion which preceded the 1952 pilgrimage and the administrative disorganisation which characterised it, the 1953 pilgrimage seemed to be well ordered and arranged. Certain arbitrary changes in pilgrimage dues were announced after many pilgrims had made their arrangements or left their homelands but these were inconsiderable. They were mostly designed to protect the mutawwifs (pilgrim guides), who persuaded the Government that their fees should be paid in riyals at a conversion rate of 10 riyals to the pound, to guard them against a weakening of sterling, but in the event the exchange rate did not go below 9.75 riyals to the pound. The first batch of Malayan pilgrims were the hardest hit since it was

not until after their arrival that the Saudi Government announced an increase of 50 riyals in the charges for the comprehensive service provided for Far Eastern pilgrims. This increase was claimed to be a correction of a misprint in the 1952 tariff.

2. As the pilgrimage time approached it became apparent that the much-vaunted quarantine station to the south of Jeddah which was to have been ready for the 1952 season would still not be open for the 1953 season. This, together with an unusually high rate of identified smallpox in Jeddah, gave rise to some fear of an epidemic. Fortunately the pessimists were to be disappointed.

3. This time there was in Jeddah itself much less evidence of the pilgrims, owing partly to the fact that sanitation nearly adequate for the purpose had been introduced into the pilgrim camp and overcrowding reduced by enlarging it. The principal reason, however, was the surfeit of transport available, which quickly cleared the pilgrimage traffic. A cartel of bus and car companies had replaced the monopoly previously held by the Arab Car Company. The dissolution of this latter company had created the possibility of competition between all those who felt capable of providing transport facilities but big business intervened and a powerful group of four firms combined and influenced the Government to promulgate a set of restrictive regulations which prescribed that only companies with large capital and large

numbers of vehicles should function. Fares identical to those charged by the Arab Car Company (though expressed in riyals) were fixed, and the element of competition thus reduced. Sheikh Mohamed Suroor, the President of the Haj Committee informed a member of this embassy that the high charges were designed to encourage the transport companies to import an adequate number of buses and that the fares would be reduced in future years. There was certainly enough transport this year but it remains to be seen whether the Government will force the transport ring to reduce fares. This profitable business can be judged from the following figures:—

Mecca and Return Off-Season Pilgrims		(Riyals)	
Bus or truck	...	4	22½
Taxi	...	8	45

4. There were two interesting examples of Government interference in the transport business. One company wishing to attract customers to their Medina service included therein a free conducted tour of the holy places in that city. Competitors branded this as unfair competition and contrived to have the scheme scotched. The second instance was when the cameleers, finding that they could not compete with mechanised transport, petitioned the Government to assist them. The result was an order giving camels first option on all pilgrim baggage being carried between Jedda and Mecca. Some pilgrims were thus permanently separated from their belongings while the more fortunate spent only one or two days separated from them.

5. Arrangements for the reception of pilgrims at both the port and the airport were greatly improved in 1953. There was surprisingly little delay in disembarkation. Pilgrims were quickly claimed by their mutawwifs and whisked away to the pilgrim camps to be charged and documented. Within an average of two days they were in Mecca. At the airport the different airline agents were made responsible for transport to the pilgrim camp and there was little congestion. The normal airlift of pilgrims to Jedda was very late in starting. By the beginning of August only Aden Airways, who had made extensive preparations for a better-than-ever pilgrimage, had brought any pilgrims in. It was feared that there might be a recurrence of the trouble of the previous year, when a last minute rush of pilgrims was too much for the available

aircraft. However, the optimistic forecasts of the airline operators were wrong. Instead of an expected 30,000 air pilgrims there were only some 19,000, a reduction of about 25 per cent. compared with 1952. The number of pilgrims arriving by ship, however, increased to about 115,000 as compared with 111,000 in 1952.

6. Of the nationalities which normally provide the largest contingents of pilgrims Egypt's total fell by over 40 per cent. to about 22,000, Sudan's by 30 per cent. to about 6,400, Syria's by about 30 per cent. to 3,500, Pakistan's by over 20 per cent. to about 13,000 and India's by over 10 per cent. to about 9,000. The Lebanese and Iranian contingents were halved at about 850 and 1,700 respectively, and the Siamese quartered at about 1,400. North African pilgrims marginally decreased in the region of 7,500 while pilgrims from Iraq and the Hadhramant were slightly more numerous at about 2,800 and 3,700 respectively. Turkey, Yemen, Indonesia and Malaya all registered increases of about 10, 15, 20 and 25 per cent. respectively. The Trucial States and Persian Gulf Sheikdoms, however, which in previous years have provided only small numbers of pilgrims, were able to double their figures in general, while Qatar pilgrims numbered 374 as against 20 in the previous year.

7. The perennial problem of illicit entry by West African pilgrims seems to be dying. After the Saudi Arabian Government renounced their share of the pilgrims dues in 1952 the attraction of the illicit route was reduced. This year the Government announced drastic punishments for dhow owners caught smuggling pilgrims. This was doubtless a deterrent, though none were apprehended. While it seems certain that illicit entries will continue so long as Red Sea dhow owners are prepared to run the risk of being caught and illiterate West Africans are gullible enough to accept their services, it is now hoped that the previous steady stream will be reduced to a trickle. The only indication of the volume of this traffic is the number of West Africans to whom British Emergency Certificates are issued for their return journey. Since few of these West Africans remain for only a single pilgrimage (which is understandable in view of the rigours of the trans-continental trek which most of them undertake) this counting of heads gives only a delayed-action idea of the traffic. It is most encouraging to note, however, that while

about 4,300 Emergency Certificates were issued after the 1952 pilgrimage the total for this year is unlikely to be more than about 1,200. This is partly due to the Government's decision to renounce their share of the pilgrimage dues.

8. In July the Crown Prince, who had again been entrusted by his father with the overall supervision of the pilgrimage, formed an advisory committee of officials from all the departments concerned with the administration of the pilgrimage. This committee met a few times, first under the chairmanship of the Minister of Finance and subsequently under Mohamed Suroor, and discussed a number of minor administrative points, but it does not appear to have met again after the pilgrimage to consider possible improvements.

9. By the 18th of August, except for the bank of workmen and officials preparing for reception of General Neguib, Jedda wore the aspect of a ghost town; shops were closed, and Government offices deserted. Many of the growing European and American community, while enjoying the strange silence of the town and wondering at the comparative coolness of the weather, had to grapple with their own domesticities or hire bad substitute servants whose cupidity exceeded their religious zeal.

10. At Mecca, Arafat, Muna and Muzdalafa the religious rites were performed by some 300,000 of the faithful, 50,000 less than last year. Arafat day was on the 19th of August and fortunately the weather was fine and not too hot (by Arabian standards) for the whole week. The scenes of mass prayer and swarming crowds so often described were repeated. The congestion on the roads was not so great as that of last year; the traffic system had been improved and the Royal Family and their retinues were well engaged in their self-appointed task of traffic policemen. One-way roads, tarmac (in places), and a better realisation of the problems presented by crowd movements, combined to render the customary confusion less chaotic. Again the supply of water was adequate, though the price was inevitably high. Victims of sunstroke were reasonably sure of receiving first aid from one of the medical teams present, all of which were provided with sufficient ice. The medical missions from Pakistan, India, Egypt, Indonesia, Malaya and the Sudan were each well above the efficiency level of the teams

provided by the Saudis. Though each mission tried to treat its own nationals before foreigners, the contingents from each country became in most cases so scattered that the sick were generally taken to the nearest doctor, and the doctors themselves soon gave up national discrimination.

11. At Muna the Crown Prince kept up the custom of receiving notables who had come on the pilgrimage. This year these were few apart from President Neguib and his retinue, and some minor notables from Malaya and Nigeria. It is difficult to imagine a pilgrimage in modern times without some attempt at political propaganda. This year it was from the Egyptians who brought a supply of glue and posters of the photogenic General. Few pilgrims can have left without seeing the General's face plastered on dozens of Mecca walls but the delivery of the prepared speeches was lost to most in the hurly-burly of their religious duties. A few heard the President speak from a balcony in Mecca. Only one paper, the *Medina Journal* edited by an "anti-Imperialist" Egyptian, reported any of the Egyptian tirades against Western nations.

12. The departure of pilgrims both by sea and by air started on the 26th of August. For a few days the pace was comparatively slow, as many pilgrims had gone to Medina after, rather than before, Arafat Day and there was no initial wild rush to be away. There was little trouble with shipping and air companies since the pilgrims in most cases realised that their departure was planned and they would be taken away in their turn. The transport companies made every effort to ensure that schedules were maintained and that pilgrims were informed of arrangements through their leaders. Departing pilgrims were in general kept away from Jedda until transport was available for them. Congestion at the Consular Section of this embassy or the shipping offices was thus avoided. One ship returning to Turkey was superficially damaged by pilgrims who "mutinied" against the conditions on board. They had to travel home the rest of the way under worse conditions, as they had damaged their own quarters. As usual it was the Far Eastern pilgrims who lingered longest. The Indonesians were the last to leave owing to the loss of a ship, but fortunately no lives, a few hours out of Djakarta. By the end of November all was quiet except for angry buzzes from the Saudi Arabian Ministry of Health.

13. The return pilgrimage arrangements were at one time thrown right out of gear through an Egyptian ship reporting that a case of smallpox, forced on to the ship by Saudi quarantine doctors, had infected fellow-passengers who had fallen sick by the dozen on arrival at the Egyptian quarantine station at el-Tor. The Lebanese Government immediately enforced a compulsory three-day quarantine period for returning pilgrims, and other Governments introduced similar measures. All planes from Jedda to Cairo were obliged to land at el-Tor to disembark passengers. The Turkish Government called for action to be taken at once. In Jedda the pessimists awaited a plague. The Saudis took the precaution of fitting up two rooms at the quarantine station and installing there several persons who had spots on their faces. This, however, was the worst of the scare. Shortly afterwards news came through that the "smallpox" was merely a form of heat rash. But it was not until the 12th of January, 1954, that the Saudi Arabian Ministry of Health published the long promised denial of the charges which had been made against them. A copy of this official denial is attached. It is certain that the Ministry of Health was much worried and the scare they received may accelerate completion of the quarantine station. While the structure is complete and water and sewage lines have been laid, the water supply is not yet adequate and there is no adequate provision for a power supply, nor, apparently, has any move been made to staff the buildings. If the station is to be ready for the 1954 season the Ministry will have to work fast. There is just a chance that they will do so.

Annex

The Saudi Arabian Ministry for Foreign Affairs present their compliments to the British Embassy and have the honour to inform them that, despite the statement issued by the regional office of the World Health Organisation in Alexandria which confirmed that no cases of smallpox were identified among the returning pilgrims, and despite the repeated statements by the Saudi Arabian health authorities to the same effect, reports are still being received from some States that cases of smallpox are being identified among their nationals.

The Saudi Arabian Ministry of Health announce the following in support of truth and fact:—

(1) The Saudi Arabian health authorities received no reports of any cases of smallpox or any other epidemiological disease amongst pilgrims while they were on Saudi soil.

(2) None of the medical missions which accompanied the pilgrims from some countries have reported any cases of smallpox.

(3) After completion of the pilgrimage the Saudi Arabian Ministry of Health (acting on the negative reports to hand) announced that the pilgrimage was free of epidemics.

(4) On 29/12/72 (corresponding to September 9, 1953) the Saudi Arabian health authorities were informed by the regional office of the World Health Organisation at Alexandria that eighteen cases of smallpox had been identified among returning pilgrims at el-Tor quarantine station.

(5) On 3/1/73 (corresponding to September 12, 1953) the Saudi Arabian Ministry of Health wrote to the regional office asking for details of these cases and afterwards despatched a telegram suggesting that the cases were not smallpox but rather some other disease.

(6) The regional office sent a telegram to the Saudi Arabian Ministry of Health on 8/1/73 (corresponding to September 17, 1953), stating that the number of smallpox cases at el-Tor had reached 317.

(7) In view of the seriousness of the situation, and since, up to that date, no cases of smallpox had occurred among the pilgrims before leaving Jedda on their return journey, the Saudi Arabian Ministry of Health could only send a telegram to the regional office refuting the accusation that smallpox had broken out among the pilgrims and asking that a technical committee should be sent to el-Tor to examine the patients and make a full enquiry.

(8) The regional office arranged for an international technical committee to proceed to el-Tor to investigate.

(9) Some States had taken precautionary measures after the announcement by the regional office which they refused to cancel even when it became evident that none of their own pilgrims were returning with the disease.

(10) On October 10, 1953, the Saudi Arabian Ministry of Health received a telegram from the regional office. The text was: "The cases formerly identified as

smallpox by Egypt and which had consequently been isolated at el-Tor are now ascertained not to be smallpox."

(11) In the experience of the doctors of the Saudi Arabian Ministry of Health, pilgrims from the northern States often contract skin diseases brought on by the hot weather of the summer months and it is likely that the health authorities of some States identified these skin diseases as smallpox. The announcement from Egypt may have encouraged this, thought the international technical committee proved that the announcement was ill-founded.

(12) The Saudi Arabian Ministry of Health confirms that there were no cases of smallpox or any other disease among the pilgrims between their times of arrival in and departure from the Holy Land.

(13) The weekly international statistical reports issued by the regional office of the World Health Organisation in Alexandria mention no cases of smallpox occurring in any zone of the Republic of Turkey after September 1953, *i.e.*, the date on which pilgrims started to return to their countries.

(14) On the other hand, there was no call for exceptional action to be taken by the

Saudi Arabian Government in accordance with Article 14,⁽¹⁾ as was stated in paragraph 2 of the note sent by the Turkish Ministry for Foreign Affairs to the Saudi Arabian Legation at Ankara.

(15) The Saudi Arabian Ministry of Health regret the actions of some Arab States of the Islamic world which are still submitting notes to the Saudi Arabian Government about the appearance of smallpox among their pilgrims, despite the declaration of the regional office at Alexandria that no cases of smallpox have been identified among the pilgrims.

(16) The Saudi Arabian Ministry of Health maintain that they carry out their duties towards all Moslem pilgrims in a manner designed to safeguard their health and protect them from epidemic diseases which might break out among those coming from various parts of the world where endemic diseases exist or break out in epidemic form.

The Ministry takes this opportunity of renewing to the British Embassy the assurance of their high consideration.

(1) Presumably Article A 14 of Annex A to International Sanitary Regulations adopted by the World Health Assembly (Cmd. 8394).

EA 1081/125

No. 9

SAUDI ARABIAN FRONTIER DISPUTE

Mr. Pelham to Mr. Eden. (Received March 8)

(No. 60. Confidential)
(Telegraphic)

Jedda,
March 7, 1954.

My telegram No. 50: Frontier Dispute.

During a conversation the other day with the Minister in charge of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs an opportunity arose for me to deprecate this publicity.

2. The Minister has since handed me an aide-mémoire in the following terms:—

The Saudi Arabian Government regret that they should be compelled to publish such communiqués, but deplore the continued daily aggressions by British Government officials in the disputed area at the very time when proposals for a solution have been submitted to the Saudi Arabian Government. If the British Government do not wish such aggressive acts to be published, they should stop them; and if the truth of Saudi complaints is doubted, the Saudi Arabian Government are still prepared to send a joint investigation committee to prove the facts, provided that the British undertake openly to punish offenders.

3. The aide-mémoire states that the Saudi Arabian Government intends to reply to our new proposals.

FS 1371/1

No. 10

REPORT ON A TOUR OF THE PERSIAN GULF COASTAL AREA OF SAUDI ARABIA

Mr. Pelham to Mr. Eden

(No. 40 E. Restricted)
Sir,

*Jedda,
March 14, 1954.*

In the course of his tour of the Persian Gulf coastal area of Saudi Arabia (on which I have reported in my despatch No. 38 E. of to-day's date) my Commercial Secretary was able to see something of present conditions on the American-built railway from Riyadh to Dammam, and at the port of Dammam.

2. Mr. Heath travelled in a Budd railcar, a single diesel-driven carriage, very clean inside and fitted with a small refreshment bar (without any alcohol, of course). The occupants of the car were about 60 per cent. Saudi and the rest Levantine. This is the luxury car and pride of the railway, but the bedouin travelling in it had obviously grown accustomed to the novelty and some of them squatted amiably on the seats. The inferior passenger train which the car passed some way down the line consisted of ancient railway carriages formerly belonging to the New Haven Railroad and was packed with passengers, soldiers acting as guards to stop pilfering. It had second and third-class compartments, but in deference to Arab democracy the only difference between them was the fare.

3. The journey itself was not particularly interesting. From time to time the desert would change colour from dirty grey to bright yellow, and back again, and it was interesting to see that the sand was kept from piling up over the railway track through oil being sprayed on either side of it which when hardened gave sand no purchase. Some wind-breaks and dykes against floods were also to be seen, but not much else except sand. At each neat little desert station was to be seen a tall very-high-frequency radio mast, part of the railway telecommunication system costing \$1½ millions which had to be installed because it was found that sand particles in the air created too much static electricity if normal line signalling was used.

4. At each stop for the first two of the nine hours which the 350-mile journey took, Mr. Heath's passport (but not ticket) was solemnly inspected. At Haradh, where the late King Ibn Saud ordered every through train to stop so that the faithful could pray for half an hour, the train duly stopped but no one got out to pray. Otherwise the line certainly did not seem to merit the title of "the strangest railroad on earth" given to it in a recent article in the *Saturday Evening Post*. It was a quick, efficient and on the whole comfortable journey. It is of course understandable that the Saudis should be proud of their railway; and though Americans still manage it for the Government most of the operating personnel (including the drivers) are Saudi. Its revenue in 1952 was about \$6 millions, as against expenses of \$8 millions; but the administration claim that in 1953 revenue actually exceeded operating expenses by about 6 per cent. (without allowing for depreciation).

5. The railway administration also control the operation of Dammam port. They appear to be doing satisfactory work, though unfortunately from the point of view of British interests there is no love lost between the administration and Gray, Mackenzie and Company, who from their Dammam office handle most of the British shipping through the port. The pier is generally congested at peak commercial seasons, the average monthly import cargo shipping over the past two years being more than 23,000 tons, as against a theoretical pier capacity of only 10,000 tons. The main reason for this is the mass of material imported for the Arabian-American Oil Company and for the Royal Family in Riyadh. As usual, no statistics are available, but one railway official estimated that 60 per cent. of this material was from Europe (of which only a small proportion was from the United Kingdom), 35 per cent. from the United States, and 5 per cent. from the Far East.

6. The average time taken between arrival at the pier and clearance through customs in slack seasons seems to be generally about ten days, and two more days are needed for transport to Riyadh. At busy times, however, goods may not be

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cleared for weeks. Demurrage is not basically high, but there are various impositions which can easily mount up alarmingly if a clearing agent in Dammam is not energetic in collecting goods. The pier itself seems well enough run: two ships were berthed alongside when Mr. Heath inspected it—one Dutch and the other British—though the latter disappointingly had German Hansa Line markings and was unloading Egyptian cement.

7. The American executives in the railway and port administration, despite their vigorous running of the system for the Saudi Government, have their troubles with the local authorities, who are anxious to replace the Americans with their own men. But in its present early stages the system certainly needs the expert hands of the Americans on it, and it is doubtful if the Saudi Government will yield prematurely to the self-interest of their own local officials in this regard.

8. I am copying this despatch to the Political Resident at Bahrain and the Head of the British Middle East Office.

I have, &c.

G. C. PELHAM.

ES 10171/1

No. 11

FIRST SESSION IN THE NEW REIGN OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

Mr. Pelham to Mr. Eden

(No. 42)
Sir,

*Jedda,
March 14, 1954.*

On the 7th of March the first session of the Council of Ministers in the new reign was convened in Riyadh. Before the meeting there had been a military review and tribal dancing in which both the King and the Crown Prince took part. The royal party then went up to the Council Chamber where, besides the Ministers and sundry advisers, there were present the Egyptian Ambassador, the Italian and Turkish Ministers (who were presenting their credentials) and an Iraqi Press delegation who happened to be in Riyadh at the time. After a lengthy reading from the Koran by the Grand Qadi the Speech from the Throne was delivered by Sheikh Yusuf Yasin, the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, and in the following paragraphs I have the honour to give the substance of it shorn of its crop of pieties.

2. The first subject was foreign policy. King Saud affirmed his intention of following his father's footsteps, and declared that his first interest would be to work for Arab unity through the Arab League and in accordance with its Covenant. He stressed the already existing cordiality between the Islamic States, and singled out for special mention Jordan and Pakistan. We all knew, the speech continued, of "that cancerous growth planted in the Middle East," the perpetrator of "the worst crimes in the history of the world": Israel was a threat not only to her neighbours but to Islam itself (which of course carries the implication that war with Israel would be "jihad" or holy war). Elsewhere, the general policy of Saudi Arabia would be to work for an improvement in her political relations with all countries. There then followed the reference to the frontier dispute with Her Majesty's Government which I quoted in my telegram No. 63 of the 11th of March and in which His Majesty expressed his hope of an early settlement.

3. The speech went on to refer to the Budget, the preparation of which is to be the main task of the present meeting of the Council of Ministers. A major item of expenditure would be for the army, especially on technical training and in purchasing modern weapons: there would also be an increase in manpower. There was brief mention of the work of the other Departments. Education would concentrate primarily on religious instruction; agriculture would not neglect the possibility of exports; and communications would concentrate on the planned railways. It was interesting in this latter context to note that first place was given to the proposed line that will link Riyadh, Jedda and Mecca, and the much publicised Hejaz railway had only a passing mention. Furthermore, it is intended that road development shall wait till later.

4. It is envisaged that the development projects for the country will eventually take the form of a five-year plan. Certainly the speech emphasised that the King

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has the welfare of his people very much at heart. It mentioned the arrangements His Majesty made for moving a number of tribesmen into the towns after the rains had failed in the desert. This may be a charitable action: but it is also rumoured that most of the tribesmen concerned are Nejdīs through whom the King hopes to strengthen his support in the towns of the Hejaz. There is no mistaking the felicitous effect on the tribal mass in Riyadh of his joining in their sword-dancing as his father in his younger days did before him.

5. Perhaps the most significant part of the address was that concerned with the financial workings of the Government and the changes proposed. The increasing complexity of governmental machinery demanded that the former scope of the Ministry of Finance should be curtailed somewhat. Such a burden would have been too great for a fully-staffed organisation, let alone a single person or a small group of individuals. The Ministry would in future work within the terms of the Budget. In order to "ensure the accurate conduct" of this Ministry, the Council of Ministers will have annexed to it an Accountancy Division whose Controller-General will supervise all State income and expenditure. The creation of this new post is being generally interpreted as another step towards stripping the Minister of Finance, Sheikh Abdullah Sulaiman, of some of his power, in favour of Mohammed Surur, Financial Adviser to the King, who may well get the post of Controller-General.

6. It is difficult at the moment to deduce much from this speech about the King's intentions. We have learnt so many anodyne expressions from him in the past that it is hard to credit him with much sincerity now; and palace politics and ministerial intrigues inevitably cloud the issue. But behind the new financial proposals, at least as they appear to me, lies the growing realisation (outlined in by Economic Reports over the past year) that something must be done about the chaotic financial state of the country if any large project is ever to be carried through. The next step will be the new Budget upon which so many hopes are being placed; eye-witness observers report that work on this was going on in earnest in Riyadh. It will be a bitter disappointment to the Finance Minister if he is not to be allowed the principal finger in this pie, and he is said to have looked thoroughly dejected in Riyadh. This may be the beginning of the end for him; yet it seems to remain generally recognised that with his vast store of experience he still has his uses.

7. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Political Resident at Bahrain, the Head of the British Middle East Office in Fayid, and Her Majesty's Ambassador at Washington.

I have, &c.

G. C. PELHAM.

EA 1011/1

No. 12

PERSIAN GULF: ANNUAL REVIEW FOR 1953

Mr. Burrows to Mr. Eden. (Received March 22)

(No. 30. Confidential)
Sir,

*Bahrain,
March 12, 1954.*

I have the honour to submit a report on the main political events in the Persian Gulf in 1953. I did not myself arrive in the Gulf until the end of July so that my personal impressions are limited to the second half of the year.

2. The main events of the year were concerned with the impact of vast new wealth on Kuwait, the dispute with Saudi Arabia over the frontiers of the Trucial States and Muscat, the general increase in oil production and in the profits derived by the Persian Gulf Shaikhdoms from their oil, the search

for oil in territories where it had not previously been found and the first beginnings of economic development sponsored by Her Majesty's Government in the Trucial States.

General

3. The remarkable multiplication of material benefits which the Gulf continued to enjoy during the year derives almost exclusively from oil and the shaikhdoms have enjoyed an increased prosperity as a result of both the discovery and exploitation of further sources of oil and of increased output and profits from sources already existing. Of the new sources discovered

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during the year the most important is the Wafra field in the Kuwait-Saudi Neutral Zone. The American Independent Oil Company, carrying out exploration both on its own behalf and on behalf of the Pacific Western Oil Company, the holders of a concession from Ibn Saud in respect of his undivided half-share in the oil in the zone, struck oil in April in commercial quantities and the first shipload was exported from the territory in the last few days of the year. Later in the year the Iraq Petroleum Company associate drilling at Murban, south-west of Abu Dhabi, also struck oil. Though they have not at present committed themselves on the nature of the field, the indications are consistent with there being oil in commercial quantities quite close and there is of course much excitement in the shaikhdom. The same associate of the Iraq Petroleum Company has taken up an exploration concession for Fujairah and a comprehensive concession for the sea-bed area of Sharjah, while a subsidiary of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company has taken up from Shaikh Shakhbut of Abu Dhabi the sea-bed concession abandoned in 1952 by the Superior Oil Company. Thus the only area on the southern and western shore of the Gulf in respect of which no concession has as yet been granted is the sea-bed area of Kuwait and the Kuwait-Saudi Neutral Zone. The expansion of the existing sources of oil and the corresponding expansion in the incomes of the shaikhdoms from this and other sources is shown by the following figures:—

		Oil production (^{'000} tons)	Oil revenue (^{'000} Rupees)	Customs revenue (^{'000} Rupees)
<i>Bahrain—</i>				
A.D.	A.H.			
	1370	...	15,339	8,165
1951	1371	1,479	20,101	9,732
1952	1372	1,471	24,043	10,544
1953 (estimate)		1,344
<i>Kuwait—</i>				
1951		27,783
1952		37,042	93,996	9,152
1953		40,000	778,002	12,000
<i>Qatar—</i>				
1370		...	7,053	...
1951		2,246
1952	1371	3,225	34,531	...
	1373	...	41,885	...
1953 (estimate)		3,839

4. The expansion of production in Kuwait, Qatar and Saudi Arabia resulted in a continued demand for labour in the

northern parts of the Gulf. Thus the year saw a continuation of the movement of population from Oman into the Trucial Coast and thence northwards and westwards to Qatar, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. It is estimated in Muscat that over the past few years as many as 100,000 men have been drawn out of Oman by the attraction of the high wages to be earned in the oil-producing States to the north. Another consequence of this demand for labour was the continuation of the tendency of wages to rise. The goods on which the poorer classes wish to spend their money, food, piece-goods and clothing, radios, watches, thermos flasks, &c., are all in ready supply and prices, being mainly dependent on factors outside the Gulf, have not risen in anything like the same proportion as wages. Thus there has been an absolute rise in the standard of living throughout the Gulf.

Kuwait

5. Kuwait received far greater revenue than ever before, the total for the year amounting to over £61 million (of which practically £60 million were from oil). This was due partly to increased rates for profit for Kuwait arising from the conclusion of the 50/50 agreement in December 1951, partly from a sweeping rise in production following on the closing down of Persian oil exports. The possession of this unprecedented wealth caused attention to be turned on Kuwait not only in the rest of the Middle East, where those countries without oil thought it only right that they should share in the benefits of that of Kuwait which could surely not be absorbed by a population of a mere 200,000 or so, but also in the United Kingdom where some of the British contractors who were engaged in the public works development programme in Kuwait, and later the Government departments concerned, began to view with alarm the apparent lack of control over Kuwait's administration and expenditure. It is true that the acquisition of this great wealth imposed for a time an intolerable strain on the extremely rudimentary administration of the State and at the same time inflated the self-importance of members of the Shaikh's family to such an extent that they were very impatient of even such slender controls as existed over their personal power and finances. At the beginning of the year the development programme was largely under the control of General Hasted, who had been engaged at

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the end of 1951 by the Kuwait Government, while Colonel Crichton, a former member of the Indian political service, was trying to organise the Finance Department. In March Shaikh Fahad, a half-brother of the Ruler, who was in charge of the Municipality, the Health Department and the Public Works Department and chairman of the Development Board, bending to the pressure of those Kuwaitis who were not sharing in the profits of the British contractors and irritated by General Hasted's high-pressure approach, appointed a Syrian, Majduddin Jabri, who had formerly been Mayor of Aleppo, to the post of Chief Engineer in the Public Works Department. After considerable skirmishing between him and General Hasted and Colonel Crichton—the two last-named unfortunately making it perfectly clear that they were on opposite sides of every available fence—Jabri emerged as, in practice, the head of the Public Works and Development Organisation, while General Hasted was relegated more and more to a technical advisory rôle. It was these developments which touched off the excitement of the British contractors and led via parliamentary questions to a general feeling in London that Kuwait was on the way to being "another Abadan." A more realistic danger was that Kuwait might follow in the footsteps of Saudi Arabia whose roughly similar oil revenues are handled or mishandled by a similarly rudimentary administration. The remedy to which Her Majesty's Government devoted their efforts was to attempt to persuade the Ruler to appoint a British adviser on the same lines as Sir Charles Belgrave in Bahrain. This proposal was pressed on Shaikh Abdullah al Salim by the Prime Minister during his visit to London for Her Majesty's Coronation. It was also the principal item in my instructions as regards Kuwait when I first came to the Gulf to back up this approach and make a further effort to secure the Ruler's agreement. But all these attempts were unsuccessful. The most the Ruler would say was that he understood the difficulties and would try to deal with them in his own way. He hinted, with characteristic ambiguity and obscurity, that if his own efforts failed he might turn to us.

6. In fact the course of events during the rest of the year allowed of a somewhat calmer appreciation of what was really going on in Kuwait, and the right conclusion seemed to be that, while serious

dangers abounded, our essential interests were not in immediate jeopardy.

7. Neither the Ruler nor any other responsible Kuwaiti showed any wish to break their political association with Her Majesty's Government. Indeed, by asking for our assistance in negotiating with the Iraqi Government for the supply of water from the Shatt-el-Arab to Kuwait and over the ownership of islands off the Kuwait-Saudi Neutral Zone which are also claimed by Saudi Arabia, the Kuwait Government gave practical evidence of their dependence on us for their foreign relations. On the debit side it must be recorded that the Kuwaitis gave further evidence during the year of their susceptibility to criticism from the rest of the Arab world, particularly as regards trade with Israel. Evidence was also forthcoming that the indefinite continuance of the present judicial arrangements under which we have jurisdiction over the majority of non-Arabs could not necessarily be taken for granted. After a number of attempts by the Kuwaiti Administration to circumvent this separate jurisdiction in practice the Ruler, just before the end of the year, proposed that in the future all cases in which a Kuwaiti was involved should be tried before his courts. The importation of further large numbers of school-teachers from Egypt and the rest of the Arab world boded no good for the political education of the Kuwaitis of the next generation.

8. On the financial side the basic essentials were that Kuwait showed no signs of wishing to change the arrangements by which the oil revenue is paid in sterling and which imply Kuwait's membership of the sterling area; the allocation of revenue between current expenditure, reserves, and development was made in reasonable proportions, though there was inevitably a considerable waste on the first and last of these items. The reserve funds were invested in British securities on the advice of an Investment Board sitting in London. The chief weakness was the Ruler's unwillingness to control the members of his family and particularly Shaikh Fahad and Shaikh Abdullah Mubarak, the head of Public Security, and his failure to impose strict budgetary control of their expenditure as was being continuously recommended to him by the Finance Department. Nevertheless, a beginning was made in establishing a budgetary system, and the State continued to live well within its income.

9. On the contracting and development side the most noteworthy development, apart from the appointment of Jabri, which has already been mentioned, was the institution, largely on his advice, of the rule that all future contracts for large-scale development projects would be given on the basis of fixed price competitive tenders rather than on the cost plus basis which had been in force hitherto. The first work to be put out to tender on this basis is the projected new port. The "Big 5" British contractors had a further serious grievance in that they were not allowed to tender for this contract. After considerable argument the Ruler of Kuwait maintained this decision but said he would give British contractors some preference over contractors from other countries. The final list of firms entitled to tender had not been drawn up by the end of the year. In spite of all the argument to which it gave rise the development work proceeded apace and towards the end of the year, with some of the new schools approaching completion, the distillation plant in partial operation and a growing mileage of new roads, the peak of chaos appeared to have been passed and there could be no doubt in anyone's mind that the Kuwaitis were beginning to acquire some, at least, of the essentials of a new way of life. The planning for future development work has not proceeded at the same speed, and there may for this reason be some recession in the extraordinarily high recent level of activity.

The Frontier Dispute

10. Our other main preoccupation last year was the frontier dispute with Saudi Arabia. When the year opened we had reached a deadlock. In return for our having prevented the Sultan of Muscat from forcibly ejecting Turki from Buraimi we had succeeded in concluding with the Saudis yet another standstill agreement, whereby we agreed to Turki's continued presence in Hamasa pending the settlement of the question of the frontier on condition that he did not engage in political activity. This condition he of course disregarded and throughout last winter our position steadily deteriorated as he suborned more and more of the tribes with the unlimited money at his command. Eventually it was decided that we must take some decisive action both to restrict Turki's activities and to bring the dispute to a settlement. The Trucial Oman Levies were doubled in size and in April we informed the Saudis that in view of Turki's

abuse of the standstill agreement of the previous October we reserved our liberty of action in the area under dispute. At the same time we moved our forces up to the western limits of the territory which we claim for the Ruler of Abu Dhabi and imposed a blockade on the village of Hamasa. The effects of this long-awaited positive action were immediately beneficial. Our prestige on the Trucial Coast rose while Turki's correspondingly declined and the Saudi Government agreed in principle to the submission of the dispute to arbitration. There then ensued a further prolonged tussle with them regarding the practical arrangements to be made on the spot pending the outcome of the arbitration proceedings. We made two proposals for the regulation of matters on the ground: first we offered to raise the blockade of Hamasa and to permit Turki to receive supplies, leaving him and our own forces in position on the ground. When this was rejected we made a further proposal that both sides withdraw their troops from the disputed area and that there should be a return to the standstill agreement of 1951. This offer, too, was rejected by the Saudis who, after some delay, countered with a proposal of their own that both sides should withdraw their troops from the disputed area, replacing them with a combined police force consisting of fifteen men from each side to be located somewhere in the Buraimi Oasis. We accepted this proposal in principle and at the end of the year it began to look as if arbitration might soon be brought about.

The Trucial States

11. The first small steps were taken during the year in the development of the Trucial Coast. It was remarked by Sir Roger Makins in his report in 1952 that we could not run the Gulf on the cheap and that the maintenance of our position here would require the expenditure of money. This fact was brought home to us by the significant volume of sympathy which the Saudis appeared in the early part of this year to be winning in the towns of the Trucial Coast other than Abu Dhabi. The Ruler of Dubai and his son had for some time been known to be well disposed to the Saudis, while the arrival of Turki and his men in Hamasa was welcomed by the merchants of Dubai. Also the dislike of the Ruler of Ajman for the Naim of the Interior predisposed him to look kindly on the enemies of the latter. Such special considerations apart, however, the Arab's

respect for power effectively wielded led to a rise in the prestige of the Saudis with a corresponding drop in ours. It was therefore decided that something should be done to demonstrate in a concrete way the benefits of the special relation of the shajkdoms with Her Majesty's Government. A doctor was procured from the R.A.F. and despatched to Buraimi to provide the medical treatment for the tribes previously supplied by Turki's Syrian doctors and now denied by our blockade. £5,000 was devoted to the construction of a school in Sharjah and a small sum allocated for the purchase of equipment for the Dubai Hospital. In addition surveys were made of the creeks of Sharjah and Dubai and of the potential water resources of the Trucial Coast. A further sum of money has been promised for the next financial year, chiefly for the discovery and, if possible, production of water. Her Majesty's Government's decision to make money available for this purpose, which I was able to announce at the Trucial Council meeting in November, has aroused great interest throughout the shajkdoms.

12. The Trucial Council met twice during the year and, though progress is slow it is developing along the lines marked out for it. During the past year it has been possible to bring the Rulers to take common action on such matters as travel documents and traffic regulations. Soon after the discovery of oil at Murban the suggestion was made to Shaikh Shakhbut that he might, when oil was produced in commercial quantities and he was reaping the benefits, put 2 per cent. of his share of the profits at the disposal of the Trucial Council for the benefit of his neighbours not fortunate enough to have oil in their territory. Shakhbut, in characteristically Quixotic fashion, replied by offering 4 per cent. There is a long, long way to go before we achieve anything like integration, but these steps are at least in the right direction.

The Trucial Oman Levies

13. The military measures taken in connexion with the frontier dispute necessitated a rapid increase in the size of the Trucial Oman Levies, and in the course of the year their strength rose from 1 British officer and 100 men to 10 British officers and 500 men. It was not thought either possible or desirable to make this sudden expansion wholly by the recruitment of locals, and the service authorities in Aden recruited on our behalf some 300 former members of the

Aden Protectorate Levies for two years' service with our levies. At the time these men were invaluable by reason of their previous military experience, but later events unfortunately made it necessary to revise our judgment of them. In November there was a serious breakdown of discipline in one squadron composed almost entirely of Adenis, which was at the time conducting the blockade of Hamasa and the squadron commander, Major Thwaites, the R.A.F. doctor and a Palestinian sergeant-major were murdered. As a result, about ninety men of that squadron were repatriated immediately. Since then other Adenis have been giving trouble, and it is now our intention to return them to Aden in the course of the next financial year. The steady flow of volunteers from the Trucial States for enlistment in the levies is encouraging and we anticipate no difficulty in reaching our full complement. The inevitable preoccupation of the levies with the military problems arising out of Turki's presence in Hamasa has forced into the background their police duties. The necessity for a police force in the Trucial States is, however, becoming more urgent and, now that the military training of the levies is approaching an adequate standard, more attention is to be paid to their police duties.

Bahrain

14. A recent traveller in the Gulf remarked that to come from Kuwait to Bahrain is like passing at a bound from Klondyke to Bloomsbury, and certainly in comparison with the excitements of Kuwait and the Trucial Coast, Bahrain has presented a tranquil picture during the past year. Physical development has continued steadily. The private construction of houses continues at a great pace and the supply seems to be approaching equality with the demand. Even our own long-incubated housing scheme is at last approaching completion, though it is a pity that our pleasure at being adequately housed must be tempered by widespread criticism of the marked lack of distinction in the outside appearance of our houses. The Bahrain Government have started work on the construction of a long-overdue new power-house and a large new palace for the Ruler is nearing completion. Work has also started on the approaches to the new deep-water pier in the Khor Kaliya, while a slipway and repair yard constructed by Gray Mackenzie were practically ready by the end of the year. This picture of respectable if unspectacular

progress was marred by an ugly outbreak of rioting between the Sunni and Shia communities at the time of the festival of Muharram in September last. There is always tension between these two communities in Bahrain, where the distinction tends to be social as well as religious. The original inhabitants, who constitute the poorer classes, the agricultural labourers and lower working classes, are predominantly Shia, and they regard the Sunnis as alien interlopers who have dispossessed them of their land and imposed a heretical creed on them. However, this latent tension has never before erupted so violently and there seemed to be no particular reason why such an outbreak should have occurred when it did. The spark which touched it off appears to have been some casually offensive remark aimed by one of the on-lookers at one of the Shia participants in the procession, and in the early stages of the disturbance the police do not appear to have acted with conspicuous discretion. It is of course practically impossible in any dispute between a Sunni and a Shia in Bahrain for the Sunni to be in the wrong, and by the end of the year no action had been taken by the Ruler against such of the Sunni ringleaders as were identified.

15. The self-styled press and the "opposition" in Bahrain continued their petty sniping attacks on their usual targets throughout the year. They appear at times to cause both the Ruler and their other targets a disproportionate amount of annoyance. There is no evidence of any widespread dissatisfaction in Bahrain, and so long as the present general prosperity continues it seems unlikely that any will develop.

16. The Ruler paid a visit to Europe and England for Her Majesty's Coronation and was much impressed by all that he saw and did. In so far as his visit has given him a respect for order and good administration it may be accounted a success. The deference paid to him in London, however, appears occasionally to have given him unwarranted illusions of grandeur. This, no doubt, helped to account for the asperity of some of his exchanges with myself and the Political Agent on the subject of Zubarah, which again became an active question during the year and, though his relations with the oil company recovered from the low point to which the protracted negotiation of the 50/50 agreement had brought them, he showed considerable impatience with them for not having as yet

undertaken any operations in the sea-bed area of Bahrain. Since the only part of the area in which they are interested is the subject of a dispute between Bahrain and Saudi Arabia which we have hitherto failed to solve, this was hardly fair to the company. On the 26th of December the Ruler demanded that the rate of production from the Bahrain field should be raised from the present level of 30,000 barrels a day to 60,000 barrels; the company said that this was most undesirable, and at his request sent him, on the 31st of December, a letter explaining in detail why it was necessary not only not to increase output but to reduce it gradually in three or four years, in order to prevent the permanent loss of a considerable quantity of oil owing to the too rapid encroachment of water and gas. The Ruler was not satisfied and discussions continued into 1954. The company have rather tardily begun to show some concern for their public relations in Bahrain. They realise at last that the good relations which they have hitherto enjoyed cannot be taken for granted and have established a new public relations branch.

17. The question of alcohol also became difficult during the year. The extent to which the prohibition placed by the Ruler on drinking by persons subject to his jurisdiction is disregarded, and particularly by members of the Ruler's own family, is serious and there is a real danger at the moment of the law as a whole being brought into disrepute by the Ruler's failure to compel obedience to a prohibition which is now generally regarded as unreasonable.

18. Notwithstanding these preoccupations, the Ruler remained throughout the year personally affable and dignified. Though he has by far the best administration of any of the shajkdoms, he is also by far the most conscientious of the shajks. He works hard and many of his tantrums can no doubt be attributed to tiredness. In spite of this there was no fundamental weakening of our position in Bahrain.

Qatar

19. Qatar is a problem child. Like Kuwait it has had a sudden access of wealth, and like Kuwait it had a weak Ruler and no administration to handle it. We have, however, had two further difficulties in Qatar which we have been spared in Kuwait, an *Eminence grise* in the person of Abdullah Darwish, and the deplorably bad relations between the Qatar Petroleum

Company and the Ruler. Progress, however, there has been. A development plan has been drawn up and development is proceeding in accordance with it, while Mr. Hancock, adviser to the Qatar Government, is constructing the skeleton of an Administration and has got the State's accounts organised in the proper way. He has, however, only achieved what he has achieved by yielding to Abdullah Darwish the points which the latter thought important. Mr. Hancock's own defence of his policy towards Abdullah Darwish is that he could not successfully challenge the latter's position immediately on his arrival in Dohah, and that he must be given time to establish his own position before he could be expected to assert himself as the Ruler's adviser. Abdullah Darwish is in many ways one of the most interesting problems in the Gulf at the moment. He is the only outsider, that is, the only man not a member of a shaikhly family, to have aimed at and achieved political power. His ambitions appear to be power and money, and in so far as the continued existence of Qatar as an independent State facilitates his achievement of these ambitions he accepts and welcomes our position in Qatar. His interests, however, and ours will not necessarily always be the same and we may at any moment find ourselves involved in a struggle with him. Though the relations of the Qatar Petroleum Company with Abdullah Darwish and the Ruler showed no improvement, their relations with their labour force were marred by no strikes during the year. Under Mr. Cochran's able and enthusiastic command the Qatar police were strengthened during the year and equipped with a number of armoured cars. They acted with considerable discretion and aplomb after a squabble between the two branches of the Al Thani family which ended in a resort to shooting and arrested the young shaikh responsible. Somewhat to everyone's surprise the Ruler supported Mr. Hancock in the action which he took, and there is now good hope that the police may become powerful and independent enough really to maintain public order in Qatar.

Muscat

20. In Muscat the outstanding event of the year was the agreement of the Sultan that an Iraq Petroleum Company associate should launch an exploration party into the Huqf depression from which it is hoped that they can penetrate the areas of central

Oman which they consider most likely to contain oil. The Sultan insisted that before the landing could take place the company should pay for the raising and training of a force of 400 men to accompany them. To this the company agreed and in the course of the year the British officers required were recruited and the equipment obtained and brought to Muscat. The recruitment of the men required unfortunately proceeded more slowly than had been hoped but at the end of the year the company still aimed at getting ashore some time in February 1954.

21. In February the Sultan, disappointed at Her Majesty's Government's handling of the frontier dispute, determined to go to England to present his views in person. On his return he settled in Dhofar, where he stayed for the rest of the year. In addition to his reasonable preference for Dhofar to Muscat as a place it seems probable that he wishes to remain out of reach of recriminations from the Shaikhs loyal to him for his failure to have secured Turki's removal from Hamasa. While in Dhofar he has occupied himself with the improvement of communications between the coast and the hinterland. He has also been much interested in the activities of the City Services Oil Company to whom, through the mediation of Mr. Wendell Phillips, he has given an exploration licence for Dhofar.

22. Meanwhile in his absence nothing of importance has happened in Muscat. From Oman the news came at the beginning of the year that the Imam was dying. Dr. Thoms, however, of the American Mission in Muscat visited him later in the year and his treatment appeared to have been effective since subsequent reports were that the Imam, despite his age, was again taking an interest in the affairs of the country. Both Sulaiman bin Hamyar and Saleh bin Isa were absent from Oman for prolonged periods during the summer, each in his different way and pursuing his ambition, in Riyadh and Al Azhar respectively, of inheriting the chief power in Oman on the Imam's death. Both came to see me on their way back to Oman. Sulaiman bin Hamyar repeated his request for recognition by Her Majesty's Government of his independence and asked me to put him in touch with an oil company with whom he could conclude a concession agreement. He claimed complete independence from the Sultan. Saleh on the other hand professed to be able to bring the whole of Oman in behind the Sultan if the Sultan made him, Saleh, his agent. When this proposition

was subsequently put to the Sultan he dismissed it with the comment that Saleh overrated his own importance.

23. The Sultan concluded a treaty with India, with whom he had had no such relations since his treaty of 1939 with us lapsed in 1951. The new treaty with India is said to follow very closely the terms of his treaty of 1952 with us. No progress was made during the year towards a solution of the problem raised by the desire of the Government of Pakistan to acquire Gwadur from the Sultan.

Trade and Currency

24. The foreign trade of the Gulf continued at a high level, though the rapid expansion of the last two or three years was somewhat checked. For Kuwait, complete figures are lacking, but in the six months, May-October, imports were running at the rate of just under £37 million per annum, the United Kingdom's share being at the rate of £16 million. In the six months £7.4 million worth of goods were imported by the Kuwait Government and the oil company and £11 million worth by private traders. Over those same six months the proportion of private trade to total trade rose from 48 per cent. in May to 60 per cent. in October; this reflects both the slowing down in the pace of development and the increase in general prosperity as the oil revenues percolate down through all strata of the population. The United Kingdom's share in this private trade increased steadily, from £285,000 (16 per cent.) in May to £711,000 (32 per cent.) in October. Bahrain's imports (excluding those by the oil company and the Government, which probably amounted to £6-7 million) totalled £15.4 million in 1953 against £14.6 million in 1952, a modest rise of 5.4 per cent. Exports (mainly re-exports) fell from £7.4 million to £7.2 million. One factor contributing to this decline may be the increasing tendency of Qatar and Saudi Arabia to import direct instead of through Bahrain, in order to avoid delays, handling charges and transit duty. Bahrain merchants, accustomed to several years of expanding trade, consider 1953 to have been a quiet year; it may well be that the peak has been reached. The other main trading centre, Dubai, had another dull year; it is doubtful whether trade will ever return to the levels of the boom years of 1950 and 1951, until oil is produced in the Trucial Coast. But a revival of economic

activity in Persia might have a very favourable influence on Dubai. Such information as is available about trade in Muscat indicates stagnation, if not decline.

25. At the beginning of the year the banks were perturbed by the hesitation shown by the Reserve Bank of India at accepting rupee notes from the Gulf for conversion into sterling, prompted by fears that a large proportion of these notes represented the proceeds of gold smuggled into India—a traffic which the Indian Government are continually trying to check, with little success. There was a threat of an acute shortage of sterling, the currency which finances the bulk of the Gulf's imports. In the event the Reserve Bank has continued to convert repatriated notes, albeit with some delay; and at the same time supplies of sterling on the market were augmented by the Governments' sales of their oil revenue sterling to meet their increased requirements of rupees for local disbursements.

Legal

26. Effect has been given during the year to the most important of the recommendations made by Sir Eric Beckett after his visit to the Gulf in 1952, by the appointment (actually made towards the end of 1952) of Mr. W. P. R. Mawdsley as Registrar of the Chief Court for the Persian Gulf and the Court for Bahrain, and as Assistant Judge of the Courts for Kuwait, Qatar and the Trucial States. The Residency has also had the benefit of Mr. Mawdsley's experience in his capacity as Legal Adviser.

27. Two new Orders-in-Council, those for Kuwait and Qatar, came into force and extended the area of the Rulers' jurisdictions, in Kuwait to include nationals of all Arab countries of the Middle East and in Qatar those of Saudi Arabia, the Yemen, and the other Gulf States. In Bahrain, jurisdiction over Persians was ceded to the Ruler, bringing him into line in this respect with the Ruler of Kuwait.

28. Legislation enacted in 1953 included Criminal and Civil Appeal Rules under the Orders-in-Council for Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and the Trucial States, and Legal Practitioners' Rules for Bahrain and Kuwait. Work proceeded or was initiated on the Penal and Procedure Codes; Company Patents and Dangerous Drugs legislation (Bahrain); a Workmen's Compensation Ordinance (Bahrain and Kuwait); Traffic Regulations (Kuwait, Qatar and the Trucial

States); a new Order-in-Council for Muscat; and amendments to the various Alcoholic Drinks Regulations to make them consistent with each other and with current drinking practice.

29. The general pattern which emerges from the year's work in the legal sphere is composed of three main strands: the increased tempo of legislative activity in recent years has been maintained; the transfer of judicial authority to the Rulers has continued; but progress in educating them in British ways of justice (*e.g.*, by the Joint Court procedure) has been disappointing.

Slavery

30. Slave trading in the Gulf is now confined almost exclusively to Oman and the Trucial Coast where, if there has appeared to be an increase in the number of incidents during 1953, this is probably due to an improvement in detecting and reporting them rather than to an increase in the actual volume of traffic. The presence of the Levies in greater strength and over a wider area than hitherto—and particularly in Buraimi, which has for long been a centre of the trade—has contributed largely to this improvement; and if they were not as successful in catching offenders as they were in reporting them, one notorious slaver, Khalifah bin Majid, who has close connexions with the Dubai ruling family, was banished to Bahrain for a year, while another transgressor was cast into prison by Shaikh Saqr of Sharjah. It is a measure of the effect of the Levies' threat to these activities that the slavers now operate by sea rather than land routes; and the inhabitants of the Trucial States have had impressed on them the fact that Her Majesty's Government regard the slave

trade as abhorrent and are prepared to do something about it.

31. The Rulers have, at least outwardly, expressed their agreement with this attitude towards the slave traffic, and at a meeting of the Trucial Council in November all seven undertook to issue A'fians prohibiting it. At an earlier meeting in April, however, when the thornier problem of domestic slavery was broached, the reaction was not even outwardly favourable. It varied from the argument that it was unthinkable that free men should be employed in the place of slaves whose duties often took them into the women's apartments where the ladies were unveiled, to the less reasoned plea that it was intolerable for Christians to interfere with Muslim institutions. It is clear that for both economic and temperamental reasons the end of domestic slavery on the Trucial Coast is a remote prospect at present. The following are the numbers of manumissions effected during the year:—

Kuwait	5
Bahrain	12
Dohah	13
Sharjah	59
Muscat	16

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32. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Ambassadors in Bagdad and Jedda, the Head of the British Middle East Office and the Head of the Development Division, Her Majesty's Political Agents in the Gulf and Her Majesty's Consul-General in Muscat, and the Senior Army, Naval and Air Force Officers in the Persian Gulf.

I have, &c.

B. A. B. BURROWS.

EM 1011/1

No. 13

YEMEN: ANNUAL REVIEW FOR 1953

Mr. Roper-Curzon to Mr. Eden. (Received March 24)

(No. 9. Confidential)

Taiz

Sir, March 4, 1954.

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith my annual report on the Yemen for 1953, together with a summary of events in chronological order.⁽¹⁾ I regret the delay in submitting this report which has been due to the pressure of recent events and to the fact that I am single handed.

⁽¹⁾ Not printed

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Enclosure

Annual Report on the Yemen for 1953

The end of the year left our relations with the Yemen as unsatisfactory as they were up to last February. During the intervening eight months until October it was possible to detect a slight improvement. After the raids in the spring of the rebellious Mansouri into the Protectorate and the Abida (Yemeni) into the Yemen from the Protectorate, there was a partial lull in the perennial Yemeni activities against the Protectorate tribes, which usually take the form of sheltering rebel chiefs from over the border and providing them with means of creating as much trouble as they can. The onset of the monsoon weather in May, coupled with agricultural activities, coincided with a reduction in major frontier incidents until October.

In this year especially, the world-wide interest taken in the Coronation made its impact also on the Yemen. Saif Al-Islam Al Hassan, the titular Prime Minister, was delegated by His Majesty The Imam to represent him at the Coronation, and there is no doubt that his reception, together with the ceremonies and functions, made a favourable impression not only on Al Hassan but also on the Yemeni Government. The opportunity was taken of holding conversations in London between Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, the Minister of State, and Al Hassan, conducted in a cordial atmosphere wherein nothing very tangible was arrived at. The Yemeni Prime Minister contented himself with vague generalities and aspirations that our differences would eventually be settled to the satisfaction of both parties in the spirit of the Treaty of 1934 and the agreement of 1951. To emphasise his friendliness towards Britain, His Majesty the Imam chose two of the best horses that Yemen breeding can produce as a Coronation gift to The Queen, together with a quantity of the country's famous coffee. One of the animals was a mare which enhanced the generosity of the gift, as it is seldom that a mare is permitted to leave the country. The Deputy Foreign Minister also favoured the formation of a frontier commission which would settle the future of the three disputed areas recognised in the exchange of letters of 1951 without laying any stress on further claims to Protectorate territory which in point of fact would inevitably follow.

2. Her Majesty's Government eventually came to the conclusion that our relations had reached a stage where the appointment of a Minister to the Yemen would be of benefit to both countries. An *agrément* was, therefore, asked for in September. The Deputy Foreign Minister did not at the time show any marked enthusiasm, and as the days lengthened into weeks I began to have serious misgivings. I was told that the Imam was consulting Saif Al Islam Al Hassan and eventually after six weeks I was informed that the Imam did not consider that our relations had developed to the point where he thought a Minister would be useful and that he was satisfied with a chargé d'affaires for the present. To soften the blow, Qadhi Al-Amri blandly remarked that a Minister would not have sufficient work to occupy him, or at least work of importance. On this point I hastened to disillusion him. I am still of the opinion that the true reason has little to do with the state of our relationship. I do not think the Imam can bring himself to have such an important person as a Wazir right on his door-step, especially the representative of a colonial and imperialist Power. He prefers to keep the accredited representatives of foreign Powers at a respectable distance in Cairo, Addis Ababa or Jedda, where they can be welcomed to the Yemen with bands and guards of honour on their annual visit for a few days. Also he would be unable to avoid receiving the Minister and thus showing a mark of exceptional favour towards a country with which the Yemen have had differences of long standing.

3. The first raid of the season took place in October when the Awadhis (Yemen) raided the Fagamis. In November the Government of Aden began operations to bring a trade route under control between Lodar and Nisab and the tribes living round it. The forces used were quite small, and no attack was made on any of the tribes, but the Aqil of the Damani resisted the troops and caused a few casualties to the Aden Protectorate Levies. The Yemeni Government protested against a military expedition to subjugate peaceful tribes by force contrary to the spirit of the Anglo-Yemeni Treaty of 1934 and the agreement of 1951, and that they did not recognise the right of the British Government to interfere in these areas. The Yemeni Government purposely exaggerated the character of the expedition and were determined to make capital out of it. In their reply Her

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Majesty's Government made it plain that the incident took place in the territory of the Aden Protectorate and that the Yemeni Government had no standing in the matter. They pointed out that the unrest of the Rabizi and Damani was largely the result of the interference of the Governor of Beidha in Protectorate affairs. The Yemeni Government were convinced that our operations were directly related to imaginary oil exploration near Shabwa. The construction of the oil refinery at Little Aden and the departure of an oil survey expedition in the apparent direction of Shabwa are supposed to be connected. Finally, rumours of the proposed federation of the Western Aden Protectorate were taken to be another example of colonial subjugation of independent States and tribes which, if given the chance, would happily return to the bosom of the mother country.

4. The principal architect of incidents between the Yemen and Aden is the Governor of Beidha. His continually unfriendly and arrogant attitude has prejudiced security on the frontier. It is probable that his instructions from the Yemeni Government are in very general terms and that he interprets them as full licence to stir up continual trouble. His main line of action is to shelter rebels and encourage malcontents to visit him. They are then provided with plenty of money, arms and ammunition and encouraged or allowed to raid the Protectorate from within the Yemen. These people he describes as political refugees from British oppression. He encourages tribal chiefs to deposit hostages with him and also makes incursions into Protectorate territory in order to seize hostages. In his view the Protectorate does not exist, and he refuses to recognise our right to be there.

5. A further incident which caused bad blood between the two sides was started by some refugees of the Yemeni Abida tribe who had been living in the Beihan area. They raided into Yemen territory with the result that several reprisal raids and looting were staged. A number of Beihanis were arrested in the Yemen, while considerable quantities of grain and salt, together with a large number of Beihani camels were seized. After prolonged negotiations an agreement was reached between the frontier officers. The impertinent and obstructive attitude of the Amil of Beidha did not help to promote good relations between the two countries. When the prisoners were released it came to light that for three and

a half months they had been subjected to brutal and inhuman treatment by the Yemeni authorities although they were merely hostages and innocent of any crime. The incident and its repercussions were the subject of a strong protest from Her Majesty's Government at the treatment of these hostages by Yemen soldiers, and full compensation for the victims was demanded. The Yemeni Government has not yet deigned to reply to this note.

6. In the course of the year the Imam had sensed the warnings and advice coming from Yemenis in Egypt and Aden. He has noticed the support given to the free Yemenis by the Egyptian Government. He now feels that it would be wise to proclaim the progress and development of the country by inviting geologists and engineers from foreign countries to prospect for minerals and examine the possibilities of such projects as harbour improvements. One cannot but feel that this activity is more to make a show than any genuine desire to allow foreign firms to develop the country's resources. It is, however, a departure from his unusually frank speech at the Victory Day celebrations on January 21. He then pronounced that he preferred "hunger and nakedness for his people together with the preservation of religion and country" rather than open it up to colonisers who would exploit the riches of the country. This was in answer to the free Yemenis of Aden and Egypt who are opposed to the present régime. He made it clear that opposition to the Imam does not pay and that a number of those who took part in the *coup d'État* of 1948 are still in prison. Although always sensitive to criticism from Egypt, he does not approve of the civilisation of the more progressive Arab States, whom he regards as harming Islam. As the years go by he finds it increasingly difficult to maintain his position and realises that he can only do this on the grounds of religion by preserving Islam in its true form. It is this emphasis on religion which he keeps before the people as the only means of maintaining the independence of their country. In the councils of the Arab League the members are not likely to treat the Yemen with very much respect, and at the United Nations the Yemen Delegation rarely open their mouths.

7. The main economic development during the year was the inauguration in April by the Imam of the Salif Mineral Salt Company in the presence of many

notables, merchants and shareholders. My predecessor was also invited to attend. The salt is exported to a large extent to Japan. The company was at first managed by an Englishman who left towards the end of the year, and is now run by Italians. The only other projects completed in the course of the year were the water distillation plants at Bab-al-Mandeb and Hodeidah. Criticism from other Arab States, especially Egypt, about the lack of progress in the Yemen has undoubtedly spurred the Imam to make a show at least of developing the country. A constant stream of geologists, mainly Italians and German, have surveyed the country in all directions in a vain search for minerals. Thin strata of coal were found near Sana'a, but it is doubtful whether the deposits would be a workable proposition. There is also abundant clay and limestone, suitable for making cement and silicious sandstone. This is the sum total of mineral deposits so far discovered. Naturally, oil has been uppermost in the minds of the Government, and serious efforts are being made in the Salif area to determine whether oil may exist in commercial quantities. In this direction German geologists were favoured, and a German firm came to an agreement with the Yemen to make the survey and carry out the subsequent exploitation for oil, if any. By the end of the year an aerial survey had been completed, from which maps are being prepared. The firm has not been granted a concession in the normal way as the Imam does not believe in granting concessions to foreign firms. Nor has he yet agreed to deposit £80,000 in a bank in Aden to cover future expenditure by the company.

8. The country is dependent on Aden for the bulk of its trade, and the Imam is seeking ways to reduce this dependence by directing commerce through their own ports. The principal port will be Mocha, and a French firm from Jibouti has signed a contract to carry out improvements to the harbour so that ships of 3,000 to 4,000 tons can use it. German engineers were asked to study the project of constructing a harbour at Ras Katib, 4 miles north of Hodeidah. As a much cheaper proposition, they recommended improvements to the harbour at Salif, but the Imam objected to this as Salif is opposite the British island of

Kamaran and therefore could easily be blockaded by the British! He is, therefore, prepared to spend about £1 million on the Ras Katib port. Various other projects have been considered, such as a cement plant in the Bajil district to be run on San'a's coal, a dam for irrigation and power supply near Ibb, and the improvement of roads. It seems unlikely that these will get beyond the project stage for some time to come.

9. Transport costs in the Yemen are prohibitive owing to the appalling wear and tear on lorries and the slow rate of travel. The distribution of goods between towns and districts is on a very small scale, camel caravans being useless for perishable goods. It is putting the cart before the horse to spend large sums on building harbours, searching for minerals or trying to increase agricultural production for export instead of making contracts with foreign firms to construct sound metal trunk routes between the various centres. The next step should be to improve agricultural production and livestock with special attention to sheep, of which there are large numbers in the country. At present the people are more interested in growing that pernicious, but profitable drug, Qat. Thousands of acres of fertile land in the mountains, where almost anything will grow, is wasted on Qat.

10. In conclusion, I foresee little prospect of any marked change in policy of the Imam. He has succeeded in maintaining his strong hold on the country, but the fear of assassination is never far from his mind. Although he has paid lip-service to the present régime in Egypt, he knows he has most to fear from that quarter. To keep criticism within bounds by his people in the country and those outside he has publicised various economic projects. His suspicion and treatment of foreigners show no improvement, while his unfriendly attitude towards Aden and the Protectorate has in fact deteriorated. Mounting criticism and dissatisfaction with present conditions may bring matters to a head in time, otherwise there is little prospect of any improvement in the lot of the people during the lifetime of the Imam or indeed as long as the present dynasty survives.

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No. 14

STATEMENT ON THE CURRENT POLITICAL SITUATION

Mr. Pelham to Mr. Eden. (Received April 4)

(No. 50. Confidential)

Jedda,

Sir,

March 28, 1954.

With King Saud's visit to Cairo, the recent opening of his Council of Ministers, and the end of a round, as it were, in his frontier negotiations with ourselves, it might be useful if I tried to assess the general state of this country and to indicate, if possible, some trends in the policy of its rulers. It has been suggested that the Saudis have no firm intentions, only suspicions, prejudices and resentments. This cannot be disproved: but I feel that at best it is only a partial truth, and reflects not so much Saudi shortcomings as our ignorance of the way in which their minds are working. What follows, will, I hope, make our guesses in this direction a little surer.

2. Four months have now passed since King Saud acceded to his father's throne. Although the new reign has brought few marked changes it has been a time of much speculation about the future of the country and its affairs. Perhaps the most significant fact of the past few months is that the succession has never been openly disputed. Whether this has been due to the King's tactful and moderate behaviour or to some bargain between himself and his brother Crown Prince Feisal is not known, but it is most probably that he now feels secure in this quarter: any qualms that he may have are more likely to be about the loyalty of some of his subjects than of his family, though the possibility of challenge from some members of the family cannot be entirely ruled out. King Saud fully intends to wield the absolute power that his father did—but with this difference: that in a State, the complexity of whose government grows daily, such a determination entails that he will be more and more dependent on his Ministers. (At present it is not clear to what extent he is swayed by his many advisers). The particular dangers, therefore, that the King must face are those of being misinformed or ill-advised. The royal court now includes both the late King's advisers and also those of the new order. Abdullah al Khair, the King's principal private secretary, is reported to have said that about eight or nine groups have now formed themselves in the King's entourage, each struggling for power, yet each realising that the others are necessary if the present balance is to be kept. The King is said to be determined to rout out the old guard sooner or later. It was only last week that Jedda was filled with rumours of Cabinet changes including the dismissal of Abdullah Suleiman, the Minister of Finance, and the bestowal of a number of ministerial posts on some of the King's brothers and the Emir Fahd, his eldest son. The rumours soon proved false, but their very existence is an indication of the fluid state of the country's internal affairs. The fall of the Minister of Finance has long been foretold, and there has already been some dispersion of his power (as reported in my despatch No. 42), but it would be surprising if the King made any sweeping changes, at least for a time, in his circle of advisers. Men like Abdullah Suleiman and like Yusuf Yasin, the Talleyrand of the country, are not easily replaced: nor would anyone who stands to gain by their dismissal be inclined to hasten it if by so doing they threatened the smooth working of a machine which conveniently places a pound in the pockets of the administrators for every pennyworth of good it does the country.

3. Yet whichever power group finally wins it is unlikely to make any significant difference to the country; their first consideration will always be themselves. There is plainly no urgent concern among them for the welfare of the people, nor much sleep lost in worrying about the misfortunes of neighbouring Arab States. With self-interest as the ruling creed it is surely to the governing class's advantage to ensure that such a profitable *status quo* remains, and this I think will be the prime factor affecting the nature of this country's internal and foreign policies for some time yet.

4. On that basis the ruling class must fear any challenge to the existing internal social order. Here in Saudi Arabia this class is fortunately placed. In the sorry histories of other Middle Eastern countries the disruptive element has always been the middle classes. But in Saudi Arabia there is no indigenous middle class—and those birds of passage, the Levantine merchants, are much too busy getting rich to bother about politics. Even so, there are changes taking place that may well

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produce a society less content to see the country's money spent in the way it is to-day. At the moment such changes are proportionately small, and there are still enough opportunities for making easy money to satisfy this emerging sophistication: but this cannot last, and if, with the discovery of new fields and markets, oil royalties increase, this might only accelerate the growth of an "effendi" class and put a more speedy end to the present honeymoon. However, any awareness of such a trend would be scarcely likely to affect the rulers' present policy: on the contrary, it would merely aggravate corruption and emphasise a creed of making hay while the sun shines. I therefore feel that in spite of the recent announcements about changes in the control of the country's finances, and in spite of King Saud's possible sincerity and good intentions for the betterment of the country, the realities of any internal policy which the Government produces will be little different from what we have seen in the past few years.

5. I come now to the Government's foreign policy and what little can be known about it. It seems to be a paradoxical compound of hard sense and wishful thinking. The first shows itself, for example, in what has so far been a highly successful harnessing of the Americans: the second, in the fine words and grandiloquence of King Saud's approach to Middle Eastern politics and the problem of Israel. *Au fond* there is a contradiction: on the one hand a distrust of foreign influence (which might jeopardise the present balance in the country), on the other a pride which hankers after the fruits and know-hows of Western technology. Fortunately for Saudi Arabia, America's policy of "appeasement" in the Middle East provides a simple way out of what might otherwise have become a frustrating dilemma. So the oil revenues come flowing in bearing a welcome flotsam of technical and military assistance, all without "interference" and "conditions," and with scarcely any attempt to bring about changes in the tangled form of Saudi Government. Furthermore, American dominance even ensures that no other power will interfere. The Saudis may well think that such a position can be held indefinitely provided that they periodically adjust the balance and ensure that any one country's influence (no matter how benign) is suitably trimmed. It may have been to this end that at the beginning of this year the American firm of Baker's were replaced by a German group as the official Government contractors (see my despatch No. 148 E. of 1953). The story ran locally that the Germans were intent on extending their sphere of influence, but I have yet to find any such political significance in their advent. What is clear, however, is that by this move the Saudis proved themselves diligent in shackling the hand that feeds them—but to bite it seems quite remote from their ideas.

6. In spite of occasional misgivings the Americans, I imagine, are satisfied with such an arrangement. But what are their real motives? With the present absence of interfusion between their Middle East policy and ours, what follows must be largely speculation. Recent events have left me wondering what part Saudi Arabia is intended to play in the impressive set-piece that the Americans now seem to be building up behind the tattered facade of the Middle Eastern Defence Organisation. Saudi Arabia is not of course in the front line like Turkey and Pakistan and one would have thought her importance in the tactical defence of the Middle East to be little. But from the point of view of being groomable for a part in this new defence scheme she has the advantage over Egypt and the countries of the Fertile Crescent of comparative internal stability. The State Department and the Pentagon have naturally appreciated this, and advice, as well as what aid the Saudis charily accept, is being showered on the country. My American colleague told me the other day that he and General Grover, the head of the American military mission in this country, had been preparing the military budget for the next two years. The sum involved was U.S.\$65 millions. Mr. Wadsworth considered it not enough: if Saudi Arabia was to take her proper part in the defence of the oil lands she would need to spend a larger sum. He agreed with me that the part at best would be small, but "every little helps."

7. King Saud, perhaps without American prompting, has certainly shown himself very defence-minded, and recently in talks with the Egyptian leaders has shown some concern for safeguarding the Middle East and their oilfields from possible Soviet aggression. But if America ever intended that Saudi Arabia should eventually join some such defence organisation as is now taking shape in the north and east, it is evident that she would have had to wean King Saud from a too acquiescent following of Egypt's lead and the neutrality or indecision that it

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involves. For the King, even so recently as when he refused American aid, has shown himself reluctant to tarnish his exemplary record in the Arab League. It is therefore possible that behind the King's newly revealed attitude in his remarks to General Neguib lies the admonitory shadow of the State Department. This is admirable. But King Saud and his political advisers are adept flirts and I cannot help feeling that Saudi Arabia, like the majority of other Arab States, is less concerned with the Communist than with the Zionist threat.

8. As far as his neighbours are concerned, and even apart from possible American influence, King Saud's policy will probably remain uncertain. He will be watching the tussle between Egypt and Iraq for supremacy in the Arab world with an eye to the main chance; and he has probably already seen that Iraq with its actual and potential wealth and without Egypt's pressure of population, stands to win. Even if he now seems well on the way to forgetting the Hashemite feud, his recent flattery of King Hussein and support of the late régime in Syria which was firmly set against any type of union with Iraq might point to a persisting rancour towards Iraq. However, I think that Saud's motives are more firmly based than on a mere vendetta, and he is and will continue spending these considerable sums of money on intrigue for good reasons. For while the countries of the Fertile Crescent are divided he might have some influence there: but if they were united he could less hope to be courted for his support and have more to fear. Meanwhile he will continue his opportunist policy towards the smaller States that border his kingdom, and in particular he has inherited much (but not all) of his father's fervour in pursuing a policy of expansion in the south-east. In consequence of which his attitude to the United Kingdom is a compound of petulance and righteous indignation. Although the frontier dispute continues to muddy our relations, it may be that since the new reign (and since, I hazard, the recent discovery of further vast oil resources in Saudi Arabia) the dispute will lose some of its importance in Saudi eyes, and there may consequently be a greater readiness on their part to see it settled. The clue to much of the King's attitude in his foreign policy is pride. At the moment the borrowed robes of greatness sit a little bizarrely on the shoulders of a country whom her neighbours know better as the home of certain profligate and uncouth patrons of their saucier night clubs, and the King's vision of his nation as *the* great Islamic State *par excellence* are probably clearer to himself than they are to other Arab rulers. Nevertheless Saudi Arabia is of increasing importance in the Arab world, and should her internal economy become less chaotic she might well play a not ineffective role in Middle Eastern politics.

9. In spite of the deal of cynicism I have imputed to the Saudis in the above paragraphs, there is a certain amount of altruism too. The King himself is, I feel, genuinely concerned for the good and well-being of his people though his concept of this has a strong medieval flavour, but all too often his good intentions are crowded out by the self-interest of his advisers. His sincerity is at present being reflected in the optimism of the country. For some time everyone has been talking about the good the coming budget will do, how everything will be put to rights, how Ministers will have fixed allocations, and proper grants will be made for developments projects. But optimism cannot alter the fact of a national income so thoroughly overspent already nor can it ensure the wise and efficient administration of a growing modern complex by levantine mercenaries or indulged and uneducated princes. It remains to be seen whether Saud will open himself to, or buy, first class advice and then have the courage to adopt it.

10. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Ambassadors at Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Tel Aviv and Washington; to the Political Resident at Bahrain and to the Head of the British Middle East Office.

I have, &c.

G. C. PELHAM.

ES 1941/14

No. 15

VISIT OF KING SAUD TO BAHRAIN

Mr. Burrows to Mr. Eden. (Received April 26)

(No. 42. Confidential)
Sir,

Bahrain,

April 20, 1954.

I have the honour to report that King Saud arrived at Bahrain for a three-day visit on April 11. He was accompanied by some twenty-three members of his family—brothers, sons, uncles and cousins—and by a numerous retinue of officials, slaves, bodyguards, &c., the total number being about 120. The only person of any political consequence who accompanied King Saud was Jamal Hussein (Saudi Personalities No. 133) who, in spite of his background, appeared helpful and well-disposed. The party arrived in three aircraft from Dhahran. Thanks to the co-operation of the Air Officer Commanding, Iraq (Air Vice-Marshal J. G. Hawtrey, C.B.E.) it had been possible to arrange for a squadron of Royal Air Force Vampires from Habbaniya to arrive in Bahrain the previous day. They escorted King Saud's aircraft for the last part of its short journey and flew past in formation after he had landed. The presence of these aircraft made a notable impression and was much appreciated by the Ruler of Bahrain. King Saud was received on landing by Shaikh Salman and myself, the Political Agent, senior members of the Shaikh's family, Sir Charles Belgrave and the Senior Royal Air Force Officer, Persian Gulf. After a royal salute he inspected guards of honour provided by the Bahrain State Police and the Royal Air Force. He then greeted numerous other members of the family of the Ruler of Bahrain and other Bahrain notables and left the airport for the Qadhaibia Palace where a small additional number of Bahrainis were received and the ceremonial coffee was taken. There were considerable crowds at the airport to welcome King Saud and others waited along the route of his drive to the Palace. The arrangements at the airport and on the drive into the town worked as smoothly as is considered seemly among Arabs.

2. The three days of the visit were taken up by a very full programme consisting mostly of lunches, teas, dinners and after-dinner receptions. King Saud submitted to this exacting round of functions with goodwill. On only one occasion was he more than about an hour late, though on few occasions less. Dinner the first night was given by the Ruler in his new palace of which the reception and dining rooms had barely been completed and the rest of the building was still incomplete. About 300 guests attended including a certain number of British officials in the Bahrain Government Service, members of my staff and the heads of British businesses. The tables groaned under the weight of whole sheep and camels of which, however, King Saud partook only to the very smallest extent to which politeness demanded. He seemed in fact throughout the visit to have a distinct aversion to Arab-style food. After dinner we adjourned to a very large open-air gathering given by Abdul Rahman Qusaibi at his house at Rufa'. He is the head of a Nejd family who have been settled for some time in Bahrain and who are treated as the unofficial representatives of Saudi Arabia. After coffee and speechmaking we sat down to a further meal of ice-cream and cakes. (When I asked His Majesty, by way of making conversation, what the former was called in Arabic he replied in all seriousness "ice-cream" and asked what it was called in English.) The next morning was intended to be devoted to visiting schools and hospitals but owing partly to the length of my conversation with His Majesty reported in my telegrams No. 202 and No. 35 Saving of April 12 and 13 and partly to apparent lack of interest in such projects the King did not fulfil this part of the programme in person, but sent some of his family instead. Lunch was given by Shaikh Abdullah bin Isa, one of the Ruler's uncles. In the late afternoon King Saud made a short trip to the installations of the Bahrain Petroleum Company, arriving there more than two hours late and following a different route from that agreed, with the result that the General Manager spent three hours sitting in his car at a cross-roads in the desert and never met the King at all. Dinner was given by Shaikh Mohammed bin Isa, the Ruler's other uncle. After dinner there was a reception by the Bahrain Chamber of Commerce, followed by coffee drinking with two of the more notable merchants. As all these functions were in the middle of the town of Manama the crowds were at their thickest and

at one point they entirely surrounded the car in which King Saud and Shaikh Salman were travelling and prevented further movement. Shaikh Salman could be seen standing up in the back of the car, waving his camel stick and adjuring his subjects to make way, which they eventually did. In spite of the crowd and confusion everyone was in good humour and King Saud's geniality in such a situation caused favourable comment.

3. On April 13 King Saud received a few members of the British and other western communities who wished to call upon him. He then went for a drive through the countryside surrounding Manama including a visit to one of the famous Bahrain pools. Here the party, being free from western eyes (other than those of Sir Charles Belgrave) relaxed from the gravity normally shown in ceremonial gatherings and indulged in some good-natured horse-play including pretended attempts by the King to push members of his entourage into the pool. This was followed by a picnic lunch of sandwiches and Pepsicola, taken in a neighbouring mosque. In the afternoon the Bahrain Education Department had organised an excellent programme of school sports which King Saud watched with interest and amusement. He then went for coffee to the garden of Hassan Mudaifi, one of the leaders of the local Shia community and a prominent pearl merchant. This gathering was notable for the friendly remarks made by the Ruler to the King about his Shia subjects. These things were said in a loud voice in public hearing and must have been specifically intended by the Ruler to emphasise his impartiality as between his Sunni and Shia subjects. The King followed this up by an even more remarkable demonstration of catholicity by saying his evening prayers in the middle of this prominently Shia gathering and accompanied by the Shia notables. All this produced a considerable impression in Bahrain. From there the King, and the Ruler, adjourned to my house for a western style dinner party which, owing to the difficulty of selecting a limited number from among King Saud's family, had grown to number some 60 guests. The experiment of giving a western rather than Arab meal on such an occasion proved entirely successful and King Saud obviously enjoyed his food much more than at the Arab meals which he had previously attended. I took the opportunity on this occasion of arranging for Brigadier Baird, who had of course known King Saud in Saudi Arabia before he became king, senior officials of the oil company and representatives of British businesses operating in Saudi Arabia each to have a few minutes conversation with King Saud. In the course of one of these conversations he produced the startling proposal that a bridge should be built between Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. He did not appear in the least dismayed on learning that this would probably be twice the length of the longest existing bridge in the world. After dinner the party went to a large reception organised by the Bahrain (Arab and Indian) clubs.

4. The next day I had the further conversation with King Saud reported in my telegram No. 206 of April 14 and after various leave-taking ceremonies he and his party took their departure for Pakistan soon after noon.

5. The visit, while exacting to most of the participants, must be regarded as a considerable success. King Saud's easy manner and obvious friendliness, coupled with his father's mantle of authority, produced a good effect among most of the Bahrainis. The Saudi entourage behaved very much better than they had in Kuwait and thus did nothing to mar the favourable impression made by their master. It is inevitable that such visits, with the constant accompaniment of speeches of welcome of inordinate length should emphasise the bonds of Arabism between Bahrain and Saudi Arabia and the rest of the Arab world. I doubt, however, whether this influence is more than a transitory one, and on the whole I am inclined to think that even from our point of view the visit will have been a useful one as tending to make easier the handling of problems which from time to time arise between Bahrain and Saudi Arabia.

6. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Jeddah and the British Middle East Office.

I have, &c.

B. A. B. BURROWS.

ES 1017/4

No. 16

CHANGES IN THE SAUDI ARABIAN GOVERNMENTAL MACHINE

Mr. Pelham to Mr. Eden. (Received April 30)

(No. 60. Confidential)
Sir,

Jedda,

April 20, 1954.

In my despatch No. 42 of the 14th of March I referred to some proposed changes in the Saudi Arabian governmental machine which had been mentioned in the Speech from the Throne at the first session of the Council of Ministers. A series of Ordinances have now been issued synopses of which I attach herewith.⁽¹⁾

2. It will be seen that they concern the organisation and extent of authority of the Council of Ministers and its Secretariat, together with the three subsidiary branches—Audit, Technical, and a third, demurely called Grievances. With one or two exceptions (which I mention below) the various clauses in these regulations are not of very great interest. What is remarkable, however, is the promise they contain of a possible abatement of the chaos that now reigns in Government departments; a hint of the new broom.

3. Clause 7(c) of the basic Ordinance is obviously designed to prevent there being forced on the Government any more *faits accomplis* such as the German GOVENCO contract concluded by the Minister of Finance in October last year. One of the matters, for instance, which will now presumably have to come up for consideration is the reported tanker agreement with Onassis (reported in my letter 15311/7/54 of February 2, to Eastern Department) over which the Minister of Finance with the connivance of Mohammed Alireza, the newly appointed Minister of Commerce, appears to have attempted the same tactics. The provision in paragraph 7(d), though it looks distinctly strange to Western eyes, is obviously designed also to assert the Council's authority over the Ministry of Finance. Paragraph 7(i) reflects the growing dislike of non-Saudis working in the country especially Levantines. Paragraphs 17 and 18 show that the Crown Prince genuinely intends to take an active part in supervising the internal administration of the country.

4. Most important of all, however, is paragraph 18(c) concerning the supervision of the execution of the State budget. It is clear that the Minister of Finance (though he will presumably be present at meetings of the Council) will be subject to the general decision and in particular will not be able to interfere with the State audit or intercept allocations of cash to individual Ministries other than his own in the future. So much elaborate out-manoeuvring of the Minister may in the event merely make the workings of the Administration as a whole more cumbersome, without necessarily abating the present corruption.

5. Reliable eye-witnesses back from official meetings in Riyadh seem to be full of confidence that something is now really going to be done to put the financial house here in order. Local merchants seem less discontented as a result of these public announcements. The more cynical doubt, however, whether much can happen this year now; the Riyadh meetings drag on week after week, the heat of the summer is approaching, and there is still no sign at all of the much-heralded State budget.

6. One of the major decisions reported to have been reached is that for purposes of centralisation and better liaison all Ministries will move to Riyadh as soon as offices can be found for them. This has, of course, been rumoured often before but there does seem more substance this time. A general transfer could, I imagine, be effected within the next two to three years; it remains to be seen how this might affect the Diplomatic Corps.

7. I am copying this despatch to the Political Resident at Bahrain, the Head of the British Middle East Office at Fayid, and Her Majesty's Ambassador at Washington.

I have, &c.

G. C. PELHAM.

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.

EA 1081/285

No. 17

DISCUSSION BETWEEN HER MAJESTY'S AMBASSADOR AT JEDDA
AND KING SAUD ON THE ARABIAN FRONTIER DISPUTE

Mr. Pelham to Mr. Eden. (Received June 10)

(No. 69. Confidential)
Sir,

Jedda,
May 22, 1954.

In accordance with instructions in your telegram No. 257 of the 10th of May I obtained an audience of King Saud and went on the 13th of May to Riyadh to discuss the frontier dispute. The salient points of the discussions which took place during my two days' visit have already been reported to you in my telegrams Nos. 120, 121 and 122. In what follows I shall describe the course of the meetings, which began with a possible willingness to settle the dispute by negotiation and ended with mutual convictions that the method of arbitration seemed more likely to be successful. Like so much in this dispute it is a pattern we have seen before.

2. Sheikh Yusuf Yasin met me at the airport and made an abortive attempt to get me first to disclose to him all that I had to say. Shortly after my arrival I was received by His Majesty at the Nasariyah Palace. The Crown Prince Faisal, the Foreign Minister, Yusuf Yasin his deputy, and Rushdi Malhas (who on these occasions acts as little more than secretary), were also present. My initial object was to acquaint the King with the history of events since he had first proposed at Kuwait that we might reach a compromise agreement on the frontiers by negotiation. It soon became clear that I was wasting neither my time nor his, for I discovered that the King knew perhaps less than anyone present of what had been the precise nature of the proposals made by the Saudis to the Political Resident at Bahrain. If it had not been so before it now seemed plain that in the matter of this dispute the King was little more than a mouthpiece for Faisal and Yusuf Yasin. His Majesty was perfectly capable of making general declarations about ancestral rights and tribal loyalties, even if his manner was much less convincing than his father's: but when it came to the niceties of claims and concessions it was clear that he needed prompting more than a little.

3. The King listened patiently, and without interrupting, to my description of the

events that ended with Sheikh Yusuf's suggestions at Bahrain, nor did he or the others seem particularly concerned to comment on the reasons I gave as to why these proposals were not acceptable to you. It is true that, after I had stated that Her Majesty's Government were not prepared to barter Abu Dhabi's land for an oil concession, Prince Faisal interrupted to the effect that neither would Saudi Arabia barter *her* land for a concession and insinuated that the suggestion for some agreement about the use of the oil in any part of the disputed area accruing to Saudi Arabia had originally been made by us. This called for a short discursion on my part to emphasise for the King's benefit that the suggestion had originally been theirs even though we had been the first to mention it on a piece of paper. But by and large your rejection of Yusuf's proposals was equably received and I believe that these proposals had been but a test of your intentions and Mr. Burrow's reaction.

4. I then began to detail Hafiz Wahba's offer as it had been understood by us. No sooner had I described the first alternative than the King asked for a map. Rushdi Bey rummaged in a cupboard and produced a battered copy of the small-scale one that Aramco uses for general publicity. The Saudi party gathered round the King's desk and there followed a few minutes of confused talk in Arabic while the King was laboriously shown what the proposals implied—laboriously, because His Majesty, it seems, is not well acquainted with a map. Where, he asked peevishly, was Khor al-Odeid? The Crown Prince pointed to it. And Buraimi? And was this (hand circling vaguely over the northern reaches of the Persian Gulf) the Imam's territory? (This last gratuitous question was presumably the consequence of his having heard earlier in the day that the Imam Khalili had died: that evening at supper the King alluded to this and said that the successor was "a very good man".) After I had described the rest of Sheikh Hafiz's suggestions, the King, not surprisingly, said that he had not yet fully studied the question: Hafiz had been

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speaking in a personal capacity and report of what he had said had only reached Riyadh the day before: nevertheless, he was prepared to discuss these new suggestions. What did I think of them? I replied that I was chiefly concerned to discover if these proposals had His Majesty's approval, but that in any case the idea of a neutral zone would not be acceptable to Her Majesty's Government.

5. Meanwhile, Yusuf Yasin had been making some rough measurements on the map with the aid of a jewelled paper-knife that was lying on the desk. He leant towards the King and announced that the distance between Mirfa and Khor al-Odeid was a matter of 230 kilometres. This seemed to excite His Majesty: if the frontier were to start just to the east of Khor al-Odeid, he said, this would be a very great concession indeed. I then asked bluntly if His Majesty was suggesting as a basis for negotiation the proposal that Khor al-Odeid should be Saudi. After further talk, and not a little confusion in the King's mind, he eventually said that, if—and this he reiterated—if Her Majesty's Government agreed, Hafiz's first proposal (*i.e.*, that the frontier should leave Khor al-Odeid, Dhafra and Buraimi to the Saudis) might be regarded as a starting point for discussion. It was evident what this prevarication meant: the Saudis were trying so to manoeuvre that the suggestion should seem to come from our side; the next step on this well-trod path would be to insist that by *our* suggestion we had given up some right at least to Khor al-Odeid, if not Khor al-Odeid itself. I did my best to make the King understand that any concession in the mooted proposal would be a concession on our part and went on to give my personal opinion (as detailed in paragraph 5 of your telegram No. 257). This was unhappily received: my suggestion that the King should now be prepared to indicate what part of his claim he would give up if we were prepared to concede Khor al-Odeid drew sighs of exasperation from Yusuf Yasin; and when I said that Saudi withdrawal of their claim from Baraimi, for example, might be considered a practical and useful step, there was a burst of derisive laughter from the King and an aside between Prince Faisal and Sheikh Yusuf to the effect that they had expected this. There was plainly no hope of progress in this direction, so I suggested that if there was to be little likelihood of a practical compromise we should at once revert to arbi-

tration. The King readily agreed and said that he was merely waiting for the British answer to their note replying to the aide-mémoire on pre-conditions for arbitration which I handed to Hafiz Wahba on the 15th of February. It was decided that Yusuf Yasin should receive an answer from me that afternoon.

6. The discussion had lasted over two hours and the King was showing considerable impatience towards the end. At one point he interrupted the argument with an accusation that the British were starving the inhabitants of Hamasa. I of course countered this strongly: nevertheless it remained a running sore during this and other meetings. (I have reported the substance of the complaint in my telegram No. 122. I have since addressed His Majesty on the basis of your telegram No. 281 to me, but the Saudis have again accused us.)

7. That afternoon I had a meeting with Yusuf Yasin and Ahmed Musa, the Egyptian legal adviser to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. My intention was to present your replies (as set out in your telegram No. 249) to the Saudi note about the pre-arbitration conditions. Yusuf listened carefully and scarcely interrupted once: he said he would report all I had said to the King. There was just one question, he said: Would Her Majesty's Government have any objection if the Arabian-American Oil Company wished to carry out oil activities in the same area as where our oil companies were? I repeated that the Iraq Petroleum Company had obtained their present concession long before the Saudi claim was put forward: and that the objection was therefore inherent in my reply.

8. Later that day Sheikh Yusuf asked me for copies of the draft arbitration agreement and of the draft exchange of letters that would constitute agreement on the pre-conditions. These I gave him since it was clear that, while negotiation remained but a faint possibility, it was desirable to ascertain if it were now possible to obtain arbitration on our terms.

9. The next morning I was again summoned to the palace where I found the King with his counsellors of the day before reinforced by Prince Mishaal, who is Minister of Defence, and Sheikh Khalid Qarqani, one of the elder statesmen at the Court. Without any delay the King ordered

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the interpreter to read out a statement of His Majesty's views which had presumably been prepared by the Crown Prince and Sheikh Yusuf. It ran as follows:—

(i) His Majesty wished to emphasise that the proposals put forward by Hafiz Wahba were the latter's personal ones.

(ii) In spite of the fact that the positive steps taken by Yusuf Yasin and Hafiz Wahba in their meetings with Mr. Burrows were not met by a similar advance on the part of Her Majesty's Government for the settlement of the dispute in a friendly way, His Majesty was prepared to show *his* willingness to reach an understanding.

(iii) For this reason he had decided that, if Her Majesty's Government concurred, the following could be used as a basis for negotiations:—

- (a) Jebel Dhanna will be relinquished to Abu Dhabi;
- (b) Khor al-Odeid will be relinquished to Saudi Arabia;
- (c) A point in between Jebel Dhanna and Khor al-Odeid will be agreed upon and there the frontier will begin; it will then pass through Bainuna and Taff, leaving Dhaffra and Buraimi to Saudi Arabia;

(iv) If this point of view were agreeable the delineation of the frontiers would proceed accordingly; if not, arbitration should be resorted to at once.

This, the King added, was only a basis; there would of course be give and take; and, as quite often happened during this meeting, he turned to Prince Faisal for confirmation.

10. I said I would report to you what the King had given as his statement, but added that I could hardly believe that you would find it acceptable. The King shrugged his shoulders: what he had suggested represented a great concession; if it was not acceptable, then let us resort to arbitration.

He was ready, he said, to sign the agreement there and then: it was only necessary that the British concede one small point—the single condition that there be full equality in the area during arbitration. I invited His Majesty to say more explicitly what he meant by "equality"; and added that you already considered that the two sides had reached that position, that you had shown much goodwill, and considered your proposals both reasonable and generous. At this the King laughed: he would, he said, send a reply to me within a few days.

11. There followed further argument, much of it circular and repetitive, in which the King harped on equality in the area, on our unreasonableness, and on the pretentiousness of Shakhbut's claims. I found opportunity to make a broad and general statement of Her Majesty's Government's position and traditional friendship with Saudi Arabia (which the King reciprocated) and went on to point out that we also had a tradition of friendship with the Gulf Rulers, who had our protection in virtue of treaty obligations, which—and I feel that the Saudis took the point—it was not your intention to flout.

12. The main achievement of this latest visit to Riyadh is, I think, that we have now satisfied ourselves that there is a virtual impasse as far as a settlement by negotiation is concerned. If, in the matter of preparing for arbitration, there has been little progress, the two sides do at least know better where the other stands—and that, in this long-drawn-out dispute, is something.

13. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Washington, the Political Resident at Bahrain, and the Head of the British Middle East Office.

I have, &c.

G. C. PELHAM.

EA 1421/24

No. 18

REPORT ON THE SCHEME FOR SUPPLYING KUWAIT WITH WATER FROM IRAQ

Mr. Burrows to Mr. Eden. (Received May 31)

(No. 57. Confidential)

Bahrain,

May 23, 1954.

Sir, You expressed the wish in paragraph 2 of your despatch No. 281 (EA 1421/15) of October 9 to Mr. Stephenson at Fayid, that I should report to you on the political implications of the scheme for supplying Kuwait with water from Iraq. Since that date considerable progress has been made with regard to the practical aspects of the scheme, thanks in the first place to the visit of Mr. Crawford of the Development Division of the British Middle East Office to Kuwait and Baghdad at the end of last year. I enclose a copy of his report on his visits. This has already been sent to the other recipients of the present despatch. Among the most important points in Mr. Crawford's recommendations were that:—

- (a) the water should in the first stages at any rate be brought by pipeline and not by canal;
- (b) the priorities for the use of the water should be—
 - (i) domestic supply;
 - (ii) gardens and trees in and around the town of Kuwait;
 - (iii) small scale agriculture consisting principally of market gardening;
- (c) large-scale agriculture should not be attempted.

As reported in Mr. Pelly's letter to me No. 1421/4 of January 11 last, of which a copy was sent to the Eastern Department, these recommendations were generally speaking accepted by the Kuwait Development Board, the chief exception being that the amount of water to be obtained in Stage I was increased to 30 million gallons a day, and that the Stage II figure of 70 million gallons a day was to be reached as early as possible after the completion of Stage I. Sir Alexander Gibb and Partners were then appointed by the Kuwait Government to carry out a survey of the scheme on this basis and to make a report. Facilities for the operations of the survey party in Iraq territory were readily given by the Iraq Government. The survey is now complete and the report will be ready shortly. The Company propose to show it to the Foreign Office, but will not hand it to the Ruler of Kuwait until his return to Kuwait about the beginning of July. His Highness in fact instructed the firm to hand the report to the Development Board in his absence as soon as it was ready, but Mr. Pelly and I advised them that this was undesirable because the leakages which would be bound to ensue would lead to premature and unnecessary discussion among the Kuwaitis and would prejudice the negotiations with Iraq. I understand that the report will show that the project is technically a feasible one and will not present any undue physical or mechanical difficulties.

2. I have been unable hitherto to complete my report on the political implications of the scheme as I wished first to discuss them with Her Majesty's Ambassador in Baghdad and to obtain some preliminary Iraqi reactions. I have now been able to spend two days in Baghdad which were mainly taken up with these discussions.

3. There is no doubt that the project has deeply stirred the feelings of the Kuwaitis. They have always been short of water and they are still near enough temperamentally as well as geographically to the desert to share the Bedouin's almost reverential feeling towards it. Moreover Mr. Crawford's report shows that they can expect considerable benefit from the scheme, not least in increasing the amenities of their at present unlovely town. I think that they now appreciate the wisdom of our advice that they should first assure themselves of a supply of drinking water under their own control by means of a distillation plant, rather than making themselves wholly dependent on a supply controlled by another country. But further than this they do not seem to be worried at the thought that when this scheme is completed they will have given a fairly large hostage to their neighbours. If they were ever brought to analyse their thoughts on the subject they would probably feel that the combination of Arab brotherhood and the protection of Her Majesty's

Government should be enough to avert any danger. They will wish to get as good terms as they can from Iraq, and the Ruler was notably non-committal when I tentatively put before him the thought that it might be advantageous to arrange the scheme in such a way that Iraq as well as Kuwait should get some benefit from it. The Kuwaitis would probably resist any idea that they should pay for the water, thought they will no doubt be ready to pay for the land that is necessary for pumping installations and wayleaves for the pipe.

4. The Kuwaitis have up to now conducted the business connected with this project with full regard for our responsibility for their foreign relations and they have been unusually ready to accept our advice on the substance of the scheme, as provided by Mr. Crawford, and on the appointment of British consultants. It remains to be seen whether they will be equally co-operative as regards arrangements for negotiating with the Iraq Government, which I discuss in paragraph 10 below.

5. The major political question to be considered in relation to this scheme is that in paragraph 4 (b) of your despatch No. 261 (EA 1421/13) of September 24 last to Mr. Stephenson, namely its effect on Kuwaiti-Iraqi relations bearing in mind Her Majesty's Government's responsibility for the conduct of Kuwait's foreign relations. There are two obvious dangers. One is that the scheme might tend in the direction of the absorption of Kuwait by Iraq, which certain highly placed Iraqis openly regard as desirable and inevitable. The other is that it might, owing to Iraqi attempts to cut off the water or to their demanding too high a price for it, lead to strained relations between the two countries and thus involve Her Majesty's Government in protecting Kuwait's interests against Iraq without any effective means of doing so. On the other hand it was clear from the beginning that if through fear of these rather remote dangers we refused to try to obtain Iraqi agreement to the scheme, we should immediately incur the criticism that our protection did not avail to obtain one of Kuwait's most important requirements, and this would in itself have been a serious danger to our special position there. The decision of principle was therefore taken that we should go in for the scheme on Kuwait's behalf. It remains to do what we can by the form and substance of the agreement to be reached with Iraq to obviate any possible political dangers. On the positive side, if we succeed in making a satisfactory arrangement with Iraq on Kuwait's behalf, this will do much to cause the Kuwaitis to value their connection with us.

6. During my visit to Baghdad Sir John Troutbeck took me to have an audience with King Feisal II and to call on the permanent head of the Iraq Foreign Office, Yusuf Gailani, on the Minister of Agriculture and on the Minister of Communications and Works. I also had an informal talk with the Foreign Minister, Dr. Jamali, who was not attending his office owing to indisposition, but whom I met socially. The object of these talks was to emphasise to the Iraqis our close concern with this project and to give them an idea of the timetable which we foresaw for further discussion of it. I said on this point that the consultants' report should be ready in the next month or two, that thereafter the Kuwaitis would have to decide on the basis of this report exactly what proposals they wished to put forward, and that we would then hope to approach the Iraq Government with firm and detailed proposals for an agreement probably by about September next. King Feisal and the others whom I saw all expressed themselves as keenly interested in the project and eager that it should be put into effect. The Ministers had clearly not given any detailed thought to it and we did not therefore obtain many clues as to the likely Iraqi attitude on the matters which will have to be negotiated with them. The question of a canal to carry the water was raised several times. I said that I thought this would be undesirable for practical reasons, at any rate until a very much later stage. This view appeared to be accepted, but it would be rash to exclude the possibility of further attempts being made from the Iraqi side to introduce this idea from the beginning.

7. The most important point to be decided as regards the content of the agreement with Iraq is perhaps that the mutuality of benefit. You agreed in paragraph 4 of your telegram No. 10 of January 4 with my idea that it was desirable that Iraq should obtain some benefit from the scheme in order that future Iraq Governments might be deterred from making difficulties by the thought that if the supply of water was interrupted they would thereby be depriving their own country as well as Kuwait of something to its advantage. The possibilities are either that Kuwait should pay for the water in addition to the facilities required on land,

or that the scheme should supply water to Iraq territory as well as to Kuwait, or that some reasonably similar concessions or facilities should be granted by Kuwait to Iraq. I am against the first of these alternatives. The Kuwaitis would I think object to paying for water which would otherwise go to waste and which they have been using from time immemorial, albeit in much smaller quantities, by fetching it from the river by boat. The second method would mean either that part of the water raised from the river by the pumping installations to be set up by Kuwait should be diverted for irrigation in Iraq territory, or that from a point somewhere near the Kuwait-Iraq border (if possible perhaps on the Kuwait side) a branch pipe should be laid from the main pipe to supply water to the port at Umm Qasr, which is just inside Iraq territory and which the Iraqis say they intend to develop. If Kuwait obtains the water free the Umm Qasr supply might also be provided by Kuwait free of charge. As regards the third of the possible methods mentioned above there seems some possibility of a useful parallel being established between the facilities required by Kuwait in Iraq for this water scheme and facilities which may be required in Kuwait territory by Iraq in connection with the development of Umm Qasr. I am reporting separately on some talk I had with Dr. Jamali and with Yusuf Gailani on the question of demarcating the Kuwait-Iraq frontier. It has long been known that one of the causes of delay on the part of the Iraqis in agreeing to this was their feeling that they might wish to obtain some change of the frontier to give them full control of the approaches to this port. It occurred to me that instead of handing over any territory it would be better, and more acceptable in Kuwait, if facilities were provided for the Iraqis on the basis of a lease, or any other suitable agreement, for such practical purposes as might be necessary. In the course of the talk which Sir John Troutbeck and I had with Yusuf Gailani he said in fact that this was what the Iraqis would require. Dr. Jamali on the other hand began by saying that Iraq would like to obtain possession of the Kuwait island of Warba. But he appeared interested in the idea that I put to him on a purely personal basis that it would be easier to arrange for facilities to be provided on Kuwait territory, in exactly a similar manner to those to be provided on Iraq territory for the Kuwait water scheme. The difficulty of this method, as also to some extent of the previous one, is likely to be that of timing, since the development of Umm Qasr will not be undertaken for at least some time after we hope that the water scheme will be well under way. Nevertheless it might well be possible for Kuwait to give an assurance now that if water was required in the future for Umm Qasr they would supply up to a stated quantity, or that when the Iraqis required facilities for harbour works, &c., on Kuwait territory near the port these would in principle be provided on similar terms to those agreed on for the use of Iraq territory for the Kuwait water scheme. It was agreed in my discussion with Sir John Troutbeck that the best tactics might be that we should go into the negotiations on the assumption that Iraq would not charge for the water, and we should be prepared to argue against this if necessary. If, however, it appeared that the Iraqis were determined to obtain payment, or if they asked for some concession in return for the water, we should then propose as a counterpart either the provision of water for Umm Qasr or the grant of facilities on Kuwait territory for harbour works in connection with the development of the port and the channels leading thereto. In the unlikely event of the Iraqis not asking for something in return we should have to consider whether it might even so be in Kuwait's long-term interest to offer either of these things, but there might in that case be greater difficulty in obtaining Kuwait's agreement to our doing so.

8. Apart from whatever might be decided on the above question the points to be covered in an agreement would be:—

- (1) the amount of water to be taken out of the river;
- (2) the lease of land required for the pumping installations close to the river, possibly for one or more relay pumping stations in Iraq territory, and for the narrow strip of land required for the passage of the pipe or pipes;
- (3) provision for suitable means of inspection or control by Kuwait of the installations on Iraq territory;
- (4) duration of the agreement;
- (5) method of carrying out the construction work, customs duties on material, &c.

In discussion with Sir John Troutbeck we tentatively reached the following conclusions on these points. The maximum amount of water likely to be required in any foreseeable time should be stated in the agreement, though it might also be

said that for a certain period only a smaller amount would be required. It might be necessary to have a further clause saying that in the event of unforeseen circumstances still larger amounts might be taken by the Kuwait Government on a similar basis, but it would be much better to avoid having to enter into new negotiations once the scheme was in operation because this would give the Iraqis the opportunity to demand a very stiff price if they felt so inclined. Similarly on point (2), the areas to be leased should be sufficiently extensive to cover any foreseeable enlargements of the scheme beyond what would be required in its earliest stages. It would be best for the Iraq Government to acquire such land from private owners and lease it to the Kuwait Government. There might be a useful precedent in the terms on which the oil companies in Iraq operate their pipelines. There is a complication here about the possible use of land in the Royal Air Force area at Basra which is being discussed in separate correspondence. As regards (3) it was thought that the Iraqis might require that the personnel employed in Iraq should be Iraqi. It would no doubt be desirable from the Kuwait point of view that an official paid by the Kuwait Government should be in charge of the pumping installations and the pipeline, but if this could not be arranged it would probably be sufficient for rights of continuous inspection to be given to Kuwait and any local difficulties would then have to be dealt with in the first place between the Kuwaiti inspector (preferably resident in Iraq) and the appropriate Iraqi authorities. In this connection I do not see the need for a joint Kuwait-Iraq high level policy board to direct the project, as advocated by Mr. Crawford. I think it will be better so far as possible to dispose of matters of high policy in the initial negotiations and to treat the operation of the scheme as primarily a technical matter to be settled on a technical basis at as low a level as possible. In fact it may well be that at any rate for some time to come there will not be available either Iraqi or Kuwaiti qualified technicians capable of doing the job and in that case we could hope that an Englishman could be appointed. On (4) Sir John Troutbeck's view was that the agreement should be of definite though long duration rather than of indefinite duration, the latter type of agreement being more liable to political attack in Iraq. With a definite time limit the Government stood a better chance of putting off discussion on the grounds that the agreement would in any case fall to be reconsidered at such and such a time. It seems therefore that we should try for an agreement of say 25 years, with provision for automatic extension for periods of 5 or 10 years failing notice to the contrary. As regards (5) the Kuwaitis intend that the work of installing the pumps and pipes should be done by contractors, but that when this is complete the scheme should be under Government control. There may be some practical advantage in having the work in Iraq and Kuwait done by two separate contractors. Alternatively in order to avoid customs dues it might be possible for the material for use in Iraq to be imported in the name of the Iraq Government.

9. As regards the form of the agreement there are conflicting arguments. From the point of view of Kuwait and of ourselves in relation to Kuwait it is desirable that the agreement should be of as formal and public a type as possible so that we can have the strongest possible grounds on which to carry out our obligation to protect Kuwait's interests if there were Iraqi infringements of the agreement. On the Iraqi side, however, while we may reasonably accept goodwill in this matter from the Government and officials, there will be very great reluctance to submit to Parliament any agreement which openly admits the special position of Her Majesty's Government in the Persian Gulf. If there is a real danger that an agreement with us acting on Kuwait's behalf might be seriously attacked in Parliament and still more if there was a danger of its being rejected on this account, we would ourselves be in an awkward situation since it might be represented in Kuwait that our conduct of her foreign relations was a hindrance and not a help to the attainment of her practical requirements. We have therefore some interest in helping the Iraqi authorities to avoid this predicament. The best compromise might be an Exchange of Letters between Her Majesty's Ambassador and the Iraqi Government which would constitute an agreement containing all the necessary provisions, but which the Iraq Government might not feel it necessary to submit for ratification. It would, however, be desirable from Kuwait's point of view and indeed probably obligatory on us that we should register such an Exchange of Letters with the United Nations. It appears to be uncertain whether the Iraq Government could so register an agreement which had not been ratified, but this should probably be our objective when we come to discuss the matter with them.

Yusuf Gailani made no comment when Sir John Troutbeck mentioned that this was our present thought about the form which the agreement should take.

10. There remains the question of the method of negotiating the agreement. Here again we have the somewhat conflicting objectives that on the one hand we must assert our right to conduct Kuwait's foreign relations, but that we do not wish to have the responsibility, or at least the sole responsibility, either of a failure to reach an acceptable agreement or of accepting one on Kuwait's behalf which may appear unduly onerous. The best compromise seems to be that we should be responsible for the negotiations in general and that we should ourselves negotiate with the Iraqis the general outline and substance of the agreement, but that the financial details should be negotiated, at any rate in the first instance, by a Kuwait attached to our delegation, these details being subsequently incorporated in the agreement to be concluded by us. We would naturally secure the agreement of the Ruler of Kuwait to the proposals put to the Iraqis in the first instance and we would consult him on major points which arose in the course of the negotiations. The first step should thus be that when definite proposals have been worked out in Kuwait on the basis of the consultants' report these should be forwarded to the Iraq Government by Her Majesty's Embassy with the request that negotiations for an agreement on this basis might be opened as soon as possible. On receipt of a favourable reply Her Majesty's Political Agent at Kuwait, accompanied by a suitable Kuwaiti nominated by the Ruler (very likely his "State Secretary" Abdullah Mullah), should go to Baghdad and carry out the negotiations under the general direction of Her Majesty's Ambassador, who would formally open the discussions with the Iraq Government, and assisted as necessary by members of the staff of Her Majesty's Embassy. Mr. Reilly, the Financial Counsellor on my staff, might also assist Mr. Pelly as required and deputise for him whenever it was necessary for him to return to Kuwait.

11. With reference to paragraph 4 (c) of your despatch to Mr. Stephenson, No. 261 (EA 1421/13) of September 24 last, in view of Mr. Crawford's recommendation that agricultural use of water in Kuwait should be severely restricted it does not seem likely that more than an extremely small number of Palestinian refugees could be settled in Kuwait as a result of this scheme. But there might conceivably be openings for a few men with some qualifications for the kind of market gardening operations which are contemplated.

12. As regards the question raised in paragraph 4 (d) of the same despatch of securing for British industry the execution of a major share of the work involved in this project, the Ruler of Kuwait has said that it will have to be put to international tender, and in view of past history he is almost certain to maintain this view. I suggested to the representatives of Sir Alexander Gibb and Partners, whom I saw in Kuwait, that they should if possible mention in their report the availability in the sterling area of the materials which will be required. I hope also that the specifications which they will prepare may assist the chances of the contract being obtained by a British firm. But the best hope in this direction will have to be the competitive nature of British tenders.

13. I shall be glad to learn whether you agree that we should proceed generally on the above lines. It is perhaps none too early to start considering the nature of the agreement to be reached with Iraq in greater detail, and it would be useful to know whether drafting for this purpose will be carried out in the Foreign Office or whether the attempt should be made here or at Her Majesty's Embassy at Baghdad.

14. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Baghdad, the Political Agent at Kuwait, and to the British Middle East Office at Fayid and Beirut.

I have, &c.

B. A. B. BURROWS.

EA 10393/10

No. 19

IRAQI-KUWAITI FRONTIER INCIDENT

Sir John Troutbeck to Sayid Arshad al Umari. (Received June 8)(No. 254. Confidential)
Sir,Baghdad,
May 26, 1954.

I have the honour on instructions from Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to address your Excellency on the following important matter.

2. On the morning of the 21st of May, 1954, at a point five miles south-east of Safwan, a Kuwaiti frontier patrol encountered three Iraqi frontier guards mounted on camels. The leader of the Kuwaiti patrol invited the Iraqi guards to withdraw, whereupon they opened fire. The Kuwaiti patrol was thereafter obliged to return the fire, with the result that one of the Iraqi guards was killed and the other two wounded. A doctor was summoned by the Kuwaiti authorities to attend the wounded.

3. Your Excellency will recall that the Iraqi-Kuwaiti frontier in this area, as defined by the then Prime Minister of Iraq in his letter of the 21st of July, 1932, to the United Kingdom High Commissioner in Iraq, is considered to run "just south of the latitude of Safwan; thence eastwards passing south of Safwan Wells, Jebel Sanam and Umm Qasr, &c.", and in my Note Verbale No. 626 of the 28th of December, 1951, under sub-paragraph (b) the "point just south of the latitude of Safwan" was interpreted to mean the "point on the *thalweg* of the Batin due west of the point 1,000 metres due south of the customs post at Safwan." Your Excellency will observe therefore that the site of this incident, five miles (circa 7,500 metres) south-east of Safwan, must lie well within Kuwaiti territory.

4. Accordingly, while it is regretted that this incident has caused casualties to Iraqi frontier guards, I am instructed by Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to protest in the most formal manner to your Excellency both at the presence of these guards at the place in question, where they had no right to be, and at the fact that they opened fire on Kuwaiti forces which they had no cause to do.

5. This unfortunate occurrence emphasises clearly the need properly to demarcate the Iraqi-Kuwaiti frontier as soon as possible and, in this connection, I would draw your Excellency's attention to the fact that my Note Verbale No. 626 of the 28th of December, 1951, on this subject has remained without definitive response. The allegations of Kuwaiti infringement of the frontier made from time to time by the Ministry under your Excellency's charge are likely also to have arisen from the lack of any precise frontier in this area. Moreover, the project for supplying water from Iraq to Kuwait, and the fact that both the Kuwait Oil Company and the Basra Petroleum Company are operating comparatively near to the border, further increase the necessity for fixing this frontier without further delay.

6. In the meantime, I am instructed to request your Excellency to be so good as to cause the necessary orders to be issued to the Iraqi frontier guards and police operating in the neighbourhood of the frontier to ensure that they do not enter Kuwaiti territory and that similar incidents do not occur in the future.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to your Excellency the assurance of my highest consideration.

J. M. TROUTBECK.

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EA 1622/10

No. 20

ABOLITION OF VISAS BETWEEN KUWAIT AND IRAQ

Baghdad,
June 1, 1954.

(No. 262)

Her Britannic Majesty's Embassy presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and, with reference to the Ministry's Note No. 896/245/100 of the 25th of November, 1953, regarding the approval of the competent Kuwait authorities of the revised instructions relating to the abolition of visas between Iraq and Kuwait, has the honour to state that it has not yet been informed of the date on which the instructions are to be put into force, and to suggest therefore that this date should be one month after the date of the present Note, if there is no objection.

In this connection the Embassy is prepared to transmit to the Kuwait Government the list of persons whose entry into Iraq is considered undesirable by the Iraq Government and subsequent additions and amendments to it.

Her Britannic Majesty's Embassy avails itself of this opportunity to renew the expression of its highest consideration.

ES 10016/1

No. 21

RELATIONS BETWEEN EGYPT AND SAUDI ARABIA

Sir Ralph Stevenson to Mr. Eden. (Received June 12)(No. 690. Unclassified)
(Telegraphic)Cairo,
June 12, 1954.

On June 9 Major Salah Salem returned to Cairo from a four-day visit to Saudi Arabia. On the same day the Saudi Arabian Embassy in Cairo issued a communiqué which stated that all questions of interest to Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the Arab world had been reviewed, and there had been complete agreement between Major Salem and King Saud. There had also been complete agreement on outstanding Arab problems, and both countries would unite their efforts to obtain satisfaction for Arab demands regardless of attempts being made to attract certain countries to alliances with Powers opposed to the Arabs.

2. On June 11 Salah Salem said at conference, that King Saud has assured him that he would put aside the private interests of his kingdom if these were to clash with Egyptian interests and aspirations. The King and he agreed that neither Saudi Arabia nor Egypt would take any action internationally without consulting the other, and also that monthly political consultations should be held between the two countries.

3. The efforts of certain Powers to attract Arab countries to join foreign alliances had been discussed. The joint statement issued after the meetings had put an end to the rumours circulating about the Saudi Arabian attitude towards these alliances. The primary considerations in determining foreign policy would always be the Arab League Charter and the outstanding Arab questions, such as the Canal Zone and Palestine. Full agreement for the co-ordination of defence was reached, and an invitation to the Saudi Arabian Minister of Defence to visit Egypt had been accepted.

4. Major Salem then made the following points in answer to journalists' questions:—

- (i) The Turko-Pakistani pact had been discussed. If circumstances in Pakistan had forced her to enter into an alliance with the West, that did not mean that Egypt would be hostile to Pakistan. Relations between the countries would not be affected by the conspiracy of those who occupied Egypt and who had handed over part of the Arab world to Israel.

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- (ii) British aggression in the Buraimi was no less significant to Egypt than British aggression in the Canal Zone and Western complicity in the Israel aggression.
- (iii) The cooling off in relations between certain Arab States had been reviewed. No efforts would be spared to restore unity.
- (iv) Arrangements had been made to fix the exchange value of the Egyptian pound at 10 Saudi rials and to organise exchange operations during the pilgrimage. The Sudan had been included in these arrangements.
- (v) No loan had been requested from Saudi Arabia.
- (vi) Should a Moslem conference be held in Mecca during the pilgrimage, Egypt would send a delegate, and it was hoped that Colonel Nasser would be able to go.

EM 1041/136

No. 22

YEMEN-ADEN FRONTIER

Sir Ralph Stevenson to Mr. Eden. (Received June 23)(No. 148. Unclassified)
(Telegraphic—Saving)Cairo,
June 19, 1954.

The Arab League Secretariat issued the following communiqué on June 17:—

“The Arab League has endeavoured by peaceful means to forestall the efforts of the British authorities to detach certain southern areas of the Yemen. These efforts violate the principles governing international relations and lead to violation of the integrity of Yemini territory, thus causing a threat to peace in that region of the world.

On January 27, 1954, the Arab League Secretariat addressed a letter to the Sultans and Sheikhs of the Southern Yemen appealing to them to unite against efforts to detach their lands from the Yemen. Meanwhile, the Arab League has endeavoured to improve the situation. Its mission, which visited the Yemen in February 1954, investigated the present position. Despite the efforts of the Arab League, it has been gathered from reports from the Yemini Government that British aggressions still continue. About two weeks ago the villages of Sawmaa and Baida were attacked.

It has also been brought to the knowledge of the League that the British Authorities are still exerting pressure on certain Sheikhs to obtain pledges from them by which they would agree to the British scheme for a federal régime and to other projects. These Sheikhs are refusing to agree despite British threats to bombard their lands.

Expressing its indignation at these methods and the repeated aggression on the southern frontiers of the Yemen, the Arab League still hopes that British authorities will put an end to these aggressive actions directed against the integrity of Yemini territory.”

EA 10110/1

No. 23

COMMUNAL FEELING BETWEEN THE SHI'A AND SUNNA SECTS

Mr. Burrows to Mr. Eden. (Received June 26)(No. 63. Confidential)
Sir,Bahrain,
June 23, 1954.

I have the honour to report that I took the opportunity of a meeting with the Ruler of Bahrain on June 20 to speak of my concern at the serious state of communal feeling between the Shi'a and Sunna sects in Bahrain which gave rise to the riot on the 10th Muharram last year, which has continued to be inflamed and which has

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lately broken out again in a communal fight at the Bahrain Petroleum Company's Drum Plant at Sitra in which Shi'i and Sunni villagers of Sitra Island joined and which resulted in a dozen or so casualties, one of them fatal.

2. I said I was aware that there was some talk of Sunni and Shi'i representatives getting together to settle their communal differences and that some meetings had been held with that purpose, but they had been discouraged by the Government, because it appeared that those concerned wanted to make these meetings an excuse for putting forward all kinds of unacceptable political demands. While I knew that the leadership of this movement had got out of the hands of the sensible and respected leaders of the communities and for that reason ulterior and highly undesirable motives on the part of the present promoters of communal understanding were to be suspected, I thought it necessary that the Government should encourage some proper measures to reduce the heat of communal feeling and might itself indeed take the lead in promoting agreement. I offered for His Highness's consideration an idea that had occurred to me as possibly useful, namely that His Highness might himself appoint a joint commission of good men from both parties to enquire into the causes of the ill-feeling and advise him on measures likely to reduce it. Their report might serve two purposes: it might produce some useful practical ideas and, secondly, it would show the people that the Government was doing something about the situation.

3. His Highness replied at some length. His objections to my suggestions were:—

- (i) that any persons he appointed would be repudiated by the ignorant agitators on both sides;
- (ii) there was a risk of the persons appointed posing as being the chosen leaders of their communities and setting themselves up as rival authorities to the Government;
- (iii) the appointment of such a commission would be an invitation to the agitators to press their unreasonable and undesirable demands, such as the removal of British influence, the dismissal of the British Adviser, the control of the finances, education and the law courts and the establishment of a representative Government. His Highness emphatically asserted that he could never countenance any action that aimed at disturbing his relations with us and it was unthinkable that he would betray the Adviser, who had served him and his father before him so loyally, to a gang of ignorant self-seekers.

4. Shaikh Salman further begged me not to listen to Shi'a complaints about their oppression by the Bahrain Government and the Al Khalifah. (From this point His Highness seemed more concerned to defend himself against a charge of partiality—which I had been careful to avoid making—than to deal with feeling between the communities.) The Shi'a in Bahrain, he said, enjoyed a far more favourable position than their co-secretaries in Saudi Arabia. They were free to make their own dispositions as regards Waqfs; they had their own Sharia Courts; they were exempt from the *Zakat* (Tithe) and other taxes; the Government—or rather His Highness himself for the most part—had contributed heavily to the building of mosques and schools for them. They had in fact no real grievances. In any civil dispute between a Shi'i and a Sunni the Courts were open to all.

5. The Political Agent, who was also present, remarked that this was so but the Shi'is observed that all the judges were Sunnis and they did not believe impartial justice was done by an entirely Sunni bench. His Highness replied that they might equally well demand that the judge of Her Britannic Majesty's Court for Bahrain should be a Shi'i! The Government and the judges were strictly impartial.

6. His Highness protested that in all countries of the world there were sectarian and communal differences that led to outbreaks of violence from time to time. No Government could entirely prevent them and it was particularly difficult with a population so ignorant and excitable as Arab villagers. The trouble here was that such material could be easily worked upon by a few agitators whose motives were patently to secure power and profit for themselves. The way to deal with the situation in his view was to discourage inflammatory talk on the one hand and, on the other, for the Government to act promptly and firmly in dealing with all breaches of the peace.

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7. I said I, for my part, was not influenced by what Shi'is said to me about the Government, but I was somewhat perturbed about what they did—they and the Sunnis—to each other. I would certainly support every firm action the Government took to maintain law and order and suppress communal strife.

8. Although His Highness did not accept my proposal of a joint commission—and there is force in some of his objections to it—I felt the discussion was useful in that it impressed on His Highness the fact that I am concerned about a situation which, I believe, may become more serious with the approach of Muharram. It is well that His Highness should feel that we do not entirely share his view that the Al Khalifah Government is perfect. It is naturally, from our point of view, far preferable to the sort that would be set up by the people now talking about “democracy” if they were given the chance, and there is not the slightest doubt that the Island is much better administered than it ever would be by any conceivable sort of representative government of Bahrainis; nevertheless, such talk is gathering volume and force here and the fact that the Sunni Al Khalifah and the Shi'i aborigines stand in a kind of Norman-Saxon relation to each other provides a source of strong feeling that could be made to drive a political movement aimed really at ousting the Ruling Family—and ourselves—and setting up a “democracy.”

9. Reform of the Law Courts is probably the best antidote to this feeling. There will always be rivalry between the sects, but it is important to the Al Khalifah, and ourselves, that they should remove from themselves the odium of partiality that now attaches to them in Shi'i eyes. The appointment of a British Judicial Adviser, even though he may not at first sit as a judge, will do much for the reputation of the Bahrain Courts. When he has been installed and has begun to make his influence felt we shall be able to consider whether any further steps can usefully be urged on the Bahrain Government.

I have, &c.

B. A. B. BURROWS.

EA 1081/343

No. 24

CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND THE SAUDI ARABIAN AMBASSADOR ON JUNE 24, 1954

1. Frontier Dispute.
2. The Shipping Agreement with M. Onassis.

Mr. Eden to Mr. Pelham (Jedda)

(No. 58. Confidential) *Foreign Office,*
Sir, *June 24, 1954.*

The Saudi Arabian Ambassador called on me this morning at his request.

2. I began by asking His Excellency to convey to King Saud my thanks for the very friendly message which I had just received through him. I should, of course, be sending a formal reply; in the meantime, I could assure the Ambassador that I entirely reciprocated His Majesty's feelings regarding the need to restore the friendly relations between our two countries and to find a solution to the present disputes.

3. As regards this, I said I had hoped to be able to give His Excellency the substance of our new proposals for arbitration. Unfortunately they were not quite ready. I hoped they would be delivered to him

during the course of this week. They were a sincere effort to find means of agreement on the conditions for arbitration, and I hoped the Saudi Arabian Government would feel able to accept them. In the meantime, it seemed to me most necessary that both sides should refrain from exacerbating the dispute by public statements and accusations. The Ambassador said that he agreed with this. He had ignored most of the requests from his Government to issue accusatory statements to the press about British activity at Buraimi. He did not believe in such methods between friends. It was, however, embarrassing for him that the English newspapers picked up and reported similar statements issued by his colleague in Cairo. He looked forward greatly to receiving our new proposals and

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said that he would be very glad to fly to Riyadh to discuss them with his Government if he felt they offered real prospects of agreement. I encouraged this.

4. Finally I told the Ambassador that I was much disturbed by the recent agreement reached between the Saudi Arabian Government and M. Onassis. It seemed to us that this agreement ran counter to international shipping practice and was liable to do grave damage to British interests. I hoped he would telegraph to his Government an expression of my concern. Other Governments, notably the United States, were equally, if not more, affected and I hoped the Saudi Arabian Government

would think very carefully before pursuing a course which seemed liable to lead them into difficulties with friendly Powers. The Ambassador took note of what I said, but made no comment.

5. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representative at Washington, Her Majesty's Political Resident in the Persian Gulf at Bahrain and the Head of the British Middle East Office at Fayid.

I am, &c.

ANTHONY EDEN.

EM 1041/169

No. 25

YEMEN-ADEN FRONTIER

Mr. Eden to Mr. Roper Curzon (Taiz)

(No. 58. Restricted)
(Telegraphic)

Foreign Office,
July 8, 1954.

A Note was presented to the Yemeni Chargé d'Affaires to-day and will be released to the Press for publication to-morrow, July 9. Please present a Note in identical terms, *mutatis mutandis*, to the Acting Foreign Minister as soon as possible.

2. Following is the text:—

Your Excellency,

In my Note No. EM 1041/103 of the 17th of May I addressed you about the failure of the Yemeni Government to prevent their territory from being used as a base for raids into the Aden Protectorate. I now have the honour once again to draw your Excellency's attention to the very serious situation that continues to exist on the Aden-Yemeni frontiers. Between the 1st and the 24th of May some twenty-eight raids on the Protectorate took place, and there is no sign that the situation is improving. Indeed, Yemeni raiders attacked the Protectorate town of Mukeiras on the 10th of June and this series of aggressions culminated on the 18th of June in a serious attack on Martaa by some 80 regular Yemeni troops and 400 tribal irregulars.

In addition to these attacks on the Aden Protectorate the Yemeni Government, according to evidence in the possession of the British authorities, continue to foment rebellion in the Protectorate and to give encouragement, money and arms to lawless elements such as the Dammani, the Rabizi and the Hassani Akil.

By making the Treaty of 1934 and the Exchange of Notes of 1951 with the Yemeni Government, Her Majesty's Government had hoped to secure, among other things, peaceful conditions on the putative frontier between Aden and the Yemen. Indeed, those international agreements bound parties to “maintain the situation in regard to the frontier on the date of the signature of this treaty” (the Treaty of 1934) and “to refrain from taking any action which may alter the *status quo* existing in the disputed areas at the present time” (the 1951 Exchange of Notes). For their part, Her Majesty's Government have done their best to observe those agreements. The actions of the Yemeni Government, in contrast, give colour to the belief that they lay claim to the whole of the Aden Protectorate and have no intention of settling the problem of the frontier.

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Her Majesty's Government firmly reject any such claim. They call upon the Yemeni Government to stop the attacks which are being mounted against the Protectorate from Yemeni territory, and to refrain from fomenting unrest within the Protectorate by supplying lawless elements with arms, money and food. Her Majesty's Government are encouraged by the agreement of your Excellency's Government with the suggestion made to you recently by the Minister of State that the frontier authorities on both sides should at once consult together with a view to restoring tranquillity on the frontier. The Governor of Aden is being invited to make appropriate arrangements for this consultation.

I am however to inform your Excellency that, if the attacks continue, Her Majesty's Government reserve their right to take such steps, including direct action in the frontier areas, as may be necessary to protect the territory and inhabitants of the Aden Protectorate.

3. Governor of Aden is being asked to tell you time and place at which his representatives will be ready for frontier consultation. When you receive this information please notify Yemeni authorities.

EA 1622/14

No. 26

ABOLITION OF VISAS BETWEEN IRAQ AND KUWAIT

Mr. Hooper to Mr. Eden. (Received July 13)

(No. 151. Unclassified)
Sir,

Baghdad,
July 10, 1954.

With reference to your despatch No. 91 (EA 1622/7) of the 14th of May, 1954, and my telegram No. 400 of the 1st of July, I have the honour to enclose a translation of a *Note verbale* from the Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs dated the 28th of June, which states that the Iraqi authorities support the proposal of Her Majesty's Government to abolish visas between Iraq and Kuwait with effect from the 1st July, 1954.

2. A copy of this despatch is being sent to Her Majesty's Political Resident at Bahrain and Her Majesty's Political Agent at Kuwait.

I have, &c.

R. W. J. HOOPER.

Enclosure

No. 323/119/100/17750

Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Economic and Consular Department,
Consular Section,
Baghdad, June 28, 1954.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs presents its compliments to Her Britannic Majesty's Embassy, Baghdad, and, with reference to the Embassy's Note No. 262 of the 1st of June, 1954, has the honour to state that the competent Iraqi authorities support the proposal of the esteemed Embassy to put into effect the instructions for the abolition of visas between Iraq and Kuwait from the 1st of July, 1954.

The Ministry avails itself of the opportunity to express its highest consideration and esteem.

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EA 1016/8

No. 27

REPORT ON THE SUCCESSION TO THE IMAMATE OF OMAN OF GHALIB BIN ALI BIN HILAL AL HINAI

Mr. Burrows to Mr. Eden. (Received July 19)

(No. 71. Confidential)

Bahrain,

July 12, 1954.

Sir,
In the Residency letter 10133/68/54 of May 7 the Eastern Department were informed of the death of Mohammed bin Abdullah al Khalili, the Imam of Oman, and of the succession to that title of Ghalib bin Ali bin Hilal al Hinai. I have the honour now to submit a more detailed account of the circumstances surrounding this change in the tenure of the Imamate together with an account of other recent developments in Oman.

2. Though the old Imam had been in a very poor state of health for some considerable time it appears that his death came more or less unexpectedly. A meeting was held in Nizwa some time in the last week of April, attended by him, Sulaiman bin Himyar, Salih bin Isa and other leading Shaikhs, at which Ghalib bin Ali was appointed successor to the late Imam. Ghalib himself took up residence in the fort at Nizwa immediately. The late Imam died at about 7.30 a.m. on May 3 and was buried in the Imam's cemetery at Nizwa a few hours after his death. On the day of his death a meeting was held at Nizwa which confirmed the appointment of Ghalib bin Ali. Sulaiman bin Himyar came from Tanuf to Nizwa immediately on hearing the news of the late Imam's death, but Salih bin Isa being away in Sharqiyah, was unable to be present. Agreement to appoint Ghalib as the new Imam was taken unanimously and he immediately wrote letters to the authorities in Muscat, including Her Majesty's Consul-General, announcing his succession to the Imamate. Sayid Ahmed bin Ibrahim appears to have had some fears that the Bedouin might be tempted to carry out raids in the coastal area while the new Imam was not yet firmly in the saddle and he accordingly stationed Muscat infantry at the Customs post beyond Ruwi and sent motor patrols daily up to Sib. There have however been no reports of any disturbances. Ghalib is a member of the Beni Hina. His father, Ali bin Hilal is the Imam's Wali at Rostaq. He is reported to be between 40 and 45 years old and was employed as a Qadhi at Rostaq before his election to the Imamate. He is said to be rich. The general impression in Muscat appears to be that he is a man of strong and independent character who is unlikely to be willing to go very far to come to terms with the Sultan or to admit foreigners into Oman. By way of compensation, however, it is thought that he is not likely to be any more eager to see an extension of Saudi influence in Oman. The Sultan has not indicated how he views the succession. It is, however, no secret that he has at times entertained hopes that the Imamate might once more be left vacant on the death of the late Imam and the unanimous election of so strong a character as Ghalib is unlikely to be welcome to him.

3. In my telegram No. 48 Saving of October 13 last I reported the visit which Sulaiman bin Himyar had paid to me in the course of which he said, claiming to speak on behalf of the Imam as well as of himself, that the people of Oman desired to obtain for their own people the benefits which he had seen elsewhere in the Gulf flowing from the development of a country's oil resources. This was not the first occasion on which one or other of the Omani leaders had made such a proposal to us and our reply has always been the same, that the Sultan has already granted to a British oil company concession valid in the whole of Oman, that we quite agree that the development of the oil resources of Oman, if any, is very much in the interests of the inhabitants, and that the Omanis should therefore come to some arrangement with the Sultan and the company for the exploration and development of these resources. In the correspondence ending at your telegram No. 12 of January 5 to us it was decided that there was no reason for us now to depart from a line of policy which we have consistently followed in the past, and that all the more so in as much as the Sultan had recently agreed to the oil company's landing a party in the Huqf, from which it was hoped that Oman might be penetrated. It was scarcely to be expected that this reply would satisfy Sulaiman bin Himyar or that our recommendations would be followed. Certainly they were not. On the other hand the Omani leaders did not thereupon abandon their hopes of getting an oil company into Oman. In February of this year Mohammed bin Abdullah al

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Salami came to see me armed with a letter from the Imam. Shaikh Mohammed is a member of a very small tribe living in Sharqiyah, Nizwa and Samail and his importance derives from the circumstance of his father's having been largely responsible for the election of the first Imam in 1913, while he himself has a considerable reputation for piety. His brother is the Sultan's Wali in the Wadi Beni Khalid. Shaikh Mohammed, after rehearsing the usual claims that Oman was quite independent of the Sultan, said that the Omanis wanted an oil company to go into their territory and wanted to know whether Her Majesty's Government would arrange this for them. (My telegram No. 21 Saving of February 26.) I replied in the same terms as I had replied to the previous approach on these lines by Sulaiman bin Himyar. Shaikh Mohammed hinted that he might be willing to approach the Sultan, as I had suggested, but I am doubtful whether he really understood what it was that he was agreeing to and no such approach has subsequently been made. More recently there has been a further indication of the continued interest of the Omani Shaikhs in making contact with an oil company. A certain Kuwaiti, by name Rashid bin Said Raqraq, recently arrived in Dubai by air, where he let it be known that he had come in response to a telegram from Sulaiman bin Himyar asking him to pay a visit to the Jabal Akhdar. Mr. Pirie-Gordon reported that it was believed that Sulaiman wished to appoint Rashid as his representative in Kuwait to negotiate with an oil company. When Saiyid Ahmed bin Ibrahim heard of this man's presence on the Trucial Coast he asked us to pass a message to the leader of the Sultan's askars in Buraimi instructing him to arrest him, if possible, and send him to Muscat. By that time Rashid was safely back on the coast and I instructed Mr. Pirie-Gordon to tell him before he left that the Sultan had asked us to prevent his returning to Oman and that we should do our best to do so. He should therefore return to Kuwait and not visit the Trucial Coast again.

4. Some time ago the second Munshi from Her Majesty's Consulate in Muscat, a native of Laskarah, returned from a period of leave at his home through the Sharqiyah and Oman and he reported that everywhere there was talk of opposition to and resentment at the arrival of the oil company at Duqqam. There was a feeling that the arrival of Europeans in Oman would result in the inhabitants losing their freedom. There is an apparent contradiction between this attitude and the continued attempts of the leaders to introduce an oil company into Oman. The contradiction is however, I think, only apparent. Opposition to the introduction of an oil company on simple grounds of xenophobia seems now to be much diminished in Oman, largely no doubt owing to the very large numbers of Omanis who now go to work in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Bahrain and see what oil has done for those countries. In principle the Omanis would now like to enjoy the benefits of the operations of an oil company in their own country. They insist however that the company should be introduced on their terms and there is no evidence that they are prepared to abate their insistence on their complete independence of the Sultan. Both Sulaiman bin Himyar and Mohammed bin Abdullah prefaced their requests for the introduction of an oil company by insisting on the independence of Oman. As reported in my telegram No. 21 Saving of February 26, one of the purposes of Mohammed bin Abdullah's visit to me was to urge again that recognition be accorded to travel documents issued by the Imam and Sulaiman bin Himyar has been reported as desiring to proceed from the issue of travel documents to the issue of passports. They view therefore with jealousy and resentment the landing at Duqqam of a company under the auspices of the Sultan. Under the Residency reference 10133/52/54 of April 14 the Foreign Office will have received a copy of a letter from the late Imam claiming that Duqqam was his country and asking us to remove the company. At the same time you received a copy of Major Chauncy's reply. I now enclose copies⁽¹⁾ of translations of a further letter from the old Imam and of two letters from new Imam in the same strain. Major Chauncy sent a non-committal acknowledgment of the first of Ghalib's letters and I am instructing him not to reply to the second.

5. One of the reasons which confirmed our decision not to give any encouragement to Sulaiman bin Himyar's approach to me last October was the fact that the Sultan and we had put our money on the Huqf expedition as the key to the door to Oman. On arrival at Duqqam the company found the coastal areas to the west of the Huqf depression thinly inhabited by Janabah. These coastal Janabah are Shafi and appear to accept the leadership of Salim bin Nasir, the Shaikh from Sur who the Sultan has appointed as his representative on the beachhead, and Said

(1) Not printed.

bin Sultan, who lives in Mahot, and to admit an allegiance to the Sultan. The Janabah of the interior, whose Tamimah is the notorious Yasir bin Hamad, are Hanbali. They deny allegiance to the Sultan and Yasir himself has come very close to being a Saudi agent. Of the other tribes in the coastal area the Harasis were found hardly to exist while the Wahibah showed themselves somewhat resentful of the arrival of the company. In my despatch No. 35 (15331/168/54) of March 30 I have described the areas in which the company were particularly interested and their disappointment at the limitations which the Sultan had placed on their operations. These have resulted in their exclusion, for the time being, from the area around Jebel Fahud, in which they are particularly interested. The initially disappointing results of their operations in the coastal area allotted to them have made the company the more keen to gain admission to the interior and their main ambition at the moment is to be allowed to visit the Duru territory. Evidence of the attitude of the Duru is contradictory. In December of last year Ali bin Hilal of the Duru went to see Shaikh Zaid bin Sultan in Buraimi and expressed to him a desire to visit the Sultan and make his peace with him. Shaikh Zaid recommended him to visit Saiyid Ahmed bin Ibrahim in Muscat and to ask the Sultan to establish a post in his territory which would give employment to his followers and increase his prestige and influence. Shaikh Zaid said that at first Ali bin Hilal agreed to do this. In the event however he did not but returned immediately to his own country from Buraimi. More recently Saiyid Ahmed bin Ibrahim informed Her Majesty's Consul-General in Muscat that Ali bin Hilal had asked the Sultan to give him a post, for which he could supply the askars, but that the Sultan had not replied to the approach. More recently still a minor Duru Shaikh is reported to have presented himself at Duqqam with letters to Shaikh Salim bin Nasir which appear to constitute an invitation to him, Shaikh Salim, to visit the Duru territory. On the other side is a letter sent by a Duru Shaikh, Huwaishil bin Hamad, who resides near Tanam to Shaikh Zaid bin Sultan, the Janabah Shaikh from Mahot, who has attached himself to the oil company in Duqqam. In this letter Huwaishil asked Zaid to stop the company from penetrating the Duru country.

6. There are one or two other developments in Oman which I should report in order to complete the picture. In the first place, although the election of Shaikh Ghalib as the new Imam was in theory unanimous he does not, at the moment, appear to enjoy the unanimous support of the Omanis. It was said at the time of his appointment as successor to the previous Imam that Sulaiman bin Himyar was opposed to the appointment, and it is certain that it was known for some time that Sulaiman had favoured a nephew of the previous Imam as his successor. The Levies blockading Hamasa have intercepted two letters from Yasir bin Hamud to Mohammed bin Salimin bu Rahma and to Turki bin Ataishan that "we did not like him [Ghalib] but when we saw that the people of Oman had evil intention we wished to accept him in order to avoid interference by the foreigners." It seems probable that Yasir's antipathy to Ghalib stems from the latter's reputation for hostility to the Saudis. Even since his appointment, however, Ghalib's authority in Oman has not been unchallenged. For some time now we have been receiving reports of disturbances at Ibri where last year Sulaiman bin Himyar installed on behalf of the late Imam a Wali loyal to himself. It is now reported that Sulaiman's puppet has grown frightened of him and wishes to turn the fort over to the Sultan, an enterprise in which he is said to be receiving encouragement from the Sultan's friend Saif bin Amir, a Shaikh of the Beni Ali at Yanqul. It seems unlikely that either the Imam or Sulaiman would allow Ibri to escape from their control and there have recently been reports of the Imam's leading an expedition to Ibri in order to re-establish his authority. The Imam is also meeting with some opposition in the Wadi Samail, the inhabitants of which refused to accept his authority. It is reported that he proposed to visit the Wadi with some 250 men, but that the expedition has had to be called off as someone stole his six personal camels just as they were about to set out and some of the expected tribal contingents did not turn up. The waters being thus muddied the Sultan is trying to fish in them. He is said to be paying considerable sums to the Shaikhs of the interior and to have made a large sum of money available to his representative at Duqqam, Salim bin Nasir, for the same purpose. There are unfortunately grounds for supposing that a good deal of this latter money is diverted by Salim from the purpose for which it is intended. I do not venture to hope that the Imam's authority is weak enough to offer the Sultan any serious chance of re-establishing his own in Oman. It is, however, satisfactory that the Sultan is taking what I think to be the most practical steps open to him to re-establish his authority in Oman. Major Chauncy believes that the slowness of the people of Oman to recognise the new Imam is due in part to this distribution of largesse.

7. One of the difficulties with which we are always faced in deciding on a line of policy to be adopted towards Oman is that our information about that district and its inhabitants is so fragmentary. Much of it is inevitably received through persons with an axe to grind. It is no less difficult now than it has habitually been in the past to know what is going on and what is being thought in Oman. I do not however think that the information at present available to us and outlined above suggests the necessity for any change in the policy decided on at the end of last year. We should continue to pin our faith on the Duqqam landing together with whatever the Sultan can do by distribution of money to win friends for himself to pave the way for the re-establishment of his authority in Oman. The Omanis accept the possibility of and some of them appear actually to want an oil company to come into their area. For the reasons which I have outlined above they are not at present prepared to come to terms with the Sultan and the company to which he has granted a concession and I still adhere to the view which we have held in the past that so long as this is the case it would be a mistake for the company to try to force their way in. The Sultan has many times made the point that the one thing which will unite the Omanis is the forcible entry into their territory by foreigners, as evidenced by the instant closing of the ranks when the Saudis appeared in Buraimi and the deference of the Imam to his leadership. More recently this same reaction has been demonstrated in Mahot. In January of this year Sulaiman bin Himyar visited Mahot, which he claimed as part of the Imam's territory. The Wahiba living there, who had previously shown themselves resentful of the company's landing, showed themselves equally resentful of this attempt by Sulaiman to establish Imam's control of part of the coastline. I think therefore that we must accept it as axiomatic that no penetration of Oman can be achieved by either the Sultan or the company without a careful preparation of the ground beforehand leading up to an invitation by the inhabitants of the area in question. As explained above, I see no grounds for hoping that the Omanis are likely, in the near future, to offer such an invitation to either the Sultan or the company. This however is not, I think, a matter for concern. The company are not interested in Oman itself and the areas in which they are interested are not occupied by tribes owing allegiance to the Imam. These areas are occupied by the coastal Janabah, the Wahibah and the Duru, the most interesting area of all being the Duru. I think therefore that for the time being we need not waste our time trying to devise ways of getting the company into Oman. If the Omanis themselves continue to make advances to us we should continue to reply by urging them to come to terms with the Sultan. Beyond that, however, we can leave the pot to simmer.

8. We must, however, make an effort to secure the admission of the company to the Duru territories. In March representatives of the oil company saw the Sultan at Salalah and gave him orally an assurance on the lines forecast in Mr. Fry's letter to me EA 15311/4 of April 1 to the effect that their operations would continue until some time in 1956 whether or not oil was found before that time, but on condition that they were allowed to go outside the area to which they are at present restricted. It was made clear that if they were not allowed outside this area no such guarantee could be given. No letter on this point was handed to the Sultan. Representatives of the oil company saw the Sultan in Salalah again recently and attempted once more to persuade him to extend the area to which he had confined them, but without success. The Sultan professed to be confident that when he returned to Muscat in October the Duru Shaikhs would come in to him. Even if this forecast is true it would then be very late for the company to take full advantage of the winter season for work in the interior. It may be therefore that we ought to give further support to the company's representations to the Sultan and urge him to expedite his dealings with the Duru. I am discussing this point further with Major Chauncy. The Sultan has also refused permission to the company to operate throughout the area of the coastal Janabah. These Janabah have hitherto shown themselves friendly both to the Sultan and to the company and there seems every reason for the company now to be allowed to operate throughout their area. Were this possible the company would be within reach of the Duru and it is a reasonable expectation that inquisitiveness and cupidity would bring the latter into the company's camps so that contact would at least have been made.

I have, &c.

B. A. B. BURROWS.

REPORT ON COMMUNAL TENSION BETWEEN THE SHIA AND SUNNI SECTS

Mr. Burrows to Mr. Eden. (Received July 26)

(No. 75. Confidential)
Sir,

Bahrain.

July 20, 1954.

I reported in my despatch No. 63 of June 23 a conversation with the Ruler of Bahrain about communal tension between the Shia and Sunni sects, each of which comprise roughly one half of the population of the island. The anxiety which I expressed to the Ruler on that occasion was unfortunately borne out only too soon by the rioting and strike which occurred at the beginning of this month. I have summarised these events by telegram. I now have the honour to submit a more detailed account.

2. As a result of the fight at Sitra mentioned in my despatch under reference eight Shias and three Sunnis were put on trial. The trial was held in the Police Fort on June 30. This place was chosen, perhaps unfortunately as it turned out, in order to give more room for the court and with an eye to greater security. The choice of site naturally encouraged the Shia to feel that their men would not get a fair trial, and a crowd of some three hundred Shia, some of them from the village near Sitra from which the accused men came, gathered round the court room. The court sentenced one Shia to three years' imprisonment and a fine of three thousand rupees (or an additional year in prison) and three others to two years' imprisonment and a similar fine. Four other Shias received sentences of one month, as did the three Sunni. The latter were boys whose squabble started the riot, but who were clearly not to blame for the serious turn it took. The Shia had come up on purpose from a neighbouring village to join in the fight. It was therefore no doubt right that the Shia should be punished considerably more heavily than the Sunni though the actual sentences given may possibly be regarded as over severe.

3. In considering the events which followed it must be borne in mind that, after the riots at the time of Muharram last year (my despatch No. 99 of October 13, 1953), there was a delay of nine months in bringing to trial the Sunni who had, to general knowledge, made an unprovoked attack on the Shia village of Arad, and that a few days before June 30 a Shia had been sentenced to a year's imprisonment for voluntarily causing hurt to a Sunni who had unfortunately fallen dead, presumably from a heart attack, when pushed by the Shia in the course of a market place argument at Muharraaq. It has also to be considered that while Sir Charles Belgrave often sits on the bench (and is sometimes criticised for doing so while being at the same time Commandant of Police), the other judges are all members of the al Khalifah family and therefore Sunni. While therefore in the Sitra case a somewhat heavy handed justice may in fact have been done, it was inevitable that in the eyes of the Shias it should not manifestly have been seen to be done.

4. When the sentences were announced there was a general uproar, and the crowd ran to the Agency, where they clamoured to the Political Agent for the protection of the British against the Bahrain Government. Mr. Wall persuaded them to disperse and return to their homes. They promised, however, to return the next day. In addition to this demonstration at the Agency, the Shias entered on a general strike, as a protest against the sentences, which affected some 70 per cent. of the Bahrain Petroleum Company labour force (mainly in non-producing departments such as maintenance), and the Public Works Department. The Customs jetty was not much affected. All the shops in the bazaar closed mainly because the shopkeepers were apprehensive of rioting in Manama, and of the Shia youths acting as strike pickets. Activity also ceased in the fish and vegetable markets.

5. On the morning of July 7 the Shias returned to the charge and contingents of men from the villages were arriving in buses in Manama at about 9.30. A crowd, somewhat larger than on the previous day, gathered at the Moamin Mosque to the north of the Police Fort. A little after 10 a.m. the crowd emerged from the Mosque, and some 200 of them moved over to the Police Fort, having armed themselves on the way with bits of wood, iron piping and leaves of motor-car springs. It is not clear what the intentions of the crowd were. They may have

had an idea of freeing the Shia prisoners, or the fort, like the Bastille, may have represented itself to their minds as a more general symbol of oppression and injustice. One of the non-commissioned officers did good work trying to persuade them to disperse, but meanwhile the police rank and file were being unsettled by the crowd's threats accompanied by crude and unmistakable gestures, to attack the married lines where the police families lived. Finally when two revolver shots went off in the crowd a number of policemen opened fire without orders, some at the crowd, others over their heads, killing three and wounding twelve, one fatally. The mob immediately ran once again to the Agency, leaving their dead behind them. The events which took place at the Police Fort are described in the Report of the Commission of Enquiry of which I enclose a copy.⁽¹⁾

6. At the time that these incidents occurred the Political Agent had gone to see the Ruler to urge him to agree to the appointment of the Judicial Adviser as a judge and to announce the appointment publicly and also to persuade him to institute a proper hearing of the appeal of the Muharraq manslaughter case. The news of the disturbances, however, prevented further discussion. The Ruler accepted the advice of the Political Agent to issue an Ordinance announcing the formation of a Commission of Enquiry to determine the responsibility for the shooting, and drafted this at once. He also accepted the Political Agent's suggestion that Judge Haines should assist the Commission. The Commission was to be composed of the Ruler's uncle, Shaikh Abdulla bin Isa (Sunni), two Sharia Qadhis, Shaikh Abdul Latif bin Muhammad al Sa'ad (Sunni), and Shaikh Abdul Hussain Hilli (Shia), with Judge Haines advising. The Political Agent then returned to the Agency where the crowd, some 300 strong, were swarming round the compound, demanding protection against the Bahrain Government and the police. A delegation of seven or eight from the crowd were inside the Agency demanding that British soldiers police the town, that the Bahrain police be disarmed, that the Sitra sentences be reviewed by a British judge and that Shaikh Khalifah, Director-General of Public Security, be dismissed. On his arrival, the Political Agent had the Agency Police Guard disarmed and withdrawn inside the building, and spoke with the delegation. The Political Agent assured the delegation of the concern of Her Majesty's Government in the good name of Bahrain and said he would report their plea for protection. The delegation said they would return the next day, but were unable to persuade the crowd to disperse. A section of them had meanwhile gone to the Government Hospital, and taken away the bodies of the three people killed—all of them boys of about seventeen—and brought them to the Agency. The rest became hysterical on the sight of the bodies and broke into the Agency in a mob and made their way up to the Political Agent's office, bearing the bodies with them. Someone in the crowd took a spare Consular flag from the hall and draped it over one of the bodies. It was quickly retrieved by the Agency boat man. The Political Agent, with members of his staff, managed to shepherd the people down the stairs and out of the building, and then spoke to the crowd outside for an hour. He repeated what he had said to the delegation and announced that the Commission of Enquiry was being set up. The names of those appointed were given a mixed reception, though the mention of Judge Haines' participation was applauded. At 2 p.m. the temperature was having its effect and the crowd withdrew from the Agency compound, loaded the bodies on to buses, and drove off to their villages to hold the funerals, saying they would return the next day.

7. The crowd did not return on Friday, July 2, but held the funerals in the villages concerned. The Political Agent sent in the morning for the two older leaders of the Shia community, and persuaded them to try to resume control of their sect, since the "delegates" he had been seeing were persons neither of much intelligence nor influence and one or two of them extremists. In the afternoon the Political Agent saw a delegation of four of the Shias he had seen the previous day. The main demands they put forward were that the Chief of Police (Shaikh Khalifah) and an Inspector should be suspended, and that the persons sentenced in the Sitra case should either be pardoned by the Ruler, or allowed bail pending appeal. The meeting ended with the Shias declaring that if the Government did not show evidence of their intention to protect the lives of the Shias, the Shias would continue the strike indefinitely. At this stage of events, the Political Agent and the Adviser managed to associate the two pearl merchants who were former leaders of the Shia

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.

community, older and more respectable, with the movement. The suggested reforms they put forward in the meeting with the Political Agent were more reasonable than those proffered by the delegation, they asked mainly for reform of the courts and of the police, the introduction of a written law, applied to everyone in Bahrain, put forward for consideration the case for setting up a Majlis of Shia and Sunni representatives to act as a sort of Court of Equity to the Ruler. They felt that it might be possible to exclude trouble-makers, and that the chief value of such a Majlis would be in its psychological effect, but admitted that it might be disowned by the more extreme elements.

8. On the morning of July 3 the Political Agent had another meeting with the Ruler. The latter was anxious, in view of the crop of rumours current that the Agency was encouraging the Shia against the Government that some sort of public announcement of Her Majesty's Government's support for the Bahrain Government could be published by us. Accordingly the British Broadcasting Corporation broadcast on its Arabic Service of July 5 a statement giving the news of the disturbances, stressing the longstanding friendship between Her Majesty's Government and the Bahrain Government and announcing Her Majesty's Government's confidence that the Bahrain Government would take the measures necessary for restoring peace between the communities. (On July 8 they broadcast another statement stressing the Ruler's responsibility for internal affairs in Bahrain.) During this meeting with the Ruler, the Political Agent had a frank discussion of Judicial Reforms with the Ruler suggesting—

- (i) that Judge Haines or the Registrar of Her Majesty's Court should sit on the Court of Appeal which would presumably hear the appeals in the Sitra Case;
- (ii) that the Judicial Adviser to the Bahrain Government should, on appointment, be a Judge of the Courts, or, better still, Chief Justice;
- (iii) that the police should be reformed, on the appointment of a senior Police Officer. The Political Agent had previously discussed this question with the Adviser who agrees that the Bahrain police force needs more British officers, and that one senior officer with the title Assistant Commandant should be responsible for the training and organisation of the force. The Ruler counter-attacked vigorously on this, saying that we had been unable to produce the extra police officers already asked for and complaining that he could not afford the extra remuneration needed to attract suitable officers for the force. Later, His Highness, having realised the power a bigger and better police force would put into his hands, told the Adviser he thought the strength ought to be doubled and appeared to accept readily the appointment of an Assistant Commandant and the increased charges.

9. The same day a list of the Shia demands under the heading of "The Requests of the People of Bahrain" was circulated in the bazaar. The petition asked for:—

- (i) A freely-elected Advisory Council with equal representation for Sunnis and Shias to examine all public affairs.
- (ii) A Legal Committee to draft a code of law; the law was then to be approved by the Advisory Council.
- (iii) Reform of the courts and appointment of judges, foreign judges, if necessary, with law degrees.
- (iv) Elected Councils for the Municipalities, public health and education.
- (v) Reform of the police and acceptance of the principle that the head of the police is responsible for consequences of any breach of the peace.
- (vi) Compensation for the victims of incidents since 10th Muharram and a general amnesty.
- (vii) Punishment of the police responsible for firing on the crowd on July 1.

10. Nos. (ii), (iii) and (v) of these demands corresponded, with some modification, to proposals which we had already pressed on the Ruler, and it appeared that if the Ruler accepted our views on these points and were willing to pay compensation, he could without harm to his interests go a long way towards making a constructive reply to the petition, save only on the questions of an Advisory Council and of elected councils for public health and education. In discussion with Mr. Wall on July 5 the Ruler accepted our advice to this effect and

agreed that the Government should prosecute the essential reforms which have been long under discussion in the hope that this would give a breathing space in which they might strengthen the Public Security Department and at the same time satisfy the more intelligent section of the people now discontented. The reforms were not, however, to be announced until the situation had returned to normal. It was also agreed that as a temporary measure designed to secure a return to work by the Shias the Ruler should inform the two senior and respectable Shia leaders that if the strike ended the Government would announce substantial reforms.

11. The next day, at the Ruler's pressing request, the Political Agent was present at the meeting with the two Shia leaders. Despite careful coaching, however, the Ruler gave them a very unsatisfactory answer, and it was only by strenuous efforts on the part of Mr. Wall and Sir Charles Belgrave that the situation was retrieved and a Government ordinance published to the effect that reforms would be announced if the strikers returned to work.

12. Meanwhile, difficulty had arisen over the composition of the Commission of Enquiry, which was due to hold its first meeting on July 7, owing to the refusal of the two Qadhis to serve on it. They were eventually replaced by Ahmad Fakhroo, a leading Sunni merchant, and Mansur al Orayidh, one of the two senior Shia representatives referred to above. The change was, as it turned out, a considerable improvement, and these two men showed notable public spirit in accepting the appointment at this difficult juncture and in the strenuous efforts which they made outside the Commission to pacify the feelings of both the communities and to secure an early return to work by the Shias.

13. During the night of July 6-7, various other disturbing developments occurred as reported in my telegram No. 440 of July 7. Sunni tribesmen gathered round the Palace volunteering for service with the Ruler, and other Sunnis were summoned from the villages, ready to be armed by the Al Khalifah and to go down to Manama, open the bazaar by force and break the strike. A deputation of the leading Sunni merchants and one of the leading Shias went to the Palace to urge the Ruler to provide police protection for shopkeepers, but not to send the tribesmen into the town. On July 7 I went to the Palace at Rufa, accompanied by the Political Agent, and after driving through a mob of tribesmen engaged, quite amiably, in a war dance, saw the Ruler and obtained his solemn assurance that he would not send tribesmen into the town: he had already arranged to disperse a crowd of Sunni gathered in Muharraq. Instead, some seventy-five policemen were sent into the bazaar area, to protect the merchants from the strike pickets. The shops were opened, at first with considerable hesitation and anxiety, and the strike gradually petered out. By July 10 the great majority of the Oil Company employees had returned to work, and the situation had returned to normal.

14. On July 10 the Commission finished its sittings and produced its report, of which I enclose a copy.⁽¹⁾ The hearings had been boycotted by some of the Shia, but the Commission was able to obtain enough evidence to make a clear picture of the events of July 1. The main burden of the work devolved upon Judge Haines, and it is due to his efforts that the Report was completed and presented to the Ruler within a comparatively short time. The Report, as we had anticipated, blamed the police for opening fire without orders, although not without considerable provocation.

15. On July 15 a Proclamation was issued, of which I enclose a copy,⁽¹⁾ announcing specific reforms to which the Ruler had previously agreed. It has been on the whole well received in the town, although it is still early to judge its full effect, and of course it is distasteful to many members of the Al Khalifah and to certain "advanced" young Sunnis who suspect us of imposing "colonialism" on Bahrain.

16. It is difficult to see how the enmity between the Sunnis and Shias in Bahrain can be brought to an end. The normal evolution in European countries would be for the difference to become blurred and finally to disappear through intermarriage. But this has up to now been unknown between the two communities and owing to social as much as doctrinal differences is unlikely for a considerable time to come. The Middle Eastern solution would be a tacit or written compact between the rival sections, as occurred in Egypt, the Lebanon and Iraq, by which each was guaranteed a pre-determined share of Government posts and administrative

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.

influence. The Bahrainis are not yet politically mature enough to make or execute such an arrangement, and an attempt to apply some such system even to the Manama municipality was not a success. The difficulty has been aggravated by the fact that the Bahrain Government has been, and in the popular mind still is, associated with one of the sections, but yet has not sufficient force or authority to maintain order in face of the exacerbation of communal feelings existing here since the Muharram troubles last year. It is the object of the reforms which the Bahrain Government have announced on our advice to increase both the impartiality and the power of the administration.

17. We shall be involved in a greater degree of direct participation in the administration, through the Judicial Adviser and the British police officers, than would otherwise be necessary or perhaps desirable. It is not here, as it is in Kuwait, an object of our policy to increase the British element in the local Government since in normal circumstances the Government is itself usually amenable to our influence. But in the present case there is no alternative method of reassuring the people of Bahrain that impartial justice will in future be done and that the police will be in a better position to maintain order without the unwarranted use of firearms. As a corollary to these steps, and in order to show that we are not imposing more direct rule on Bahrain for its own sake, we shall have to take seriously in hand the training of Bahrainis for judicial and police posts, and it will be one of the first tasks of the Judicial Adviser and the Assistant Commandant of Police to prepare schemes for this purpose.

18. The intensification of Shia-Sunni feeling during the past year must probably be attributed in part at least to the general malaise of the Middle East, whose influence percolates even here through the Egyptian Press and the various Arab radio broadcasts. It will not therefore automatically be appeased by any measures of reform which the Bahrain Government may undertake. Nevertheless, the removal of some justifiable grievances will leave the subversive virus with less to feed on. Apart from this latent source of communal violence the Bahrainis remain a peaceable people, and even with the weaknesses which have been shown up by these recent events the Bahrain Government remains a model of efficiency and integrity among its neighbours. The immediate future, and particularly the recurrence of Muharram in a few weeks time, gives rise to some renewed anxiety, but in the longer term the chances of survival of good government may still be rated higher than in most other Middle Eastern countries.

19. In closing this despatch I would like to pay warm tribute to the coolness and patience displayed by Mr. Wall in unusual and difficult, not to say dangerous, circumstances. The return of Judge Haines to Bahrain at considerable personal inconvenience and his skilful guidance of the Commission of Enquiry was another most important factor in restoring the situation to normal.

20. I am sending copies of this despatch to the British Middle East Office and to posts in the Persian Gulf.

I have, &c.

B. A. B. BURROWS.

EA 1421/38

No. 29

COMMENTS ON A DISCUSSION WITH THE RULER OF KUWAIT ON THE SUBJECT OF THE SCHEME FOR BRINGING WATER TO KUWAIT FROM IRAQ

Mr. Burrows to Mr. Eden. (Received August 2)

(No. 78. Confidential)
Sir,

*Bahrain,
July 23, 1954.*

With reference to your telegram No. 634 of July 13, I have the honour to report that I saw the Ruler of Kuwait on July 14, accompanied by the Political Agent and Mr. Boddington of Messrs. Alexander Gibb and Partners, on the subject of the scheme for bringing water to Kuwait from Iraq. The Ruler had previously requested that the report should be presented to him in my presence and I saw no objection to this. The Ruler made no particular comment at the time on the

substance of the scheme, except to get it clear that the Kuwait Government could, if they wished go in for the first phase of the scheme to produce 25 million gallons a day, without necessarily committing themselves to the second phase designed to produce a total of 75 million gallons. The only other point in which the Ruler showed immediate interest was the method of acquiring the necessary land in Iraq. I explained our idea that the land should be acquired by the Iraq Government and made available by them for the purpose of the scheme and I said I thought it likely that the Iraq Government would charge something for the land required. I emphasised the desirability of keeping the report confidential for the time being in order to prevent speculation in the acquisition of this land. The Ruler arranged that a copy of the report should be handed by Mr. Boddington to Shaikh Fahad and said he would give us his view as soon as possible. At Fahad's request further copies were made available for members of the Development Board who were to study it urgently. In a conversation with Shaikh Fahad I asked whether he would welcome a visit by Mr. Crawford while the report was under consideration, in view of the useful advice he had been able to give at an earlier stage. He replied, on learning that Mr. Crawford had not yet studied the report, that he preferred that Mr. Boddington should stay in Kuwait and take part in meetings of the Development Board to give such further technical advice as might be required and to answer questions arising out of the report. Shaikh Fahad hinted at one point at the possibility of direct technical discussion between Kuwait and Iraq. But I made it clear that it was in fact our intention to handle the negotiations.

2. I discussed the matter again, with particular reference to the handling of the negotiations, at an informal talk with the Ruler on the evening of July 14 and again in the course of his call on me before my departure on July 17. He accepted without any reservations whatever the idea that we should carry out the negotiations with Iraq on his behalf. When I mentioned the idea that a Kuwaiti might be attached to us for the purpose of detailed negotiations he began to speak of the desirability of his sending a mission of one or more members of his family to thank the Iraq Government for their co-operation and I thought it better not to pursue this point at that time.

3. As regards the possibility of Iraqi demands in return for facilities for the water scheme the Ruler said that when he had discussed the matter with Nuri Pasha, the latter had said that if a company was to obtain a concession for delivering the water the Iraq Government would wish to charge for it, but they would not do so if the Kuwait Government were handling the matter themselves. I then said that I thought it quite possible that the Iraqis might ask for something in connection with the development of Umm Qasr, such as a concession on Warba Island. His Highness replied to the effect that we were responsible for settling his frontiers with Iraq. He would not want to give up Warba Island as part of Kuwait territory, but if there was a question of a concession or facilities in return for similar concessions given by Iraq the matter could be adjusted.

4. It was agreed with the Ruler that the next steps in the programme for handling this matter were that the Kuwait Government should decide as soon as possible whether they wished to proceed with the scheme and if so on what lines. I explained that all we should want to know at this stage was the total amount of water required, the site of the intake and the general route of the pipe. When they had informed us of their decision we would put appropriate proposals to the Iraq Government. The latter would no doubt require some time to consider the proposals and would then either send a reply or say that they were ready to hold negotiations with us; and, after further discussion with the Ruler, I or the Political Agent would proceed to Baghdad to carry out the negotiations. The Ruler hoped to be able to let me have the Kuwait Government's views before he leaves for the Lebanon about the end of this month. If not he might be able to give me their views while he was there if I felt inclined to visit him for the purpose.

5. I think this is as far as we can take the matter for the moment. It is extremely difficult to get the Ruler and other Kuwaitis to see more than one step ahead. Their general intention clearly is to divide the question into two parts, one of which consists of the general decisions to be taken with regard to the nature of the scheme and its finance, &c., and on which they do not require advice other than from the consultants. The second is the negotiation with Iraq, which they will probably wish to leave almost entirely in our hands. The two aspects of the matter will in fact necessarily be to some extent interdependent. But at present our

chief interest seems to be that the Kuwaitis should fully understand the implications of the various decisions they will have to make about the scheme, in the hope that we can avoid the kind of difficulties that arose over the dredging contract. I have asked Mr. Reilly to keep in touch with Shaikh Fahad and so far as possible with the personnel of the Development Board while they are discussing the scheme, with the primary object of seeing that the various issues are properly understood by them.

6. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires in Baghdad, the Acting Political Agent at Kuwait, the British Middle East Office and the Development Division at Beirut. I have asked the Political Agency at Kuwait to send copies of Gibbs' report to Baghdad, the British Middle East Office and the Development Division Beirut. I assume that copies are available to you in London.

I have, &c.

B. A. B. BURROWS.

ES 11345/1

No. 30

ATTITUDE OF THE SAUDI ARABIAN GOVERNMENT TO THE UNITED STATES POINT-FOUR MISSION

Mr. Pelham to Mr. Eden. (Received August 4)

(No. 87. Confidential)
Sir,

Jedda,
July 11, 1954.

I have the honour to report that in the course of an interview on the 25th of June with the editor of *Bilad al-Saudia*, Saudi Arabia's only daily newspaper, Crown Prince Faisal gave some indications of the Saudi Arabian Government's attitude to the United States Point-Four Mission now in Jedda.

2. The text of the Crown Prince's remarks was as follows: "The work of Point Four depends to a large extent on the plans of the Government of any of those countries which have signed agreements with this organisation. It is true that no great works of Point Four with practical results are to be seen in our country. In fact, His Majesty's Government always prefer to meet the needs and requirements of their country by themselves. In the meantime, if assistance is not on a scale worthy of acceptance, His Majesty's Government would not require it, but would prefer to manage without it."

3. The failure of Point Four to get any project agreements signed with the Saudi Arabian Government for the use of sums appropriated by Congress for the United States fiscal year 1953-54, and the apparent lack of interest in Point-Four technical assistance among Ministers, have for some

time been encouraging speculation about the future of Point Four here. The closing remarks of the Crown Prince, hinting that Saudi Arabia might dispense altogether with Point-Four aid, have encouraged strong rumours that the departure of the mission was imminent. Colour was recently given to these rumours by the movement back to Jedda of some Point-Four equipment. These rumours, though by no means implausible, are stated by Mr. Harland Corson, director of the mission in this country, to have no foundation in fact.

4. Commenting on Prince Faisal's statement, Mr. Corson pointed out that although it was quite true that his mission had achieved little practical result in Saudi Arabia this was precisely because, as the Crown Prince said, Point Four depends on plans issued by the Government of the host country. Not only had the Saudi Arabian Government not signed the project agreements carefully prepared by Point Four, but even work-plans devised by Mr. Corson to allow work to begin on a short-term basis on certain projects had not been returned by the Government. Attempts by Point Four to extract suitable plans from the Government resulted in impracticable suggestions or, at best, schemes for which Point Four would have to pay over their

contribution of dollars to the Saudi Government without any guarantee that the money would not be diverted to other purposes or that their technical assistance would be called upon. Mr. Corson has formed the impression that Point Four is regarded as a milch-cow, and the suggestion that the Saudi Government might dispense with its services altogether unless the assistance offered was "on a scale worthy of acceptance" is taken by him as an attempt to coerce Congress into appropriating larger Point-Four funds for Saudi Arabia lest the Saudis reject American assistance altogether.

5. Mr. Corson had visited Riyadh, the capital, for some weeks in May and had at that time formed the impression that the necessary projects might after all be signed in time to allow funds to be obligated before the end of the United States fiscal year on June 30, 1954. During the course of his negotiations, however, he noticed a sudden cooling in Saudi interest, which he understood (from hints dropped to him from the Saudi side) to be connected with the situation at Buraimi. This he assumed to be attributable to American failure to give the Saudis the political support against Her Majesty's Government which they desired. (It will be recalled that the United States Ambassador here used the same argument with me in discussing our current proposals to the Saudis on the frontier dispute.) Since then no progress has been made by Point Four with the Saudi authorities, and practically all the 1953-54 funds appropriated by Congress for Saudi Arabia have now lapsed.

6. Nevertheless, Mr. Corson has been assured by the Crown Prince and various responsible Ministers that the Government's attitude to Point Four is friendly and co-operative. This is cold comfort to him while his staff of experts with wide experience in their various fields must sit idly planning schemes the execution of which is interminably delayed by Saudi

procrastination. The Point-Four programme chart affords melancholy evidence of this: eight projects are still under review by the Government, and on one—a vaccine laboratory—work is now beginning after long delays. A maternal and child health clinic has been completed in Jedda by the mission, but no reference to Point-Four aid was made at its inauguration. Preliminary work is now in progress on a rural community development scheme at Wadi Khulais, but here again serious work is delayed for want of the necessary agreement.

7. The budget for 1954-55, which has been expected for some months, is still before the Council of Ministers and awaits confirmation. Meanwhile Govenco, the German combine engaged by the Saudi Arabian Government as public works contractors, remains relatively inactive, and in expectation of the appearance of the budget the schemes of various departments have to be shelved. Point Four, therefore, can hardly be blamed for their failure to produce results. Prince Faisal may say that the Government can manage without their aid, but unless conditions alter in the Government itself this would not necessarily mean any alteration in the rate of development of the country. Abundant funds are available from oil revenues, and technical assistance is available from various sources of which Point Four is only one: but as long as the country's oil wealth continues to be dissipated to gratify private avarice, development of irrigation and agricultural work and educational and public health projects is not likely to make great progress.

8. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Washington and to the British Middle East Office at Fayid and Beirut.

I have, &c.

G. C. PELHAM.

AGREEMENT BETWEEN HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT AND THE SAUDI ARABIAN GOVERNMENT TO REFER TO ARBITRATION THE DISPUTE CONCERNING THE FRONTIER BETWEEN ABU DHABI AND SAUDI ARABIA AND SOVEREIGNTY IN THE BURAIMI OASIS

Mr. Pelham to Mr. Eden. (Received August 4)

(No. 96. Confidential)
Sir,

Jedda,
July 31, 1954.

I have the honour to inform you (as reported briefly in my telegram No. 200) that at a short ceremony at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs here at 10.00 a.m. on Friday the 30th of July, in accordance with your instructions I signed, together with His Royal Highness Prince Faisal ibn Abdul Aziz, Crown Prince and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Saudi Arabia, an Agreement which provides for the determination by an Arbitral Tribunal of the common frontier between Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi, and of sovereignty in the Buraimi zone.

2. Immediately before signing the Agreement I had effected with His Royal Highness the exchange of Notes which makes certain provisions for the areas in dispute during the period of arbitration—notably, the withdrawal of Turki bin Ataishan and his party from Hamasa, the withdrawal of the Trucial Oman Levies from the disputed areas, and a temporary arrangement whereby both sides may conduct operations in separate areas between the lines of the Saudi 1949 claim and the claim put forward on behalf of the Ruler of Abu Dhabi in 1952. The documents are enclosed in my despatch No. 97 of the 31st of July to the Foreign Office only.

3. It was the arrangement for the continuation of oil operations that featured in so much of the negotiation during this last month. On the 17th of May, a Saudi draft of the exchange of Notes forwarded to me by Sheikh Yusuf Yasin, deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, had proposed that one of three methods should be adopted: either there should be no oil operations in the disputed areas during arbitration, or there should be freedom for operations of oil companies of both sides in the whole area, or—the third alternative—the area should be temporarily

divided into two parts, with British oil companies operating in one part and the Arabian-American Oil Company in the other. It was this third alternative that I was authorised to adopt. Accordingly, at a meeting with Sheikh Yusuf on the 28th of June, I put forward your proposal that there should be a dividing line, solely for the purposes of oil operations, and that it should follow the Fuad Hamza Line (the Saudi 1935 claim).

4. But as I had feared, the Saudis argued that this line had too obvious a political connotation to be acceptable and also that its vague definition would leave the door open for further misunderstanding. In all this Sheikh Yusuf was backed up by the attitude of my American colleague Mr. Wadsworth, whom he went to see on the 2nd of July. Mr. Wadsworth had long been in favour of a "geometricized" line which would follow co-ordinates of latitude and longitude rather than wend its way between certain ill-defined districts. It was not surprising, therefore, that at our next meeting on the 9th of July, Sheikh Yusuf should propose such a line in place of the Fuad Hamza Line which had been rejected by the King.

5. This new line, which later came to be called the Red Line, ran south from the coast to a point 52° East and 23° 15' North, and thence due east. I pointed out that such a line was in no way equitable: the virtue of the Fuad Hamza Line had been that it was very close to an equal division of the area: the Red Line ran for the most part to the north and east of the Fuad Hamza Line and so left the lion's share of the area to the Saudis. This argument was of course largely bogus: "equality" in an area, parts of which are oil-bearing, is scarcely an acre-for-acre affair. Surprising though it might seem to anyone who knows his astuteness and intransigence, Sheikh Yusuf resisted attempting to make the point that all these suggested dividing lines left

most of the likely oil-bearing areas on our side, though he did on more than one occasion show that he knew that to be the case. But it had long been clear that all this hankering after "equality" had been inspired as much by pride and the all-important necessity in the Arab world of saving face, as by any concern to prospect for oil in that area in the immediate future. In fact, the head of the Arabian-American Oil Company's office in Jedda had assured me that any line acceptable to both Governments would be acceptable to the Company.

6. After some argument, my reply to Sheikh Yusuf's proposal of the Red Line was to say that although your only suggestion was the Fuad Hamza Line I felt it might be possible for Her Majesty's Government to accept a geometricized version of that line. I therefore brought forward, as a personal proposal, the line defined in your telegram No. 436, the Ras al-Hazra Line. It was evident that it received scant consideration, because at the next meeting when the oil question was discussed, Sheikh Yusuf without more ado brought up his suggestion of a neutral strip to divide the two areas in which the oil companies were to operate.

7. Meanwhile there had been some discussion about the definition of the Buraimi zone, the location of the combined police force that is to be stationed there during the course of arbitration, and the tribal posts and officials in the disputed areas. For some months the Saudis had evinced a fear that a withdrawal of the Trucial Oman Levies from a circle of merely twenty kilometres radius round Buraimi village would leave us in too dominating a position in the area. They had therefore proposed that, whereas sovereignty was to be determined within a circle of twenty kilometres only, the withdrawals should be from one of fifty kilometres radius. This you naturally found unacceptable and I told Sheikh Yusuf so. There then began the sort of exchange which I have recently come to know all too well, Sheikh Yusuf first trying to make out that Mahadha was part of the Buraimi oasis, then suggesting with sweet illogicality that "we split the difference" between the twenty and fifty kilometres, and finally, after more absurdities of this kind, taking my hint that, if all else were to be agreed upon, it might be possible to extend the circle to include the terminal point of the line of the Saudi

1949 claim. For some time it had become evident that the Saudis would accept nothing less.

8. On the afternoon of Friday the 9th of July, I spent a weary three hours arguing about whether the police force to be stationed in the Buraimi zone should be a joint force or whether it should be encamped in two groups, ours and the Saudis, at some distance from each other. I repeatedly stressed that the whole point of the group would be lost unless its two constituent parts co-operated, and that the outward and visible sign of this would be that they should be stationed together or at least quite near to each other. (It seemed to me to be desirable that the conduct of the Saudis should easily be observable.) Finally my point was carried, and at a later meeting Sheikh Yusuf agreed. The suggestion that the group be stationed at al-'Ain was, however, rejected out of hand by the Saudis who decided for a mutually suitable tented camp.

9. Sheikh Yusuf had all along accepted my firm insistence that none of the indigenous inhabitants of the areas in dispute were to be disturbed in any way, but he was clearly worried about certain armed tribal posts and officials which he said had been established in the areas since the arrival of Turki bin Ataishan. With your authority it was eventually agreed that the tribal posts should be disbanded and certain alterations made in the text of the exchange of Notes to provide for the withdrawal of any newly introduced officials.

10. There now seemed to be only one point of substance outstanding between us—the division for purposes of oil operations. On the 11th of July, (as mentioned briefly at the end of paragraph 6 above) Sheikh Yusuf suggested a new way of dividing the area in question: in two parts of it the respective companies would operate; a third part, a neutral strip between the other two, was to be closed to all oil operations. Sheikh Yusuf's first proposal was that this neutral strip should extend from the edge of the Thesiger map eastwards between parallels 23° and 23° 40' North. It was plain that he had intended by this to revert as far as possible to one of the initial Saudi suggestions that operations should cease in the whole area in dispute, for, when I countered that his proposal placed the whole strip north of parallel 23° (which by now had come to represent the lie of our

proposed dividing line), he seemed quite ready to broaden the strip to cover an equal area south of that parallel. I made clear that it was not your intention that oil operations should all but cease in the area as a whole. I let him understand, however, that I would put up this new idea to you provided that the neutral strip was envisaged as no more than a *cordon sanitaire* between the areas in which the respective companies would operate, and that it was more equitably situated in relation to the twenty-third parallel.

11. This meeting ended on a note of optimism guarded though it was in the light of the many disappointments of the past. When, on the 15th of July, I told Sheikh Yusuf that you were not averse to the idea of a thin neutral strip, it was clear that the bargaining match had begun. But it was bargaining with a difference—I took care never to offer a price of my own, but always by devious hints, to induce Sheikh Yusuf himself to make all the offers. This, I suggest, is the best way with the Saudis: for they have in the past shown themselves particularly prone to accept every offer and then ask for more. In this manner Sheikh Yusuf lowered the northern edge of the neutral strip from 23° 40' to 35'; from 35' to 20'; and ultimately from 20' to 15', which was the limit you were prepared to accept. I could not get him to go further. It was all over bar the shouting; but unfortunately, of shouting there was still to be plenty.

12. Dr. Ahmed Musa, an Egyptian legal adviser on a two-year contract to the Saudi Arabian Government, is an adept at making difficulties. During a meeting on the 17th of July, a misunderstanding, largely of his engineering, arose as to whether in the draft Arbitration Agreement the clause empowering the Tribunal to take account of "the desires of the inhabitants of the areas concerned" had been agreed upon in London last December or not. I knew it had not and therefore wondered to myself whether the Saudis were deliberately staging an issue on which they intended to break off negotiations, leaving themselves, I need hardly add, in the strong position of being able to advertise that the British had denied to the people in the disputed territories the internationally accepted right of self-determination. Behind this vexed clause lurked, of course, the long-standing hope of the Saudis that they might be able to force a plebiscite of the people they had long been bribing.

Rather than find a way out by letting the clause stand with the provision that we could have an interpretative opinion that it did not entail a plebiscite, I thought it better to insist that the clause be dropped entirely, and with your authority I offered to waive in exchange the clause referring to "geographical, economic, and strategical considerations." This solution was finally found acceptable by the King.

13. There now arose a difficulty about the text of the exchange of Notes. You had shown yourself ready to comply with the Saudi request that the additional officials appointed in the disputed areas should be withdrawn, and stipulated that they should be specified as those who were brought in after April 1953, the time when we resumed our freedom of action after the Standstill Agreement of the previous year had been broken. As soon as I informed Yusuf Yasin of this he insisted that the date mentioned should be that of the arrival of Turki bin Ataishan in the zone. This was not unreasonable in comparison with some of his earlier demands, and I was glad to be able to pass on to him your acquiescence: "August 1952" were to be the operative words. But at the eleventh hour—for all was now agreed upon and the documents were being drawn up in their final form—I was astounded to discover that Dr. Musa, at Sheikh Yusuf's instigation, had slipped in a qualification—"the first of August, 1952." I asked to see Prince Faisal.

14. My meeting with His Royal Highness on the 28th of July, was an inconclusive one: the Prince was his usual charming self, but hardly helpful. Once again, the question was to be referred to the King—the King, who, one could not but think, had no very clear idea of the details of these negotiations. Anticipating difficulties, I had telegraphed to you for authority to substitute the words "after the arrival of Turki bin Ataishan in August 1952"; but, in the event, it was not required. At eleven o'clock that same evening a message was received from His Majesty that the offending "first" was to be deleted. The signing of the exchange of Notes and of the Agreement took place two days later. I am happy to say that Mr. Burrows, Her Majesty's Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, was also present at the ceremony.

15. It would be gratifying to be able to believe that United Kingdom relations with Saudi Arabia will be significantly improved

by the signing of this long sought-for Agreement, but to expect much would, I think, be unrealistic. Leaving aside the dangers in the delicate situation that will lurk in the Buraimi zone until both Turki bin Ataishan's party and the Trucial Oman Levies have been withdrawn (and one hardly needed Prince Faisal's reminder of this barely five minutes after the Agreement had been signed), there remain many matters still outstanding between Saudi Arabia and the lands under British protection that fringe her ill-defined frontiers. However loud King Saud may proclaim his brotherly love for the remaining Rulers concerned (in distinction to his contempt for Shakhbut of Abu Dhabi), he is not inclined to give them anything for nothing. But he will protest his desire for a generous settlement with them and see us as an obstacle in his way because we expose the true facts of his "generosity" when we negotiate on the Rulers' behalf. So long as Her Majesty's Government retain influence in the Arabian Peninsula, Saudi expansion to the coast all round will be thwarted; and not all their arrogant wealth can change that. It hurts their pride in a way that the present Arbitration Agreement probably does little to soothe.

16. Since, then it can hardly have been concluded by the Saudis solely out of a

desire for goodwill towards the United Kingdom, the Agreement can perhaps be considered an opportune way of showing Saud's statesmanship side-by-side with that of his allies in Cairo, and of rectifying the blunder he must realise that his father made when he sent Turki bin Ataishan to invade Hamasa. It has been expensive to keep Turki there, and of late it has become more apparent that his presence there was doing little good to the Saudi cause. But in accomplishing his honourable withdrawal the Saudis have at the same time contrived to reach a not unsatisfactory position for themselves in the matter of oil operations. If this was the price we had to pay for American support and Saudi compliance it was, I think, well paid. For even if it barely mollifies the grasping Saudis it will, I feel sure, coming hard on the agreement with Egypt, do something to convince Moslem governments of the sincerity of the United Kingdom desire for friendly relations with them.

17. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Ambassadors at Amman, Cairo, Damascus and Washington; to the Chargés d'Affaires at Beirut and Bagdad; the Political Resident at Bahrain; and the Head of the British Middle East Office.

I have, &c.

G. C. PELHAM.

EA 1534/32

No. 32

THE ABU DHABI FRONTIER DISPUTE

Foreign Office,

August 6, 1954.

Sir,

I am directed by Mr. Secretary Eden to inform you of certain provisions of the agreement recently concluded in Jedda between Her Majesty's Government and the Saudi Arabian Government for the submission to arbitration of the Abu Dhabi frontier dispute.

Paragraph (v) of the Notes exchanged between the Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister and Her Majesty's Ambassador on the 30th of July reads as follows:—

"For the purpose of oil operations only, and without prejudice to the rights of the parties to the frontier dispute the region lying between the Saudi 1949 claim and the claim put forward in 1952 on behalf of the Ruler of Abu Dhabi shall be divided in the following manner:—

- (i) in the area bounded on the west by Longitude 51° 35' East, on the south by Latitude 23° 15' North, and on the east by a straight line connecting the eastern termini of the Saudi 1949 line and the Abu Dhabi 1952 line, Petroleum Development (Trucial Coast) Limited and D'Arcy Exploration Limited may conduct oil operations during the period of arbitration;
- (ii) in the area bounded on the east and west by the same lines as in sub-paragraph (i), on the north by Latitude 23° 15' North, and on

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the south by Latitude 23° 00' North, no oil operations shall be permitted during the period of arbitration;

(iii) in the area west of Longitude 51° 35' East and in the area bounded on the North by Latitude 23° 00' North and on the east by the same lines as in sub-paragraphs (i) and (ii), the Arabian American Oil Company may conduct oil operations during the period of arbitration.

It is understood that there shall be no oil operations in any case in the Buraimi zone during the period of arbitration."

I am to add that the end of the Saudi 1949 line referred to in sub-paragraph (i) above is the point 24° 25' North, 55° 36' East; the end of the Abu Dhabi 1952 line is at Umm-al-Zamul.

I am, &c.

A. C. I. SAMUEL.

The Secretary,
Petroleum Development (Trucial Coast) Limited.

The Secretary,
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company.

EM 1041

No. 33

REPORT ON TALKS BETWEEN HER MAJESTY'S CHARGE D'AFFAIRES AND THE FOREIGN MINISTER, SAIF AL ISLAM ABDULLAH

Mr. Roper Curzon to Mr. Eden. (Received August 18)

(No. 20. Confidential)
Sir,

Taiz,

August 8, 1954.

With reference to my telegram No. 58 (repeated to Aden), I have the honour to submit an account of my talks with Saif Al Islam Abdullah, the Foreign Minister.

2. I arrived at Sana'a by air on August 3 accompanied by my clerk, Sayyid Mustafa Issa, and was received by His Royal Highness the following morning. Sayyid Muhammad Ash Shami of the Foreign Ministry, a nephew of the Imam, was also present. The Foreign Minister began by saying that His Majesty The Imam was anxious to end the present situation on the frontier which he thought was due to misunderstandings on both sides. He had reason to believe that Her Majesty's Government shared his desire to reach an agreement. I assured His Royal Highness that Her Majesty's Government were most anxious to reach a settlement. He went on to say that we must find ways and means to create a healthy atmosphere so that discussions could take place frankly and amicably. He then mentioned that when he was in London he saw you, Sir, and spoke about the economic exploitation of the country as regards oil, &c., and about his Government's preference for economic dealings with Her Majesty's Government rather than with any other country. Unfortunately, since then, he said, misunderstandings had arisen which prevented them from taking advantage of this preference. I reminded him that in the 1934 Treaty and in the 1951 Exchange of Letters we had agreed to develop mutual trade between the two countries and to provide technical assistance and experts as required.

3. I wished to make clear from the start one aspect of our attitude towards the Yemen, so I said that in all cases of criminal activities there must always be a motive and I asked what possible motive the Government of Aden could have in stirring up trouble with the Yemeni Government, as the latter alleged. We had no wish whatever to occupy any part of the Yemen, so what purpose would be served by making raids into the Yemen? The Government of Aden merely wished to be left in peace to assist and advise in the development of the Protectorate States. The Foreign Minister then referred to the proposals for federation, which disturbed them, and to the fact that we had not consulted the Yemeni Government first. I replied that federation was not a matter which should cause them any concern. As I understood it, speaking unofficially, Her Majesty's

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Government had decided that the Protectorate States had reached a stage where further economic progress could only be achieved by some kind of federation which would enable them to achieve economies by pooling resources, &c., and help to improve the standard of living of the people. I emphasised two points: (1) that there could be no question of imposing federation by force on any Sultans or Chiefs unwilling to accept it; they were free to accept or reject the proposals, which were not cut and dried and which could be amended by mutual agreement; (2) Her Majesty's Government had no call to consult the Yemeni or any other foreign Government as it was a purely internal matter and could not be interpreted in any way as directed against the interests of the Yemeni Government. The Foreign Minister appeared to accept this and repeated that a way must be found to settle our disputes.

4. I said that ever since the 1934 Treaty and again since the 1951 Exchange of Letters Her Majesty's Government had consistently tried to get the Yemeni Government to agree to the formation of a Frontier Commission for the purpose of demarcating the disputed areas of the frontier. The Foreign Minister thought that peaceable conditions should be restored first and that the frontier problem should be settled before federation. He did not see how the frontier could be altered once federation had taken place. I said I understood his point but federation of the States should not be regarded as purely a geographical matter. The proposals would not preclude or prejudice discussions on the disputed areas or prevent adjustments of the frontier agreed upon by the Commission. I agreed that the first step was to do away with the suspicions that affected both sides and I said that Her Majesty's Government were pleased to note that His Majesty The Imam had definitely issued orders that the frontier troops and tribesmen were to remain on the defensive and not make incursions across the frontier.

5. The Foreign Minister suggested that he and I should forget our official capacities and approach the subject as a Briton and a Yemeni trying to find a way to help solve our mutual problems, that we should speak quite frankly to each other and make suggestions which might result in creating a better atmosphere for future discussions between the two Governments. He proposed a further meeting at 5 p.m. which was eventually postponed until the following morning.

6. At this second meeting Qadhi Muhammad Al Amri, the Deputy Foreign Minister, was also present. After the preliminary expressions of good will and sincere desire to reach an understanding, I suggested that, as two sets of frontier talks had been agreed upon, it would be advisable to start them as soon as possible. Speaking quite frankly, I said that the situation on the frontier would be eased immediately if the Yemeni Government ceased to supply lawless elements of the Protectorate with money, food, arms and ammunition. The Foreign Minister then made the statement that he did not admit that these gifts were made but, assuming that they were, then they should cease. This is the nearest the Yemeni Government have ever come to admitting such actions. Previously Qadhi Al Amri has only admitted that small gifts of money had been made as tokens of normal hospitality.

7. The Foreign Minister went on to suggest that the first step before the frontier talks should be the withdrawal of troops from either side of the frontier area, leaving only those which were normally stationed there. I replied that we had very few troops there but I would undertake to put the suggestion to my Government, adding that the removal of troops appeared to be a matter of timing. I thought, however, that the talks should take place first as, if the reasons which caused the raids could be removed, there would be no need for additional troops. The Foreign Minister asked what were the original causes of the trouble with the Dammani and Rabizi and enquired whether we would undertake to remove these causes and accept the rebels back on lenient terms. I suggested that such matters could best be discussed between the frontier Officers themselves and that the future treatment of the rebels was a matter to be decided by the respective Sultans in consultation with the Aden Government. I pointed out that the rebel Dammani were only a very small section of the tribe, most of them were living peaceably and cultivating their land. I said that the rebels had retired to an inaccessible part of the mountains where they could not possibly exist unless they were supplied with the means of doing so. The Foreign Minister then repeated the statement in paragraph 6 above.

8. I then referred to Wadi Hamra where Yemeni troops had established several military posts and said that the number of troops had been increased to 80. Qadhi Al Amri countered with a list of places that we had occupied, which was not in accordance with the provision of the 1951 agreement. I said that the Aden Government had been most careful not to alter the *status quo* in any of the disputed areas and that any way this was an argument in favour of setting up the Frontier Commission. He said that a commission would not be of much use if we presented them with a *fait accompli* by having occupied these areas. I said that this would not be so as naturally one side would have to withdraw from any area which the commission decided properly belonged to the other.

9. I also referred to anti-British articles in the Yemeni Press, which I was sorry to see had increased in virulence, as well as to the distribution of leaflets and propaganda in the Protectorate. The Foreign Minister drew my attention to articles in such papers as *The Times* and *Manchester Guardian* which in some respects were inaccurate. I mentioned the freedom of the Press and drew a distinction between statements released to the Press and leading articles which were the responsibility of the newspaper concerned.

10. The Foreign Minister then made his suggestion that the Governor of Aden should visit the Yemen for the purpose of having talks with him as well as meeting the Imam. I said that I would be pleased to put his proposal before my Government and asked if the Yemeni Government would send a formal invitation either through me or their Minister in London. He agreed to send the invitation through the latter.

11. The conversations, which were conducted in a very friendly way, then concluded with the usual expressions of good will and hope for the future. I formed the opinion that the Foreign Minister was genuinely anxious to settle our differences. It may be that the recent Notes from Her Majesty's Government have had the desired effect but I feel sure that our recent settlements with Egypt and Persia have influenced them to a certain extent. I do not suppose that their ideas about the Protectorate have undergone any change but they may be persuaded to stop aggressive activities on the frontier and so perhaps prepare the way for more concrete suggestions about a frontier commission.

I am sending a copy of this despatch to the Governor of Aden.

I have, &c.

R. ROPER CURZON.

EA 15357/2

No. 34

PERSIAN OIL AGREEMENT

Mr. Burrows to Mr. Eden. (Received August 14)

(No. 47. Confidential)
(Telegraphic)

Bahrain,
August 8, 1954.

Following discussions with Beckett I assess below the probable repercussions of the Persian Oil Agreement on the oil-producing Sheikdoms of Kuwait, Bahrain and Qatar:—

(a) *Points of Little Interest to them*

- (i) The organisation, form and nationality of the holding, operating and trading companies;
- (ii) the purchase and sale agreement with N.I.O.C.;
- (iii) N.I.O.C.'s responsibility for all non-basic operations;
- (iv) N.I.O.C.'s responsibility for internal distribution;
- (v) 12½ per cent. royalty on oil.

(b) *Point which may excite some Interest*

The payments agreement under which up to 40 per cent. of the direct and indirect payments in sterling may be converted into dollars.

(c) *Points of Vital Interest to them*

- (i) That posted price (less a disguised discount of 2 per cent.) is to be used for calculating the profit margin on which the 50 per cent. take is computed;
- (ii) that Persia will receive in tax 2s. 6d. per ton on refinery throughput;
- (iii) the minimum production figures.

2. As regards 1 (b) above, I do not think that this concession is likely to bring about an immediate reopening of the dollar question in any of the three Sheikhdoms. While the free markets persist in Kuwait and Bahrain the merchants are unlikely to think of pressing their Rulers to provide dollars for normal trade, although their attitude might conceivably change if dollars became scarce and went to a high premium. The local Governments have shown no impatience with the present arrangements whereby they are provided with dollars for Government expenditure. The Persian Agreement would, however, increase the difficulty of persuading the Ruler of Kuwait to use his own dollars for any major dollar contracts.

3. As regards 1 (c) (i) above, Kuwait and Bahrain have clauses in their agreements which, in effect, provide for the reopening of discussions if any neighbouring country receives better terms. Q.P.C. appear to have no such written obligation to Qatar but could hardly avoid acting as though they had. All three Sheikhdoms would benefit from the re-negotiation on the basis of posted prices. (The American Independent Oil Company's concession for the Kuwait Neutral Zone is on an entirely different basis to the other concessions and does not appear to require consideration in this context.)

4. As regards 1 (c) (ii), Bahrain in particular will expect to be brought into line and receive a similar payment per ton of refinery throughput. I doubt whether this will be an issue in Kuwait at present.

5. As regards 1 (c) (iii), presumably Kuwait will have to bear the brunt of the cut-back in production. However, if a reduction in output coincides with increased revenue per ton owing to re-negotiation of the profit margin on a posted price basis, no great difficulty need be expected. Kuwait would probably be content provided the total revenue does not fall. Similarly, Qatar is likely to look at total revenue rather than tonnage output.

6. It will be necessary to decide as soon as possible what action should be taken, and by whom, with regard to informing the Sheikhdoms about the three vital points in paragraph 1 (c) above. There appear to be three possible courses:—

- (a) The Rulers may be left to discover the terms of the agreement which affect their interests for themselves with the help of their own advisers.
- (b) The Political Agents, having regard to Her Majesty's Government's obligations to care for the interests of the Sheikhdoms, could be instructed to bring to each Ruler's notice the terms of the agreement which affect him.
- (c) The Bahrain Petroleum Company and the Kuwait Oil Company themselves could inform the Rulers that under a clause of their recent agreements they have undertaken to reopen discussions if a neighbouring country receives better terms for its oil and arising out of Persian agreement they are prepared to do so. The Qatar Petroleum Company could make a similar statement but without reference to a specific commitment.

7. I consider that (a) in paragraph 6 above is wrong, that we should make a virtue of necessity, and that either Her Majesty's Government or the oil companies should take the initiative in informing the Rulers before they find out for themselves. I should welcome the opportunity these circumstances provide for demonstrating Her Majesty's Government's concern for the interests of the Sheikhdoms and should therefore be glad of instructions to inform the Rulers. On the other hand the oil companies may also wish to win favour by, for once, coming forward with a proposal to raise payments without waiting for the squeeze from the concessionary country. In which case we would not wish to steal their thunder.

8. Once it is decided who should take the initiative, I think the first tentative approach to the Rulers should be made before discussion of the Agreement starts in the Persian Majlis and its detailed terms are disclosed.

ES 1197/1 No. 35

REPORT ON A MILITARY PARADE STAGED IN HONOUR OF KING SAUD ON HIS RETURN TO JEDDA FROM THE PILGRIMAGE

Mr. Phillips to Sir Winston Churchill. (Received August 25)

(No. 101. Confidential)

Jedda,

Sir, August 22, 1954.

I have the honour to report that on the 16th of August a military parade was staged in honour of King Saud on his return to Jedda from the Pilgrimage. Due to the excessive heat of the day at this time of year, the parade was held at 5 a.m.; though, as the Iraqi Minister was heard to say, to cause the Diplomatic Corps to get up at such an ungodly hour warranted a more impressive display than was actually given.

2. I attach as an appendix to this despatch a few observations on the units and armaments that were paraded: but in what follows I am concerned to convey to you those aspects of the occasion which seem to me to throw some light on the changing ways of this country.

3. The timing of the parade was opportune. Coming so soon after the Pilgrimage, it was able to advertise the new might of Saudi Arabia to a larger audience than would at other times have been available, though I cannot suppose that the numerous representatives of other Moslem countries were particularly awed by the outdated armament and poor physique of the soldiery. Still, in this part of the world it is the idea not the reality that matters, and, as if to emphasise this, the puny display of the march-past was accompanied by a constant and unashamed panegyric delivered *fortissimo* over the loudspeakers. These, the commentator said, were noble youths, the sword and might of Islam. Thus, their shortcomings were made to pass unnoticed in a haze of religious and patriotic fervour.

4. The arrival of His Majesty, driven in his special green Rolls-Royce, was marked by deafening and intermittent gunfire and a very low fly-past of the three new Saudi Convairs, bought recently for the national airline. These were followed by a squadron of the antiquated trainers and fighters which (excluding a few B 26 bombers not brought out for the review) make up the Royal Saudi Air Force. But the fly-past was surely less remarkable a novelty than the appearance of His Majesty, who was wearing a mushroom-grey uniform of Field-Marshal of the Army strung around with orders and medals—almost certainly the first occasion on which the King of this country has appeared in public in anything other than the traditional Arab robes.

5. After the Royal Salute, His Majesty, accompanied by Prince Mishaal, who, as Minister of Defence and Aviation was responsible for the parade, toured the troops lined up on the parade ground and returned to his pavilion to watch the three hours of the march-past. First came the band and, *mirabile dictu*, the pipes; then representatives of the military and flying schools; a unit of the Royal Bodyguard; three battalions of infantry and a contingent of the air force. By now the sun had risen from behind the bare mountains that girdle Mecca, and heat was added to the other discomforts. The slow procession of men and vehicles dragged past, mile after remorseless mile. Military police on motor-cycles, a signals unit, a reconnaissance battalion; the armour, each piece named after Arab states or the towns of Arabia (including Buraimi); the artillery; and so on, right until the units of the Red Crescent (the Arab Red Cross) and the break-down lorries.

6. One could not help reflecting throughout all this on the ending of an era. It was not only that the shapely curved sword was replaced by the rifle, and the "ghutra" had given way to a smart Khaki beret, and that there was not a camel to be seen. Trends such as these were foreseen and appropriately lamented long ago during the reign of the late King Ibn Saud. It was not the form but the significance of this parade that made one reflect how Ibn Saud's careful policy to keep his country out of the political bustle of the Arab world until such time as she might be ready to play a fit part in it has now been swept aside; how good government is now less important to the new régime than cutting a dash in the international field; and how, symbolised in the numbers of Egyptian officers now training the Saudi forces, it is Egypt who is become the model for this country.

7. But such sombre reflections induced by the excessive tedium of the parade—one felt at times that, like in Chu Chin Chow, the same old extras were contriving to pass again and again across the stage by nipping round behind the scenes—such reflections were quickly cut short by the arrival of the tribal forces, the Ahl al-Jihad (Holy Warriors), the once terrible Ikhwan, or Brotherhood. For the people of Jedda too, as much as for the foreigners, this was plainly the highlight of the parade. From all sides they pressed on in their motley and sweating hundreds to see the white-robed Nejdi warriors shuffle by in their strange rhythmical dance. All order among the spectators was soon abandoned. Buses converged onto the parade ground, their roofs festooned with spectators like any Derby Day. Drums beat, swords rattled, and, with the commentator declaring that there was no God but God and Mohammed was His Prophet, the Ikhwan were upon us. So too were the crowd. With scant regard for the confused shouting of the police they swept across the carpeted area occupied by the notables and the Diplomatic Corps and pressed forward even to where the King was sitting surrounded by his younger children, a Prince or two, and four Royal fan-bearers. But for the rest of us, the show was over: hot humanity, ten deep, effectively blocked the view (though the less restrained among us could, by leaping to stand on their chairs, contrive to share its brocaded vantage point with three or four of the mob).

8. The crowd were plainly hoping that His Majesty would himself, as is often the custom, join in the tribal dancing: but it was not to be—the new uniform perhaps had too restraining an influence. Instead the roles were performed by Prince Mohammed bin Saud and Prince Abdullah Feisal. The latter, the competent Minister of the Interior and son of the Crown Prince, was dressed in the ornate scarlet and gold robe used on these occasions and performed his part with much grace. So the ceremony ended and, in a little spurt of applause, His Majesty drove away.

9. In most countries, I can conceive that a parade of this sort would scarcely be worth reporting. But in Saudi Arabia, not only is such an event unusual, but is perhaps indicative of how eagerly this country is struggling to join the modern world and forget the simplicities and dignities of its desert past.

10. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the Political Resident at Bahrain and the Head of the British Middle East Office at Fayid.

I have, &c.

H. PHILLIPS.

Enclosure

1. *Troops—General.*—The traditional Arab head-dress has been replaced throughout by a khaki beret. Smart United States-style khaki drill shirt and slacks were worn with British web belt and anklets (most of the latter the wrong way round). Boots looked like British, and seemed sound. All men shouldered arms in the United States Army way, instead of (as in the past) some in the United States way and some (British-trained) in the British way.

2. *Training Battalion and Army Schools Force.*—Boys down to about 8 or 9 years of age took part—all dressed as miniatures of the regulars—with the companies of older boys also carrying rifles.

3. *Infantry.*—What was described as a battalion consisted of three companies of 120–150 each.

4. *Artillery.*—A battery of 25-pdrs. consisted of three troops of six lorry-drawn guns; a battery of 105-mm. consisted of three troops of eight guns. Battery HQ in both cases seemed to be contained in a jeep and two 4×4 command cars with wireless.

5. *Armoured Cars.*—There was one troop of six small 4-wheel cars mounting a Bren gun. Then a squadron of 42 larger, 6-wheel cars (presumably the recent supply from the United States) mounting a machine-gun bigger than a Bren, and what looked like a 2-pdr. Squadron and troop HQs were in the usual jeeps and command cars with wireless.

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6. *Reconnaissance Battalion.*—There were three companies: one of 18 jeeps mounting Bren guns, and some of them with wireless; one of 12 4×4 trucks each carrying an anti-aircraft gun smaller than a Bofors; and one of 12 4×4 trucks each with a Bren gun and a bazooka.

7. *Signals Battalion.*—A vast number of 4×4 trucks each with what appeared to be a very uneconomical load of one field set and two operators. Two of these trucks held one drum of cable, but there were no cable-laying trucks or manual equipment; nor despatch riders.

8. *Military Police.*—There are 24 to what is presumably a company, looking exactly like United States Army "Snowdrops"; no longer riding "Indian" motorcycles, but a less lethal British-type machine (which may, however, be German or Czech in make).

9. *Medical.*—A field ambulance of six large and six smaller ambulances, with four stretcher trucks: all white, with the familiar Moslem emblem of the Red Crescent.

10. *Maintenance.*—A field workshop consisting of four heavy mobile cranes and six workshop lorries which looked as if they needed the cranes.

11. *Supplies.*—It was impossible to count the canvas-covered apparently brand-new American 3-tonners in the parade. There must have been 500. From what could be seen there was no attempt to form supply columns or ammunition companies or the like. Each of the units and formations outlined above trailed its own quota of lorries behind it.

12. *Conclusions.*—From the great number of vehicles of all kinds it seems clear that the chief aim is mobility. Indeed in a country like Saudi Arabia this is essential, given the distance between centres of urban or tribal population. But it is doubtful if the vehicles or armour would run for long without adequate maintenance, and there seems to be little provision for that. There would seem to be little to fear from the Saudi forces—even by Middle East standards.

EA 10113/1

No. 36

REVIEW OF EVENTS IN THE PERSIAN GULF DURING THE PAST YEAR AND SOME THOUGHTS ON THE FUTURE

Mr. Burrows to Mr. Eden. (Received September 1)

(No. 87. Confidential)
Sir,

Bahrain,

August 26, 1954.

It is now just over a year since I arrived at this post. It may be useful if I set down some impressions of what has happened in the Persian Gulf during the past year and some more speculative thoughts on the future. Owing to the great diversity of the territories for whose political affairs this Residency is responsible it is difficult to formulate the resounding generalisations which are usually considered appropriate on this kind of occasion, and I must therefore begin with some remarks about the individual territories.

2. Kuwait's progress in recent years has been marked by violent oscillations. We are now at the bottom of a trough. The rate of production of oil seems likely to decrease as a result of the Persian settlement, though it is quite likely that increased payments per unit of oil may be enough to keep the State's income about the same. For reasons unconnected with oil the rate of development expenditure has quite sharply decreased and is likely to do so still more, since some of the work in hand will come to an end during this year and even if new works are approved the preparation of plans and specifications will necessarily take a long time. With the departure of the British Controller of Development and of the Syrian Chief Engineer, the Kuwait Government now turn for technical advice to a youthful Lebanese engineer of remarkably small qualifications and experience. Further study of the history of the development programme in Kuwait reveals that, in addition to its unbalance, to which I have referred in earlier correspondence, it could be seriously criticised on grounds of financial inaccuracy, much of which must

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unfortunately be laid at the door of British advisers and technicians. Nevertheless the Kuwaitis have got a good deal for their money in the way of school buildings and public services, even though the money has turned out to be much more than they were led to suppose. The worst result of this overspending, coupled with a technical misfortune in the harbour-dredging contract, has been the loss of confidence in British advice. In fact these errors occurred because there was not enough British advice; that is to say because there was not a single senior British Adviser who could perform some of the functions of Prime Minister and Chancellor of the Exchequer and thus relate the programme to the needs and resources of Kuwait and supervise more thoroughly its execution. But it is hard to get the Kuwaitis to see it in this way.

3. The largest single factor making for chaos and maladministration has been the personal power and rivalry of the members of the ruling family. The role of the family in the system of government in the Persian Gulf territories is often insufficiently realised. The absolutism of a single monarch or leader seems almost the exception. The more general rule is: "L'état c'est nous." The Kuwait Shaikhs feel they have a divine right to treat the State as their own property, to parcel out its functions among themselves and to rule their little administrative empires without much regard either to the wishes of the people or to the decisions of the Ruler. The most successful in this grab for power have been Shaikh Fahad, the Ruler's half-brother, who has until recently controlled the development work, the Health Department and the Municipality, and Shaikh Abdullah Mubarak, who has the Public Security Department and the "Army." In addition to the advantages which they obtain from this administrative power the Shaikhs have been supporting themselves financially by selling to the State tracts of land which they have either inherited or acquired for the purpose by a unilateral demarcation and which is now required for building or development schemes.

4. The attempts made by Colonel Crichton, the British Controller of Finance, and the other remaining British officials to instal a decent administrative system continually run up against the arbitrary use of personal power by these Shaikhs, who have for instance been known to send a couple of heavily-armed slaves into the Finance Department to demand the immediate signature of a cheque on the State funds in their master's favour. The Ruler knows that this sort of thing goes on. He fails to do much about it partly because, though himself upright and disinterested, he is weak in character and lazy in disposition, partly because he to some extent shares the inherited belief that the ruling family have a right to rule and to some of the prerequisites of ruling. Many of the Kuwaitis have for long murmured against this state of affairs. Very recently they have gone a little further, and as a result of pressure from the merchants a "Higher Executive Committee" has been set up by the Ruler to propose administrative reforms. Although the selection of personnel for the committee leaves a good deal to be desired they have expressed some sensible views and their existence seems on the whole a net gain even though it is still doubtful what weight they will carry when they really come up against the entrenched interests of the Shaikhs.

5. The Ruler has steadfastly failed to take our advice about the reform of his administration. But he has equally consistently shown himself entirely correct in his attitude to foreign affairs. He is relying on us for the negotiation of the international aspects of the scheme to bring water from Iraq to Kuwait; he has accepted without demur our decision to refuse the Egyptian Government's request to establish a Consulate in Kuwait; and he has confined his association with the Arab League to social and educational matters. It should not be forgotten that it is this responsibility for external affairs to which the history of our association with Kuwait, as with the other Persian Gulf States, gives us the right. Our concern with internal affairs derives from a natural and logical extension of this responsibility in circumstances in which Kuwait's internal affairs may have a profound effect on its external relations, and from our realisation of the extent to which our own interests can be affected by the use to which Kuwait puts her resources. But for the present at any rate the Ruler clearly wishes to stick to a more rigid reading of the agreements between us, and it has proved impossible without the use of more forcible measures than would on other grounds be desirable, to persuade him to accept our advice with equal readiness on internal affairs.

6. I am not unhopeful of the future. There is no appreciable tendency on the part of any Kuwaitis, from the Shaikhs downwards, to question the ultimate value

to Kuwait of our protection. The facts of the case and their geographical position so near the frontiers of three much larger, unpredictable, and in varying degrees so unscrupulous Powers as Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Persia, must even to the most gullible reader of the Egyptian Press be a convincing argument in favour of maintaining their basic relationship with us. They view differently from us the obligations which this relationship imposes on them. But the comparative failure of their Arab advisers and the first stirrings of indigenous impatience with the maladministration of the Shaikhs give ground for hope that if we are ready with help and advice, but do not thrust it too violently down their throats, they may sooner or later be more ready to accept what we have to offer.

7. The normal tranquillity of life in Bahrain has been rudely disturbed by the outbreak of trouble between the Sunnis and Shias on which I have reported in a recent despatch. Here again a disturbing factor has been the intemperate exercise of arbitrary power by the ruling family in the past and, though to a lesser extent, even at the present time. Fortunately the Ruler here is better able than in Kuwait to restrain the worst excesses of his family, though there is still some way to go before all Bahrain subjects are in fact treated as equal before the law. The forthcoming appointment of a British Judicial Adviser to the Ruler should greatly improve matters in this respect and in increasing generally the authority of the Courts and the respect felt for them by all sections of the population. The greatest difficulty which the latest disturbances have revealed is the weakness and indiscipline of the police force. Radical measures to rectify this will have to be undertaken as soon as the new British police officers, whose appointment has been approved, can be found and brought here to take up this task. Parallel perhaps to the climatic difference between the two places, the Bahraini is normally easy-going and amenable in comparison with the more turbulent inhabitants of Kuwait. But it seems that in the matter of law and order the Bahrain Government have relied too much on this amenable disposition of their subjects and that more strenuous means are now desirable to exercise authority.

8. The expenditure of the comparatively small revenues of the State continues to be conducted in a thoughtful and efficient manner. But in the long term Bahrain's economic prospects must appear rather difficult, unless some large discovery of oil can be made in the seabed. Bahrain's known oil resources have reached and probably just passed their maximum production. There is no prospect of any major addition to the refinery which now relies for its raw material largely on Saudi Arabian production. The natural water resources which differentiate Bahrain so strongly from the other Persian Gulf territories are also a wasting asset. The artesian head is constantly falling owing to increased use both in this island and on the Hasa coast whose water comes from the same geological source. In course of time this is bound to make agriculture more and more of a luxury. Bahrain's other main source of wealth has been the profits and customs duties derived from its entrepôt trade. But this again is threatened by the increasing tendency of Saudi Arabia and Qatar to import direct from the outside world rather than through the Bahrain middleman. The Government are reacting by building a deep-water jetty to increase the attractiveness of the port, but it will be something of a miracle if trade does not continue its slow decline. Another thing that would seriously affect Bahrain's economy would be a change in the general manpower movement in the Persian Gulf. At present there is a reserve of unskilled and cheap labour in Oman which moves up the Gulf to Qatar, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. In Bahrain this labour is largely used for agriculture and in the worst-paid navvying jobs, leaving many Bahrainis free to get the better-paid jobs with the oil companies both here and in Saudi Arabia. If oil development occurred in the south of the Gulf this source of labour might dry up and the jobs which the Omanis now do would either not get done or would cost a great deal more.

9. I have been able to make some progress on the two foreign policy matters which the Ruler of Bahrain raised during his visit to London last year, viz., the definition of the seabed boundary so as to leave the probable oil-bearing area to Bahrain, and the question of Bahrain's "rights" in the Zubarah area in north-western Qatar. The first of these questions is of the greatest possible concern to Bahrain's future. I have had the first round of talks with the Saudi Government on the subject and there has been at least some advance on their part from the attitude previously adopted. The Zubarah question on the other hand is of no possible material concern to anyone. In spite of this the Ruler feels far more deeply about it than any other outstanding question. On this I have announced to both

parties a settlement of the most immediately pressing matter of access by the police and individual subjects of either side. I have some hope of reaching a further agreement between the two Rulers to shelve the legal claims to the derelict property in the area.

10. Qatar continues to come along quite well. The problems are provided by the Ruler's family, by the position and personality of Abdullah Darwish, and by the preponderant and highly reactionary influence of the Qadi on judicial and social matters. The family are even more numerous and even less well behaved than in Kuwait and Bahrain. Fortunately, however, with the exception of the Ruler's son who is a comparatively reasonable person, they have not obtained any positions of authority in the administration. Fortunately also, the Ruler, while in many respects a weak man, has become so annoyed at their continual squabbles and their continual importunity for a larger share of the revenue, that he relies heavily on his British Adviser and on a strong British element in his police force as a counterweight. Abdullah Darwish describes himself as the Prime Minister of Qatar. There is in fact no such office, but he carries out most of the functions that would go with it. He is, in addition, by far the most prominent man of business in the State and the Ruler's official representative with the oil companies. He naturally abuses this plurality of offices and makes a very good thing out of it for himself. He is apt to make life difficult for the Iraq Petroleum Company subsidiary which produces Qatar's oil, and the British Adviser has found it necessary in order to maintain and consolidate his own position to defer in a large number of matters to Darwish's views. It must be said on the other hand however, that Darwish has not tried improperly to influence the nature and rate of the development expenditure in Qatar; indeed he has sometimes been on the side of economy. Apart from his commercial tie-up with Mr. Emile Bustani's Contracting and Trading Company he seems ready and eager to deal with British suppliers and firms in preference to others, and the very fact of his monopolistic position makes it impossible for a crowd of other Middle Eastern sharks to invade Qatar as they have invaded Kuwait. Following perhaps partly on some frank conversation I had with him earlier this year he has of late been rather milder in his attitude to the oil companies.

11. The expenditure of oil revenue on necessary development works continues steadily and, on the whole, sensibly. Some money is also being invested through British banks. A large share goes to the Ruler's privy purse and in allowances to the family. Of the Ruler's share however a very large amount is distributed in direct gifts to all classes of the inhabitants of Qatar. This simple but original method of sharing out among the people the benefit of the country's resources does not have the inflationary effect which might be expected since almost all consumer goods are imported and prices need therefore contain only a very small element reflecting local costs. Wahabism has left a strong influence in Qatar. It is represented by the Qadi who fulminates regularly against the wicked behaviour of foreigners as demonstrated in Qatar by their indulgence in drinking, gambling and the cinema. This gives rise to occasional attempts to interfere with the normal pursuits of Europeans working for the oil companies, and may in time lead to an effort to impose the same drastic restrictions as those which the Saudis have inflicted on the Arabian American Oil Company. The respect for the Qadi and therefore for the Sharia system of law which he enforces is also delaying the development of a better judicial system. But my last conversation with the Ruler on this subject was rather more encouraging.

12. As regards foreign policy questions, apart from the Zubarah dispute referred to above, there remains the settlement of the Qatar-Saudi boundary, which however is unlikely to give us anything like the same difficulty as the other disputed Saudi boundaries, and the question of the ownership of the small and desert island of Halul which is claimed by both Qatar and Abu Dhabi. Qatar has better and nearer communications with the inhabited areas of eastern Saudi Arabia than other Persian Gulf territories. It was brought later than most of the others into exclusive relations with us and before that was more immediately influenced than the others by the political fortunes of Nejd. It is therefore not unnatural that the Qataris should still have rather close relations with the Saudis. These are no doubt reinforced by the fact that Abdullah Darwish's contracting activities extend to Saudi Arabia as well as to Qatar. It is reported that some at least of the minor members of the Qatar ruling family are in receipt of Saudi allowances, and when one faction of the family is banished it is to the Saudi King that they turn for diplomatic support in securing their return. I do not think that all this means that the Qataris are

seriously tempted to transfer their allegiance from us to the Saudis. They realise that as part of Saudi Arabia they would not retain in the peninsula anything like the oil revenue which they now enjoy, and those at the top with vested interests would not like to find themselves replaced by Saudi appointees. Nevertheless it is clear that bad relations between us and Saudi Arabia impose a strain on the feelings of the Qataris and they must welcome the return of conditions in which they can, while really sitting quite firmly in our camp, continue without danger of schizophrenia to dangle their toes invitingly over the fence.

13. The event of most immediate importance in the history of the Trucial States and Muscat during this period has been the conclusion of the agreement to submit the conflicting claims of Saudi Arabia, Abu Dhabi and Muscat to arbitration, and the subsequent withdrawal of Turki bin Utaishan from Buraimi oasis where he had lived for two years as the Saudi representative. The Rulers concerned, having been persuaded with some difficulty to accept the fact that Her Majesty's Government were unwilling to go to war with Saudi Arabia on their behalf, have acquiesced in the terms of the agreement, but the final outcome will not be known for some two years. The area under dispute has been through so many vicissitudes in its quite recent history, the data are mostly so vague and so conflicting, and the local inhabitants so unreliable in their testimony, that the process of arbitration resembles a game of chance more than one of skill. Meanwhile early indications suggest that we may be in for a continuance of argument with the Saudis about the execution of the terms of the agreement which we hoped would come to an end with Turki's withdrawal.

14. The disputed territory to the west of Abu Dhabi is the most likely area in the Trucial Coast to contain commercial quantities of oil. It is just possible that some oil may also exist within the undisputed boundaries of this State. The discovery of oil in Abu Dhabi territory would not only transform that State even more radically than any of the other States in which it has hitherto been found, but would also go far towards changing the whole aspect of the other Trucial States as well, since I have extracted from Shaikh Shakhbut the promise to pay to the Trucial Council 4 per cent. of his oil revenues. Even without this stimulant the Trucial Council has been functioning with greatly increased interest and efficiency. It would be a gross exaggeration to suggest that these seven States are now on the road towards a confederation or federal union of any kind. Their meetings are at present, and are likely to remain for a considerable time, more in the nature of a Commonwealth Conference than of a Federal Parliament. But with continued careful guidance they seem unlikely to lose the ground that has been won, and the isolation from which they have previously suffered has already been to some extent overcome. The greatest unifying factor so far has been the increased interest which Her Majesty's Government has been taking in the welfare of these States, as evidenced by the sums already spent on health and education and the programme of drilling for water which is at this moment on the point of being launched. The Trucial Oman Levies will now, since the end of the Buraimi blockade, be able to give increased attention to internal security and police work generally and this will also serve to improve conditions in the remoter areas and to give added evidence of our interest in the Trucial States. The existence of the levies in their internal security role however poses more clearly than usual the question which has been with us off and on throughout our dealings with the Gulf peoples, viz., how far in fact we should intervene to maintain internal law and order and thus preserve the existing régime. Lord Curzon touched on the subject in his speech to the assembled Trucial Shaikhs at Sharjah on November 21, 1903, when he said "The British Government have no desire to interfere . . . in your internal affairs, provided that the Chiefs govern their territories with justice. . . . If any internal disputes occur, you will always find a friend in the British Resident who will use his influence . . . to prevent these dissensions from coming to a head, and to maintain the *status quo*. . . ." He went on to indicate that he was thinking not only of attacks by land by one Shaikh against another but also of dissensions within part of the territory of one of the Shaikhs. A far-reaching extension of our normal policy of non-interference in internal affairs (though its significance hardly seems to have been appreciated at the time) was the operation at Rams by landing parties from one of Her Majesty's ships supported by the Levies in July 1952 for the purpose of putting down resistance to the rule of the Shaikh of Ras al Khaima. The recognition of a new State, Fujeirah, and the reabsorption of the independent State of Kalba by Sharjah which we brought about in the same year, were more traditional types of

operation, but demonstrated that we are not always to be bound by the principle of maintaining the *status quo*. We may well be faced in the future with requests from the Rulers of Dubai or Sharjah, for instance, to help them against dissident members of their families who wish to make trouble or to detach part of their dominions. The existence of the Levies gives us the power to do this, which we formerly lacked except in coastal areas. We shall however probably be wise not to lay down any hard and fast rule for ourselves in matters of this kind but to judge each case on its merits, bearing in mind on the one hand the benefits of public security, on the other that dynastic *coups* have on the whole been the rule rather than the exception as a means of securing changes, and that a safety valve has its uses. Moreover, if we are asked to support a Ruler we shall presumably want to be sure that he is worth supporting, *i.e.*, that his administration is reasonably good at least by local standards. But it will not be wise to follow this route too far, or we shall find ourselves saddled with the direct administration of backward and primitive areas, with all its attendant pitfalls.

15. Apart from the Buraimi arbitration the most important event which has happened in Muscat is the launching, after years of discussion and preparation, of the oil expedition into southern Oman by a subsidiary of the Iraq Petroleum Company under the protection of a new local force with British officers, raised by the Sultan and paid for by the company. Even more potentially significant from the political as well as the oil point of view is the very recent adherence of a number of important Shaikhs of the Duru to the Sultan, and their written guarantee to welcome the oil company into their territory. They are a large and very widely-scattered tribe living on the desert fringes between the high sands of the Empty Quarter and the Oman mountains. If the Sultan can successfully establish his suzerainty over them he will have enclosed the other tribes around the Jebel Akhdar who are normally subservient to the Imam and many of whom actively reject the Sultan's authority. In handling this whole matter the Sultan has shown himself more skilful and successful than we or the oil company expected, even though he has for more than a year been operating by extremely remote control from his far western province of Dhofar. The old Imam died recently and a new one has been elected. The Sultan is doing his best by covert means to make difficulties for him, but has in other respects maintained his well-known policy that the tribes of the interior will always unite against anyone who enters Oman with hostile intent—as they did in the case of Turki—and that it is therefore fatal for him to make any forward move except by agreement, as he hopes to do in the case of the Duru. The discovery of oil either by the Huqf expedition or by the Americans who are prospecting in Dhofar would enable the Sultan to extend his sway by peaceful means gradually throughout Oman, to the great benefit of this large and comparatively populous region.

16. Does any recognisable pattern stand out from the complicated and sometimes tangled fabric which I have attempted to describe? Patriarchal government is still the universal rule, and remains probably the most suitable form of government in the local conditions. But the influence of the Shaikhly families is too great as compared with that of the Rulers themselves, and is often exercised irresponsibly. This is unfortunately a fact of life in a tribal or near-tribal society and there is very little we can do about it, other than hope that the younger generation of Rulers may be better able than the present one to set aside its ill-effects. The embryonic public opinion of Bahrain and Kuwait does not at present seriously want democracy for its own sake. Many people want a better administration and an end of the arbitrary inefficiency of the subordinate Shaikhs. The establishment of legal equality before a reasonable system of law and some fairly simple administrative reforms would go a long way to satisfy such popular feeling as there now is, though there is likely to be an increasing desire for control over the public purse. Owing to the unobtrusive nature of our authority, to the manifest advantages of our protection, and to the welcome preoccupation of the inhabitants of the Gulf States with trade and material advantage, there are as yet few signs of a liberal-nationalist movement such as helped to sweep away the small independent States of Germany and Italy which are perhaps the most recent prototypes of the city-States of the Persian Gulf. But the danger of this must grow with the growth of the influence of the Press and radio of the more "advanced" Arab countries—hence the importance of a British Information Service in the Gulf, which will soon be in operation, and of the establishment of the British Council in Kuwait, which has unfortunately not yet been sanctioned.

17. A second factor which emerges rather surprisingly is that in most of these territories the last year or so has seen a definite growth in British intervention, and where this has not been the case, as in Kuwait, it has not been for want of trying. We have almost unawares slipped into a more colonial position here than we previously had. In the special case of the Trucial States it is undeniable that our zeal for development and better administration has been stimulated not only by humanitarian feelings but by the necessity of competing with the Saudis for the goodwill of the inhabitants. But even in Bahrain, so long held up as an administrative model, we have felt that an important increase in British personnel in the administration is essential to prevent serious danger to the State. In Kuwait there was at first a lack of balance between our governmental and commercial intervention. When we sought to redress this by increasing British participation in the administration it was already too late. In both respects therefore it is as though we pushed rather too hard at the door and are now meeting the rebound. In Qatar I thought a year ago that I detected a tendency towards inflation of the British element of the administration and of all the evident signs of their presence. This has now been corrected, though owing to the backwardness of the population it is inevitable that for many years almost all responsible posts should continue to be held by British officials. Muscat could still do with a great deal more British-directed administration, and if oil is found there its administrative and development problems will dwarf those of all the other territories.

18. Each step in increasing the responsibility of Her Majesty's Government or of British officials has been a necessary one, and in many cases overdue, but the tendency is curiously dissimilar to that which prevails in most of our overseas territories and for that reason should be given careful scrutiny. It is a paradox that we came to the Gulf to safeguard our communications with India but that when India is no longer, at least in the same sense, ours, the Gulf is even more important to us than before. Considerations of economics, strategy and prestige all point in the same direction, and all are actually reinforced by the fact of our changed status in neighbouring areas. But it does not follow that we ought to seek to make our presence felt more obviously than before. It would be both contrary to our general principles and unwise in the particular circumstances here to impose more direct rule for its own sake. Arabs have shown elsewhere that they prefer independence to efficiency. We are trying here to let them have a modicum of both. In the external affairs of these territories I remain unconvinced that there ought to be or necessarily will be any significant change in such period as can be taken as a basis for useful thought. There are very few people in the Persian Gulf States who are so dazzled by Arab propaganda that they seriously propose to exchange our comparatively remote protection for assimilation by a neighbouring State with the consequent complete loss of internal autonomy. The danger is that without thinking or meaning what they say they may be led by the fatal hypnosis of words so prevalent in the East to repeat as their own the slogans of their more sophisticated and irresponsible Arab brethren. The less we give a handle to such propaganda, the better. There are equally few who believe that each State could stand alone on its own feet. Apart from the growing discussion of common problems between the Trucial States, which we have fostered, there is very little possibility of union between the Persian Gulf territories. It would be quite a good thing if there were a greater tendency in this direction, but it would be wrong for us to force it on them, and in any case the chance of anything even as strong and coherent as a West Indies Federation developing in the Persian Gulf seems impossibly remote. Fruitful progress appears possible therefore mainly in the improvement of the internal administration and the training of the local inhabitants to play their part in it. This is particularly true of judicial matters. At present a good deal of internal as well as external guidance by us is essential and this will no doubt remain true for some considerable time, but we need not even now lose sight of the aim that in time the local inhabitants should run their internal affairs well enough to allow us to resume our traditional unobtrusiveness. The correct balance is difficult to find. There will always be a level below which our interest in internal affairs should not sink without risk to our status as Protecting Power, but there is no advantage in our keeping this level artificially high.

19. I am sending copies of this despatch to the British Middle East Office.

I have, &c.

B. A. B. BURROWS.

ES 1017/7

No. 37

**RESIGNATION OF SHEIKH ABDULLAH SULAIMAN, UNTIL RECENTLY
SAUDI-ARABIAN MINISTER OF FINANCE**

Mr. Phillips to Mr. Eden. (Received September 25)

(No. 108. Confidential) *Jedda,*
Sir, *September 18, 1954*

I briefly reported the news of the resignation of Sheikh Abdullah Sulaiman, until recently Minister of Finance, in my telegram No. 236 of August 31. I have now the honour to offer my views on the significance of this, the latest and perhaps the most far-reaching development in Saudi Arabia since King Saud succeeded his father.

2. Sheikh Abdullah's fall from power came as no surprise: it had in fact already been forecast in Mr. Pelham's despatch No. 42 of March 14, in which also was mentioned the growing influence of Sheikh Mohammed Surur who is now the new Minister of Finance. Nevertheless, even if these changes were not unexpected, the drama of the past few weeks with its arrests and scandals and rumours has been an engrossing affair to watch.

3. There was perhaps always the feeling that this was not only the finale of one man's long, brilliant and roguish career, but also the end of an era. For Abdullah Sulaiman has for as long as most people can remember held in his hands the essential reins of government. It is largely he who, with the late King Ibn Saud, his friend and protector, has been responsible for transforming Saudi Arabia's simple, patriarchal rule into one which, if still an autocracy, is more suited to coping with the wealth which has been suddenly thrust upon it by the activities of the American oil men. And if in the process of that he has managed to gather together a vast personal fortune, and if too during that time the financial affairs of the country have become, to say the least, not all they might have been, is it to be supposed that by his resignation corruption will cease and Government improve? It is probable that at least one person thinks so—the Emir Faisal, Prime Minister and Crown Prince.

4. The immediate cause of Sheikh Abdullah's resignation is widely believed to have been a sharp disagreement with Faisal during one of the meetings of the Council of Ministers. But whatever the truth of that, it is certain that his fall was

virtually assured after the arrest of Mohammed Ali Mousli and Badr Fahoom, two of Abdullah Sulaiman's "men" who were involved in the recent Govenco scandal (as reported in my letter 22625/13/54 of September 7 to Eastern Department). When, at the same time, it was learnt that no member of the Sulaiman family would be permitted to leave the country it was thought that a special vengeance was being prepared. But more reasonable counsel prevailed. Instead, Sheikh Abdullah's humiliating resignation has been dressed up for the benefit of the public as the retirement "for reasons of health" of a great statesman (which, by Saudi standards, he was): the King has publicly and speciously expressed his gratitude for his labours and ordered that he should continue to receive his salary (a nice touch): and even his successor, Mohammed Surur, once a protégé, later an enemy, has shed a crocodile tear or two in the local press.

5. It is probably sentiment that saved Abdullah Sulaiman from the farce of a trial for misuse of public funds. The King, and more especially Prince Faisal, must constantly have recalled how high a place he commanded in their father's affections, and must indeed long have regarded him almost as a member of the family. Yet if it was filial duty that withheld the bludgeon, it was possibly reaction from the severities of those many duties demanded from his children by such a stern father as Ibn Saud which caused the friction between Abdullah Sulaiman and the palace in the first place. Prince Faisal and his brothers must long have fretted at the power wielded by Sheikh Abdullah, especially during the final years of Ibn Saud's reign: but now that Faisal has absolute power (his brother may reign, but he it is who rules) he must have found Abdullah Sulaiman's presence at Court and in the Council of Ministers more than irksome. Absolute rulers do not care for avuncular advice.

6. All this throws new light on the character of the Crown Prince. Faisal has long been known to be one of the most competent men in the country, but has not

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until now had much opportunity to prove himself. However, with the new régime now firmly established under his premiership, with a number of the ministries in the hands of the wiser among his younger brothers, and, above all, with the last connexion with the "bad old days" severed by the resignation of Abdullah Sulaiman, Faisal is now in a position to carry out the reforms which are generally expected of him.

7. In spite of his very great popularity at this moment, there can be no question of his casting ambitious eyes on the throne. Apart from the fact that he makes a great show of self-effacement when he appears in public with his brother, it seems not unlikely that a convenient division of the labour of governing has been arrived at between them. For a time at least it seems that the rôles are to be reversed: Prince Faisal, who has formally been entrusted with being Saudi Arabia's spokesman abroad, now evidently means to devote more time to the internal affairs of the country, while his brother the King

performs his self-appointed task of increasing the prestige of Saudi Arabia abroad by his pious speeches of Islamic unity and the series of visits he has made and is to make to neighbouring countries. (Persia and Afghanistan are rumoured to be next on the list.)

8. Although Abdullah Sulaiman's firm and experienced hand is no longer to guide the affairs of Saudi Arabia between the reefs of popular discontent at the Royal Family's extravagance and princely displeasure at being denied an extra palace or two, it seems to me nevertheless that we can look forward to a period of comparative stability, and, unless the Crown Prince belies the promise he has shown in the past, a period of gradual improvement in the chaotic financial state of the country.

9. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the Head of the British Middle East Office in Fayid.

I have, &c.

H. PHILLIPS.

EA 1081/564

No. 38

**WITHDRAWAL OF TURKI IBN ATAISHAN AND PARTY
FROM HAMASA IN THE BURAIMI OASIS**

Mr. Burrows to Mr. Eden. (Received October 4)

(No. 94. Confidential)
Sir,

Bahrain,

September 22, 1954.

In my telegram No. 531 of August 13, I reported briefly that Turki ibn Ataishan and his party had that morning left Hamasa, the village in the Buraimi Oasis which they occupied on August 31, 1952, in furtherance of the late King Ibn Saud's 1949 claim to the area and to a substantial part of the coastline between the Qatar Peninsula and Abu Dhabi. Though this bare report has since been amplified in semi-official correspondence with the Department, I think it may be useful to attempt in the despatch which I now have the honour to address to you, a more general review of the fulfilment to date of the conditions under which Her Majesty's Government acting on behalf of the Ruler of Abu Dhabi and of the Sultan of Muscat and Oman, recently agreed to submit to arbitration this dispute regarding the common frontier between Abu Dhabi and Saudi Arabia and the question of sovereignty over Buraimi.

2. When the Buraimi Arbitration Agreement was signed in Jedda on July 30, in order to minimise the risks of incidents in the period before the arrival of the two police detachments and Turki's ensuing withdrawal, I arranged at the request of the Saudi negotiators that two of the Trucial Oman Levy posts which had comparatively recently been moved forward nearer to Hamasa with the object of more effectively blockading the village, should be moved back and that the Levies should refrain from firing unless fired on or in military danger. At the same time Her Majesty's Ambassador at Jedda and I urged Yusuf Yasin, the Saudi Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, to agree to an early evacuation of Turki and his party by air and offered assistance in arranging this; but after some deliberation on the Saudis' part, we were told that King Saud had decided on the movement of their

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incoming police detachment from Hasa (destined, in accordance with the agreement, to replace Turki and his men in the Buraimi zone) by the Abu Dhabi coastal track, and that on the arrival at Buraimi, probably about August 9th, Turki and his men would leave by the same route. Though these arrangements carried with them the risk that Turki, after ten days' benefit of the relaxed blockade to enable him to receive, to entertain and to reward visiting tribesmen in large numbers, would use his withdrawal to further advantage by visiting the coastal areas and showing the Saudi flag on Shaikh Shakhbut's doorstep, there was no choice but to agree and then to do whatever we could to minimise the risks to our own interests.

3. It was at least partly with this last consideration in mind that I arranged for Major Johnson of the Levies to go to Nakhla, at the western end of the disputed area, with an escort to await the incoming Saudi police detachment (which we had learned would be commanded by an officer from the Royal bodyguard named Abdulla bin Nami) and to show it the route. The convoy, which arrived on August 7, consisted of nine vehicles and thirty-eight men, only fifteen of whom were due to remain at Buraimi under the terms of the exchange of letters. The joint party left at midnight that same night with Captain Nami's detachment leading the way and using their own guides. However, some of the Saudi vehicles soon got stuck and after this the Saudi commander, who had wanted to use the less direct track via Dubai, agreed that his guides did not know their business and consented to follow Major Johnson along the track passing behind Abu Dhabi which the Political Agent for the Trucial States had recommended as it avoids inhabited localities and thus provided a minimum of opportunity for a triumphal entry. The convoy reached the Levies' post at Magheira on the morning of August 8th and worked that day recovering broken-down vehicles. The Saudi detachment had by this time spent four consecutive nights travelling and Major Johnson attempted to persuade Nami to remain there that night resting his troops, but this he proved unwilling to do as he said he was under strict instructions to be at Buraimi next day. That night's journey, however, cannot be reckoned particularly successful as Major Johnson arrived on the morning of August 9 at Buraimi with the leader of the Saudi party and only two vehicles. The heat at this stage was such that movement by day was impracticable and it was not until the night of August 11 that the last stragglers arrived in the oasis.

4. While the incoming convoy was on the road, Lieutenant-Colonel Martin, commanding the Trucial Oman Levies, had formed our own police detachment and had moved it to Kahil on the edge of the zone defined in the Agreement, ready to move up to Buraimi at the appropriate time. In view of the limited and purely constabulary functions which the exchange of letters contemplated, I had originally intended to put our detachment under an Arab non-commissioned officer, but when we were informed of Captain Nami's appointment, I decided we must have an Arab-speaking British officer to command it. The man selected was Captain Clayton, of the Queen's Regiment.

5. Colonel Martin meanwhile had sent an Arab officer with a letter to Turki to ask when he would be ready to leave and this man reported on his return that large numbers of tribesmen were visiting Turki to ask for money, but that the latter was turning them away empty-handed. He is reported, as a matter of fact, to have handed most of his remaining cash to the leading local Saudi supporters, Obaid bin Juma', the deposed and evicted leader of the Beni Ka'ab, and Shaikh Rashid of Hamasa, who issued the original invitation to the Saudis to establish themselves in the oasis. Shaikh Saqr of Buraimi, whose policy has always been to keep a foot in both camps and to collect all possible pickings, was also given a present.

6. On the evening of August 9 the leaders of the two police groups selected a camp site some 7 miles south of Shaikh Zaid's fort at El Ain on the road to Jebal Hafit. The choice is interesting as Turki was known to favour a site close to the villages, while our authorities felt for a variety of reasons that it should not be too near them. However Nami is said to have had a falling out with Turki on his arrival and it may be for this reason that he agreed with our views on the camp site so readily.

7. Turki's outgoing party is said to have numbered eighty. In spite of Colonel Martin's offers of help, he insisted that his own vehicles and those of the incoming detachment were all that he needed. It had also been intended to provide him with a discreet escort of one British officer and six men in two Landrovers, but

Turki refused this, pointing out that there was no provision for it in the exchange of letters and that he had no need of guides in his "own desert." A reply was sent to the effect that the escort was there to guide and assist him, but that if he needed no such help he was free to go as he pleased, provided he informed us exactly when he intended to leave and what route he intended to follow, so that we should be able to arrange for the withdrawal of our posts simultaneously. Turki replied that he would set out early on the morning of the next day (August 13) and would follow the same route as the incoming party. He did in fact leave at a quarter past five and the Trucial Oman Levies were simultaneously withdrawn from the zone.

8. On the morning of August 14, the Trucial Oman Levies were still without news of the party's passage through the post at Magheira, where they should have arrived the previous night. Though Turki had so clearly invited trouble by his decision to travel by day and his refusal to accept an escort, we felt concerned about the well-being of the women and children who were presumed to be in the convoy, since its water supplies were known to be limited. I arranged therefore for a Royal Air Force reconnaissance to be flown that afternoon over the part of the track lying in undisputed territory. Owing to a breakdown, this search was not completed by nightfall, though it was to be continued next morning. I had also arranged with Petroleum Concessions Ltd. (P.C.L.) that if necessary, they would continue the search with one of their own aircraft down the part of the track in disputed territory, but within the area where they were permitted to carry out oil operations. However, Major Johnson's Landrover patrol found Turki after nightfall, some distance east of Magheira, his saloon car broken down, he himself in a state of collapse from heat-exhaustion and his convoy scattered over 80 miles of desert. He was taken to the Levies' camp at Magheira and resuscitated before moving on to establish his own camp, while the Levies worked all day rescuing all but one of his vehicles, which had to be abandoned. It was a partially revived but crestfallen group that on the night of August 15-16 passed through our last post at Nakhla on its way to Hasa. The Nakhla and Agheila posts, being in disputed territory, were withdrawn as soon as the Saudis left. Meanwhile Shaikh Shakhbut had been asked to disband his tribal posts in the Liwa and he has since confirmed in writing his orders on the subject.

9. A curious epilogue to this operation followed three days later (August 19) when a band of twenty-four armed Saudis turned up at Magheira, having infringed the agreed conditions by re-entering the disputed area without consultation or agreement with us, announced that they had come to recover the abandoned vehicle. The Levies decided, in the absence of instructions, to escort them to the vehicle, which was found to have been systematically looted by Bedu. Captain Clayton had been in touch with his opposite number about the recovery of this truck and the absence of any warning, either through him or through the diplomatic channel, suggests that part at least of the groups' mission was to find out whether we had withdrawn our posts from the disputed area.

10. There is no doubt that from our point of view the change-over operation went far more smoothly than we had any right to expect and for this much credit is due to the hard work, patience, tact and forbearance of Colonel Martin and his Levy Officers and to Mr. Pirie-Gordon, the Political Agent at Dubai. Turki left assuring all and sundry that he would be back in three months, but the initial impression which his departure made in the oasis and on the coast was that of a set-back for the Saudi cause; the news of the break-up of his convoy and his own collapse caused particular amusement.

11. Since then there have, as you, Sir, are only too well aware, been a flood of Saudi protests at the manner in which we and the Abu Dhabi and Muscat representatives are carrying out the terms of the agreement. Judging from these protests and from Captain Clayton's reports from the zone, it seems fairly clear that the Saudis had not appreciated the practical effects of the agreement and in particular of the limitation of the arbitration, and consequently of the withdrawal of forces, to the Buraimi zone and the disputed area in the west. Having been obliged to withdraw their own men some 300 miles they find it hard to understand and still more to accept the fact that our forces have the right to remain and operate freely within 16 miles of Buraimi and to control the tracks from the oasis to the coast. Their protests have foundered time after time because they relate to matters outside the defined zone, whereas we are under no obligation to apply the agreed conditions to the territory north, east or even south of that zone. They have in the

past contended that this area is the preserve of independent tribes with whom they would like in due course to make their own political arrangements, but it is in our view sovereign territory of the Sultan of Muscat, whose interests there we continue to represent and to defend. We are to-day, as a matter of fact, physically in a better position to do so than before the raising of the blockade since an outburst of banditry in the Beni Ka'ab country in the fortnight before Turki's withdrawal (a development for which local opinion was quick to hold Turki himself responsible) obliged us to establish three new Levy posts north and east of the Buraimi zone as the only way of restoring order without the risks of violation of the Buraimi zone inherent in a settlement by tribal action of the traditional kind. The existence of these new posts has somewhat cramped the style of Obaid bin Juma who now lives in the safety of the Buraimi zone and has for the moment transferred his extra-zonal efforts further south on to the Wadi Jizzi route to Sohar and the Batinah.

12. Obaid remains and will remain a considerable nuisance. His son and his cousin left for Saudi Arabia with Turki and will doubtless return with instructions, encouragement, rupees, arms and quantities of Saudi passports. But on present showing Shaikh Zaid, the Ruler of Abu Dhabi's brother and Wali in the oasis for the last nine years, who has been the main rallying point for resistance in the oasis to Saudi penetration, must be reckoned more of a thorn in the Saudis' side than Obaid is in ours. There is too, no doubt that the Ruler's recent visit to the zone, though we felt obliged to ask him to withdraw, heartened his friends and supporters and much discomfited his enemies. On balance I agree with the view expressed in your telegram No. 837 of September 13 that an attempt to secure Obaid's removal from the zone might in present circumstances lead to more difficulties than his presence creates and, although we shall have to take steps wherever possible to frustrate his politics, we must be careful to do nothing that may strengthen the Saudis' hand, when, after the establishment of the Arbitration Commission, they attempt to invoke its authority to circumscribe Shaikh Zaid's "unfair" advantage of being able to leave the zone at will for adjacent friendly territory.

13. In spite of these underlying difficulties, Captain Clayton seems to have established good personal relations with Abdulla bin Nami, his Saudi opposite number. The latter is clearly a man of a certain weight and authority and, whatever his titular army rank, he is reported to have at one time commanded a brigade during the war in Palestine. The composition of his detachment, too, is interesting and scarcely suggests that it was selected with the limited and police duties referred to in condition (ii) of the exchange of letters in mind. Nami is, for example, assisted by a civilian clerk whose nominal function is that of Koran reader to the detachment. It is believed that this man is in fact an official of the Saudi Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Shaikh Zaid says he remembers him as a member of the Saudi delegation at the Damman Conference of 1952, when this frontier question was under discussion. The detachment's signals too are planned on a generous scale, since four out of a total strength of fifteen are W/T operators and they seem to be hard worked. However it appears that, whatever his ultimate purposes, Nami is at the present stage making an ostentatious if misleading show of abiding by the rules.

14. With regard to the rest of the disputed area, we have now no regular source of information except the oil company, who have hardly yet begun their season's operations there and who will not, of course, be able to penetrate south of latitude 23° 15' N. I find it encouraging however, that they should already have decided to drill a test well at the western end of the area near the eastern edge of the Sabakhat Mutti and some 20 miles in from the coast. I have no confirmed news of any corresponding activity by ARAMCO in the area south of 23° N., though one of P.C.L.'s parties recently sighted what may well have been an ARAMCO vehicle making a furtive reconnaissance well on our side of the "no oil-man's land."

15. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Ambassadors at Jeddah, Cairo, Beirut, Damascus, Baghdad and Washington, to the head of B.M.E.O., to the Political Agents at Dubai, Bahrain, Kuwait and Dohah and to Her Majesty's Acting Consul at Muscat.

I have, &c.

B. A. B. BURROWS.

(Received September 28)

(No. 203. Unclassified)
(Telegraphic)

Baghdad,

September 23, 1954.

Her Britannic Majesty's Embassy presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and has the honour to invite reference to the esteemed Ministry's Note No. 3041/3041/7/28266 of the 4th of October, 1953, in which the Ministry informed the Embassy that the Government of Iraq agreed in principle to the proposal relating to the carriage of water from the Shatt-al-Arab to Kuwait, and also to the Ministry's Note No. 750/750/7/1875 of the 10th of February, 1954 in which the Embassy was informed that instructions had been issued to afford facilities to Sir Alexander Gibb and Partners to carry out survey work in the area through which the water pipeline between Kuwait and the Shatt-al-Arab would pass.

The Embassy now has the honour to inform the Ministry that Sir Alexander Gibb and Partners have presented their report to the Ruler of Kuwait. His Highness has accepted the substance of the report and has requested that Her Britannic Majesty's Government should approach the Government of Iraq with a view to opening negotiations for an agreement in the near future.

The Government of Kuwait wish to ask for permission to take up to 100 million gallons of water a day from the Shatt-al-Arab.

The scheme in the first stage would involve a single pipeline about 54 km. long from the intake point to Kuwait capable of delivering about 33 million gallons a day. At a later date the number of pipelines might be increased to three. The most suitable intake point would appear to be on land at present used by the Royal Air Force near the Rumailah Creek at Hargil. The Royal Air Force hope to reach agreement with the Iraq Government on the transfer of title of this land. The pipeline would approximately follow the direction of the road from Basra to Kuwait via Safwan, and an easement of about 30 metres in width would be required. From the proposed intake site there is a pipeline route which would not interfere with buildings and would involve the minimum of road crossings. At the intake, the scheme provides for a jetty built on piles carrying electrically driven pumps. Natural gas would provide fuel for power purposes. An area of land would be required at the intake site for two or three houses for key personnel operating the Intake Works and Pumping Station. During construction it would be an advantage if space could be provided close to the intake works for a pipe depot and a base for the construction contracts. The scheme further provides for a pilot water treatment plant near the intake: on completion of the scheme, water treatment would be carried out in Kuwait. The installations in Iraq would be managed by a Resident Engineer appointed by the Kuwait Government.

Materials for the intake works and the pipeline up to the proposed booster station 64 km. along the pipeline would be shipped through Basra. It is hoped that customs duties on these materials could be waived.

The Consultants have given careful consideration to the possibility of constructing a canal instead of a pipeline and have examined the possibilities of two alternative routes, one following the general direction of the Khor Abdullah, the Khor as Sabiyah and the Kuwait coastline, and the other an inland route involving a pressure pipeline 68 km. long from the Shatt-al-Arab to a canal situated on the high ground south-west of Jebel Sanam. They have found that a canal scheme has many disadvantages, being more costly to construct in the first instance and more expensive to maintain because of silting from wind-blown sand and possible damage to the banks by nomadic herds. Both the routes mentioned above would require pressure pipes and pumps because of the rise in ground between the Shatt-al-Arab and Kuwait, and there would moreover be much loss of water by evaporation from the open sectors. For these reasons the Consultants recommend the construction of a pipeline rather than a canal. If it is desired to make some provision for the inhabitants along the route of the pipeline it might be possible to provide some watering points for Nomads, to be supplied from the pipe.

Her Majesty's Embassy hopes that the Iraq Government will in the near future be ready to conclude an agreement covering the points in the preceding paragraphs of this Note. The Embassy will be happy to discuss the matter at any time that the Iraq Government should require.

Her Britannic Majesty's Embassy avails itself of this opportunity to renew the expression of its highest consideration.

ES 10345/4

No. 40

THE UNITED STATES POSITION IN SAUDI ARABIA

Mr. Phillips to Sir Anthony Eden. (Received October 23)

(No. 117. Confidential & Guard) *Jedda, October 20, 1954.*

You will know from Sir John Sterndale Bennett's despatch No. 30 of August 30, in which he reviewed the progress of inter-Arab relations, that the United States position in Saudi Arabia tended to deteriorate towards the middle of this year. Chancery letter No. 10328/1/54 of August 13, from Her Majesty's Embassy in Washington to Eastern Department gave some details of this deterioration and reported that it was causing the State Department concern. Since then I have kept in touch with the American Ambassador here on this question, and I have the honour now to report that, from what Mr. Wadsworth has told me and I have myself observed, relations between the two Governments seem to have improved of late.

2. The deterioration was, in my opinion, an outcome of the Saudi desire to give a lead to the Moslem world in turning down any Western aid which might infringe sovereignty. Thus Iraq's acceptance of American military aid brought on Saudi resentment against Washington as well as Bagdad. Similarly, the Turco-Pakistan Pact was an American defeat for Saudi principles. The Saudi Government's request soon after for removal of the Point Four Mission here may have served conveniently as a snub to the United States, but having advertised their principles so loudly the Saudis could in any case hardly have let the mission stay on. On the other hand, having talked equally loudly about Arab mutual defence, they could not turn down Egypt's offer of military advisers. That was Moslem help, therefore unobjectionable.

3. The Egyptian officers, however, are here mainly to standardise Saudi military procedure with their own. Training remains in the hands of the American Military Mission. I am assured by the American Ambassador that there has been no question of withdrawal of the mission or abrogation of the Dhahran Airfield Agreement. Mr. Wadsworth emphasised, indeed, that Saudi-American military co-operation was now closer than ever. The Head of the American Military Mission was second

member of a newly formed planning committee headed by the Minister of Defence which the ambassador had been instrumental in having set up to study and advise the King on expansion of the Saudi Arabian armed forces. Saud was anxious for practical help from the United States, but it must not conflict with the appearance or reality of Saudi sovereignty.

4. A further sign of improving relations is the recent agreement by the Arabian-American Oil Company to pay the Saudi Government \$70 million additional royalties for the three years ending October 1953. Continuing additional royalties are expected to raise the Government's income by \$20 million to \$30 million per annum. So far as I can judge, the Onassis oil-tanker agreement is now the only important point of difference between Riyadh and Washington in regard to oil operations. Even so, it is not directed against the United States in particular: it is as much a symbol of the Saudi desire for independence of the West in general as was the removal of Point Four. Yet the King is now apparently less dogmatic about the Onassis plan, and a Saudi-American committee here is now studying the problems involved in it for both sides.

5. United States relations with Saudi Arabia involve Anglo-American relations to some extent. I have shown in an earlier despatch that the hardening American attitude to the Saudi Government on their frontier dispute with the United Kingdom earlier this year probably had little to do with the removal of Point Four. Nor is it likely that this attitude influenced the Saudis in signing the contract with Onassis or bringing in Egyptian officers. The American Ambassador here may not have entirely agreed with this inference at first. But he has more recently appeared to recognise that the Saudi Government will arrogantly go any way that suits them, regardless of interest, pressure or concessions on the part of any Western Government and probably of few Moslem Governments. Mr. Wadsworth has therefore taken a less pessimistic view of the United States position here than seems to have been taken in Washington. In these circumstances it occurs to me that the State

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Department perhaps showed exaggerated concern for the American set-backs in Saudi Arabia in order to emphasise the extent of their "self-sacrifice" in latterly making it clear to the Government here that the United States would not back them against the United Kingdom in their frontier dispute. Yet, considering the Saudi Government's growing desire to safeguard their sovereignty and the repugnance to them of continued American support for Israel, the United States Government have

done well in keeping their dominant position in this country. They need not, I think, lament their failure to monopolise completely all their spheres of interest here.

6. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Ambassador in Washington, the Political Resident at Bahrain, and the Head of the British Middle East Office.

I have, &c.

H. PHILLIPS.

EA 10113/2

No. 41

CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM IN BAHRAIN

Mr. Burrows to Sir Anthony Eden. (Received October 30)

(No. 100. Confidential)

Bahrain,

Sir,

October 25, 1954.

I regret that it has taken me so long to provide the report requested in your telegram No. 621 of July 8 on the strength of popular feeling in Bahrain in favour of a more representative form of government and my recommendations as to our attitude towards future pressure for constitutional reform. I have since had the benefit of the comments on the subject in paragraph 3 of your despatch No. 132 (EA 10110/9 of August 14). Part of the cause of the delay has been that, after I had obtained a report on the subject from the Political Agent in Bahrain, it seemed that it would be more satisfactory if I could at the same time include some comments on the development of opinion on this subject in Kuwait, and I consequently called for a similar report from the Acting Political Agent there. I now have the honour to enclose copies of the two reports⁽¹⁾, with which I am in general agreement.

2. It is perhaps not always realised that certain functional forms of representative government have existed for some time in both Bahrain and Kuwait. In Bahrain there are four Municipalities (Manama, Muharraq and two smaller towns) of which half the members are elected and half nominated by the Government. The elections are on a restricted franchise based on property, but a striking feature is that women who possess the necessary qualification are entitled to vote and in fact do so. The Manama Municipality broke down some time ago owing to Shia-Sunni rivalry and Municipal affairs are at present being conducted by an appointed committee. But new elections are to be held in a short time, after which it is hoped that the Municipality will be reconstituted in the original form. There are, in addition, councils—one Sunni and one Shia—for handling the religious trust funds (Waqfs), and a mixed council under a Shia superintendent for looking after the affairs of minors. There is a Water and Agricultural Committee and there is a council of merchants, corresponding roughly to a Chamber of Commerce, and a council of those concerned in diving for pearls. The Shia Waqf council is elected. The others are appointed by the Government but have the power to co-opt further members and frequently do so. The Municipalities have power to impose Municipal taxes and to make what use they think fit of the proceeds. They are frequently urged by the Government to impose higher taxes but are reluctant to do so since the members of the Municipal Councils would be among the chief tax payers. The Government, therefore, find it necessary quite often to contribute subventions to the Municipal funds. The religious councils exercise a good deal of autonomous power in their own spheres. The Water and Agricultural Committee is largely advisory and its advice is by no means always taken by the Ruler. There seems to be no particular pressure to increase the elected element in these bodies and it is probable that if this were done the results would not be noticeably different from what they are now. In

(1) Not printed.

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this small community there is only a very limited number of committee men available for these tasks.

3. In Kuwait wholly elected councils have existed for some time in the Departments of Health, Education, Waqfs and Municipal Affairs, but with one exception have not been allowed to function by the Shaikhs in charge of the departments. The exception is the Education Council which has always been a more effective body and has normally worked in comparative harmony with Shaikh Abdullah Jabir, who is in charge of the department. It was largely owing to this that the Education Department were ready with their plans before anyone else and were thus able to obtain such a large, and perhaps disproportionate, share of the development funds for their immense schoolbuilding programme. It was representatives of these Councils who joined together a few months ago to present their grievances to the Ruler and to ask for a Central Council to be formed of selected representatives of the departmental Councils. When this was refused and the High Executive Committee set up instead the members of the departmental Councils all resigned and no means have yet been found of restoring the Councils to life.

4. The history of an earlier attempt to install representative government in Kuwait makes curious reading in present circumstances. In 1938, in consequence of agitation in Kuwait, Her Majesty's Government advised the then Ruler to form a nominated Advisory Council. He refused at first but later in the year, in the face of renewed agitation, acquiesced in the formation of an elected Executive Council which proceeded to draw up a new Constitution depriving the Ruler of most of his powers. The president of this Council was Shaikh Abdullah as Salim, the present Ruler. The Council was disbanded and a new Council elected, with the same president. This second Council never met and after a brief interlude of violence was superseded by a nominated Advisory Council, again with Abdullah as Salim as president. This, in turn, petered out after a few years and had no important achievements to its credit. The present Ruler appears to have retained none of his earlier enthusiasm for democracy and his reaction to the recent movement for reform has been to increase the executive authority of the Government as represented by himself. He is, however, known to be worried at the resignation of the members of the various departmental Councils and would no doubt like to find some means to resuscitate them without loss of face to himself.

5. The Ruler of Bahrain has inherited or acquired—and has expounded to me on more than one occasion—a philosophy of government which recalls something like the guild system in our own constitutional history, and which is reflected in the functional Councils now operating in Bahrain. His view is that all would be well if people stuck to their own concerns; that is to say, it is the function of the Government to govern, of the merchants to trade, of the farmers to farm and of the workers to work, and the less any of these groups interfere in the concerns of another the better. He feels that this kind of system is more than ever justified in the case of Bahrain since the inhabitants pay no taxes (other than extremely low customs duties and the Municipal taxes referred to above). This is undoubtedly an important feature of the situation here and in Kuwait and Qatar. The revenues of the State go directly into the hands of the Government as a result either of payments to the Government by a foreign company which has no part in the political life of the territory, or, in the case of customs revenues, by the application of Government authority on a narrow and well-defined class of importers whose profit margins are in most cases so much larger than the duties that the latter have comparatively little obvious impact on the local purchaser. These Governments are therefore not obliged to exact funds for their support from the general body of citizens. Whatever may be thought of the theoretical argument of "no representation without taxation," it seems likely that in practice this fact has delayed the growth of pressure for democratic institutions.

6. Nevertheless, it must be expected, as Mr. Wall point out, that pressure for greater control of Government by the public will be directed to a large extent to the control of the public purse. Even though the individual citizens make no contribution to the revenues of the State they will increasingly hold the view that these revenues are theirs and are not at the sole disposition of the Government. Much of the feeling in Kuwait which led to the protests by the merchants at the

maladministration of the Shaikhs and which thus contributed eventually to the establishment of the Executive Committee is attributable to the simple idea that the State's revenues are not the personal perquisites of the Ruling family, but should be used for the benefit of the State as a whole (*i.e.*, in the merchants' eyes, for the benefit of the merchants).

7. The enclosed reports suggest that hitherto grievances against the Governments of these two States have been mainly specific. But in the last few weeks agitation in Bahrain against specific grievances concerned with the freedom of the Press and the incapacity of the judges has developed into a cry for a Legislative Council, and in the course of political meetings unofficial "elections" have been held to form a deputation to present a demand to this effect to the Ruler and, if he refuses it, to Her Majesty's Government. This movement includes some of the Shia leaders and the young "intellectuals" of both communities who have at least temporarily managed to make an impressive show of unity against the Government. But it is by no means fully representative of the more responsible elements in Bahrain. Nevertheless, the fact that it has taken this form, and that the recent agitation in Kuwait also took the form of a demand for a Council is perhaps symptomatic. It shows the effect even in these politically remote territories of the ideas, or rather slogans, of democracy which are so freely uttered by Middle East politicians and journalists and which penetrate into the Gulf through the Press and radio of Egypt and the Levant. The growth of education in Bahrain and Kuwait will unfortunately only render still larger sections of the population amenable to this half-baked political journalism, without imparting to them the critical faculties with which it might be correctly judged. We may thus expect to hear repeated increasingly in the future the view that the adoption of representative forms of government will automatically provide a panacea for the administrative failings which are the real and often legitimate object of complaint. Unfortunately, experience in the Middle East and in other under-developed areas and the extreme political immaturity of the Gulf States suggest that in fact the result would be the opposite and that under more representative government administrative inefficiency and corruption would increase.

8. From our own point of view, moreover, I still see considerable force in the view I expressed in paragraph 5 of my despatch No. 103 of October 26, 1953, with which you expressed agreement in paragraph 6 of your despatch No. 196 (EA 10111/24) of November 20, 1953, that an early result of the Constitution of an Advisory Council in Kuwait would be agreement by its members on a policy hostile to British interests for lack of agreement on other matters of domestic and administrative concern. In your despatch No. 132 of August 14 last you raise the question whether, at the same time as we secure the appointment of additional British officials in the Bahrain Government, we should adopt a rather more forthcoming attitude towards any genuine movement for more representative government. I doubt if these two tendencies are compatible. It is greatly to be feared that among the first subjects of discussion by general, as opposed to functional, representative bodies would be the allegedly excessive number and power of the British officials in the Government. It also seems unlikely that such representative bodies would accept as readily as have the Rulers the comparatively conservative financial policies now being applied in Bahrain, Kuwait and Qatar by which reasonably large sums are put aside every year out of the oil revenues as a reserve invested in British funds. As against these considerations we have the difficulty which has been met with in so many other politically evolving countries, that if a new order is going to come about anyway it may in future be to our disadvantage if we are thought to have opposed its emergence. We have often been accused of being tied to reactionary elements in such countries and of losing the chance of getting on our side the progressive movement which will eventually take control. The point is a real one but, while we can and ought to have some personal contact with moderate representatives of progressive opinion, if they are to be found, I do not believe the time has yet come when we should publicly advocate or even privately press the Governments of the Gulf territories to adopt constitutional change, as opposed to reforms in the Administration. Some of these reforms are still urgently and obviously needed, and, when the local pamphleteers keep to their specific grievances I often find myself in agreement with them. It is probable that by an adequate programme of administrative improvement the support now obtained by the advocates of representative forms

of government could be reduced, and this still seems the most sensible objective of our policy. At the same time the existing representative institutions can perhaps be made to work better and new ones of a similar character might be established where appropriate. But the most urgently needed reforms are those which are the most difficult to obtain since both in Bahrain and in Kuwait they involve a major attack on the prerogatives of the Ruler's family, and it is by no means certain that such reforms can be brought about in time to stop or delay the development of agitation for change in the whole system of government. Whatever was done in the way of reform there would no doubt always remain a hard core of agitators and propagandists. But they might be more isolated than at present, and we should feel happier in our consciences in supporting the present régime if, after administrative reforms, we had less sympathy with the specific grievances of those who wish to overthrow them.

9. I am dealing in a separate despatch with the problems more immediately posed to us by recent events in Bahrain.

10. I am sending copies of this despatch to the British Middle East Office and to the Political Agencies at Bahrain, Kuwait and Doha.

I have, &c.

B. A. B. BURROWS.

EM 1041/354

No. 42

TALKS BETWEEN GOVERNOR OF ADEN AND YEMENI MINISTERS

Mr. McGregor to Sir Anthony Eden. (Received November 17)

(No. 23. Secret)

Taiz,

October 30, 1954.

Sir, I have the honour to refer to my telegram No. 93 of the 26th of October and to report that His Excellency Sir Tom Hickinbotham, the Governor of Aden, visited the Yemen from the 16th to the 25th of October, 1954. The visit was made at the invitation of His Majesty the Imam. I enclose a diary of the visit.

2. The Governor travelled by road from Aden and was accompanied by Mr. Watts, his Political Secretary, Flight Lieutenant Spencer, his aide-de-camp and an escort of Government Guards. At Kresh, on the Aden side of the frontier, he was met by a Senior Yemeni Military Officer, the Yemeni Commissioner of Police and a Yemeni military escort, and a special car was provided by the Imam for the remainder of the journey. Qadhi Muhammad As-Shami, the Governor of Beidha, a member of the Royal Court and I welcomed the Governor at Rahida, the main Yemeni customs post. After a short rest, the Governor continued his journey to Taiz. There were guards of honour at the principal towns en route. On arrival at the Guest House at Taiz the Governor inspected a guard of honour and was then greeted by Qadhi Muhammad Al-Amri, the Yemeni Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs. At 7 p.m. His Royal Highness Saif-al Islam Abdullah, the Yemeni Minister for Foreign Affairs, called on the Governor and stayed to dinner. Qadhis Al-Amri and As-Shami were also present (the latter had been given the duty of accompanying the Governor throughout his visit). The Governor was satisfied with his reception and it was commented locally that the arrangements had been much more elaborate than those made to welcome either Major Salah Salem, the Egyptian Minister for National Guidance, or the Arab League Mission.

3. The following morning I accompanied the Governor to the Imam's Palace at Sala, where his Excellency signed the visitor's book. We then called on the Minister for Foreign Affairs at the Ministry. Qadhis Al-Amri and As-Shami were also present. The conversation was confined to general polite conversation, His Royal Highness having indicated that discussions would not begin until after the meeting with the Imam. Later in the morning we returned to the Palace in white uniform. After inspecting a large guard of honour and a military band we were shown by the Minister for Foreign Affairs into a room containing a throne. No other Yemeni was present. The Imam entered alone after fifteen minutes and I introduced the Governor to him. A small boy then came in and sat at His Majesty's feet.

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4. After the exchange of the usual courtesies, the Imam opened fire by asking the Governor to whom the Protectorate belonged and he himself suggested that the answer was "the Yemen." The Governor replied that it did not belong to the Yemen, but was in treaty relations with Her Majesty's Government. The Imam then asked why the Governor was bombing and sending aircraft against the people, killing them and destroying their homes. The Governor replied that he had to honour his treaty obligations and fulfil his responsibility to Her Majesty's Government for the maintenance of law and order in the Protectorate and was compelled on occasion to use force to punish wrong-doers, just as His Majesty had to do in his country. His Majesty rejoined that during the time of previous Governors and the early part of his Excellency's tenure of office, there had been no trouble or disturbances in the Protectorate, he demanded to know the causes of the present disturbances which, he said, should be investigated. The Governor replied that those troubles were internal matters, that they were not all recent, and that they were caused by interference from outside including material assistance in the form of arms, ammunition and money from persons (including officials) in the Yemen to dissidents in the Protectorate. The Imam said that an accusation against his officials was an accusation against him, but the Governor replied that His Majesty could not be expected to know all that went on in the remote areas, and they both agreed that people sometimes told them lies and made false reports. Further reiteration of charges and denials followed in the course of which the Governor asked the Imam why he was pressing his territorial claims, when his father had been content to reserve them; to this His Majesty replied that disturbances had increased in the Protectorate and he was concerned about his people. The meeting ended on a calmer note, both the Imam and the Governor expressing their desire to end the differences between their two countries, to establish friendlier relations and to help each other. Before leaving, the Imam expressed the hope that useful discussions would take place between his Excellency and the Minister for Foreign Affairs. Although he had spoken vigorously for more than half an hour and had at first treated the Governor as if he were an official summoned to answer for shortcomings in his conduct of affairs, the conversation had been frank rather than unfriendly.

5. The Imam was clearly in poor health and on account of his rheumatism he nearly fell when leaving his throne. He had also been suffering from fever the previous day and his hands were shaking. I should say from his appearance and manner that he takes drugs. He is, however, strongly built. As a result of his fever he had to excuse himself from the luncheon which he was giving in the Governor's honour. Luncheon was held in a summer house at the Palace and was presided over by the Minister for Foreign Affairs. Their Royal Highnesses, Suyuf-Al-Islam Qassim and Abdul Rahman, the Qadhis Al-Amri and As-Shami and many local notabilities attended the luncheon. In the evening the Governor and his party and the Minister and Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs dined at the Legation.

6. On Monday discussions began at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Minister for Foreign Affairs was assisted by the Deputy Foreign Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Governor of Beidha. Mr. Watts acted as interpreter. I am mentioning in this despatch only the main points, as a full account of the discussions is, I understand, being sent by the Governor to the Colonial Office.

7. The Minister for Foreign Affairs began by asserting that many changes had taken place in the south (the usual circumlocution employed by the Yemenis to avoid using the word "Protectorate" or "frontier" which terms I use for convenience hereafter), which were contrary to the provisions of the Treaty of 1934 and the 1951 Exchange of Notes and those changes had caused the deterioration in Anglo-Yemeni relations. He said that the causes of the recent troubles should be examined and the *status quo* in 1951 should be restored. The Governor replied that he had taken no action which contravened the *status quo* in the frontier or limitrophe areas, that the Yemenis had given material help to anti-Government elements in the Protectorate, and that he was not prepared to discuss any matters relating to areas not mentioned in the 1951 Exchange of Notes as they were either internal matters concerning him and not the Yemeni Government or were properly a subject for discussion between Her Majesty's Government and the Yemeni Government. After considerable discussion and reiteration of their respective positions by both sides His Royal Highness agreed that they should endeavour to create a better atmosphere and that a settlement of local differences would help to achieve this end.

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He agreed to leave the major questions and to discussions on the basis of the Treaty and the Exchange of Notes, and asked the Governor if he wished to make any proposals.

8. His Excellency then proposed:—

- (a) *Material Aid*.—Neither side should give material aid to anti-Government elements in the territory of the other.
- (b) *Wadi Hamra*.—Yemeni troops should be withdrawn from the Wadi during the examination of ownership claims in that area. He would not insist on the return of hostages held by the Yemen as a pre-condition of discussions.
- (c) *Dammanis*.—They could return to their country and differences could be settled amicably in accordance with tribal custom; but the Audhali Sultan was not prepared to accept the former Dammani Aqil.
- (d) *Rabizis*.—As soon as they stopped attacking Government forces, he would stop bombing them and they would suffer no punishment.
- (e) *Masabein Refugees*.—They would be allowed to return to their homes and their property would be returned to them, but they would have to submit to the jurisdiction of a special tribunal with regard to any offences they had committed since their flight. The tribunal would be composed of a President to be appointed by him (the Governor) and one representative each of the Amir of Beihan and the Masabein.
- (f) *Muhammad Shahir*.—The ex-Mansuri Sheikh could return, but he would have to submit to the jurisdiction of the Sultan of Lahej on the charge of complicity in the murder of five relatives of the Sultan. (The Governor expressed the opinion that it might be better if he did not return.)

9. The meeting which had lasted two hours then broke up. The discussions had been frank but friendly and were marred only by the behaviour of Qadhi Al-Amri who refused to obey His Royal Highness's twice repeated order to sit beside him and assist him. Al-Amri sat at some distance from us all, made a few notes, left the room after quarter of an hour and did not return. His Royal Highness obviously did not have detailed knowledge of frontier incidents and localities and the knowledge of Qadhi As-Shami though extensive was not offered in the interest of impartial enquiry. (I should mention here that at the beginning of the meeting the Governor raised in general conversation the question of diplomatic representation. The Minister for Foreign Affairs thought that Her Majesty's Government had been very slow in nominating a Minister at the beginning, but added that his Government had perhaps been responsible for delay subsequently in settling this question and the political situation had been a contributory factor. He remarked that it should be an easy matter to settle and the Governor did not press the matter further. The desirability of an air agreement, to which question I had drawn the Minister's attention on October 15, was also mentioned by the Governor and His Royal Highness said that he would look into the matter, adding that he had not been aware that correspondence existed on this subject.)

10. A luncheon party followed at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and among the guests were His Royal Highness Saif-Al-Islam Al-Badr, the Imam's son, and many of those who had attended the luncheon at the Palace. Al-Badr appeared to be a colourless and not very intelligent young man, but it was noticeable that the Minister for Foreign Affairs spoke to him in a deferential manner.

11. On Tuesday there was a further meeting at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs which was attended by the same persons on both sides. The Minister for Foreign Affairs said that he had discussed the Governor's proposals with the Imam and the "men of Government" and he proposed that representatives of both sides—he suggested Mr. Watts and myself and the two Qadhis—should meet to discuss in detail practical proposals from both sides. The Governor consulted me and I informed him that in view of my instructions I should not be able to participate in such discussions. His Excellency then agreed with some reluctance to the proposal and appointed Mr. Watts as his representative on the clear understanding that no decisions were to be reached and only frontier incidents and differences mentioned on the previous day should be discussed.

12. The representatives met on three occasions, twice on Tuesday and once on Wednesday. The discussions were prolonged and not very fruitful, as the

Yemenis refused to recognise any boundary and reiterated their claims to sovereignty in the Protectorate. The following changes were suggested to the Governor's proposals of October 18 and new matters raised:—

- (a) *Wadi Hamra*.—Negotiations between frontier officers should take place outside the Wadi.
- (b) *Dammanis*.—The ex-Aqil should be allowed to return on a two years' truce.
- (c) *Rabizis*.—A mediator should be appointed to settle any differences.
- (d) *Masabein Refugees*.—A free pardon should be granted except to those whom the Amir of Beihan specified as having charges to answer.
- (e) *Muhammad Shahir*.—Both sides regarded him as a nuisance and Mr. Watts, who is Political Adviser to the Sultan of Lahej, undertook to speak to the Sultan to see what arrangements could be made.
- (f) *Ataq*.—Mr. Watts refused to discuss this matter on the ground that it was an internal affair of the Protectorate.
- (g) *Awadhi-Fagami Dispute*.—On being reminded by Mr. Watts that compensation in accordance with the 1953 Agreement had not been received, the Yemenis replied that the Amir of Harib had been ordered to pay it forthwith.
- (h) *Khalifi Territory*.—The Yemenis maintained that the *status quo* of 1950 should be restored and the question of ownership examined. Mr. Watts refused to discuss the matter on the ground that the area was well within the Protectorate.
- (i) *Husn Al Awsaj*.—The Yemenis asked that the house be restored to Ali Naser.
- (j) *Bilad Ali Muhammad*.—Qadhi As-Shami said that the territory belonged to the Yemen. Mr. Watts denied this, pointing out that the area was evacuated by Yemen before the Treaty of 1934 was concluded.
- (k) *Amir Fadhl bin Abdul Karim of Lahej*.—The Yemenis mentioned unofficially that the ex-Sultan had complained that he was not receiving revenue from his private lands in Lahej.

13. The Governor and I accompanied by Qadhi As-Shami flew to Sana'a on Wednesday morning returning in the afternoon. At the airfield there was the usual guard of honour and the Governor was welcomed by a learned Seiyid representing Saif-Al-Islam Al-Abbas. After driving through the town we visited the Imam's country house at Dar al Hajr, a most attractive dwelling built into and upon a rock overlooking the Wadi Dhahr, and lunched at Ar-Rodha as the guests of the Imam's brother Saif-Al-Islam Al-Abbas. Al-Abbas is not a very attractive person nor does he seem to be very intelligent and I suspect that he drinks heavily. Three young princes, Hassan and Abdullah bin Hassan (sons of the Prime Minister) and Muhammad bin Hasein were among those present at the luncheon.

14. On Thursday morning a further meeting took place at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in order to discuss the position following upon the meetings between the representatives. His Royal Highness began by saying that he was anxious to reach some agreement, but that the Governor's attitude was making it difficult—His Excellency had refused to discuss changes affecting the *status quo*, e.g., the situation in the Khalifi area, Ataq and Aiyad and his proposals were of little interest and did not benefit the Yemen. He said that he had informed Mr. Roper-Curzon that those subjects would be raised at the meeting. At the Governor's invitation I informed His Royal Highness that Mr. Roper-Curzon had not recorded this fact. The Governor countered by pointing out that no changes had taken place on his part which affected the *status quo*, that he was not empowered to discuss internal affairs of the Protectorate (it became evident in the discussions that His Royal Highness had very little idea where Aiyad and other places mentioned by the Yemenis were situated) and that his proposals were practical measures, the execution of which would benefit both sides by removing causes of tension in the frontier area. The Minister for Foreign Affairs was so uncompromising at one stage that a deadlock seemed to have been reached. With the permission of the Governor I reminded His Royal Highness that at the outset of the talks the Governor had told him that he could not discuss the internal affairs of the Protectorate and that he had agreed to examine at the representatives' meetings the Governor's specific proposals and not to raise such general questions as the frontier and allegiances within the Protectorate. His Royal Highness disagreed, but eventually some progress was made and the Governor was able to review the points raised at the representatives' meeting. He accepted the changes proposed

with regard to the cases of Wadi Hamra, the Dammanis, the Rabizis and the Masabein and also dropped his demand that the Yemeni troops should be withdrawn from the Wadi, before any discussion began. He confirmed Mr. Watt's refusal to discuss the cases of Ataq, Khalifi Territory and Bilad Ali Muhammad and promised to look into the question of the Amir Fadhl's revenues. He again stressed the importance of neither side's giving material aid to anti-Government elements in the territory of the other and His Royal Highness seemed to accept this.

15. In the afternoon the Governor and I met the Prime Minister Saif-Al-Islam Al-Hassan, at Sala. The meeting was very cordial. He mentioned how greatly he had enjoyed his visit to London and his meeting with Mr. Selwyn Lloyd and the hopes which he had then had of a satisfactory settlement of problems existing between the two countries. He referred to his "project" (mentioned in the working paper he prepared at the end of his talks in London) which he said he had not been able to put before the Imam until now, as he had gone on pilgrimage to Mecca on his return from London and had then been ill with malaria for two months. During that time the political atmosphere had deteriorated and he had not discussed his project with His Majesty. He then spoke at great length about the need for both sides to co-operate with one another and remarked that they should not worry very much about small incidents, but should settle the major questions and strengthen the friendship between the two countries. His manner of speech was extravagant and much of what he said was vague and meaningless.

16. Later in the afternoon we attended a tea party at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs at which most of Taiz Society, Arab and European, was present, and also the recently arrived members of the Egyptian military mission. During this party the Minister for Foreign Affairs asked the Governor to have a private talk with him that evening at the Ministry. The Governor asked me whether I objected to this procedure and I replied that, although I had been instructed to accompany him during the discussions, I did not of course wish to stand in the way of a private talk which might produce useful results.

17. The Governor gave me an account of the meeting later that night. The Minister for Foreign Affairs had explained that he was speaking in strict confidence. He had said that the Yemen was a weak country and feared Britain. They did not like the proposed federation of the Western Aden Protectorate, because they feared that it would jeopardise their claims and would be a magnet for the Shafi population in the Yemen. The Governor had replied that they might as well realise that they would never get the Protectorate, but that they were wrong to fear that we would seduce the Shafi's in the Yemen. The treaty of friendship was a guarantee against that. He had then suggested that their best course was to improve their own country and to let us help them to do so—by trade, an air agreement, technical aid, &c. His Royal Highness had enquired about reports that British troops were being transferred to Aden from the Canal Zone and that a law was being passed that foreigners leaving Aden temporarily would require a return visa. His Excellency had explained that only a small number of troops were involved and that they might be sent to Mukeiras for a rest in the hot weather and for training, but there were no aggressive intentions. Regarding the return visa, this was not aimed at Yemenis but at Indians, but naturally that could not be stated openly. The amendment to the law might not be passed and in any case he need not fear that Yemenis would find any difficulty in entering and returning to Aden.

18. No discussions took place on Friday. The Prime Minister returned the Governor's call in the morning, but the conversation was general and non-political. In the evening after dinner Qadhis Al-Amri and As-Shami called socially. After the latter had left Al-Amri confirmed reports about the Imam's illness and gave a long and intimate account of His Majesty's medical history. He apparently has had four operations including two for hernia and one for haemorrhoids. At present he is suffering from stones in the bladder and also an old wound in the ankle which was troubling him for the first time since it was originally treated. According to Al-Amri his rheumatism was hereditary. Al-Amri then went on to say that speaking in strict confidence he wished us to know something about the Imam's character. His Majesty was emotional and was easily upset by small things. Like all great men, he listened occasionally to "small people who were ignorant and irresponsible" and this made difficulties for his responsible advisers. He was telling us this in order that we might gain a better understanding of the position. The

Imam had wished to meet the Governor ever since 1951 in order that he could make his point of view clearer. Al-Amri concluded by saying that there was need for better relations and a closer understanding and he had always worked towards that end, e.g., during the London talks in 1950.

19. The final general discussions took place at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs on Saturday morning. The atmosphere was very friendly and His Royal Highness began almost at once to review the points of agreement. The only changes or additions proposed and accepted were:—

(a) *Masabein Refugees*.—The question of the return of the property of those who elected to remain in the Yemen could be considered by the Frontier Officers with a view to making special arrangements where necessary. It was desirable that all the Masabein should return, but the Yemenis could not compel them to do so.

(b) *Khalifa and Aiyad*.—His Excellency agreed to represent to Her Majesty's Government the Yemeni view that the matter should be investigated and the situation restored to that existing in 1951. The Wadi Hamra investigation should be delayed until the result of this representation was known.

(c) *Bilad Ali Muhammad*.—His Excellency agreed to represent to Her Majesty's Government the Yemeni view that the enquiry into this matter should be renewed as no documents had been produced in support of Sir Bernard Reilly's decision (see minute of 1950, London Conference), and as since then Major Seager and Qadhi As-Shami had on occasion discussed this matter.

(d) *Husn Al-Awsaj*.—It was agreed to leave the matter until feelings had become calmer, when the Audhali Sultan would probably allow Ali Naser to resume possession.

(e) *Reduction of Forces*.—Both sides agreed that the presence of unusual numbers of troops in or near the limitrophe areas was undesirable and that such forces should be reduced as quickly as possible, their reduction being dependent on the restoration of peaceful conditions. Garrisons at Marta'a and As-Soma were specifically mentioned. It was also agreed to prepare a joint statement for publication and an agreed minute of the main points. His Royal Highness raised the matter of announcements by Aden Radio of frontier incidents and His Excellency promised to make a point of seeing that no reports were broadcast by Aden Radio which might cause a deterioration in Aden-Yemeni relations.

20. In the afternoon the Governor had a final meeting with the Prime Minister who was apparently deputising for the Imam who was too ill to receive the Governor. Though as wordy as usual, Al-Hassan's manner was pleasant and he talked some sense. He said that, although they had hoped for better results from the meeting, they had taken a step towards better understanding which was important and doubtless further steps would be taken in the future. The main thing was to create a better atmosphere. From his conversation it was clear that His Royal Highness had taken a close interest in the progress of the talks.

21. On Sunday morning Qadhis Al-Amri and As-Shami produced a draft statement for publication and a draft minute in Arabic. Mr. Watts and I examined them. The statement was unexceptionable, but the minute was inaccurate. When Mr. Watts pointed this out to Al-Amri he took offence and nearly walked out. It appeared that his minute was intended to be a working paper rather than a record of what had been said. The Governor considered the minute to be too inaccurate to amend and drafted one himself. This action also seemed to offend Al-Amri, but eventually the Governor's draft was translated into Arabic and Al-Amri made a copy without further comment.

22. On Monday morning the Minister for Foreign Affairs called. He objected to the form of the Governor's minute and eventually a detailed discussion of the Yemeni draft minute took place. Although the talks had really ended on Saturday, the Governor in a spirit of compromise agreed to reopen discussions on certain points and accepted certain changes and additions to what had been agreed. The full text of the minute, after those changes, is given in the enclosure to this despatch. The first ten paragraphs of the draft minute were agreed by mid-day.

Agreement was not reached on the conclusion (which at that time contained no reference to the conduct of the Governor and was worded slightly differently from its present form) on account of the objection of the Governor to a phrase about the restoration of the 1950 *status quo* in the south. His Royal Highness said that he would prepare a revised conclusion which he hoped would obviate this difficulty and they could discuss it at lunch. He failed, however, to appear at lunch, having gone to the Palace to see the Imam.

23. In the afternoon he returned in a highly emotional state. He asked me to note what His Majesty had told him and said that I and the Yemeni Chargé d'Affaires would probably receive a communication from His Majesty about the meeting. He continued that His Majesty was not pleased with the results and had spoken severely to him, in fact had insulted him. The Imam had said to him: "What have you done?" His Majesty had then indicated the minute and said that there was nothing new in it and nothing final. Only mention of what the Governor would suggest to this and that Sultan or Sheikh all these were unimportant matters which could have been settled by correspondence; the Yemen had gained nothing; there had been "excitement" in the world about the Governor's visit and it had been discussed by the Arab League and in the Fourth Committee of the United Nations and now nothing final had resulted from the lengthy discussions. The Minister for Foreign Affairs was in such a state of agitation that rational discussion was quite impossible for some time. The Governor had so far hardly had a chance to speak, at least without interruption. He was eventually able to inform His Royal Highness that he could not agree that nothing had been achieved and enquired what the position was about the agreed minute. His Royal Highness then said that the Imam had declared that the Governor must "be" (*i.e.*, act) as his predecessors "were" (*i.e.*, acted) and had insisted on an insertion being made to this effect in the conclusion of the minute. The Governor replied that he was not under the orders of His Majesty and this sobered His Royal Highness somewhat. The Governor and I then withdrew to another room to discuss the situation. We agreed that the proposed insertion was offensive, inappropriate and unacceptable. On our return the Governor informed the Minister for Foreign Affairs that he could not accept it. His Royal Highness then said that acceptance of the whole agreement depended on the insertion being made. It was finally decided that reference would be made to London and that Her Majesty's Government's reply could be communicated through me to the Yemeni Government. In answer to the Governor's enquiry His Royal Highness said that what happened about the rest of the agreement, if the reply was unfavourable, would be decided, when the reply was received. The meeting ended with an exchange of friendly sentiments, the Minister for Foreign Affairs having recovered his composure to some extent.

24. The Governor left for the airfield at 4.30 where a Yemeni plane was waiting for him. Qadhis As-Shami and Al-Amri, Mr. Watts and I saw him off.

25. Although the reaction of the Imam was inexcusable even for an absolute monarch given to fits of temper and arbitrary actions. I think that the Imam was genuinely disappointed with the results of the visit. From reports which I have received from various sources, I am of the opinion that the Imam's Ministers and Advisers had led him to believe that it was the Governor who had asked to meet him. In consequence His Majesty may well have expected that the Governor would be coming to make some concessions and perhaps empowered to reach decisions on major questions. When I saw, separately, the Foreign Minister and the Deputy Foreign Minister before the visit, they merely expressed hopes that useful results would come from the meeting. I did receive, however, a report of a conversation which took place during a *qat* session in Al-Amri's house on October 14 in the course of which As-Shami is alleged to have said that the Yemen should try to gain something from the meeting although they could not expect to gain as much as Egypt had done from the Suez Canal negotiations. Apparently As-Shami also said that the tribes in the Protectorate could be turned either way, but propaganda amongst them was expensive and it was better to try and gain something from the Governor's visit including a temporary peace, while they concentrated on building up the army with the help of the Egyptian instructors. On being asked what he thought were the prospects of the meeting As-Shami is supposed to have said that they were not good unless the Governor had been directed by Her Majesty's Government to be wise and realised that he was going to meet a King. Al-Amri is said to have agreed with As-Shami's remarks.

26. During the meeting I received the impression that the Minister for Foreign Affairs did not enjoy the responsibility entrusted to him of conducting the talks. Although he was pleasant, courteous and I think genuinely anxious to reach a satisfactory agreement, he was also nervous and I think he may be afraid of his brother. He would probably have been happier to have been out of the Yemen at this time. The role which Qadhi Al-Amri has played is more difficult to understand. His attitude at first seemed to be one of personal pique if the discussions were to be entrusted to Saif-Al-Islam Abdullah, then he could get on with it without his (Amri's) help and would probably make a mess of it. Subsequently whether by inclination or under orders he played a greater, but not a very constructive part in the discussions. He also seemed worried and may be afraid of the Imam. It will be remembered that he was reported to have tried to resign last month. Qadhi As-Shami was the only one of the three who did not appear to have any worries. Having realised from the first meeting that the Governor had not come with any concessions in his pocket, he did not mind whether any agreement was reached or not. He made no constructive contribution to the discussions, but contented himself with making the occasional interruption or aside which was at best irrelevant, but more usually cynical or malicious. Outside the meetings he several times made the suggestion, which not even he could seriously believe would interest us, that we should give up the Protectorate in exchange for which the Yemen would welcome British technical aid and would allow us to exploit their "oil." As-Shami is, of course, batting on a good wicket, for he must appear in the eyes of the Imam as a zealous official, a good Muslim and an outstanding patriot.

27. The position of the Prime Minister is harder to assess. He arrived in Taiz on October 18 and stayed at the Palace. The consensus of local opinion is that the Imam and he are on bad terms and this seems likely. Behind the façade of a genial manner sustained by a steady flow of platitudes there must definitely be considerable strength of character or at least great obstinacy and hardness. His strict and simple way of life is reflected in the good health which he seems to enjoy and he must expect to outlive his brother and hope to succeed him. During our three meetings with him, at which Saif-Al-Islam Abdullah was not present, he paid at least lip service to the idea of strengthening friendship between the two countries and admitted the backwardness of his country and its need for technical assistance. Though he expressed mild disappointment at the progress of the talks he did not seem unduly perturbed and appeared to look to further talks at a higher level in the future. He is, however, an elusive character and his spoken thoughts were often as difficult to interpret as the paper he produced in London. I should add that I received a report during the visit that Al-Hassan had said privately that, as the talks were not going well, the Yemen would probably have to have recourse to the United Nations. This report is worth considering in the light of recent similar statements by the Yemeni Minister in Cairo and the Chargé d'Affaires in Washington.

28. It is not clear what the Yemeni attitude will be, if Her Majesty's Government refuse to agree to the insertion in the minute demanded by the Imam. It seems probable that they will make no effort to execute the agreed measures and they may decide to take the matter at once to the United Nations. It is likely that they would do so if the Government of Aden found it necessary to take stronger actions in the frontier areas. On the other hand they might be willing to enter into discussions in London or Taiz with a senior representative of the Foreign Office or of Her Majesty's Government, if a suggestion of such talks were made to them. Such talks would, of course, have a much better chance of success, if the Yemenis co-operated with the Governor in carrying out the measures agreed at the discussions just completed. I venture to suggest, Sir, that the best course might well be to inform the Yemeni Government that the execution of the agreed measures and also perhaps the acceptance of a British Minister to the Yemen would in Her Majesty's Government's view create an atmosphere favourable to the commencement at an early date of the negotiations envisaged in Article 3 of the 1934 Treaty. In this way their sincerity could be put to the test.

29. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the Governor of Aden.

I have, &c.

R. MCGREGOR.

Enclosure No. 1

Diary of Visit of Governor to the Yemen

Saturday, October 16

- 0600 Governor left Aden.
- 1130 Governor met at Kerish by Yemeni officers and escort.
- 1300 Governor arrived at Rahida and welcomed by Yemeni representatives and Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires.
- 1715 Governor reached Taiz and welcomed by Deputy Foreign Minister.
- 1900 Minister for Foreign Affairs called at Guest House and stayed to dinner.

Sunday, October 17

- 0900 Governor signed visitor's book at Imam's Palace.
- 0930 Meeting with Minister for Foreign Affairs at Ministry.
- 1100 Formal call on and discussion with the Imam.
- 1315 Lunch at Palace.
- 1730 Dinner at Legation.

Monday, October 18

- 0915 Meeting lasting two hours at Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
- 1300 Lunch at Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
- 1630 Visit to experimental farm at Oseifara.

Tuesday, October 19

- 0930 Meeting at Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
- 1045 Three hours' meeting between representatives at Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
- 1600 Visit to the new hospital, Taiz.
- 1900 Further meeting between representatives.

Wednesday, October 20

- 0845 Governor left by air for visit to Sana'a.
- 1230 Lunch at Ar-Rodha given by His Royal Highness Saif-Al-Islam Al-Abbas.
- 1630 Returned to Taiz.
- 1900 Further meeting between representatives.

Thursday, October 21

- 1000 Meeting lasting two hours at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
- 1530 Call on Prime Minister.
- 1630 Tea party at Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
- 1930 Private meeting between Governor and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Friday, October 22

- 1000 Prime Minister called on Governor.
- 1530 Visit to ancient mosque at Al-Ganad.

Saturday, October 23

- 0945 Final meeting at Foreign Ministry.
- 1530 Farewell call on Prime Minister.
- 1900 Private dinner for Governor at Legation.

Sunday, October 24

- 0915 Meeting between representatives to prepare draft statement and minute.
- 1430 Second meeting of representatives.
- 1930 Third meeting of representatives.

Monday, October 25

- 0930 Minister for Foreign Affairs called on Governor to discuss drafts.
- 1445 Minister for Foreign Affairs called again.
- 1700 Governor left Taiz by air for Aden.

Enclosure No. 2

H.R.H. Al Amir Seif Al-Islam Abdullah, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Mutawakilite Kingdom of the Yemen and His Excellency Sir Tom Hickinbotham, the Governor of Aden, during his recent visit to His Majesty the Imam Ahmed, have met a number of times at the Foreign Ministry, Taiz, between 17th and 24th October. During these meetings both sides expressed the willingness of their Governments to remove misunderstanding and to settle the incidents arising from recent developments in the south. After discussion and review both parties agreed on certain questions which were as follows:—

1. *Dammani*.—H.E. the Governor accepts the Yemeni suggestion that there should be a general truce for a period of one year between the Aqil Umer Salim ad-Dammani, his followers, and the Audhali Sultan Saleh Husein.

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They shall return during the truce to their country where their property will be restored to them. During the truce, discussions shall take place between the Aqil Umer Salim ad-Dammani and the Sultan Saleh Husein regarding a final settlement of the dispute between them. Both sides are bound to honour the truce and will refrain from acts which shall cause disturbances or a renewal of the dispute. H.E. will present this matter to the Sultan for his agreement.

2. *Ar-Rabizi*.—H.E. the Governor agrees to find a respected mediator to contact the Al Rabiz to persuade them to return to their homes. H.E. will grant them a year's truce during which they will return to their country under safe conduct. The truce begins on the 1st November, 1954. During the truce the mediator's task will be to arrange a settlement between them and Government and between them and the tribes. They are bound to respect the truce.
3. *Al Mansuri*.—H.E. the Governor will represent to H.H. the Sultan of Lahej the suggestion that Muhammad Shahir should be pardoned and return to his country if this is desired by His Highness and Muhammad Shahir. The pardon is to be effected between him and the Sultan and matters between Muhammad Shahir and his relatives are to be settled in accordance with tribal customs.
4. *Masa'bein Refugees*.—H.E. the Governor will, with the agreement of the Amir of Beihan, look into the question of a general pardon for all the refugees except some persons guilty of certain acts after their flight, who will have the right of defending themselves in the Court, if they agree to return and submit to a Court decision. All their property and its present produce shall be returned to them. The Yemeni Government will not compel them to return and whoever chooses to remain with the Yemeni Government shall have his property and its produce returned to him after investigation of any special circumstances by representatives of both parties.
5. *Wadi Hamra*.—A meeting shall take place between Amir Liwa al-Beidha and a representative of the Aden Government to investigate claims and documents connected with some of the villages concerning which H.E. has some doubt as to whether they are Rassasi. This meeting shall be in Al-Beidha or in Aden.
6. *Al Khalifa and Aiyad*.—As H.E. the Governor of Aden did not agree to discuss the case of Al Khalifa and Aiyad H.E. will represent to Her Majesty's Government the opinion of the Yemeni Government that there is a necessity to investigate these two cases. H.E. will represent the Yemeni Government's desire for and belief in the necessity of removing military forces and the administration from Ataq and Al Khalifa and a return to the situation that existed prior to 1951. Until this had been done the question of Hamra should be left, as both parties agreed recently.
7. *Bilad al Ali bin Muhammad*.—H.E. will represent to Her Majesty's Government the Yemeni's opinion and their insistence on the necessity of renewing the enquiry into this matter and that they are not satisfied with the position because the Yemeni Government did not take part in the former enquiry into it.
8. *Husn Al Awsaj*.—H.E. will, with the agreement of Sultan Saleh Husein, look into the question of returning Husn Al Awsaj to Sheikh Ali Naser with all his property, including land, &c. H.E. will attempt to come to an understanding with Sultan Saleh bin Husein on the question of compensation for the destruction of the Husn.
9. *Reduction of Military Forces*.—H.E. affirmed to H.R.H. that he would remove the new garrisons, *i.e.*, those established after 1951, from Husn Marta's and neighbouring places by stages, after H.E. had been convinced by the view of H.R.H. that the existence of these garrisons had caused disturbances and unrest.
Likewise H.R.H. confirmed that Yemeni forces in the As Soma'a area would be reduced to the strength maintained before the recent developments.
10. All incidents concerning both parties will be settled amicably between the two Governments.

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Conclusion

In accordance with the preceding items on which understanding has been reached for the purpose of ensuring the establishment and continuance of security in the south which in the nature of things affects both sides, each party will strive to prevent any aggression against the other. The Yemeni Government considers that in order to establish and maintain security and peace it is necessary to observe the terms of the 1951 agreement and the 1934 Treaty, to maintain the actual position at the time of their signature and that H.E. the Governor should act in those areas just as did his predecessors in Aden since the signing of the 1934 Treaty. His Excellency promises to act accordingly. Both sides agreed that settlements such as those on which understanding has been reached would create the cordial atmosphere which leads to firm friendship, true co-operation between the two Governments, and to the commencement of general negotiations at a high level in accordance with the 1934 Treaty.

Furthermore both parties agreed to prevent the giving of material and illegal assistance to those who oppose the Government with intent to create trouble.

EA 1058/1

No. 43

**THE FUTURE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN HER MAJESTY'S
GOVERNMENT AND THE SULTANATE OF MUSCAT
AND OMAN**

Mr. Burrows to Sir Anthony Eden. (Received November 24)

(No. 102. Confidential)
Sir,

Bahrain,

November 8, 1954.

I have the honour to submit my views on the future relationship between Her Majesty's Government and the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman. For the past few years these relations have not run a smooth course. As seen by the Sultan the salient facts have been that we failed before the war to obtain a settlement of his frontier with Saudi Arabia, largely on account of a dispute on another part of the frontier with which he had nothing to do; we refused requests he made to us on more than one occasion since the war for military or financial support in restoring the authority of his Government throughout his territory; on the one occasion on which there was a chance to restore unity as a result of a request to him by the tribes of the interior to lead resistance against the Saudi incursion into Buraimi, we stopped his taking action to this end; we then allowed the Saudis to remain in Buraimi for two years consolidating their position there and in neighbouring Muscat territory and we exerted strong pressure on the Sultan to accept the arbitration agreement which contained many features of which he was extremely doubtful; we failed to reply to the Sultan's repeated enquiry whether we would object to his taking action by his own means to restore his authority in a further area south of Buraimi; he was unable to risk taking this action without such an assurance from us for fear that we would stop him at the last moment as in the case of Buraimi; the British Oil Company which held the concession for the whole of Muscat, including Dhofar did nothing effective for many years to find oil and had finally and with difficulty to be persuaded to give up the concession for Dhofar, and has only very late in the day begun to take a real interest in the possibility of finding oil in the remainder of Muscat territory; meanwhile several of the British officials whom we provided to serve in the Sultan's administration proved unsatisfactory. We on the contrary feel that if it had not been for our diplomatic support in the long drawn-out frontier negotiations Muscat would now have been a good deal worse off than it is; we stopped the Sultan on the occasion of the Saudi occupation of Hamasa for his own good, and we then made great efforts and spent large sums of money in blockading that village and so in preventing the spread of Saudi influence to wider areas; we restored the Beni Ka'ab to the Sultan's allegiance and have now helped him to reopen the Wadi Jizzi; we have scrupulously resisted the many attempts which have been made by the tribes of the interior to establish direct relations with us; it would have been possible on many occasions for us to set up

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a British protected State in the interior; we have refrained from doing so only out of our respect for Muscat's claims; the oil company for their part have, by agreeing to pay large sums of money to the Sultan in addition to those specified in their concession, made it possible for him for the first time to establish his authority in large and strategic areas in the interior; it would not be consistent with Her Majesty's Government's general policy in the world to-day to use British forces to subdue tribes who wish to retain their internal independence which was guaranteed by an agreement under British auspices; we have—albeit with some inconsistency on our part—criticised the main policy of the Sultan sometimes for being too pusillanimous, sometimes for being too adventurous.

2. It is not very surprising that with some of these factors in the background, and taking account of the Sultan's natural diffidence and the subtlety of the policy which he tries to pursue in his relations with the tribes of the interior that he was notably unsuccessful during his visit to London in 1953 in putting across either his own personal qualities or the aspirations which he holds for the future administration and development of his State. More recently, however, changes have begun to take place in the situation of Muscat which I suggest ought to cause us to take another look at our own attitude. An American oil company has taken up the concession for Dhofar, abandoned by the Iraq Petroleum Company, and although no money has yet been paid to the Sultan, enough is thought of the prospects to justify the import of a sizeable party of American geologists and technicians and in all probability in the very near future of a drilling rig. The Iraq Petroleum Company for their part have pressed their way through repeated difficulties of all kinds, and in February last landed their survey expedition in southern Oman supported by a force of 400 men with with British officers for whose maintenance they are paying the Muscat Government. They have in a masterful, even if partially unauthorised, expedition into the interior established themselves on the feature which is of greatest interest to them and where they continue to find the geological prospects most promising. The possibility of finding oil within reach of the south coast of Arabia as opposed to the coasts inside the narrow entrance to the Persian Gulf has long been attractive to us from the strategic point of view and some help was given to the Oil Company's expedition in the initial stages by the Royal Navy. I understand from the local Oil Company representatives that if all continues to go well they may be able to start drilling a well in this area in not more than a few months' time. Meanwhile despite the Sultan's long absence in Salalah, his second capital in the extreme west of his territories, a more forward policy has been noticeable in other areas of Muscat territory where the Sultan's authority had previously been virtually invisible. This is specially noticeable in the area around Sohar where by refusing to extend the commitments of the Trucial Oman Levies but at the same time giving advice and encouragement to the Muscat authorities we have induced them to establish their influence in the area between Buraimi and the coast far more solidly than it has been for a number of years. The recovery of Ibri and the surrounding area for the Duru and other tribes friendly to the Sultan with the support of the Muscat Field Forces established and maintained with the Oil Company's money has dramatically altered the balance of power in the whole of interior Oman and has demonstrated that with a comparatively very small force fused with determination the Sultan could re-establish his position throughout the area. It is clear that he would equally be able to do this if he obtained a large addition to his revenue from the discovery of oil, which would give him the choice of obtaining the allegiance of the tribes by direct subventions or by paying for additional forces with which to exert his influence over them. I have explained in my letter to Mr. Fry of November 2 that the Sultan feels that if he had been in possession of the force and armament which he had previously asked us to help him acquire he would have been able to take advantage of the recent succession of a new Imam to receive back to his allegiance many tribes who would have been glad to desert the reactionary and obscurantist dominion of the new Imam and of the unscrupulous tribal sheikhs who supply the civil arm of this theocracy. The surprisingly extensive reverberations of the Ibri affair support this view. Unfortunately the present size of the Field Force is so small and the distances so large that I am advised it would in reality be rash to extend its commitments further into the interior even if the Sultan was willing to do so. It is to be feared that as a result momentum will be lost and no such favourable opportunity may recur for some time.

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3. During my recent visit to Salalah the Sultan explained that his requirement as he now saw it, was for an additional 400 men with the necessary officers to be attached to the Field Force together with the necessary arms and equipment, with particular emphasis on heavier armament of some kind with which forts could if necessary be dominated. (The Sultan mentioned guns in this connection but I believe that 3-in. mortars would do just as well.) He emphasised that he did not contemplate attacking the tribes of the interior but wished to be able to take advantage of offers to submit to him which would involve him in protecting them if necessary against the efforts of the Imam to recover their allegiance by force. The Sultan would like to see a plan prepared for the creation of this additional force and its maintenance for three or four years and to consider what proportion of the expense he could himself bear. He would then like us to consider whether we would be prepared to provide the remainder, if necessary, as a loan to be repaid out of his oil revenues.

4. I suggest that although we have rejected similar requests in the past, though I think these were for more extensive support, we should now carefully consider whether it would be in our own interest to make an offer of some kind of assistance to the Sultan. If oil is found in either Dhofar or Oman—and it must be concluded from the Oil Company's expenditure that the prospects are reasonably promising in both cases—this would change the whole character of Muscat and its place in the balance of power in this area. In spite of some disappointments with our policy to which I have called attention above, the Sultan retains warm feelings towards Her Majesty's Government and would not willingly turn to anyone else. I suggest that it is in our interest to reinforce this disposition on his part by a timely show of our sympathy for his aspirations now when he needs our help and that we should not reserve our goodwill to be shown later when he has demonstrated his power to stand on his own feet and will no longer need it. I have referred to the strategic importance of the oil which might be found in Muscat. The territory is also of interest to us for our strategic naval and air communications, as witness the presence on it of a reserve naval base and two transit air stations maintained by the Royal Air Force and which were enormously developed during the last war. The territory borders the Aden Protectorate on the west and various of the Trucial Shaikhdoms on the north. It would be as well in both respects that when Muscat becomes strong it should remain friendly.

5. We know that last year one of the tribal leaders of the interior tried to interest American representatives and the Arabian-American Oil Company in the alleged independence of the interior of the Oman and the prospects of oil there. So far as we know he was unsuccessful, but as evidence of the existence of oil increases it seems not impossible that Aramco at least may respond more readily to such overtures in the future, if there is not meanwhile clear evidence of the sovereignty of the Sultan being exercised in the area. (The Aramco complaint of encroachment by the Cities Service Company in Dhofar reported in your telegram No. 892 of October 13 is perhaps evidence in this direction.) King Saud has already expressed to you through the Saudi Ambassador his concern at the events at Ibbri. In doing so he made a useful disclaimer of territorial aspirations there for Saudi Arabia. But it has always been believed that the Saudi theory would be that the shaikhs in this area were independent and that they were therefore at liberty to have direct relations with Saudi Arabia as well as with Muscat if they so wished. Even if the Saudis were comparatively well disposed they might find it difficult to resist appeals to them by some of these shaikhs unless again the Sultan's sovereignty was unmistakable. The frontier between Saudi Arabia and Muscat south of the southern point of the area now being submitted to arbitration will have to be settled sooner or later and I suggest that it is in our interest that the settlement should be as much in favour of Muscat as possible. For this purpose also the unmistakable exercise of sovereignty by Muscat is bound to be one of the most powerful arguments in the event either of direct negotiation or of further arbitration.

6. In 1915 British forces were used to help the Sultan of Muscat to repel an invasion of the Muscat area by tribesmen from the interior. It seems almost certain that if this danger arose again we should find ourselves obliged to give further armed assistance. If, however, the Sultan were now given the resources with which to establish himself in the interior the danger of this commitment ever again arising would be very greatly reduced.

7. All these considerations lead me to recommend that we should reconsider our policy towards the grant of assistance to Muscat and that we should now offer to contribute to the creation of an addition to the Muscat Field Force of the kind desired by the Sultan. In order to avoid recurring expenditure our contribution might consist of the equipment required by this force including transport, armament and other supplies with stores backing for the period envisaged by the Sultan of three or four years, leaving him to provide the pay of the officers and men. If necessary it could be provided that our contribution should be repayable over an agreed period if oil were found in commercial quantities in any part of the Sultan's territory. It would be useless to provide for repayment otherwise than in this event. I am having figures roughly worked out of the probable expenditure which would be required and I will submit these as soon as possible. Under the agreement between the Oil Company and the Sultan the Oil Company have undertaken to pay a maximum of £150,000 a year for the expenses of the Field Force, but this includes quite a large element intended for subsidies to tribes and seems in any case a considerable over-estimate of the actual expenses.

8. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Jeddah, to the British Middle East Office, to the Consul-General at Muscat and the Political Agent at Dubai.

I have, &c.

B. A. B. BURROWS.

EA 1056/41

No. 44

CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND
SHAIKH FAHAD AL SALIM AL SUBAH ON NOVEMBER 9, 1954

Sir Anthony Eden to Mr. Burrows (Bahrain Residency)

(No. 186. Restricted) *Foreign Office,*
Sir, *November 9, 1954.*

Shaikh Fahad al Salim al Subah called on me at my invitation this evening, the 9th of November. He was accompanied by Mr. Jabri, who acted as interpreter.

2. After offering the Shaikh my sympathy in his recent illness, I went on to say that Her Majesty's Government had the welfare of the Ruler and of the people of Kuwait very much at heart. We had watched with great interest the good progress in development work that, in spite of difficulties, had been made, and I assured him that we were entirely at the State's disposal should it be thought that we could help in any way. We had no wish to interfere, but our advice and assistance would always be forthcoming if they were sought. The Ruler had only to ask, and I hoped that he would not hesitate to do so whenever he saw fit.

3. Shaikh Fahad thanked me, and said that the Ruler was anxious that development should go forward at a controlled and cautious pace. It was inevitable that there should have been mistakes; but it was obviously wise to try to reduce them to a minimum. He was convinced that the British connexion was beneficial to both sides, and the Ruler and the people of

Kuwait held it in the highest regard. He did not subscribe, he said, to Kipling's saying about "East is East. . . ." He thought it entirely possible, certainly in present day circumstances, for East and West to meet.

4. Shaikh Fahad then spoke of the admiration and esteem with which the Ruler and the people of Kuwait regarded Her Majesty The Queen.

5. I recalled that I had visited the State in the time of the late Ruler, and had the happiest memories of my talks with him; I therefore had a personal interest in the changes that had since taken place in Kuwait. The Shaikh replied that he well remembered the occasion and knew of my friendly interest in the State. I again said that I hoped our advice and help would be called for whenever the Ruler and his advisers wished.

6. As he was leaving, I asked the Shaikh to convey to the Ruler my warmest good wishes for the future.

I am sending a copy of this despatch to the Political Agent at Kuwait.

I am, &c.

ANTHONY EDEN.

EA 1016/36

No. 45

**ASSESSMENT OF THE POSSIBILITIES OF THE BRITISH OIL COMPANY
GAINING ENTRY TO THE COUNTRY OF THE JANABAH, WAHIBA
AND DURU TRIBES**

Mr. Burrows to Sir Anthony Eden. (Received November 27)

(No. 107. Confidential)
Sir,

*Bahrain,
November 22, 1954.*

In my despatch No. 71 of July 12 I reported the circumstances in which Ghalib bin Hilal al Hinai had succeeded to the title of Imam of Oman. I concluded that there was little immediate prospect of the British Oil Company which had landed a party in the Huqf gaining entry to Oman, but that this need not concern us unduly as the areas of most interest to the Company were in the hands of the coastal Janabah, the Wahiba and the Duru, tribes which do not owe allegiance to the Imam. I suggested however that we should make a special effort to secure the Company admission to the territories of the Duru, which they regarded as of the greatest potential interest. I have since reported to you by telegram successive developments in the Oman situation and the steps by which the Company has now attained this objective but I now have the honour to submit a more detailed and consecutive account of events during the last four months which seem likely to have an important bearing on the future of the area and on our interests in it.

2. At the time when my previous despatch was written, there was an immediate seasonal obstacle to the Company's penetration of the Duru country, since the combination of monsoon conditions off the south coast of Arabia and intense heat in the interior rules out any possibility of extended operations either by land or sea during the summer months; but beyond that lay the Sultan's refusal of permission to the Company to penetrate beyond coastal Janabah territory until the Duru shaikhs should have come in and submitted to him. Though he expressed confidence that they would do this after his return to Muscat, planned for October, the Company had nothing to show on what this expectation was founded and were understandably concerned lest they should find themselves delayed and prevented from taking full advantage of the winter season for work in the interior.

3. Though the ways of the Muscat authorities with the tribes of the interior are often secretive and difficult to follow, Her Majesty's Consul-General at Muscat learned confidentially in mid-July that Seyid Ahmed Ibrahim, the Sultan's Minister of the Interior had sent emissaries with presents to the Duru shaikhs and had received in return a letter undertaking to come into Muscat as soon as they could collect Ali bin Hilal, who is now generally regarded as paramount shaikh. At the end of July, they proved as good as their word and Ali bin Hilal arrived, accompanied by five other members of the tribe. After consulting me, a representative of the Company flew down to Muscat to meet them and discussions took place with the Sultan's Minister of the Interior, Her Majesty's Consul-General being kept closely informed. The Duru proved ready to declare their allegiance to the Sultan and to invite the Company to visit their tribal grazing-grounds, but stipulated that, as they had had no foreknowledge of the Muscat Government's purpose in summoning them, they should be allowed time to return home to prepare the tribe before actually leading the Company into the interior. It became clear that the tribe was large and dispersed and that although Ali bin Hilal was the most important of its leaders, he could not answer for some of the outlying sections: particular doubt was evidently felt about the attitude of Huwaishil bin Hamad, whose section live close to tribes under the Imam's control and who, as I reported in my last despatch, had already evinced his opposition to the Company's activities. In addition the Sultan, who is never easily persuaded to meet tribal leaders and who attaches much importance to the respite from their importunities which he enjoys as long as he remains in the remote province of Dhofar, still proved unwilling to meet the Duru before his return to Muscat in October. There was therefore no hope of an immediate move and the Company had to be content with a letter which in very satisfactory terms expressed allegiance to the Sultan and invited the Company to enter the tribe's territories. But to this the Duru added a significant request for the Sultan's support against the

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Imam, should need arise. The Minister of the Interior raised no objection to this stipulation, and did not refer the matter to the Sultan at the time. The Duru were then given suitable money presents and went home on the understanding that they would return to Muscat at the end of September to await the Sultan's arrival.

4. While this arrangement was from the Company's point of view a considerable step forward, it meant that three months must still elapse before they could hope to move into the Duru country, an interval in which their prospects of doing so might clearly take a turn for the worse, either as a result of intervention of the Saudi Government, or of an American oil company or because of retaliatory action by the Imam, a risk which had clearly been enhanced by the Duru's submission to the Sultan which had small hope of remaining secret. To these uncertainties was added the danger that the Sultan might himself get cold feet and impose further delay.

5. The risk of intervention by the Saudi Government or by an American company working under their auspices was not to be lightly dismissed. It was clear from the approaches by Sulaman bin Hinyar and by Shaikh Mohammed bin Abdullah al Salami referred to in paragraph 3 of my despatch under reference that the traditional Ibadhi conservatism and aloofness was changing and that there were now leaders in the Inner Oman who wished to attract an oil company into the area, provided this could be done on terms which guaranteed their political independence. All that we knew of the new Imam suggested that he would be likely to lend his weight to this secularising tendency. It was therefore with some misgiving that, after for reasons of overall policy administering a rebuff to these advances, we learned that a number of Omani Shaikhs, including Hilal bin Ali al Khalili, a nephew of the old Imam, Mohammed bin Abdullah al Haithi and Ahmed bin Abdullah al Haithi, had proceeded to Saudi Arabia on pilgrimage, armed it was said with letters from the Imam. By the beginning of October, the first two had returned and it was reported that they had each received a car, a radio and a monetary gift from King Saud.

6. The risk of the Sultan further delaying the party or going into reverse also deserved to be taken seriously, more particularly as there was a certain amount of evidence to suggest that he had still not entirely overcome a suspicion that the Company was not eager to embark on the commercial exploitation of oil in his territory, a fear to which colour had been lent by the Company's initial slowness in embarking on a survey of their concession.

7. Against this background, there was some misunderstanding between the Company and the Muscat Government about the preparedness of the Muscat Field Force for its intended role. Owing largely, the Company felt, to the Sultan's reluctance to spend on improvements in pay and conditions, more of the money which they had given him for the raising and maintenance of the Force, it was substantially below its full strength of 400 men and when in September the Sultan proved unwilling, in spite of military advice, formally to renounce his previous stipulation that the Force should be up to strength before penetrating the interior, it was the Company's turn to be suspicious of his motives. Fortunately this problem was circumvented by Colonel Waterfield, the Commanding Officer of the Muscat Infantry and Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs, who on a visit which he paid to Salalah at the beginning of September persuaded the Sultan to agree to the centralisation in his hands of the administration of the various Muscat military forces (a step which my Military Adviser had for some time urged) and to certain improvements in pay and conditions for the Field Force. He followed this with a recruiting drive, which, after a slow start, had by the beginning of October brought the Force up to strength, and an appropriate programme of training. With the arrival from the United Kingdom of two further officers there could, in spite of the difficult conditions in which the party at Duqqam had spent the hot weather, no longer be any reasonable doubt about the readiness of the Force to play its part in escorting and protecting the Company's survey parties.

8. Meanwhile the tribal situation in the interior had evolved considerably and by the beginning of September it was becoming clear that, in spite of the Minister of the Interior's covert efforts, the new Imam had consolidated his authority over all the Sib Treaty tribes except the Yal Wahiba and had been

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recognised by all the shaikhs of the Interior except Ahmed bin Mohammed al Haithi, the nephew of Salih bin Isa, the principal Hinai leader, who flew down to Salalah at the end of August to see the Sultan, but subsequently decided that the time was unpropitious for him to return to the interior.

9. On September 23, the Minister of the Interior handed the Acting Consul at Muscat a letter informing him that the Imam was gathering tribesmen for an attack on the Dahirah and that its tribes, the Beni Ghafir, Duru and Ya'aguib who owed allegiance to the Sultan, had sent messengers requesting the Muscat Government's help. The letter concluded with the somewhat surprising request that, as trouble was being started in an area close to the Buraimi zone and as Her Majesty's Government wanted no development that might jeopardise the arbitration, we should send "armed men and commanders" to co-operate with Muscat Government Askars and the loyal tribesmen of the threatened area. In conversation, the Minister specifically requested that the Trucial Oman Levies should set up posts at Ibri and Dariz. He added that according to Mohammed bin Sultan, the former paramount shaikh of the Duru, who had arrived in Muscat that morning, the Imam was angry with the Duru on account of their recent agreement with the Muscat Government. It was clear from the circumstances that this request had been made without reference to the Sultan, which was surprising, since the Muscat Ministers enjoy small delegation of authority. I instructed the Acting Consul to inform Seyid Ahmed that though I would be glad to consider his letter when I received it, there was no question of a British force being sent to Ibri or indeed anywhere further than the immediate vicinity of Buraimi. Discussions about the implications of the Buraimi situation and problems arising from attempts of pro-Saudi tribal leaders based on the Buraimi zone to subvert and intimidate the Beni Ka'ab and Beni Ghaith in and near the Wadi Jizzi, were proceeding satisfactorily between the Acting Consul and himself. As regards the oil company's expedition, the best answer was to get on with this as quickly as possible, as we had already advocated. I suggested he might consider, in the light of this new information, suggesting to the Sultan either that he should return to Muscat earlier, or that the Company should be allowed to move inland before he returned. However I thought it wise to send my First Secretary by air to Muscat on September 29 with two representatives of the oil company to assess the situation and its probable effect on the Company's prospects.

10. It became clear from the discussions which took place with the Minister of the Interior during this visit that the Imam, Shaikh Salih bin Isa, the head of the Hinai and Suleiman bin Himyar, who styles himself "Ruler of the Jebal Akhdar area," had collected a relatively large force of tribesmen and were moving on Ibri, whose defence was being organised by the shaikhs of the Beni Kalban and Ya' agib and by Ali bin Hilal of the Duru who had sent letters to the Minister of the Interior appealing for help. Ibri has long been a more or less independent town having at one time had a Wali appointed jointly by the Sultan and the old Imam. Its significance from our point of view arises from the fact that it is the market town of the Duru and that anyone who controls it has therefore great influence with that tribe; though it appeared that the Sultan might to some small extent have brought this trouble upon himself by sending, or allowing his Minister of the Interior to send, letters and money to subvert the Omanis against the new Imam, there was an obvious risk that the town's capture by the Imam would delay the oil company's move inland because the Duru, if the Sultan proved unable or unwilling to defend them, might in turn be unable or unwilling to let the Company into their territories.

11. It is difficult to form any estimate of the size of the Imam's force: though figures as high as 6,000 were mentioned and apparently believed by the authorities in Muscat, it is doubtful if he can have assembled more than two or three hundred properly armed men which is, of course, a large army by local standards. Though the Shaikh of Dariz was said to have refused him passage through the town, his tribesmen gathered at Salaif three or four miles outside Ibri. The defenders sent Mohammed bin Said, Ali bin Hilal's predecessor as paramount shaikh of the Duru, to Muscat to plead their cause and a letter which he brought from Ali bin Hilal and two of the other Duru who had visited Muscat in August specifically said that on their return from Muscat Sulaiman bin Himyar knew of their visit and the purpose they went for and had now decided to take action against them by war. A few days later, on October 3, Mohammed bin Abdullah of the

Ya'aguib, appeared at Shaikh Zaid bin Sultan's fort in the Buraimi oasis in the hope of collecting some sort of assistance for the potential garrison who were said to number seven hundred but who had neither food, money or sufficient modern weapons. Since the Sultan at Salalah was still hoping to avoid a head-on clash with the Imam, these requests elicited little more than fair words from the Muscat authorities and nothing at all from us. It was at this juncture that Abdullah bin Hami, the commander of the Saudi police detachment at Buraimi, sought to fish in waters already sufficiently troubled. Presuming perhaps on previous Saudi contacts with the Imam's faction, he established contact with the defenders of Ibri and seems to have hoped to mediate between the two parties, to the general profit of Saudi influence in the area. Certainly it cannot have been without his knowledge and approval that Shaikh Rashid bin Humaid of Hamasa and Shaikh Saqr of Buraimi, both of whom are believed to have received large sums of Saudi money in breach of the agreed conditions for the arbitration, set off southwards by car, announcing over-ostentatiously that they had gone to attend a funeral. But although Shaikh Zaid received a report that a substantial sum had been sent to Ibri, these Saudi attempts to ingratiate themselves with both sides, seem to have produced little result. Rashid and Saqr were held up at Dhank by Matar bin Salim and, after waiting for several days, returned to Buraimi without seeing the Imam.

12. On October 2, two representatives of the oil company flew to Salalah to see the Sultan to urge on him the need for the company's expedition and its covering Force to move forthwith into the Duru country. While the decision was essentially one for the Sultan and the Company, I gave them a letter to the Sultan in which I pointed out the advantages of this course. Somewhat to the surprise of the Company's representatives, the Sultan began by expressing readiness for the Force to pay a quick visit to Jebel Fahud without Duru support or assistance. The Company, however, doubted the feasibility and wisdom of this, which they felt might make it more difficult for them at a later stage to effect a more permanent lodgement in the area and, on their departure, the Sultan gave them a letter for me in which he agreed that the Huqf Force might enter Duru country as soon as the Duru shaikhs were able to take them there, but stipulated that they were not to go in unaccompanied. He wondered, however, whether in view of the Ibri situation they would be able to do this in the near future.

13. Armed with this approval a representative of the Company returned to Muscat, to collect the necessary Duru, but on his arrival there he found that a caucus of seven Duru shaikhs had already assembled and though only Mohammed bin Saif was of primary importance he decided that they represented a useful cross-section of the tribe, which even in adversity was showing a surprising cohesion and loyalty to its previous undertaking to the Sultan and to the Company. It was agreed that Mohammed bin Zaid's son and five others should sail to Duqqam as soon as a launch was available, while Mohammed bin Said proceeded to the interior to contact Ali bin Hilal and to arrange for the latter to meet the Huqf Force as it advanced into the interior.

14. On October 14 we received news via Buraimi that Ibri had fallen three days earlier, fifteen being killed during the fighting. Ali bin Hilal, Mohammed bin Abdullah, Sultan bin Saif, the Sultan's representative with Huqf Force and a number of less important Duru, Kalbani and Ya'aguibi shaikhs arrived as refugees at Shaikh Zaid's fort in the Buraimi oasis. Although the Imam was reported to have offered full restitution of their property if they would return to Ibri the important leaders showed no signs of accepting and expressed their desire to see the Sultan. I concluded that the fall of Ibri ought in no sense to delay the Huqf preparations and that Ali bin Hilal at least might be of use to the expedition. I arranged therefore for the refugees to have a meeting at Sharjah with a representative of the Company, Ali bin Hilal and two other Duru agreed at least to fly to Duqqam with Mohammed bin Abdullah and Sultan bin Saif.

15. The expedition seemed now at last ready to move inland but on the very eve of its departure from Ras Duqqam, the Duru shaikhs refused to proceed without either seeing the Sultan or receiving an assurance that the Force would go on to a Duru village named Tan'am ten miles south of Ibri and some sixty miles beyond Jebel Fahud, the Company's initial objective, since the Imam had threatened to destroy the village and its surrounding gardens or to occupy it permanently unless the tribe submitted to him. While the Sultan in Salalah and his officials

in Muscat were still exchanging cables on the subject, news arrived that the Force had moved inland and by the beginning of the third week in October had established a camp in the Wadi Amari, south-west of Fahud, where there proved to be abundant water, and first geological reports were promising. It later emerged that Colonel Coriat, the commander of the Sultan's escorting Force, had secured Duru co-operation in this by promising to advance to Tan'am and that the Duru had also received some general encouragement from the Minister of the Interior with regard to an earlier request to the Sultan for support against the Imam. On arrival at Fahud they insisted on their pound of flesh. After receiving emissaries and letters from the Imam they said that unless the Force continued immediately to Tan'am, they would lose their houses and trees and the Company believed that, unless satisfied on this, they would at once go over to the Imam.

16. Meanwhile the Sultan had telegraphed to his Ministers in Muscat that the Force was not to go into Tan'am or any inhabited place. He stated that, according to his agreement with the Company representatives at their last meeting at Salalah, this expedition was intended to be a quick prospecting trip and that he had not agreed that they should establish a camp at or near Fahud. This was of course at variance with the Company's recollection of the discussion, though it was not clear whether the Sultan's attitude was due to genuine misunderstanding or to cold feet at the Imam's recent successes. I came to the conclusion that the best hope of sorting out this confused and rather critical situation lay in my meeting the Sultan preferably at Duqqam, where it would be possible to get him, his officials and the Company together. However, the Sultan declined to leave Salalah and I had perforce to arrange to fly on to visit him there.

17. On October 28, on the eve of my departure, news came to us through the commander of our police detachment at Buraimi that Ibri had been reoccupied without bloodshed by the shaikhs who had accompanied the Huqf Force. Amplifying reports from the oil company were to the effect that Coriat while on patrol in the Ibri-Tan'am area had "been impelled to take action in support of the loyal Duru and later, after negotiations had accepted the surrender to the Sultan" of the Imam's garrison. He had established himself in a position commanding Ibri and the garrison had been allowed to retire with their arms in the direction of Daiz.

18. The Sultan's frame of mind at the time of these happenings may be gauged from the fact that, though the Muscat Government has in the past never hesitated to ask us to refuse travel facilities to independent shaikhs from the Oman wishing to visit Saudi Arabia, when shortly before the fall of Ibri, Talib, the Imam's brother, appeared in Sohar on his way to see King Saud, the Minister of the Interior, who would dearly have liked to lay him by the heels, felt obliged because of the Sultan's desire to avoid trouble with the Imam, to let him pass. When I arrived at Salalah I indeed found the Sultan most upset by his Field Force's action at Ibri. He felt Colonel Coriat had gravely exceeded his instructions and he even wrote me a letter asking how disciplinary action could be taken against him.

19. The reason for the Sultan's anger was that he had not planned at this stage to get into open opposition to the Imam. Colonel Coriat's action had faced him with the alternative of maintaining the force at Ibri, which would make it appear that he had deliberately planned this attack on the Imam, or of withdrawing, which would show it had been a mistake and would weaken his position and the allegiance of the Duru to him. He said he would not have minded the force going as far as Tan'am, which is a Duru village, but Ibri was not a Duru town and he had a few weeks previously refused, when pressed by the Duru and the Ya'agib, to intervene there to forestall the threatened attack on it by the Imam. The upshot of long discussions with myself and the Company's representatives, was that he agreed to leave the force where it was for the time being while he received a full report of the circumstances leading up to the surrender and an account of the topographical and military factors in the area, which would enable a decision to be taken whether there is any other suitable position for the force to hold somewhat further back. Much to the relief of the Company's representative, he was persuaded without too much difficulty to drop the idea that the Company must return to the coast after a short survey and agreed that in view of the satisfactory support obtained from the Duru, they might now stay in the Fahud

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area as long as they liked, unless circumstances changed. I have separately reported on the other matters discussed at this meeting, which included an interesting exposition by the Sultan of his general Oman policy and a request for assistance in adding another 300-400 men to the Huqf Force.

20. It is too early yet to assess all the probable repercussions of the appearance of the oil company at Fahud and of the Sultan's force at Ibri. The immediate effect of the news has undoubtedly been to produce a noticeable increase of the Sultan's influence in the Dhahira as far north as Buraimi itself where, as a result also of Abdullah Salim's success in clearing pro-Saudi intruders out of the Wadi Jizzi, many who had espoused the Saudi cause have now shown signs of having second thoughts. In the interior of the Oman it has undoubtedly had a profound effect. Before receiving the Sultan's orders Colonel Coriat had received in the Sultan's name the submission of all the tribes within a 20-mile radius of Ibri, including the Shaikhs of Kubara, Mazam, Bat and Dariz, and the Imam's efforts to raise the tribes for a second attack on Ibri had failed, largely it is said because he did not pay them adequately for the earlier expedition. After this, he was reported to have shut himself up in Nizwa declaring that he could do no more unless he received outside help particularly in the form of munitions and money. He subsequently sent a protest to Her Majesty's Consul-General listing the Sultan's infractions of the Treaty of Sib, a settlement in which Her Majesty's Government had acted as mediator, and threatening to appeal to Her Majesty's Government direct if he did not receive satisfaction. Suleiman bin Himyar also wrote protesting his friendship for Her Majesty's Government and saying he would be glad to meet Her Majesty's Consul-General. Saleh bin Isa, who is in an easier position than the other two, appeared in person at Sib on the coast and asked to see the Sultan. To this request the Sultan has acceded and he left Muscat for Salalah by launch on November 15. It appears that he is formally empowered to speak on the Imam's behalf as well as his own, though the Minister of the Interior suspects that the main object of his approach is to regain the position of favour he previously held as a subject of the Sultan, whose passport he has held all along, and thus to safeguard his standing as head of the Hinai. I think it possible that the other two still hope by their approaches to secure our mediation to gain their independence in return for a deal with an oil company through the Sultan, or at least in the process to build up their lost prestige. But it must not be forgotten that the Imam's brother Talib has now been in Saudi Arabia for three weeks. It is interesting against the background of his mission to note that though when the Saudi Arabian Ambassador called upon the Department on November 4 to express the King's anxiety about the Oman situation he specifically said that the Saudi Government did not claim the area in question, on the occasion of the later demarche reported in Foreign Office telegram No. 729 to me, he alleged that "Saudi subjects" had been killed in the Ibri affair (our own information is to the effect that there was no bloodshed) and said that if the Sultan's force stayed where it was, the Imam and other tribes would certainly seek Saudi help, which it would be difficult to withhold.

21. Meanwhile the General Manager of the oil company has visited the Fahud area with the Company's chief geologist and I understand that, though no formal decision has yet been taken, they will probably wish to drill there.

22. I have already in my despatch No. 102 of November 8 had the honour to submit my views on the implications of these developments on the future of Her Majesty's Government's relations with the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Jedda, to the British Middle East Office, to the Consul-General at Muscat and to the Political Agent at Dubai.

I have, &c.

B. A. B. BURROWS.

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ES 1941/17

No. 46

CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND
H.R.H. PRINCE FAHD BIN ABDUL AZIZ OF SAUDI ARABIA
ON NOVEMBER 23, 1954

Sir Anthony Eden to Mr. Phillips (Jedda)

(No. 115. Restricted) *Foreign Office,*
Sir, *November 23, 1954.*

His Royal Highness Prince Fahd bin Abdul Aziz called on me at my invitation this morning accompanied by the Saudi Arabian Chargé d'Affaires.

2. I enquired after the King's health, and went on to say that we were glad that agreement had been reached to take the Buraimi dispute to arbitration. Now that Sir Reader Bullard and Shaikh Yusuf Yasin had been able to agree on the three other members of the Tribunal, I hoped that it would be possible for the arbitration process to be set in motion shortly. We therefore looked forward to strengthening the close and friendly ties which traditionally bound our two countries.

3. The Prince agreed that it was good to have the Buraimi dispute, which he said he regarded as between members of one family, so well on the way to a solution. It had, of course, not loomed so large as the difficulties with Egypt and Persia; but the arbitration agreement had contributed, he agreed, to the present greatly improved atmosphere in the Middle East. I said that, although Europe continued to present many problems, the Far East was probably the area of most difficulty at the moment.

4. I asked the Prince whether he had inspected any schools while he was here,

since as Minister of Education in his country he obviously would be interested in educational developments elsewhere. He replied that he had been to a primary school in London yesterday, and had admired the modern facilities it afforded. He would indeed be proud when Saudi Arabia possessed a school so well equipped and organised. Time did not permit his seeing more during this visit, since he was on the point of leaving for Cairo on his way back to Jedda; but he assured me that everything possible had been done for him during his stay here.

5. After recalling his earlier visit to London for the Coronation and mentioning the happy memories I had of my own visit to Riyadh, I asked His Royal Highness, on leaving, to convey to His Majesty our respectful greetings and good wishes for the future.

6. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Ambassadors at Cairo, Tehran and Washington, Her Majesty's Political Resident at Bahrain and to the Head of the British Middle East Office, Fayid.

I am, &c.

ANTHONY EDEN.

EM 1041/405

No. 47

YEMEN POLICY ON THE ADEN FRONTIER

Mr. McGregor to Sir Anthony Eden. (Received December 20)

(No. 25. Confidential) *Taiz,*
Sir, *December 2, 1954.*

I have the honour to refer to my telegram No. 109 of November 23 and to enclose a copy of the note which I handed to His Royal Highness Saiful Islam Abdullah, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, on November 23 about the discussions between His Royal Highness and his Excellency the Governor of Aden.

2. The Minister for Foreign Affairs read the note and then listened to my oral explanation. He remarked that the note would be shown to His Majesty the Imam and would be studied and that he would meet me again or send a reply to me. Having sent for a copy of the draft record, he read the concluding paragraph and the relevant part of the note again and said

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rather airily that it (presumably the amendment) was a simple matter, especially as nothing final had been achieved at the meetings—the record only mentioned what the Governor would say to this Sheikh and that Sultan. It did not seem an opportune moment to take him up on this and I contented myself with reiterating Her Majesty's Government's views.

3. To-day, during a meeting with the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, I enquired informally whether I might expect a reply soon to the note. Qadhi Muhammad Al-Amri replied that it was still being studied and that the Yemeni Government would probably suggest a small amendment to the draft record.

4. At first sight the numerous raids which have taken place on the protectorate, particularly on Marta'a, since the Governor's visit would seem to indicate that the Yemeni Government were not prepared to co-operate in restoring peace on the frontier. I believe, however, that the Imam did not authorise these raids and has to some extent been embarrassed by them. Through his Minister for Foreign Affairs and Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs he denied that the raids had taken place, assenting that he had ordered the acting Governor in Beidha to visit Am-Soma'a and investigate the position and that the latter had reported that no raids had occurred. He also reaffirmed that he had given strict instructions to his officials that they must not encourage any aggression or give material aid of any kind to persons from the protectorate. I have learned from a fairly reliable source that the acting Governor of Beidha wrote last month to the Imam in order to enquire whether His Majesty's instructions meant that hospitality and maintenance payments to persons from the protectorate should cease and that the Imam replied by letter that hospitality and maintenance payments should continue, as he could not refuse that to "his sons" but that no aggression should be committed or encouraged. The Imam, I understand, has also instructed his officials at Qataba and Mawiya similarly. It has also been reported to me that recently a consignment of rifles and ammunition for Beidha was cancelled and "surplus" rifles and ammunition were sent from Beidha to Sana'a.

5. It is possible that the Imam has decided that the encouragement of and the occasional participation of Yemeni soldiers

and irregulars in frontier raids is a dangerous and costly business, for he must realise now that the Aden Government cannot indefinitely suffer these attacks without retaliating more forcibly and perhaps carrying the "war" into Yemen territory. It is equally possible that he is contemplating referring the dispute to the United Nations or stirring up trouble by indirect means.

6. Doubtless he will not refer the matter to the United Nations without the approval of the Arab League, which, I believe, will shortly be meeting and to whom he has sent a report of the discussions with the Governor together with lengthy comments on the course and results of the discussions.

7. The possibility of stirring up trouble in the protectorate by indirect means must also appeal to him as a safer and perhaps a more efficacious method of achieving his ends and particularly of preventing the creation of a federation in the Western Aden Protectorate. I have already reported in my telegram No. 105 of November 18 to the Governor of Aden that the Imam has apparently agreed to the creation of a propaganda organisation which would prepare anti-Aden propaganda and arrange to have it disseminated inside the protectorate. So far, I believe, no action has yet been taken to establish this organisation, but it seems likely that the Imam is awaiting the return to Taiz of Qadhi Muhammad As-Shami, the Governor of Beidha, from whose evil and fertile imagination has sprung the notion of creating such an organisation. As you will recall, I mentioned in paragraph 25 of my despatch No. 23 of October 30 that the Qadhi had expressed the view *inter alia* that a temporary peace on the frontier was desirable at present. It would appear that the Qadhi's views are at the moment receiving more favourable attention from the Imam than those of his other advisers.

8. Unfortunately, however, it is necessary to base one's assessment of the likely course of events in the Yemen on conjecture and reports of varying degrees of reliability and unreliability and it has also to be remembered that the Imam, although undoubtedly a shrewd and able person and one who is normally unlikely to take action in the field of international relations without consulting the Arab League States and especially Egypt, is an absolute ruler who, stirred by anger or emotion, could conceivably follow

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an unpredictable course and one bringing no advantage to his country.

I am sending a copy of this despatch to the Governor of Aden.

I have, &c.

R. MCGREGOR.

Enclosure

(1045/III/214)

*British Legation,
Taiz,*

November 23, 1954.

Her Majesty's Legation present their compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Mutawakilite Kingdom of the Yemen and have the honour to present the following note from Her Majesty's Government:—

The oral explanation, made on November 1 to the Foreign Office by the Yemeni Chargé d'Affaires in London, of the course of the talks held recently in Taiz between His Highness Prince Saiful Islam Abdullah and his Excellency the Governor of Aden, has been studied in conjunction with the draft record of the final meeting handed to his Excellency's Political Secretary in Taiz on October 26.

2. Her Majesty's Government are gratified to see that a considerable measure of agreement was reached. They must, however, request one amendment to the concluding paragraph of the draft record. It is that the sentence "his Excellency promises to act accordingly" should be

amended to read "his Excellency undertook to represent the view of the Yemeni Government to Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom." This is, in fact, what happened at the final meeting in Taiz.

3. Her Majesty's Government would be glad to receive the agreement of the Yemeni Government to this amendment.

4. Her Majesty's Government consider, moreover, that it would be helpful to both sides for this document, once agreed upon, to stand as a formal record of the course of the talks. If that is done Her Majesty's Government would further suggest that the solutions to which both sides agreed should be put into effect immediately.

5. Subject to the concurrence of the Yemeni Government in the proposals set out above, Her Majesty's Government would welcome any suggestion which the Yemeni Government may wish to make for further discussion.

6. Her Majesty's Government take this opportunity to express their thanks to the Government of the Yemen for the hospitality and kindness shown to his Excellency the Governor of Aden throughout his stay in the Yemen.

The legation take this opportunity to renew to the esteemed Ministry the assurance of their highest consideration.

*The Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
The Mutawakilite Kingdom
of the Yemen,
Taiz.*

EA 1016/1

No. 48

AGITATION FOR CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM IN BAHRAIN

Mr. Burrows to Sir Anthony Eden. (Received January 1)

(No. 113. Confidential)
Sir,

*Bahrain,
December 26, 1954.*

I have the honour to report upon the development of the internal political situation in Bahrain since the date of my despatch No. 101 of October 26.

2. The petition referred to in paragraph 9 of the enclosure to my despatch under reference was presented to the Ruler on October 28. It asserted that the present basis of the administration of the country no longer suited Bahrain's needs, and that to put an end to the consequent unrest, the signatories had been entrusted by the people with the task of putting forward the following demands:—

- (a) the establishment of a Legislative Assembly, truly representing the people through free elections;
- (b) the introduction of a general code of law for the State, both civil and criminal, to be drawn up by a committee of legal experts and to be ratified by the Legislative Assembly;

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(c) permission to establish trade unions, whose rules should also be submitted to the Legislative Assembly for ratification;

(d) the establishment of a court of appeal to decide disputes between the legislative and the executive authorities, and between individuals and the Government.

The petition emphasised that these demands in no way conflicted with the authority of the Ruler, the status of the Ruling Family, or the interests of Her Majesty's Government. It was signed by the eight members of the "High Executive Committee" which has assumed the direction of the constitutional movement. Sunni and Shia were equally represented among the signatories who included no one of particular substance. Among the Sunni signatories was Abdurrahman Al Bakir, whose loss of citizenship brought the present agitation to a head, and Abdul Aziz Shimlan, another part-time journalist who is employed in a position of some responsibility by the British Bank of the Middle East.

3. The Ruler replied to the petition on November 3 in a proclamation in which he said that "certain people" had submitted a letter containing some demands including the establishment of a Legislative Assembly, which were impracticable; the Government was making every effort in its power for the advancement of the country and appealed to the people to co-operate in the reforms which were being and would be undertaken.

4. It was not to be expected that this thinly veiled rejection of the petition would satisfy the reformists. Particular exception was taken to the Ruler's implication that the "national demands" were the work of a few agitators: the claim that the petition emanated from "the people" was advanced again at a mass meeting held on the occasion of the Prophet's Birthday on November 8. Several thousands of both communities attended the gathering, many of them brought from outlying districts by taxi-drivers who declined payment for their services. The principal speakers followed the same lines as those at the previous meetings reported in Mr. Wall's despatch of October 25 enclosed in my despatch No. 101 of October 26. The demand for a Legislative Assembly was repeated and it was argued that such a body, while being the one means of securing reforms and adequate social services, would not derogate from the Ruler's authority.

5. The High Executive Committee subsequently attempted to see the Ruler and eventually did so on November 20. The meeting, arranged by an intermediary who had characteristically managed to give each party the impression that the initiative in proposing it had been taken by the other, was singularly unfruitful. Shaikh Salman indignantly rejected the suggestion that it was by his desire that the petitioners had come, refused to discuss their demands and walked out of the room. Abdurrahman Al Bakir, who was acting as the Committee's secretary, saw the Political Agent on November 23 and said that the reformists had been patient for a long time and the Committee were doing all in their power to keep the people calm. They could not, however, understand why, if the Government had truly reformist intentions, they should not take the people into their confidence, and why the Ruler, whom they knew to be a man of integrity, morality and honour, should rebuff his subjects on every occasion on which they tried to put forward their "eminently reasonable" demands. If there was no further progress with the Ruler within a week the Committee would be unable to prevent a general strike. Mr. Wall made it clear to Al Bakir that we should deplore such action not only for its immediate harm but because it would only result in the postponement of reforms. Al Bakir was left in no doubt that we should in these circumstances support the Ruler and his Government.

6. The Political Agent had meanwhile discussed the situation with the Ruler. Shaikh Salman wanted from us a brief statement which he could publish, to the effect that Her Majesty's Government were in agreement with the Ruler's policy and were prepared to give practical support when requested. The Ruler appeared to think that the reformists owed a good deal of their popular following to the fact that we had not denied their assertions that they enjoyed our support and sympathy. The Political Agent said that we of course wanted to do all we could to strengthen the Ruler's Government, but that the question was, what was the best way, and when was the best time, for us to make some public gesture of support. He suggested that such a message as His Highness wanted could be made with most effect as a kind of comment on some new announcement by the Bahrain

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Government of its progress in internal reforms: there were, as His Highness knew, certain changes which we thought he should in the present situation introduce.

7. On November 27, the Political Agent (accurately anticipating the instructions in your telegram No. 1027 of November 27, which arrived on the following day) proposed to the Ruler through the Adviser, that he should set up a small committee of Government officials and leading citizens to hear the views of the High Executive Committee and to report to him. The Ruler obstinately rejected the idea, and in an interview with the Political Agent on November 30, having turned down all the arguments in favour of the plan, said that if Her Majesty's Government thought it was the right one, they should so advise him in writing.

8. On December 1 I went with Mr. Wall to see the Ruler. Sir Charles Belgrave, Adviser to the Ruler, was also present. I began by emphasising the friendly nature of the concern which Her Majesty's Government felt for the affairs of Bahrain in the present difficult circumstances and I said that they would never advise His Highness to take any step which in their view was contrary to his interests. In an attempt to deal with the point frequently made by the Ruler that his administration is better than that of all the neighbouring countries, with the implication that he need therefore do nothing more to improve it, I said that the very fact that so much progress had been made in Bahrain in, for instance, education and the provision of public services made it all the more necessary to keep up the momentum of progress. More people were able to read and to listen to what was said on the radio; therefore they were aware of political currents in the outside world and their demands for political development were proportionately greater. In these circumstances I had no doubt that the course suggested to him by Mr. Wall was the right one. I also suggested that the appointment of a committee to hear grievances was only an extension adapted to modern needs of the traditional relationship of the Arab Chief to his people, of which an essential part is his sitting in open session and hearing what any of his people of whatever degree has to say. The Ruler replied to the general effect that he knew his people better than we did and that it was better to let the actions of the Government speak for themselves than to give any further opportunity for public criticism by people who had in fact already stated their demands and had received a reply (*i.e.*, by the Ruler's proclamation referred to in paragraph 3 above). He finally said that he had decided that as one further step he would announce the formation of two committees to examine the affairs of the Departments of Health and Education respectively. There ensued a long wrangle during which I argued that it would be useless to go only thus far and that in order to influence the situation the Government must show it was ready for all topics including the administration of justice to be discussed before the Committee. I finally handed to His Highness a letter which I had brought with me and of which I enclose a copy stating that it was the view of Her Majesty's Government that he should appoint a committee to hear the views of the public on all matters that affected their interests. Having read the letter and after further argument, the Ruler agreed with bad grace to add a phrase to his announcement which, although somewhat unclearly drafted, contained the necessary assurance that the committee to be set up would be able to deal with all topics.

9. The reformist leaders naturally placed the narrowest possible interpretation to this announcement and refused to accept the assurances given them by the Political Agent that in fact they had now been provided with a forum in which all their grievances could be put forward. It is possible that in fact by that time it was too late for the machinery of the strike organisation to be put into reverse. In any case, the strike began according to plan at 6 a.m. on December 4, and continued until sunset on December 10. It was well-organised and well-supported. Apart from some cases of intimidation on behalf of the strikers, either by word of mouth or through anonymous letters (for which the High Executive Committee disclaimed responsibility), and some complaint about the provocative attitude of a few beduin police auxiliaries, it was entirely peaceful. Although the bazaar was closed and a majority of Indian and Pakistani staffs came out on strike with the local employees—whether in sympathy, through intimidation, or due to lack of transport—work was not at a complete standstill. British firms in Manama carried on with skeleton British staffs and with small numbers of Indians and Pakistanis, essential public services were maintained, again by British staffs, and

the Bahrain Petroleum Company kept refinery operations going on a reduced scale with European employees together with a few Indians and Pakistanis who had been moved out to camp accommodation before the strike began. Special arrangements were made by the strikers to ensure that the sick were taken to hospital and that no undue hardship was suffered on account of inadequate food supplies.

10. A noteworthy feature of the strike was the friendly attitude expressed by the strikers towards the foreign communities. I enclose as an example the High Executive Committee's "Proclamation" No. 9 which is in refreshing contrast to the xenophobia of most popular movements in the East. There was no attempt to stop Europeans and Americans working, beyond an occasional desultory enquiry as to why they did not join the strike. This was answered to the effect that when I or the Political Agent told them to stop working they would do so, and this appeared to satisfy the enquirer. There is no doubt that the majority of British and American business men sympathised to a greater or less degree with the reformists' objects and felt that the strike, while no doubt inconvenient, provided a useful object lesson to the Ruler that he must move with the times if he wished to retain his position. A curious attempt was made by the strikers to obtain foreign support of another kind, in a rather unlikely quarter. A letter was written by the secretary of the High Executive Committee, dated December 11, the day after the strike ended, to King Saud in which the Committee said that they wished him to understand what they were doing and hoped for his support. The letter was taken to Damman, where the King then was, by a Bahraini sympathiser of the Committee. It is not entirely certain whether he actually had a conversation with the King but in any case the latter replied in a letter of the same date to the effect that he did not approve of the course being pursued by the strikers and that he regretted any difference between them and Shaikh Salman "since this could only be of benefit to a third party" (by which he probably meant to refer to Her Majesty's Government or less probably to the Communists). King Saud sent copies of the two letters to Shaikh Salman shortly afterwards.

11. Another impressive feature was the apparently harmonious co-operation of the Sunni and Shia members of the High Executive Committee. There were no incidents between members of the two communities, and it is probable that this common action by Sunnis and Shias throughout the island will have proved to be a factor in reducing the traditional feelings of hostility between the two sects, by emphasising instead their common opposition to certain features of the rule of the Al Khalifah.

12. The Bahrain Government made some attempt to bring the strike to an end sooner than was intended by drafting a further proclamation which specifically stated that the committee to be set up by the Government would deal with judicial matters amongst others. The draft of this proclamation was given to two trusted intermediaries (Ahmed Fakhroo and Mansur al Orayidh, the same two who played so praiseworthy a part in bringing to an end the disturbances in July). They attempted to persuade the strikers to return to work with the promise that this proclamation would be issued as soon as they did so but these attempts came to nothing. I and the Political Agent had meanwhile been discussing with Sir Charles Belgrave and, through him, with the Ruler the composition of the committee and the nature of the announcement to be made at the end of the strike. On the first point we were not altogether successful since the committee as announced contains too high a proportion of members of the Ruler's family. The rest of the proclamation, of which I enclose a copy, was, however, on the lines which I had suggested and made the most of the various measures which the Bahrain Government had already taken to improve the administration as well as making the comprehensive nature of the committee's functions clear beyond doubt. The appointment of Mansur al Orayidh to the committee as an additional member was announced after the initial proclamation had been made. It thus consists of three of the Al Khalifah, one of whom is in the chair, the second senior British official in the Bahrain Government, a Shia official, and a Sunni and a Shia merchant. Granting that the composition of the committee had to be on these lines, the individual members are well chosen with the possible exception of Shaikh Mubarak, the Ruler's brother, who is weak and ineffective. Shaikh Ibrahim bin Mohammed, on the other hand, was put on at my suggestion in place of one of the other members of the family. He is one of the better educated and more progressive of the Ruling Family and has ideas which in several respects, particularly as

regards the administration of justice, coincide closely with our own and those of the more moderate reformers.

13. The appointment of this committee was badly received by the leaders of the reform movement, partly because they thought that it should have been composed of, or at least have contained, elected members, partly because of the high proportion of Al Khalifah. They have said they intend to boycott its hearings. The committee has nevertheless begun to sit and is examining the officials of various Government Departments beginning with the Department of Health. It has also received many letters from the public, some anonymous, making suggestions. While some of these are frivolous a number make useful points. The writers, where they give their names, have been invited to express their views orally to the committee. The members of the committee to whom I have spoken do not take the attempted boycott of their hearings at all tragically. They believe that they can make useful proposals on the basis of their examination of the Government Departments and they believe it is quite likely that when members of the public see them at work they will in the end wish to come and express their own opinions before them. I am encouraging them in this view. It is quite likely that the committee, of whom four members have sound practical experience, may discover abuses and defects in the administration and, apart from this, the existence of the committee, even if its facilities are not used by the reformist leaders, provides a potential safety valve of some value and at the same time a useful answer to those who criticise the Bahrain Government or ourselves for not paying attention to the desire for progress and reform among the population. There has been a certain amount of talk about the possibility of a renewal of the strike but the best informed opinion seems to be that it would be extremely difficult for the leaders to organise this for quite a considerable time.

14. Nevertheless one of the obvious conclusions to be drawn from these events is the extent of the influence and efficiency of the organisers of this strike. It was remarkable both that they were able to get so large a proportion of the workers out and that the strike was conducted with such exemplary discipline and good order. There are several causes for the widespread support of this movement. Several large sections of the population have grievances. The Shia have their underlying feeling of oppression by the al Khalifah, particularly as represented by the latter's monopoly of the administration of justice. The small shopkeepers in Manama have a grievance about the rents charged for their shops, which are largely owned by the al Khalifah (though this dispute is in process of reaching a reasonably satisfactory solution). The more advanced sections of the population, including the more important merchants, most of whom travel frequently abroad, are conscious of the deficiencies in the Bahrain Government system, typified again by the low standard of the law courts. They are also conscious of the generally lower standard of intelligence and education of the al Khalifah as compared with the leaders of the merchant class, and correspondingly resent the privileged position of the ruling family. But in addition to these more or less positive factors there was clearly a great deal of passive support or acquiescence in the strike on the part of those who were either intimidated or feared intimidation, or merely felt that it was not worth risking any trouble for the sake of establishing their right to work. An important contributory cause was the failure of Shaikh Salman and the Bahrain Government to carry out any kind of public relations work during the whole time that the present discontent and uneasiness has been developing. Their facilities for the actual publication of material are very small but they ought to have been explaining their policy and the achievements of the Government to potentially friendly elements among the townspeople in the hope of dividing the opposition. I have urged the necessity for this kind of work to the Ruler and Sir Charles Belgrave and I think they are now more conscious of it. An attempt is being made to make the Government *Gazette* a more interesting publication and to include background and descriptive material in it. The Government radio station will it is hoped be operating within two or three months and this will provide the best channel for making the public aware of what the Government is doing and planning. Looking further ahead it is clear that much will depend on what the committee appointed by the Government recommends and the extent to which the Ruler accepts its recommendations. The most difficult point, and at the same time the one having the most bearing on public feeling, will be the reform of the law courts. It is most unlikely that the committee as now constituted will recommend any major constitutional change. Some of the members might be in favour of a

nominated advisory council, but another and perhaps easier solution might be the continued existence of this committee itself as part of the Government machinery. This would follow the practice which appears to be taking shape in Kuwait and would, I think, be beneficial. It is unlikely that the leaders of the reform movement will be won over by administrative reforms however sweeping, particularly as these will give them personally no scope for exercising their political talents. The question will, therefore, be how far administrative reforms, coupled with the continued existence of a body, such as the present committee, forming some kind of bridge between the Ruler and the public, will detach sufficient middle-of-the-road support from these leaders to render them isolated and therefore powerless to organise any more extreme form of action against the State.

15. Finally there is a piece of comparatively ancient history which deserves mention not only for its academic interest but because it can hardly fail to have some influence on the present feelings both of the Ruler and at least of the Shia section of the reforming party, and on their respective fears and hopes of our intervention. I enclose copies of two remarkable letters written by the Political Resident in 1923, one to the then Ruler Shaikh Isa, one to the Baharina, in which he makes it clear that Her Majesty's Government have used their authority in the most direct fashion to impose reforms on an unwilling Ruler as a result of a period of tyranny and maladministration. A copy of the letter to the Baharina was produced by the present Shia leaders to Mr. Wall as evidence that they are under the special protection of Her Majesty's Government, and that it is the latter's duty to impose further reforms when this is necessary. The history of our relations with his grandfather is of course equally well known to Shaikh Salman, and I fear contributes to his defective handling of the present type of situation. He behaves as though he felt that he is not ultimately responsible for what happens, and that he is therefore at liberty to pursue the intransigent policy to which he is urged by his own traditionalism and by the promptings of the more reactionary members of his family, in the confident expectation that if we disagree we will oblige him to do something different, or that if we do not object, we will in the end rescue him from the consequences of his policy if it turns out to be wrong. I suppose that this is an almost inevitable result of the rather peculiar relationship of a protected to a protecting State, particularly when the local Government has so readily accepted administrative advice for so long a period as Bahrain. But I was surprised in the course of the developments recorded in this despatch to find myself occasionally wishing that Bahrain could borrow some of the more robust attitude of the Kuwaiti shaikhs, who, for all their many faults, tend at least to behave as though they knew that the consequence of failure would fall on their own heads, and that they cannot necessarily rely on us to pick up the pieces.

16. I am sending a copy of this despatch to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Jeddah, and the British Middle East Office, and to the Political Agents at Bahrain, Kuwait and Dohah.

I have, &c.

B. A. B. BURROWS.

Enclosure No. 1

Copy of Letter from Political Resident to Ruler of Bahrain

Mr. Burrows to His Highness Shaikh Salman bin Hamad al Khalifah

Bahrain,

December 1, 1954.

As is well known Her Majesty's Government have always taken a keen interest in everything that concerns the welfare and prosperity of Bahrain. They noted with warm approval the measures announced by Your Highness in the Ordinance of July 15. Your Highness has now been good enough to discuss with the Political Agent and myself the problems which have arisen in the internal affairs of Bahrain for which Your Highness is responsible. I, therefore, wish to inform Your Highness that it is the advice of Her Majesty's Government that Your Highness should appoint a small committee of persons chosen by you, whose

task it would be to hear the views of members of the public on matters affecting their well-being. When they had heard these views the committee would report to Your Highness and decisions could be taken on any action that might be necessary in the interests of the prosperity and progress of Bahrain.

2. Your Highness would have the full support of Her Majesty's Government in pursuing this course and in taking such measures as might seem necessary when the committee had reported. They believe that adoption of this method would give a proper opportunity for the expression of opinion in an orderly manner and would thus remove any excuse for criticism or disturbance.

B. A. B. BURROWS.

Enclosure No. 2

Translation of Reply from the Ruler of Bahrain to Political Resident

From His Highness Shaikh Salman bin Hamad al Khalifah to Mr. Burrows

December 11, 1954.

After greetings.

We have received your kind letter of December 1. We thank the British Government and Your Excellency for your help, and may God lead us all to what he wishes.

Usual ending.

Enclosure No. 3

"High Executive Committee" Proclamation No. 9 of December 4

To the Bahrain Citizens,

The High Executive Committee is proud and honoured to express its appreciations and thanks to the Citizens of Bahrain for the unsurpassed show of sensible and true patriotism in their response to our request in keeping quiet and calm. *The Committee request that they continue this peaceful way of strike, and give complete disregard to all kind of rumours and avoid all kind of frictions with any person or party as might be taken an excuse for interference turning the strike from its aims. All incidents are to be reported, without delay, to the High Executive Committee or to a member of the First Aid Scouts, who have volunteered to be at the People's service all the time.*

We take this opportunity and occasion to state and express our deep gratitude and sincere thanks and respect to all of our foreign friends who have showed their profound sympathy and sincere feelings, towards the People's National Movement. We assure them all that the people of Bahrain will think always and never forget this co-operative and helpful attitude and will act towards them accordingly.

THE HIGH EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE.

Enclosure No. 4

Bahrain Government Proclamation of December 11

NOTICE

No. 13/1374

December 11, 1954.

We, Sulman bin Hamad Al Khalifah, Ruler of Bahrain, order the issue of the following Notice:—

In continuation of our previous Alan No. 12/1374 dated 6th R/Thani 1374 (3rd December, 1954), we hereby announce that we have appointed the following

SECRET

persons as member of a committee to investigate matters concerning Education, Public Health, Judicial matters and Public Security:—

1. His Excellency Shaikh Abdulla bin Isa Al Khalifah, C.I.E.
2. Mr. G. W. R. Smith, M.B.E.
3. Shaikh Mubarak bin Hamad Al Khalifah.
4. Shaikh Ibrahim bin Mohamed Al Khalifah.
5. Haj Ahmed bin Yusuf Fakhroo.
6. Haj Salim Arayedh.

2. The Committee will submit to us its views and suggestions which we will study and we will do what we find necessary for the benefit and progress of our people.

3.—(a) We remind our people that the newly-appointed British Judicial Adviser commenced work over a month ago and has been sitting on the Criminal Court since he came to Bahrain.

(b) Much progress is being made in drafting the Criminal Code which we hope will be completed within some weeks.

(c) A senior British Officer, who was previously, for ten years, Governor of Sinai in Egypt, has been appointed as Assistant Commandant of Police and another British Inspector has been appointed. Both have arrived to take up their duties.

(d) A new British doctor has been appointed as Assistant to the State Medical Officer. He will arrive in Bahrain in the middle of January.

Another woman doctor joined the staff of the Women's Hospital about three weeks ago.

(e) A new T.B. hospital is in the course of construction. A T.B. clinic containing a new and very powerful X-ray unit will be open in a week or two.

4. A draft regulation controlling rents of shops and places of business within the Manamah Municipal area has been agreed to by the Committee set up by our Government to study this matter.

5. The Manamah Municipal election will be held after one month from now.

As all these things have been matters of interest among the different inhabitants of Bahrain in these days we take this opportunity of bringing them to the notice of the public.

SULMAN BIN HAMAD AL KHALIFAH,
Ruler of Bahrain.

Enclosure No. 5

Letter from Lieutenant-Colonel Trevor, Political Resident, to Ruler of Bahrain of October 27, 1923

To—

His Excellency Shaikh Isa bin Ali,
of Bahrain.

*Bushire,
October 27, 1923.*

After compliments.

I have received the petition signed by Your Excellency and certain other Sunni Arabs.

Your Excellency is under a misapprehension as regards the reforms at Bahrain. These are not initiated by the personal wish of Major Daly or even of Colonel Knox. The High Government has been forced to order them to be put in hand, as after prolonged enquiry and patient watching they found that the state of affairs in Bahrain absolutely necessitated reform. Your Excellency will remember that very many times you have been requested by the High Government to reform your administration, one of the last occasions being in March 1922 when under instructions from the High Government I personally visited your island and called on you to take action. On another occasion in April 1922 when your Shiah subjects could no longer bear the tyranny to which they were subjected and became restive and petitioned me and the High Government, you yourself undertook to introduce some reforms to ameliorate their condition.

SECRET

But my friend you have never introduced any reform either at the urgent request of the Government or in fulfilment of your own promises. And as the tyranny and oppression in your island had become a public scandal it became necessary for the High Government to take action, and hence the action by Major Daly and Colonel Knox to which you take exception. Your Excellency I feel sure knows all this, but as you ignore it in your petition I feel bound to inform you again.

I have to inform you that it is my duty as it was Colonel Knox's to carry out the orders of the High Government and proceed with the reforms, the object of which is to secure fair and equal treatment and even-handed justice for all. I am accordingly resolved to proceed with the reforms and I wish Your Excellency and the gentlemen who signed the petition to realise this once for all.

It is to be regretted my friend that you did not listen to my advice or to the Political Agent's and introduce suitable reforms yourself.

LIEUT.-COL.,

Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

Enclosure No. 6

**Letter from Lieutenant-Colonel Trevor, Political Resident, to Baharinah
Petitioners of October 27, 1923**

Bushire,

October 27, 1923.

To the Baharinah, signatories of the petition without date handed to me on 25th October, 1923, by three of their number.

After compliments.

I have duly received and considered your petition. Rest assured that the High Government having found the state of oppression and tyranny in Bahrain had passed all bounds and called for immediate redress ordered that reforms should be introduced in the administration of the islands—and for this purpose, as you say in your petition, instructed Colonel Knox to take action to introduce them. As the reforms are instituted by the order of the High Government the pursuance of them does not rest on the presence of this or that Resident or Political Agent. The reforms will be carried out according to the instructions of the Government whatever happens. I can however assure you that there is no question of transferring Major Daly who will stay in Bahrain as long as he wishes or as long as he keeps his health.

Be reassured then and do not be alarmed at the intrigues of mischief-makers which will have no effect on the pursuance of the policy of the High Government.

LIEUT.-COL.,

Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

LEADING PERSONALITIES IN SAUDI ARABIA

Mr. Pelham to Mr. Eden. (Received March 24)

(No. 44. Confidential)

Jedda,

Sir,

March 16, 1954.

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a revised report on leading personalities in Saudi Arabia for the years 1953-54.

I am sending copies of this despatch and enclosures to the Political Resident Bahrain, and to the Head of the British Middle East Office, Fayid.

I have, &c.

G. C. PELHAM.

Enclosure

Leading Personalities in Saudi Arabia

Notes on titles, &c.

1. Sherif.—Applied to persons in the direct male descent from Hassan, the son of the Caliph Ali.
2. Seyyid.—Applied to persons in the male descent from Hussein, the other son of Ali.
3. Amir.—A title of all princes of the blood.
4. Sheikh.—A title used, not only for tribal personages, but often for higher officials and townsmen of consequence.
5. Bey.—Still used by persons who would have been so called by right or courtesy in the Turkish system and who may dislike the association of "Sheikh" with age or desert life.
6. Hajji.—Convenient in a country where every Hejazi adult has made the pilgrimage, for certain persons not otherwise easy to give a title to.
7. Effendi.—Applied chiefly to minor officials.
8. Ibn or Bin.—Means "son of" or "descendant of." Sometimes replaced by the definite article "al" (or in its other forms, "as," "an," &c.).
9. Al.—Cannot, in the transliteration used here, be distinguished from the definite article: means "of the house of."
10. Abu.—Father.
11. Umm.—Mother.

The following index lists the name of every person who has more than an incidental mention in the report: each individual will be found under his *first* (i.e., personal) name. The index also includes the names of certain families.

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Royal Family: House of Saud

Traces its origin as the ruling dynasty to Mohammed ibn Saud (d. 1705), the founder of the Wahhabi Empire, based formerly on Dariya and now on Riyadh in the Central Nejd. On account of its long ancestry and prodigious procreation in recent generations, the family with its principal collateral branches now numbers several hundreds and is related in various degrees to a large proportion of the other personalities of the kingdom. The late King, Abdul Aziz bin Abdul Rahman al Feisal al Saud, the twelfth Wahhabi monarch and founder of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, fathered, according to Philby, forty-four sons (of whom thirty-five survive) and probably a comparable number of daughters his eldest surviving son, the present King, has twenty-two sons so far, some of whom already have issue. A genealogical table of the family is given in Philby's "Arabian Jubilee" which, together with Philby's "Arabia," are probably the best English authorities on the Saud family as a whole, although they cannot be regarded as completely accurate.

1. His Majesty King Saud bin Abdul Aziz.

King of the Saudi Arabian Kingdom, G.B.E. Born at Kuwait in 1902 on the eve of his father's (Ibn Saud's) dramatic capture of Riyadh. He was full brother to Turki, the eldest born son, who died in 1919 leaving one son, Feisal ibn Turki, who has never played any part in public affairs. Saud took part in the last campaigns against the Rashids. During the 1934 war with the Yemen he commanded the eastern wing of the Saudi forces which, as it turned out, saw no fighting. Apart from these he has no military exploits to his credit as had his father.

Designated heir to the throne and Crown Prince, May 11, 1933. Hardly left Nejd until 1935 when he visited several European capitals including London. Represented Saudi Arabia at the Silver Jubilee and the Coronation of His Majesty King George VI. In 1940 visited India. Attended the meeting of heads of Arab States in Egypt in May 1946 but as a figurehead only, King Farouk having been appointed as Ibn Saud's spokesman. In 1947 visited America as the guest of the United States Government and various American firms. Spent ten very cold days in London on his return journey. In 1947, 1950, 1952 and 1953 he led the pilgrimage in place of his father who remained in Riyadh or Taif for reasons of health. In May 1953, he represented Saudi Arabia at the Coronation of King Feisal II in Bagdad and then immediately visited King Hussein in Amman. A few weeks earlier he had visited Syria and Lebanon where his reception gratified him.

In October 1953 was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces without reference to the fact that in 1944 he had been appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Saudi Army. During Ibn Saud's last illness the Amir Saud ruled the country and on October 11, 1953, the actual position was recognised when he was appointed President of the newly-constituted Council of Ministers with over-riding

powers. He appointed the Amir Feisal (23) as his deputy. When Ibn Saud died suddenly at Taif on November 9, 1953, the Amir Saud who was in Jeddah flew immediately to Taif where he was received by the Amir Feisal who declared his allegiance to him. The new King with the assent of the royal family then appointed Feisal as his heir and Crown Prince. There were no disturbances at the time of the accession and everything was done to make the change as easy and natural as possible. The King declared to the many delegations which visited him that he would continue in his father's policy.

Though possessed of his father's imposing build it is generally agreed that Saud is but a shadow of his father in ability and personality. He certainly is not the man to conquer a vast kingdom but he may well prove able to hold it together and chart a general course for it. He is well-intentioned, works hard and is genuinely anxious for the title of reformer. But just as his natural vision is myopic in the extreme, so it may be that he does not clearly see and understand the forces of change by which he is surrounded. Within the concepts of paternalistic rule he is, for a Saudi, relatively liberal-minded. Though he maintains a strict profession of faith King Saud has promoted many modern materialistic changes. Nearly all of these are admirable in concept, but they frequently tend to neglect the realities of the situation.

King Saud has declared his intention of maintaining his father's policy of friendship with Britain, but it is unlikely that he will go out of his way to favour us. Among Western nations he certainly at present prefers the United States, and the Americans are making great efforts to foster this attitude. However, like the whole of Saudi Arabia the King is tending to conform more nearly to the Levantine pattern of other Arab States. He has many Syrian and Egyptian advisers and it will probably become increasingly difficult to persuade him to adopt any line in opposition to those countries.

The following (2-22 inclusive) is a list of the living sons of King Saud:—

Fahd, Musaid, Mohammed, Abdullah, Feisal, Khalid, Abdul Muhsin, Abdul Rahman, Mansur, Abdul Ilah, Saad, Badr, Bandar, Majid, Thamir, Sultan, Abdul Majid, Talal, Naif, Miqrin, Ahmed.

Of these, only Fahd, the eldest, deserves separate mention at this stage.

2. Fahd bin Saud

Born about 1925. Was taught by a Sudanese graduate of Gordon College and speaks fluent English. In 1943 he married a daughter of the Amir Feisal (23). He has not travelled extensively and has never held office or taken any part in public affairs but now that his father is King, it is likely that he will become more prominent and it is of course possible that he may himself eventually come to the throne. So far there has been no public discussion of this possibility. Fahd is well thought of and is believed to be of a retiring disposition.

Brothers: (All Amirs)

The following (23-56) are in order of age, the living sons of Ibn Saud, brothers or half-brothers of the present King:—

Feisal (1904), Mohammed (1910), Khalid (1912), Nasir (1920), Saad (1920-21), Fahd (1921), Abdullah (1922-23), Bandar (1923-24), Musaid (1923-24), Sultan (1924), Abdul Muhsin (1925), Mishaal (1926-27), Abdur Rahman (?), Mitaabs (1928), Talal (1931), Mishari (1932), Badr (1933), Naif (1933), Nawwaf (1934), Turki (1934), Fawwaz (1934), Abdul Ilah (1935), Salman (1936), Ahmed (Majid) (1937), Thamir (1937), Ahmed (1940), Mamduh (1940), Abdul Salam

(?1941), Hidhlul (1941), Mashuri (1942), Abdul Majid (1940), Sattam (1943), Miqrin (1943), Hamud (1947), of whom the following are worthy of special note:

23. Feisal ibn Abdul Aziz

Born 1904 of a lady of the family of Abdul Wahhab. Educated partly by Sheikh Hafiz Wahba (126). In 1920 he led the successful military expedition to the Asir and in 1934 he commanded the western wing of the Saudi Army which had such striking success in occupying the coast of the Yemen. First visited Europe in 1919. Since then he has paid many visits to Britain both as a private visitor and in an official capacity, the latter occasions being in 1919, 1926, 1936 when he received the G.B.E., 1939 when he represented Saudi Arabia at the London discussions on Palestine, 1943, after which he visited the North African battlefields, 1946 when he again represented Saudi Arabia at the London conference on Palestine and in 1948 and 1951 on both of which occasions he had discussions in the Foreign Office. He has also paid several visits to England for medical reasons and was notable for the sharp contrast between his dignified appearance at the Dorchester Hotel and the dissipated house parties in the country. He first went to the United States in 1943 and has since paid several visits. He headed the Saudi delegation to the San Francisco conference in 1943 and the Preparatory Commission of the First General Assembly of the United Nations. He has attended several further meetings of the General Assembly, about which he has become increasingly bitter as a result of its attitude towards Palestine. He also visited the U.S.S.R., Turkey and the Levant States. In 1946 at the invitation of King Abdullah he visited Transjordan but no politics were discussed.

Appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs in about 1930 and since then has impressed a succession of foreign diplomats by his suavity, intelligence and lack of application to business. In fairness it must be said that the latter characteristics may be due to severe gastric ulcers and other ailments. There is no doubt, however, that he holds fairly strong views on foreign policy. He is a notable advocate for Arab unity but has never specified what this would mean in practice. Amongst the royal family he has always been the most bitter opponent of Israel and this has caused him to become disgusted with the attitude of the western nations. He has always shown himself at least outwardly friendly to Britain but has probably been infected by the nationalistic strain which has always prevailed in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and would no doubt be glad to see our influence banished from the Arabian peninsula. Personally he has always been on good terms with British officials and though he rarely chooses to he can speak English fairly well. A great deal of the business of his Ministry is carried out by Sheikh Yusuf Yassin (182) but it is probable that if Feisal expresses a strong opinion he has the last word. Sheikh Yusuf is notably silent in his presence, but this is probably a silence of respect rather than of disagreement. There is no reason to suppose that there is any divergence in policy, either between Feisal and Sheikh Yusuf or between Feisal and King Saud.

In about 1930 he was appointed Viceroy of the Hejaz and permanent President of the Council of Ministers for the Hejaz. As a result he has resided a good deal in Jeddah and Mecca where he has become popular and has often been spoken of as a bulwark against Nejdian penetration. There were some who hoped that he, rather than Saud, would succeed Ibn Saud. However, there has never been any open sign of disagreement between the two brothers and it is unlikely that Feisal has ever seriously wished to undertake a struggle to become King. He certainly came to an understanding with his brother long

before the death of Ibn Saud. This was symbolised when Saud was appointed President of the newly-constituted Council of Ministers on October 11, 1953, and immediately appointed Feisal as the Deputy President. When Ibn Saud died in his arms on November 9, 1953, Feisal immediately went forth to greet Saud as King, who thereupon declared that Feisal was his heir and Crown Prince. Since then the two brothers have almost ostentatiously displayed their regard for each other.

Feisal's eldest son, Abdullah Feisal (62) is probably the most competent of the younger generation of princes.

24. Mohammed Ibn Abdul Aziz

Born 1910 of Jauhara bint Musaid, a former favourite wife of King Ibn Saud, and a sister of Abdul Aziz bin Musaid bin Jiluwi (78).

Mohammed headed the Saudi forces which entered Medina in 1925 and has since enjoyed the title of Amir of Medina. He has never, however, been concerned with the administration of the city, nor held any other official post except acting Viceroy of the Hejaz during the Amir Feisal's absence in Europe in 1932, on which occasion he exceeded himself and was replaced by his brother Khalid (25).

He is generally regarded as the dark horse of the Saud family, but said to be popular with the tribes and to possess the fire and appearance of his father as a young man. Bears an unsavoury reputation abroad for wild orgies, notably in Kuwait in 1932 (with the Amir Feisal), in India in 1943 (with the late Amir Mansour and Abdullah Suleiman (81)), and in Paris and Cairo in 1950. Visited the United Kingdom with the then Amir Saud in 1937 and 1938: accompanied his father to Egypt for the meeting with President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill in February 1945, and the Saudi delegation to the San Francisco Conference in 1945. Appeared with the then Amir Saud at several interviews between His Majesty's Minister and the late King at Riyadh in March 1942, but has since then rarely been seen in public. Has as a result become something of a mystery figure. There is a story that the late King once announced that he respected his first three living sons: Saud because he was his heir; Feisal because he was intelligent and Mohammed because he feared him. Popular belief also has it that Mohammed refused to accept the designation of the Amir Saud as heir to the throne in 1933, but in this he is confused with the late King's brother Mohammed.

25. Khalid ibn Abdul Aziz

Born 1912; full brother and constant companion to (24). Accompanied the Amir Feisal (23) to the United Kingdom in 1939, and to the United Kingdom and the United States in 1943, but has never held any official post except acting Viceroy of the Hejaz for a short time in 1932 (see 24).

26. Nasir ibn Abdul Aziz

Born 1920. Governor of Riyadh, 1945-47 until dismissed by his father after the death during a carousal in Nasir's palace of Abdullah al Mitaib who was one of the vassal Rashidis princes, a former Amir of Haila, and to whose daughter Nasir was married. It is popularly believed that Nasir was only saved from execution by the intervention of the Ulema, and that this whole episode was one of the reasons for the subsequent liquor ban. Nasir reappeared, however, at Ibn Saud's reception for His Royal Highness the Duke of Edinburgh in January 1950, but has not since been reappointed to any official post.

28. Fahd bin Abdul Aziz

Appointed Minister of Education in December 1953. A likeable person: is learning English.

32. Sultan ibn Abdul Aziz

Born 1924, the second of the many sons of Hassa bint Ahmed al Sidayri, the other living sons being Fahd (28), Abdur Rahman, Naif, Turki, Salman, and Ahmed. Sultan succeeded Nasir (26) as Amir of Riyadh in 1947, and was appointed Minister of Agriculture in December 1953. A pleasant, good-looking young man, but rather bumptious: is learning English, but speaks little as yet. His full brother Naif (40), born 1933 was appointed Deputy Governor of Riyadh in March 1952, and succeeded him as Governor in December of that year.

34. Mishaal ibn Abdul Aziz

Born 1926 or 1927, the second of four sons of Shahida umm Mansour (d. 1938), who was the former Caucasian concubine, and subsequently the favourite wife of the late King. Mishaal succeeded his elder brother Mansour as Minister of Defence in 1951 shortly after the latter's death in Paris of a diseased kidney. Persuaded King Ibn Saud to change the title to Minister of Defence and Aviation in April 1952 in recognition of his responsibility for Civil Aviation and in anticipation of the creation of a Saudi Arabian Air Force with American assistance under the 1951 Dhahran Air Base Agreement, and also to thwart those who had been working for a separation of defence and aviation, amongst them the Amir Talal (37). Mishaal is an unpredictable young man, handsome and quite intelligent, but childishly impatient, and he has shown during his short tenure of office a complete lack of political responsibility and diplomatic courtesy. His conduct towards the British Military Mission in 1951, once he had effectively secured their dismissal against the hope of more generous and manageable American services, and his behaviour and attitude towards the British airline companies operating pilgrim flights during the 1951 and 1952 pilgrimage seasons have not endeared him to Her Majesty's Government. Likewise his personal conduct during his visit in 1951 to the United States at the invitation of the United States Government, when he openly displayed much more interest in the lower strata of American feminine society than in his officially conducted tour, did not leave a pleasant impression. Visited Damascus in July 1952 and claimed to have been much impressed by the parade of arms put on for him by the Syrian Government, and the attention paid to him by Colonel Shishakli in the interests of securing Ibn Saud's support of the new Syrian régime.

36. Mitaab

Mishaal's younger full brother, was appointed Deputy Minister of Defence in January 1952 and appears to have taken over a fair amount of the more routine business, which he conducts with rather more sense of responsibility than his brother.

37. Talal ibn Abdul Aziz

Born 1931 of the former concubine Munaiyir, who became the late King's favourite and first-ranking wife (generally known as umm Talal). Towards the end of his father's life Talal was perhaps the favourite son. Appointed Comptroller of the Royal Household in 1950, but relinquished this post early in 1951. In 1953 was appointed Minister of Communications but by the end of the year the Ministry had not been established as a going concern. His attempt to control the civil airlines brought friction with Mishaal (34). A plump, animated, intelligent and friendly man, who has learnt to speak passable English and is fairly receptive to western ideas—but more so to its gadgets, and of late to the charms of Parisian nightlife. Showed considerable promise in earlier years of being a potential Minister with, unlike most of his brothers, an interest in work and the assumption of

responsibility. Has, however, tended recently to fall for the flattery and wiles of hangers-on and, when able to get away from court duties in Riyadh, spends much of his time in extravagant living in Cairo and Paris, where he is said to have celebrated his engagement to a lady of Saudi extraction in the summer of 1951 with a wild party lasting several days.

38. Mishari ibn Abdul Aziz

Born 1932, the son of a black slave or concubine. Imprisoned in Riyadh for the infamous murder of the British Vice-Consul in Jeddah, November 1951.

41. Nawwaf ibn Abdul Aziz

Born 1934, full brother to (37), and also favoured by Ibn Saud. Appointed, early in 1951 Comptroller of the Royal Household in succession to his brother, and also Commander of the Royal Guard (which apparently gives him a rank equivalent to that of the Minister of Defence). Visited the United States in 1947, and Lebanon and Syria in December 1952 where he was much feted and given decorations probably not so much for his own sake as to encourage Saudi loans. In January 1953 he went to Egypt where he made a prolonged visit so much did he enjoy the attention paid to him.

A tall, slim and handsome young man, seemingly intelligent and friendly but rather shy. Has learnt some English, with very good diction, and has now become an enthusiastic tennis "rabbit."

57-61. Uncles, All Amirs

Of Ibn Saud's ten brothers, only five are still living:—

57. Saud

The sixth eldest, born about 1890. Has three sons. Takes no part in public affairs.

58. Abdullah ibn Abdur Rahman

Born 1900. Took an active part in the military operations (including the capture and destruction of the notorious Ikhwan centre of Ghatghat), which led to the crushing of the Duwish rebellion in 1929-30. For many years was prominent in the counsels of King Ibn Saud: and, since about 1939, has been one of the official advisers of the King, whom he accompanied to Egypt in 1945 for the meeting with President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill. Has often attended meetings between Her Majesty's Representatives and the King in Riyadh.

A friendly and intelligent little man, who has recently acquired an interest in trading on his own account and has a modern palace being built for him in Riyadh by a British firm. Is otherwise remarkable in such profligate society for his thriftiness, and for the care he bestows upon his property, notably the Rolls Royce car presented to the King by Mr. Churchill after the 1945 meeting and passed on to the Amir Abdullah. He is the only member of the royal family to take a serious interest in agriculture and probably has the best and most modern farms in Arabia, in the smallest detail of which he is interested.

He has eleven sons and ten daughters, according to his friend Philby.

59. Ahmed

Born about 1920. Two sons.

60. Musaid

Born about 1922. Said by Philby to be an enlightened farmer. Two sons.

61. Saad

The youngest of the brothers. Neither he nor the two previous ones have played any part in public affairs.

The other five, now dead, were:—

Feisal and Fahd, neither of whom played any part in public affairs nor left any sons: Mohammed, the fourth son of Abdur Rahman, who questioned the designation of the Amir Saud as heir to the throne in 1933; he died in 1943 leaving four sons: Saad, killed in battle in 1916, leaving three sons: and finally Abdul Muhsin who died in childhood.

Nephews, All Amirs

The only nephew of King Saud who has so far achieved a position of note, and is, at the same time, the outstanding member of the younger generation of the Saud family, is:

62. Abdullah al Feisal ibn Saud

Born 1921, eldest son of the Amir Feisal (23) by a lady of the Sidayri family. Became prominent in the Hejaz in 1950 as acting Viceroy in the absence of his father in Cairo and as a popular patron of sports and other liberal pursuits. Appointed Minister of the Interior (for the Hejaz) and Health in summer 1951, the post of Minister of Interior having been revived and that of the Minister of Health created for him.

A handsome and intelligent young man who has achieved popularity and prominence, especially in the Hejaz, through the exercise of a quiet charm and dignity, inherited from his father, and a genuine interest and sympathy in his work. He still lacks experience and authority and remains very much under the influence of his father, but he has a quick brain and is discriminatingly receptive of advice and knowledge. He is refreshingly free and accessible in his dealings with foreigners. He has learnt English "on two occasions and forgotten it" according to his own account, and invariably speaks Arabic with more than a trace of his father's clear and cultivated diction. Like his father he suffers from intestinal troubles but as with most of the younger princes he is no teetotaler. He is rare in having only one official wife. He has five sons.

Visited the United Kingdom for a week, at the invitation of Her Majesty's Government, in July 1952, before going on to the United States at the invitation of the United States Government. During his visit to the United Kingdom he behaved in a restrained and dignified manner remarkable for a Saudi prince abroad and created a very favourable impression.

Araif Branch. Also Amirs

Several of the King's many cousins are mentioned elsewhere, but general mention may be made here of the Araif as being members of a senior branch of the family by virtue of descent from Saud ibn Feisal, an elder brother of the King's grandfather and the eleventh monarch of Nejd (1869 to his death in 1875). Their generic name of Araif, usually applied to raided camels subsequently "recognised" and recovered by their owners, was given by Ibn Saud to three members of the family who left the Rashidis in Hail to join the victorious Ibn Saud during the course of battle in 1904. They subsequently attempted, in 1910, to assert their claim to the throne, as the senior branch of the Asud family, in association with the rebellious Hazzani chiefs and the Ajman tribe. When the rebellion was stamped out several of the family fled to the Hejaz to become fugitives at the court of King Hussein. Not, however, the chief rebel, Saud al Arafah (63).

63. Saud al Arafah

(Otherwise Ibn Abdul Aziz ibn Saud ibn Feisal.) Had previously exercised his prescriptive right by custom of the Nejd to marry Ibn Saud's elder sister, Nura. Concerned in the rebellion (see above) but received a free pardon. He remained loyal to

Ibn Saud in Riyadh, playing a certain role in the court where he took precedence after King Ibn Saud over all other members of the royal house.

64-77. Sidayri Family.

(Family tree on page 22.)

Important as being a large family of "King's men," closely related to the house of Saud and acting as Counts of the Marches from the Yemen with few exceptions up to the Iraqi border, where they meet the bin Jiluwis (78-80). They are the one large group of Provincial Governors appointed neither on a tribal nor a feudal basis. According to Philby some twenty-one of the sons and grandsons of the King have Sidayri blood in their veins through their mothers, as also has the King himself (his mother having been a Sidayri) and numerous royal princesses, nephews and nieces. The family traces its origin to a section of the Dawasir tribe, the Baddarin or Ahl Badr, so called after its eponymous ancestor Badr, the first to settle in Wadi Dawasir, which drains the mountains of the Asir south-eastwards to Rub al Khali. The family later spread to the Wasim and the Sudair, from whence is derived the present family name and in which, at Ghat, the family home has been since about A.D. 1560. Most of the present senior members of the family derive from Ahmed ibn Mohammed as Sidayri (1869-70-1935-36) whose life, like those of several of his ancestors, was spent in the service of the al Saud; a second cousin of the present King he was also the father and uncle respectively of two of the King's wives who have been with him for the best part of thirty years.

The following members of the family are worthy of particular notice: (64-70 inclusive are brothers).

64. Turki bin Ahmed as Sidayri

Born 1901. The present head of the family. Has for many years been Amir of Jauf. A pleasant, intelligent man, well-spoken of by British visitors to his rather inaccessible seat. Short and thick-set, fond of his comforts and not a strict Wahabi. His precedence at court is high. He has six living sons, of whom the eldest, Fahd—a cripple—acts as his deputy in his rare absence from the Asir.

65. Abdul Aziz bin Ahmed as Sidayri

Born 1907. Has held various provincial Governorships but for several years has been Governor of Qariyat al Mabk in Wadi Sirham area near the Jordan frontier. Small of stature and meek and mild in manner he nevertheless exercises effective authority in an appointment of importance involving the avoidance of border incidents with the Jordanians and frequent contacts with the Jordanian authorities. Said to be progressive with especial interest in agriculture and education. Has three sons.

66. Khalid bin Ahmed as Sidayri

Born 1914. Has held various provincial Governorships, including Jizan. Since 1943 has been Governor of the Northern territories, with his headquarters at Tebuk (on the old Medina railway). Wields decisive, popular and effective authority in the Northern Hejaz. Reported to be a pleasant and sociable man with a recently adopted Western table. Has eight sons.

67. Mohammed bin Ahmed as Sidayri

Formerly Amir of Sakaka, near the Iraqi border, and, from 1943 to 1950, Amir of Jizan on the Yemen coastal border, where he was apparently much in favour with the Imam of the Yemen. Appointed in 1950 to a new post "Protector of the Trans-Arabian Pipeline (Tapline)" in which post he has been assiduously cultivated by the Americans of the Aramco and Tapline Company. Spoken of quite

highly, as an administrator, by senior members of the Aramco, after he had taken part in the 1951 negotiations between the Saudi Arabian Government and the Tapline Company and had, during this period, dealt effectively with the first major case of Iraqi tribal raiding in many years. He is popular with the bedouin, enjoys their kind of life and is effective in dealing with them. He has recently spent much time in building a modern town at Badanah where he lives. The result is said to be relatively impressive. Has three sons.

68. Abdur Rahman bin Ahmed as Sidayri

Present Governor of Jauf Sakaka. Has three sons.

69. Masaad bin Ahmed as Sidayri

Replaced (67) as Amir of Sakaka in 1943, and as Amir of Jizan and the Tihamah in 1950. Progressive and pleasant and hard-working, he has big ideas for the future of the small port of Jizan and its environs and has already done much to foster agricultural development, public health and public works there. Has two sons.

70. Suleiman bin Ahmed as Sidayri

Amir of Lith, a small port to the south of Jedda. Said to be energetic and well-intentioned.

Others of the family worth mentioning are:—

71. Ahmed bin Turki as Sidayri

Born about 1900. Amir of Qunfidah until finally removed to court at Riyadh in 1951. Reputed for his meanness, dishonesty and unpopularity. Not from the top drawer of the Sidayri family and generally treated accordingly by the blue-bloods of the family.

72. Abdullah bin Saad as Sidayri

Born 1902. Second cousin to (64-70) Amir of Tebuk 1931-36. Deputy Governor of Medina since 1936 while the Amir Mohammed al Saud and, in his absence, his brother, the Amir Khalid, nominally holds the post.

73. Fahd bin Saad as Sidayri

Brother to (72). At present Amir of Wadi Dawasir, the original homeland of the family.

74. Ahmed bin Abdul Muhsin bin Saad as Sidayri

Nephew to (71) and (72). Born about 1920. At present Amir of al Ula (on the old Medina railway). Smallish, round-faced man with a diseased right eye. Not pleasant socially nor popular in his Amirate.

75. Nasir bin Abdullah bin Nasir as Sidayri

At present Governor of the small port and environs of al Wejha on the northern Hejaz coast.

76. Abdur Rahman bin Ahmed as Sidayri

Born about 1910. Formerly Amir of Dhofar. Appointed Governor of Jedda, April 1945. A handsome but cruel-looking man with little interest in his work. Relies heavily on his assistant, Ali Taha (111). Fond of motoring and hunting.

77. Saud bin Abdur Rahman as Sidayri

Born about 1924. Amir of Mahd Dhahab, the district in the interior of the Hejaz in which the Saudi Arabian Mining Syndicate operate. A weak young man, a constant thorn in the side of the Mining Syndicate. Tends to behave in an arbitrary and unfair manner.

78-80. Jiluwi Family.

(Family tree on page 23.)

Like the Sidayris (64-77), a family of "King's men," related to the House of Saud and performing the same functions as the Sidayri family but in the

north-east and Persian Gulf areas, and on a more feudal basis.

Abdulla bin Jiluwi bin Saud (d. 1935), father of the present Amir of al Hasa a distant cousin of the King, was a formidable right-hand man of King Ibn Saud in most of the latter's earlier battles, including the capture of Riyadh (1902). He was appointed the first Amir of the Qassim (1908) and later of al Hasa after its capture from the Turks (1903). In this latter post he "acquired an almost legendary reputation for stern justice, as also for his expert knowledge of horses, camels and women" (Philby: Arabian Jubilee).

The following living members of the family are worthy of particular notice:—

78. Abdul Aziz bin Musaid bin Jiluwi al Saud

Born about 1892. Has been Amir of Hail since 1925 or earlier. According to Philby, is one of the three remaining members of the force which captured Riyadh in 1902, though he was "then in his early teens." A distant relative of the King by descent but also related through his sister Jauhara, a former favourite wife of the late King (married about 1908, died 1919) and mother of the Amirs Mohammed and Khalid (24 and 25).

One of the King's right-hand men in suppressing the Ikhwan rebellion 1929. Dis-avowed by the King, temporarily, in 1930 for conducting a punitive expedition into Trans-Jordan. Was for a short while in supreme command of the Saudi forces in the Asir in 1932 at the time of the troubles with the Yemeni and Asir rebels. Appointed Inspector of the Saudi-Iraq frontier area in 1936, in addition to being Amir of the Hail Province (which includes the former territories of the Rashidis and the Jebel Shammar). Said in 1939 to have aroused a suspicion, at Riyadh, of having designs on the throne.

Still well-preserved, of medium height, good figure, sensitive mouth and large hawk-like nose, a full black beard and refined features. Possesses an easy assured manner and is both courteous and pleasant to foreigners. Now spends most of his time in the desert, hunting. Is a very strict Wahhabi, feared but respected by the Bedouin. He and his cousin, the Amir of al Hasa, were the only Amirs who carried powers of life and death without prior reference to the late King. His only living son, Abdullah has been Amir of the relatively fertile Qassim province of Nejd since 1947.

79. Saud bin Abdullah bin Jiluwi

Born about 1900. Cousin to (78) and one of the most powerful men in the Kingdom. The second son of Abdullah bin Jiluwi, whom he succeeded to the Amirate of al Hasa in 1935 (his elder brother Fahd having been killed in action in the Feisal al Duwish revolt of 1929).

Visited India and Pakistan for medical reasons in the spring of 1948. Entertained King Abdullah of Transjordan at Dhahran in June 1948.

Like his father, he has built-up a formidable reputation for stern, crude justice. A strange soft-voiced ruthless despot, who in 1953 moved his headquarters from Hofuf to Dammam. In appearance somewhat like Ibn Saud but is troubled by a spinal injury received when hunting in 1953. Was in Europe for treatment at the time of the general strike at Dhahran and of Ibn Saud's death. Held in fear by the Bedouin and by his Court staff, and greatly respected by the Aramco, whose day-to-day operations and the behaviour of whose employees are under his surveillance.

His former suspicious attitude towards foreigners, especially noticed by Sir A. Ryan in December 1935 and also by Mr. Trott in 1950, was however much less noticeable when Mr. Pelham and Sir R.

Makins were entertained by him at Dammam in early 1952: his application to the duty of host in his province led, in fact, to Sir R. Makins having to stay at his guest house rather than the Aramco's. This change (and his recent adoption of Western table customs) is attributed largely to the influence of two senior Aramco officials who have spent much time with him.

80. Abdul Muhsin bin Abdullah bin Jiluwi

Younger brother of (79). For several years was Amir of Dammam (which includes the main Aramco centre at Dhahran) until his brother transferred his headquarters there, which brought about the removal of Abdul Muhsin to Hofuf. A sadistic, sluggish and pock-marked young man, deriving his authority from his brother and capable of administering even cruder justice. Used to entertain frequently the many important Saudi and foreign visitors to the Dhahran area, but clearly drew no pleasure from this duty.

81-84. Suleiman Family.

81. Abdullah ibn Suleiman al Hamdan

Minister of Finance. Born about 1887, of plebeian Aneyza origin. Started life in a small way with the Qusaibis, originally it is said as a coffee boy. Spent ten years as a clerk in their Bombay office. Returned to Nejd about 1919. Said to have gone bankrupt as a broker. Recommended by the Qusaibis to be a clerk in the King's Diwan. Rose to be head of the Diwan. Became Director-General of Finance and had acquired complete control of all financial matters by September 1928, when it was remarked that he travelled in greater state than the King himself between Mecca and Jedda. Promoted to the post of Minister of Finance for the Hejaz and Nejd and its dependencies in 1932 and given the title of Wazir, hitherto enjoyed only by the Amir Feisal. In spite of several assaults on his position notably in 1931 he succeeded in retaining the confidence and trust of King Ibn Saud during his lifetime becoming in effect Comptroller of the Privy Purse, Grand Master of Ordnance, Quartermaster-General on occasion, general manager of the King's establishment of slaves, and pilgrimage-organiser. Appointed Minister of Economy also in mid-1953. In spite of his many shortcomings he has been a completely loyal servant of the King's and most of the successful economic developments which have taken place in Saudi Arabia owe something to his efforts and initiation; notably the early negotiations with the Arabian American Oil Company and the development of the al Kharj agricultural scheme. Visited India during the war, accompanied King Ibn Saud to Egypt in February 1945 for the meetings with President Roosevelt and Sir Winston Churchill and in 1946 visited the United States to negotiate an Export-Import Bank loan for rehabilitation purposes.

Travelled on the continent in the summer of 1953 and appears to have been much impressed by what he saw in Germany, and probably now sees the Germans as a useful counter-weight to the Americans in Saudi Arabia. Since the war, the Minister, though he has failed completely to readjust the functionings of his clumsy and inefficient administration to meet the realities of the vast influx of oil wealth, national revenue \$7 million 1938, at least \$200 million 1953, and has time and again suffered from bad advice and venal advisers, has nevertheless succeeded in retaining his position to a large extent (besides increasing his vast personal fortune) and has been very quick to grasp financial changes and take advantage of them. King Saud's accession though not expected to increase his power (the new King is no friend of his) has nevertheless not much reduced it and it is possible to foresee that he may last for several more years yet as Minister, or at least long

enough to be able to see his young son Abdul Aziz (82) accepted as his successor. It seems to be realised that no one else has Sheikh Abdullah's stature or with his elephantine memory a title of his experience and knowledge. A master of procrastination, continually under pressure for more money from the royal family, he manages somehow to fend off princelings and creditors alike, departing suddenly to fish or to go on tour when claims become too pressing. Emphatically a "character," a chronic addiction to the bottle (unaffected by the complete prohibition which has existed in Saudi Arabia since 1952) and a multitude of prejudices make him a difficult man to deal with. At times completely dilatory and apparently senile he can still show, when he chooses, great energy, a lively sense of humour and an excellent power of repartee.

82. Abdul Aziz as Suleiman al Hamdan

Born about 1931; son of Abdullah Suleiman al Hamdan (81). Trained for two years at the Chase National Bank in New York and has visited England. In December 1952 appointed Assistant Deputy Minister of Finance in charge of Mines and Companies (involving responsibility for handling Aramco's affairs) and acted for the Minister himself on occasions in 1953 during the latter's absence. A likeable co-operative and quite able young man who does his best to please often against impossible odds. Apparently honest in intention but recently reported to have started taking large commissions. Lately married a Lebanese girl. Speaks tolerable English. Obviously intended by his father to take over the Ministry of Finance eventually when he has acquired the necessary experience.

83. Hamid as Suleiman

Brother to Abdullah Suleiman, the Minister of Finance (81). He is himself Deputy Minister of Finance and a Minister of State. For the past few years he has taken little part in business and is now generally reckoned to have retired. Though like his brother in many ways, he is a less able man and has not always been able to satisfy the King, who once had him dumped unceremoniously in the desert near Jeddah for his failure to produce money on demand. For further details see Saudi Arabian Personalities Report, 1950.

His son, Suleiman al Hamid (84) is an Assistant Deputy Minister of Finance.

84. Suleiman al Hamid

Son of Hamid as Suleiman (83) and Deputy Minister of Finance. He is well-intentioned but not well-informed, and consequently sometimes makes grotesque blunders. When his uncle, the Minister of Finance, is around, Suleiman al Hamid is almost totally neglected and thus loses touch with current problems. As a result of the long absence of Najib Salha (161) Suleiman al Hamid, who remained in Jeddah, achieved some real power, and in October 1952 acquired the authority to make payments on behalf of the Saudi Arabian Government. This position he lost in the spring of 1953 when the Government's financial position became serious and when, by the appointment of Abdul Aziz al Suleiman (82) to be Assistant Deputy Minister of Finance, the ground was cut from under his feet. His principal function is to supervise the administration of the customs. Not popular with his subordinates.

85. Abdul Aziz ibn Muammar

Born about 1904. Comes of a former ruling family of Nejd, apparently the same Beni Muammar of Ayaina, who were prominent in the early days of the Wahhabi movement and are mentioned several times in Philby's Arabia. Brought up principally at

Riyadh. Was Governor of Yanbo for some time and earned a good reputation there. Was appointed Governor of Jeddah in August 1932 with the title of Amir on the death of Hajji Abdullah Ali Reza, who had been governor with the old title of Qaimmaqam since King Hussein's time. Appointed Governor of Taif in June 1935.

He is pleasant but pretentious, probably on the score of his blue blood. Is no relation to (86) and (136). He was a keen sportsman until affected by paralysis in 1939. Was treated in India in 1941 but is incurable and unable to walk. He is also deaf and has a speech affliction. Nevertheless he is apparently a competent administrator and is popular. The British Military Mission in Taif found him most helpful.

86. Abdul Aziz ibn Ibrahim al Muammar

Born about 1923. Son of Ibrahim al Muammar (136). Given a scientific education at the American University of Beirut where his student activities appear later to have given rise to suspicion of Communist sympathy. Speaks English perfectly and often acted as Ibn Saud's interpreter. Appointed Government Liaison Officer with the American Construction Company in Riyadh. In 1953 appointed Chef de Cabinet to the newly-created Minister of Communications, the Amir Talal (37) and became Assistant Deputy Minister in January 1954.

One of the most outstanding Saudis of the younger generation and was well regarded by Ibn Saud. He is intelligent, westernised, and well aware of the real conditions in Saudi Arabia. Inclined to serious conversation and to be friendly with English-speaking foreigners. With royal favour, his father's influence and his own talents he might—to the advantage of the country—become a leading administrator. There are indications, however, that he is becoming tainted with the vices common to Saudi officials.

87. Abdul Aziz ibn Zeyd

Born about 1897 of a Hail family, and was educated in Constantinople. Sent to Amman in summer of 1926 to discuss claims in respect of raids, and attended with two other Saudi delegates an abortive conference at Maan in September. Was one of the two Saudi delegates on the tribunal which sat at Jericho from February to May 1927 in accordance with the Hadda agreement. Was later an Assistant Governor of Jeddah. Sent to Amman in August 1930 as Saudi agent at the MacDonnell investigation regarding raids. Appointed Inspector of Bedouin in the frontier region in January 1931, and held meetings at long intervals with Captain Glubb, his opposite number in Transjordan. Personally amiable, but would take no responsibility without reference to the King. From 1936 to 1938 was Inspector of the whole Transjordan-Saudi frontier, under a scheme for dividing the northern frontier area into three sectors under Inspectors with wide powers. In May 1943 was appointed Saudi Consul at Damascus. Promoted to Minister at Damascus in 1944 and to Ambassador in 1953. He is also Minister at Beirut but resides permanently in Damascus.

88. Abdul Hamid al Khatib

Born about 1905. The family is of Malayan origin and settled in Mecca about the beginning of the nineteenth century. He has a reputation as an Alim and has written several theological works in Arabic. His elder brother, Abdul Malik Khatib Pasha, was Hashemite Agent in Cairo until 1925. He himself was mixed up in Hashemite intrigues, and in particular in the preparation of Ibn Rifada's raid in 1932. He returned to the Hejaz in 1936 under the amnesty of the previous year. Was made a member of the Mecca Majlis ash Shura until his appointment as Saudi Chargé d'Affaires in Pakistan in May 1948.

He knows no English, and according to some reports may still be in touch with the pro-Hashemite "Hejaz Constitutional Party" in Cairo. He is no relation to Fuad al Khatib (125).

89. Abdullah bin Adwan

A Nejd approaching fifty. He has had a good legal education and is extremely well-versed in the Sharia Law. He speaks no English but is intelligent and well aware of the realities of a situation. He is very ambitious and is a friend of Turki bin Ataishan (181) but, like him, is not likely to rise much above his present position which is, however, one of importance.

Together with Abdul Aziz Suleiman (82) and Suleiman al Hamid (84) he is an Assistant Deputy Minister of Finance. His province covers the whole eastern area and he deals with such things as the Aramco royalties, customs, work in connexion with the Aramco reservations, local contractors, and railways. He is competent, but though he is allowed to deal with routine matters on his own anything of importance must be referred to the Minister of Finance with whom he has only a moderate amount of influence. In practice he is also inferior to Abdul Aziz Suleiman (82).

90. Abdullah Kazim

A Hejazi said to be of Cossack origin. Born about 1887. Was employed in the Mecca Post Office in King Hussein's time. Appointed Saudi Director-General of Posts in 1926 and still holds the post. Went to Port Sudan in March 1926 as one of Ibn Saud's delegates to negotiate about the E.T.C. cable and showed himself an obstructive negotiator. Was again pretty sticky in taking delivery of Marconi wireless in 1931-33 but created a good impression at the time of the cable and wireless negotiations in the spring of 1935.

91. Abdullah bal Khair

Born about 1915. Spent seven years at the American University of Beirut and speaks English easily. Accompanied Ibn Saud to Egypt on the occasion of his meeting with Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill and did some of the translations. Appointed Assistant Secretary to King Saud when he was Crown Prince and is now Principal Secretary to the King.

In the new reign he is likely to hold a position of importance close to the King though he might not have a very large voice in the formation of policy. He is fond of the western style of life he knew at Beirut and is capable of making critical remarks about the condition of Saudi Arabia.

92. Abdullah an Nafisi

Has for long been Ibn Saud's agent at Kuwait mainly for trade purposes but is not empowered to issue entry permits to Saudi Arabia. He has a large business as a merchant in rice &c. Is a helpful friendly man but is getting old and with the expansion of Kuwait his position has declined. His son, Ahmed seems to be taking his place.

93. Abdur Rahman Tarbishi

A Nejd who was for long close to the late King. He is still Comptroller of the Royal Household and manages the King's personal affairs. A Minister of State. His sons have gone into business and recently acquired the Fiat agency.

94-95. Abdul Wahhab Family

The following seem to be the most notable of the descendants of the founder of Wahhabism, or the Unitarian Movement:—

94. Abdullah ibn Hassan

Is one of the leading Wahhabi Ulema in Mecca. Played a role in 1926, with Abdullah ibn Blayhid, in the Wahhabi purging of the Holy Cities, and was in 1929 thought, like him, to favour the Ikhwan extremists. Signed the pronouncement of the Ulema in favour of Jihad at the time of the Ibn Rifada rebellion in 1932. Now Grand Qadhi. Proud and fanatical. Known as "Sheikh al Islam," he exercised considerable influence over Ibn Saud in religious and secular matters.

95. Mohammed ibn Abdul Aziz ibn Sheikh

Nicknamed as Sahabi, formerly Governor of Taif, transferred to Riyadh in 1932 as Assistant to the then Amir Saud.

96. Ahmed Ashmawi

Born in Suakin, a cousin of Ibrahim Zahran (139). Went to school in Jeddah and then entered Gellatly Hankey & Co., Ltd., where he quarrelled with Najib Salha (161) when both were junior clerks. Though he became chief Arab clerk in the firm he found many other sources of profit, notably the Middle East Supply Centre during the war. A month after becoming a director of Gellatly Hankey & Co., he left the firm and in conjunction with Ibrahim Zahran he established a new business, Saudi Arabian Markets Co. Najib Salha, with whom he was now friendly, was able to put much government business in the way of the new firm. In 1950 he went to Cairo where he was so entranced by the bright lights that he has not yet returned to Saudi Arabia.

Ashmawi speaks English well. It is always possible than an official reshuffle might give him a lucrative government post.

97. Ahmed Baeshen

Born in Jeddah. Owns and runs under the name of his father, Mohammed Saleh Baeshen, a large commercial firm which specialises in the import of Indian produce. Devotes a good deal of time to his unpaid functions as President of the Jeddah Commercial Court. He is conscientious and fair-minded even to the extent of judgment in favour of a Christian firm.

98. Ahmed Jaffali

Born about 1918. Partner in a well-known firm of wealthy Mecca merchants, Messrs. E. and A. Jaffali with a large office in Jeddah. Since 1947 has made a speciality of promoting urban electrical schemes and with powerful official support and good agencies (principally of British firms) has been largely responsible for the electrification of Taif, Al Khobar, Mecca and the projected electrification of Hofuf; also for telephone schemes in Riyadh, Taif, Mecca and Jeddah. Active, shrewd and capable with a very pleasant manner: can be unscrupulous when he chooses.

99. Ahmed Mousli

Born about 1901. Origins and early career unknown, for some years acted as secretary to Sheikh Abdullah Suleiman (81), Minister of Finance, acquiring a fortune in the process. Appointed head of the department of development projects in the Ministry of Finance in 1951 and in 1953 to be Deputy Minister in the newly-formed Ministry of Economy, controlling amongst other matters boycott measures against Israel. Since 1950 is known to have been an active protagonist for the spread of German interests in Saudi Arabia; his son Mohammed Ali Mousli holds several large German agencies and his fortune and considerable premises are committed to sponsoring German goods and enterprise. A man of much charm but ignorant and of little apparent ability;

essentially a creature of Sheikh Abdullah Suleiman's who stands or falls with the Minister.

100. Ahmed Obeid

Born about 1920. By virtue of a friendship with Abdullah Suleiman (81) has acquired the lucrative post of Director of Agriculture. A small part of his time is devoted to the attention of his official duties, about which he knows nothing. Charming to talk to, but evasive and awkward to deal with, has been responsible for numerous money-wasting procrastinations and is a thorn in the side of the British Locust Mission, the Food and Agriculture Organisation, and the United States Point Four Team for whom he is supposed to act as a liaison link with the Government. Writes eulogistic rubbish for the local newspapers and is engaged in the establishment of a new, independent printing and publishing organisation.

101. Ahmed Qandil

Born about 1918. A pleasant and helpful personality who is in charge of the office for pilgrim affairs. Has a genuine interest in his job which he tackles to the best of his ability. Unfortunately without any clear idea of the practicable and often kept in ignorance of Ministry of Finance decisions affecting his department. Visited the United Kingdom in 1953. A poet of some repute.

102-110. Ali Reza Family.

(Family tree on page 24.)

A family of Persian origin which came to the Hejaz in the third quarter of the nineteenth century. Since then the family as a whole, which has a branch in Bombay, has built up one of the largest fortunes in the Hejaz and has come nearer than any other family in Arabia to being one of merchant princes in the European and mediaeval sense. Its individual members have played for half a century a prominent and distinguished part in the municipal and political life of the Hejaz. In the past five years, however, the family has found itself rivalled in pre-eminence and wealth by several other local families and is now doing its utmost to re-establish its superiority by currying favour with King Saud wherever possible. Two members in particular, Ali Abdullah and Mohammed Abdullah are apparently intended in the future to occupy controlling positions in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Finance respectively. The following members deserve individual notice.

102. Mohammed Ali Ali Reza

Son of Zeinal Ali Reza. An exceptionally wealthy man, known locally as the pearl king. Has done much for education in Jeddah and Mecca. Was Qaimaqam of Jeddah for a short time before his uncle Abdullah Ali Reza. Now spends the greater part of his time in France and India.

103. Haji Yusuf Zeinal Ali Reza

Born about 1885. Senior member of the family resident in the Hejaz. Is much respected locally. A distinguished and scholarly man in Arabic and Persian who still affects the style of dress fashionable in King Hussein's time. Suffers from diabetes. Possesses a sparkling humour and has two strange passions in life: bridge and billiards.

104. Messud Qassim Zeinal Ali Reza

Resident in Istanbul. Is married to a Swiss cabaret artiste about whom he quarrelled violently with his cousin Mohammed Abdullah (109). Now never visits the Hejaz.

105. Ibrahim Yusuf Zeinal Ali Reza

Eldest son of (103). Is the head of the Bombay branch of the family firm. Rarely visits the Hejaz. Was a member of the Indian Trade Delegation which toured the Middle East in the spring of 1947.

106. Ahmed Yusuf Zeinal Ali Reza

Born about 1920. Works in Jeddah and represents the Zeinal interest in the firm of Haji Abdullah Ali Reza & Co. Increasingly left in charge by his cousins during their travels abroad, he has gained a good deal of experience and confidence. Apart from a tendency to arrogance (shared by other junior members of the family) he is quick and clever and a pleasant and friendly person, if not particularly scrupulous. Enjoys the company of Westerners and is extremely proud of his collection of firearms and an open admirer of the Germans.

107. Mohammed Zeinal Ali Reza

A quieter and more modest version of his brother Ahmed (106). Being groomed to take over more responsibility in the family firm.

108. Sheikh Ali Abdulla Ali Reza

Usually known abroad as Sheikh Ali Ali Reza. Born about 1910. Educated at Victoria College and the University of California. Is married to an American wife, whom he keeps in seclusion. While he is not uninterested in the family business he has mainly devoted himself to politics and diplomacy. He holds the rank of a Saudi Arabian Minister Plenipotentiary and usually accompanies His Royal Highness the Amir Feisal (23) to New York and London. Although apt to be pompous and to take himself too seriously, he is a good-hearted, quite mature personality with smooth and polished manners and a striking resemblance to Orson Welles. Believed to see himself as successor to Sheikh Yusuf Yasin (182) and if his influence with the Crown Prince subsists may well achieve this ambition.

109. Mohammed Abdullah Ali Reza

Born about 1913. The effective head of the family firm of Haji Abdullah Ali Reza & Co., he has definite political ambitions which have led him away from day-to-day office management and kept him a great deal on the move outside Saudi Arabia. For the past two years he has been courting the favour of the Minister of Finance and the Crown Prince (now King Saud), a policy which has had its reward in his appointment as Financial Adviser to the Ministry of Finance at the end of 1953. Although immature and rather childish in many ways and full of bright, though usually impractical ideas, he is unusually intelligent and can be quite ruthless and unscrupulous when he chooses. President of the Jeddah Chamber of Commerce; is feared but not liked by the community because of his arrogance.

110. Ali Hussein Ali Reza

Son of Haji Hussein Ali Reza and head of that firm which, though respectably constituted by Jeddah standards, is not on any thing like the same scale as Messrs. Haji Abdullah Ali Reza. He is married to a daughter of Haji Abdullah and has three sons who help in the family business.

111. Ali Taha

Assistant Governor of Jeddah since 1928. A Hejazi born about 1894. Rose from a small post as secretary to the Governor. Cadaverous and unhealthy. Speaks Turkish well. Well-meaning and not without intelligence. Acted as Deputy Governor of Jeddah from April 1944 and showed himself helpful and co-operative over routine matters with Her Majesty's Legation. Reverted to his former post of Assistant Governor on the appointment in April

1945 of a new Governor Abdur Rahman Sidayri (68) all of whose work, both in the latter's rare presences and lengthy absences, he continues to do.

112. Asad al Faqih

A native of Aley in the Lebanon. Counsellor to the Saudi Legation in Bagdad in 1938. Afterwards Chargé d'Affaires and appointed in 1943 to be Minister there. Has some knowledge of English and speaks French well. Member of the Saudi delegation to the San Francisco Conference in April 1945. Became first Saudi Minister in Washington in December of that year, and later Ambassador when the post was raised to that level.

113. Asaf ibn Hussein

Born about 1892. Appointed Governor of Najran and "the territories of Yam" in 1934, after the conclusion of the treaty of Taif with the Yemen. Later transferred to Ras of which he had previously been Amir. Speaks Turkish and was educated at Istanbul. He is native of Ras, and as there are two families there of Ibn Hussein, he has gone back one generation and calls himself Ibn Mansour. Is a short, stocky man beginning to run to fat. Always appears well-dressed and with mascara round his eyes. He was originally an officer in the Sherifial army at the time of the Arab revolt, and was taught demolition work by Captain Garland, one of Lawrence's assistants. A social climber: he has daughters married to Feisal, Mohammed, and Abdullah Feisal.

114. Bakhshab Pasha alias Mohammed Abu Bakr

A prominent and influential Jeddah merchant, who in recent years has become one of the commercial barons of Saudi Arabia. Principally known for the control he now exercises over the Arab Car Company which in 1953 carried by far the largest proportion of pilgrims to and from Mecca during the annual pilgrimage. Owns a large fleet of buses and lorries, besides several other enterprises. Able but swollen-headed and disliked by the local merchants.

115. Bashir Bey as Sadawi

Born in 1889 in Homs. Educated in Libya. Opposed the Italian occupation in 1913 and fled from the country. Held various posts in Lebanon and Syria. In 1939 he became confidential adviser to Ibn Saud, particularly on Arab affairs. He was used as an emissary in Syria. Intelligence reports during the war indicated a pro-Axis attitude. During the war he accompanied Ibn Saud to Egypt in February 1945 for meetings with President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill. In 1946 again accompanied the King to Egypt for a State visit and then went to Damascus to represent the King's views on various issues with the Syrian President. In 1947 he formed the Libyan Liberation Committee in Cairo and was elected its President. In the succeeding years he was most active in promoting Libyan independence. Came under Egyptian influence and became associated with Azzim Pasha's intrigues in Libya. In March 1941 declared the National Congress party's opposition to the reforms which the British Administration had put into effect and claimed that they had violated the United Nations resolution. Instituted a violent propaganda campaign against Federation. With the financial support of Egypt he opened branches of the National Congress Party in all rural districts. He attempted to organise widespread disturbances after the elections in which the National Congress Party failed to acquire a majority. As a result of this he was deported to Egypt on February 22, 1952, on orders of the Prime Minister with the approval of King Idris. The National Congress Party was outlawed. He returned to Riyadh where he again

became confidential adviser to Ibn Saud but continued attempts to return to Libya. However, King Idris had firmly set his face against him.

Bashir Sadawi holds a position of considerable responsibility in the Court at Riyadh. (The King laughingly referred to him as "our father") and in truth he had attempted to stand as a paternalistic adviser to the Amir Saud. He is a close friend of Rashid Ali. He speaks only Turkish and Arabic and is pleasant and plausible in conversation. His chief interests still lie in Libya.

116. Bujad (or Humayd) Family

A leading family in the notoriously fanatical Ghuthut section of the Ateyba tribe.

For an account of individual members of the family see Personalities Report for 1946.

117. Dabbagh Family

A Mecca family of "Moorish" (*i.e.*, some north-west Africa) origin. Appear to be Seyyids. Became prominent in 1932 in connexion with plot behind the revolt of Ibn Rifada and the preparations for the retarded revolt in Asir. The family is numerous.

For an account of individual members of the family see Personalities Report for 1946.

118. Dawish Family

The leading family of the Mutayr tribe centred near the Iraqi border. Feisal ad Dawish who died at Riyadh in 1931 was famous first as one of the leading Wahhabi leaders in the conquest of the Hejaz and then as a rebel against Ibn Saud.

For fuller account of the family, see Personalities Report for 1950.

119-123. Fadhl (or al Fazal) Family

Nejd's of Aneyza origin long settled in the Hejaz. They have been concerned in firms doing important business in the Hejaz and India, where they had a high reputation (enhanced by their position as business agents of Ibn Saud) until 1930. The family still have influential connexions in the Hejaz. The following members deserve mention:—

119. Abdullah ibn Mohammed al Fadhl

Vice-President of the Legislative Council and Assistant Viceroy. Probably born about 1883. Was formerly a merchant in Jeddah. Described in 1917 as "anti-Sherif and pro-English" and as going by the sobriquet of "Englisi" in Jeddah. Put in prison at that time in Mecca for some unknown offence, but later sent on a delegation to negotiate with Ibn Saud in Mecca. Went over definitely to Ibn Saud and acted as his representative at Rabigh for the 1925 pilgrimage, in which employment he is said to have feathered his nest. Figured as a Hejazi delegate at the Moslem Congress in Mecca in June 1926. Sent on an unsuccessful mission to Eritrea in 1927 in connexion with negotiations for the recognition of Ibn Saud by Italy and proposed treaty arrangements. Also had some part in the treaty negotiations with Great Britain. Became Assistant to the Viceroy at Mecca and so on to appointment to his present post in or before 1929. Went in that year on a mission to Persia. Alleged in the same year to have done nicely in the company of Abdullah Suleiman (81) by cornering benzine just before new duties were imposed. May still have commercial interests, but has long been dissociated from the business of the other Fadhl's. Not impressive in appearance or conversation: somewhat of a sheep.

120. Ibrahim ibn Abdur Rahman

Lives in Mecca and is engaged in trade in an unimportant way. Said to enjoy the confidence of the Amir Feisal (23).

121. Mohammed ibn Abdur Rahman ibn Abdullah
Was a partner in the firm which collapsed in India, but resided in Jeddah, and tried to dissociate himself from the other partners, his brother and cousin.

122. Abdullah ibn Ibrahim ibn Abdullah
Private secretary to the Amir Feisal in 1926. Selected in 1931 for the post of Chargé d'Affaires in Holland, under a scheme which did not materialise for having a legation there with the Saudi Minister in London as Minister. Appointed Treasurer to the Government later in 1931 as a result of the cabal against Abdullah Suleiman (81). Later became Director of Finance in Jeddah, then Government Representative to Aramco at Dhahran and Saudi representative for supply matters in Bahrain. Appointed member of the Council of Ministers in February 1946, and Saudi Consul-General at Cairo later that year: subsequently Minister on the retirement of Fauzan as Sabiq.

123. Ibrahim ibn Suleiman al Aqil
Is an important official and enjoys Amir Feisal's complete confidence. Accompanied him to London in 1939 for the Palestine discussions, to the San Francisco conference in April 1945, and on visits to the United States and Great Britain in 1948. As a young man he spent a considerable time in India. Speaks a very little English and some Urdu. A man of culture and pleasing manners. Was suggested as a possible Minister in London, but for some reason Ibn Saud did not like him. Now has the personal rank of Minister-Plenipotentiary.

124. Fawzi Silo
Born about 1895 in Hama. Joint Operational Commander of the 1st and 2nd Syrian Brigade on the Palestine front. Head of Syrian delegation during the Syro-Israeli Armistice negotiations in 1949. Appointed Director-General of Ministry of National Defence in April 1950. Minister of National Defence in several Cabinets. Made Head of the State when Shishakly arrested the politicians December 3, 1951. Soon became restive in his position as a figure-head and in July 1953 was replaced as President by General Shishakly who was elected unopposed. Silo performed the pilgrimage immediately afterwards and in October 1953 was appointed Military Adviser to the Crown Prince, the Amir Saud.

He is smooth and without real strength either morally or in Syria. He probably hopes to spend his time profitably in Saudi Arabia while awaiting a change in affairs in Syria.

125. Fuad al Khatib
Born in the Lebanon about 1875. Educated at the Syrian Protestant College. Became a teacher at Gordon College, Khartoum. Joined King Hussein about 1915 and later became his Foreign Secretary. Left the Hejaz with King Ali in 1925. Acted as an agent for some British intelligence agency in Cairo. Lived at the court of Amir Abdullah of Transjordan. Believed to have been in communication with the French in Syria in 1940 and 1941. Broke with the Amir Abdullah in 1943 and retired to the Lebanon. Returned to the Hejaz in 1947 to go on pilgrimage. Made his peace with Ibn Saud and was appointed Saudi Arabian Minister to Afghanistan in June 1948.

Well-known as a poet. He is fond of evolving political schemes but is without influence. No relation to Abdul Hamid al Khatib (88), but brother to Bahij Bey al Khatib, a Syrian personality.

126. Hafiz Wahba
Born 1889 in Egypt. Educated at al Azhar and the Muslim Jurisprudence College in Cairo. In youth he supported pan-Islam, was a fervent Egyptian nationalist and a hater of Britain. He is believed to

have been deported from India. He started a school in Kuwait but left it in 1916 to take service at Ibn Saud's court where he became tutor to the Amir Feisal. In 1919 he accompanied the Prince to London. Civil governor of Mecca, 1925-27 with a viceregal title. He performed his functions well and read the King's inaugural address at the Moslem Congress in Mecca in June 1926. After a brief lapse from favour he became Assistant Viceroy under the Amir Feisal, but his masterful attitude probably antagonised the Prince and in July 1928 he was relegated to the post of Director-General of Education. Besides his administrative duties he was also given much diplomatic work. He was a Saudi delegate at the abortive Kuwait conference in 1923-24, negotiated with Sir G. Clayton in 1925, 1927 and 1928 and represented Saudi Arabia at the International Postal Congress in London in 1929. In 1929 he was appointed Minister in London, but went on a mission to Kuwait before taking up his post in 1930. In 1931 he was designated Minister at The Hague but for reasons of economy never took up the post. Represented Saudi Arabia at the opening of the Tokyo mosque in 1938. In 1940 settled the temporary form of the Saudi-Kuwait Agreements with the Political Agent, Kuwait. Accompanied the Amirs Feisal and Khalid to America and England in the winter of 1943. In 1945 accompanied the King to Egypt to meet President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill. Was a member of the Saudi delegation at the San Francisco Conference in April 1945 and the Assistant Saudi delegate to the Preparatory Commission and First Assembly of the United Nations. Made a K.C.V.O. on May 10, 1946. February 1948 became first Saudi Ambassador in London.

Hafiz Wahba has long since lost his anti-British feelings and is now a confirmed anglophile. So much so indeed that the King calls him an Englishman and tends to regard his opinions as being unduly biased in favour of Britain. He has, however, been helpful in London and is a good propagandist for Ibn Saud. He has a pleasant manner with a nice touch of humour and speaks English well. He neither smokes nor drinks but his three daughters have been given a good western education and appear in London society. Throughout his career he has been in intense rivalry with Fuad Hamza (died 1951) and Yusuf Yasin (182). His long absences in London have cost him much political influence though the King still regards him warmly as a friend. His anxiety not to find himself in trouble with anyone decreases his usefulness.

127. Seyyid Hamza al Ghauth al Madani
A Hejazi of Medina, born perhaps 1895. Said to have been educated in Turkish schools and to have frequented Turkish society. Sided with Turks at time of Arab revolt, and edited an anti-Hussein paper at Medina in their interest. Continued to be anti-Hussein after the success of the revolt and fled. Said to have been sentenced to death by default during his absence. Seems, nevertheless, to have been given an important post at Damascus, which he continued to hold under King Feisal's régime there, even after King Hussein had launched against him an accusation, probably trumped up, of having stolen valuables from the Prophet's tomb. According to Philby (Arabian Days) was in the service of Ibn Rashid of Hail for a period. Was in Ibn Saud's service by end of 1923 and was one of his delegates at the abortive Kuwait conference of 1923-24, an appointment which led to a revival by the Iraqi delegates of the robbery charge. Became Assistant Governor of Medina after its occupation by Saudi forces in 1925. Was later employed in the palace. Selected in 1931 for the proposed Consulate-General at Batavia—a post which was never opened. Was appointed member of the Legislative Council whence

he was transferred to the Emir Saud's diwan in September 1932. Conspicuous as a palace man. Became first Saudi Minister to Baghdad in 1938. Fell into disfavour during his visit to Medina in 1941, but was later pardoned and reinstated in the King's entourage and was frequently present at meetings of the "Cabinet." Appointed Saudi Arabian Minister to Persia early in 1948 and presented his credentials in May, thus healing the diplomatic breach between the two countries caused by the reported desecration of the Kaaba by a Persian in 1940.

128. Hassan Abbas Sherbatly
Born about 1895; origins obscure. Obtained the notice of King Ibn Saud about 1940, reputedly as a seller of fruit and vegetables. Rapidly became principal purveyor to the King and much of the royal family in all manner of goods. His position is still supreme in this field and apart perhaps from the Minister of Finance he is probably now the richest private individual in the country. Purchases mainly through commission agents and operates all manner of deals, many of them unscrupulous or shady. Repulsively ugly, almost illiterate, and with a wicked commercial reputation, he yet possesses besides a most astute brain, considerable charm and philanthropy. His brother Abdullah, a paler and thinner version of himself with a slightly more savoury reputation now looks after the fruit and vegetable side of the business.

129. Hatim Zoubi
A young Saudi of Palestinian origin with a Cambridge law degree. Speaks perfect English. He is a brother-in-law of Badr Fahoom. He is a prominent member of Abdullah bin Adwan's (89) staff and is in charge of the Labour Office in Dhahran. This involves him in many dealings with Aramco principally in regard to the payment of compensation. A member of the government commission which investigated the general strike of Aramco's Arab employees in October 1953. The company have always found him very fair in his dealings and courageous in upholding his opinions. Engaged in drafting a new labour law. Is about to be transferred to Jeddah as a legal adviser to the Ministry of Finance.

130. Hithlayn Family
People of importance in the Ajman tribe, much concerned in the Nejd revolt of 1929. Its principal member, Dhaydan ibn Hithlayn, was slain treacherously in April of that year. For an account of individual members of the family, see Personalities Report for 1946.

131. Husni Bey Khair Allah
An Egyptian lawyer in his fifties. Came to Saudi Arabia in 1951. Speaks impeccable English. Holds the official appointment of legal adviser to the Ministry of Defence and Aviation. He is, however, employed by the Saudi Arabian Government generally as a legal adviser and negotiator in dealing with foreign companies. In particular he has been much concerned in negotiations with Aramco. Aramco negotiators like him personally and consider that though his arguments are sometimes not well founded either in logic or in law he is nevertheless not a twister as was his predecessor, Ahmed Taufiq.

132. Hussein Aweini
Born 1902 in Beirut. He is a Sunni Moslem and was educated at the Greek Catholic College in Beirut. Came to the Hejaz shortly after Ibn Saud's seizure of the country and quickly made a large fortune. Friendly with several influential members of the Court, including Yusuf Yasin (182) and Fuad Hamza.

Returned to the Lebanon in 1932, but continued to make periodic visits to Saudi Arabia. In association with Ibrahim Shaker (137), Mohammed Surur (158), Abdullah Suleiman (81) and Najib Salha (161) he did well in the war and formed in 1948 a firm called the Arabian Trading Company, which is now one of the most important in the country by virtue of the Government business it handles. Lebanese Deputy, 1947-51. In 1951 formed Caretaker Cabinet to supervise elections which he did successfully and honestly.

His considerable wealth has won him a prominent position both in Lebanon and Saudi Arabia, though in the former he is somewhat discredited by his association with former President El Khoury. He is, however, a possible stop-gap appointment in either country should a man of neutral principles be required. He is clever and is well aware of the chaotic way in which Saudi Government is running. He is not, however, likely to do anything about it.

133-135. Husseini Family
A famous Palestinian family which has produced a number of Arab leaders who usually placed themselves in opposition to the British Mandate authorities and have led turbulent political careers. The most prominent is Haj Amin Husseini the ex-mufti who visited Saudi Arabia at the accession of King Saud. Members of the family resident in Saudi Arabia are:—

133. Jamal Husseini
Born 1894. His two elder brothers were detained in connexion with the murder of King Abdulla in 1951 but released. Jamal was an active member of the Arab Higher Committee and founder of later committees. Deported by the British to the Seychelles. Involved in the Rashid Ali revolt in Iraq. Captured by the British forces and interned in Southern Rhodesia for the remainder of the war. A member of the so-called Gaza Government after the Palestinian war.

In 1950 he settled in Riyadh and was appointed one of the royal counsellors. He is not a member of the daily Cabinet, but is consulted on all important Arab affairs. He stands well with the royal family in general. He speaks English excellently but has a strong anti-British background. There is, however, no direct evidence that his presence in the royal councils is inimical to us.

134. Rajai Husseini
Born about 1903. Did post-graduate work in economics in both America and England. Taught for a short time at the American University in Beirut. For twelve years was an official in the Mandate Government but left in 1946 to join the Arab Office in London. Became Minister of National Economy in the abortive Gaza Government. Came to Saudi Arabia where he obtained a post in the Ministry of Finance and was later transferred to the newly-formed Ministry of Economy. Later in 1953 became Secretary-General in the newly-established Ministry of Communications.

He is an intelligent, highly-educated man with a command of English. He is said to have high personal standards and probably was involved in some of the Palestinian politics somewhat against his better judgment under a strong sense of loyalty to his family. He is under no illusions about the conditions in Saudi Arabia and the character of its rulers but believes that with patience something can be done. He has said that if he achieves 10 per cent. of success it will be as much as he expects. Unfortunately he is unlikely to have serious influence in the formation of high policy.

135. Sadiq Husseini

Formerly an official in the Department of Agriculture; is now Liaison Officer for the Saudi Arabian Government with the American Point 4 Mission. Speaks English perfectly. Visited the United States late in 1953 on a Point 4 leadership course. Has a pleasant personality and has apparently kept clear of politics.

136. Ibrahim al Muammar

Qaimmaqam of Jedda, 1937. Identical with the Ibrahim al Junaifi mentioned in "The Heart of Arabia" and, according to the author, Mr. Philby, has a very doubtful claim to the historic name of Muammar, which he subsequently assumed. In early life, travelled much in India, Persia, Egypt and elsewhere in the East, as trader and probably also as journalist and propagandist. About 1926 became head of Ibn Saud's diwan; transferred to that of the Amir Saud in 1932. In 1933 was appointed Chargé d'Affaires at Bagdad. His alleged undiplomatic activities were the subject of complaint on several occasions, and in 1937 necessitated his removal. An active, able man, interested in world affairs and with a great sense of humour. Improved Jedda considerably, was useful in pilgrimage matters, and was helpful to foreigners within the limits of his powers. At one time was the principal channel of communication between the legation and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

He was dismissed from the Governorate of Jedda in 1944 as a result of a scandal involving a slave girl and of speculation and smuggling activities. He was, however, re-employed on a special mission to the Yemen at the time of the Imam Yahia's assassination in 1948 and his retention of the King's favour is evident from his ever closer association with the King; he now lives at Riyadh except when the King is elsewhere, and has become one of his closer advisers and representatives; he was for instance deputed to look after the Sheikh of Kuwait during the latter's visit in 1950. In 1948 he had a severe attack of malaria which cost him a lot of weight, but his health was completely restored within a few months.

His eldest son, Abdullah was born about 1920; after a period of tutelage in the Political Bureau at Riyadh under Yusuf Yasin, entered the diplomatic service in 1943 and returned to the Political Bureau in 1948. His younger son, Abdul Aziz (86) is of increasing stature in his own right.

137. Ibrahim Shaker

Born of Turkish-Syrian parents in the Hejaz in about 1903. He started business life, after employment as a clerk in the Quarantine Administration under the Hashemites earlier on, as a partner of Hussein Aweini (132) in 1927. In partnership with Aweini and later Najib Salha (161) he has over the years become one of the most important merchants in the country; he owns property in Cairo and Turkey and, as a director of the Arabian Trading Company, handles a good deal of government business, especially as agent for Dodge cars, Banque Misr and other Egyptian concerns, and is associated with American big business. He is a close friend of Yusuf Yasin and is a private business associate of Abdullah Suleiman (81). He is an important personal and business enemy of the Ali Reza family (102-110), and a project for the formation of a million pound import-export concern foundered on their rivalry in 1949.

Personally, Shaker is a friendly, intelligent man who speaks Arabic and Turkish. He has a reportedly very beautiful Turkish wife and has determined that his children, two of whom are now at English schools in Egypt, shall be educated abroad and that his daughter shall remain abroad rather than be forced into wearing the veil and into harem life. In 1950 he

told His Majesty's Ambassador that one cure for the evils of this country might be the establishment of a Victoria College at Jedda where young princes and others unable to go abroad for their education could receive instruction and be given some constructive training and said that if such a plan became feasible he would be prepared to subscribe substantially.

138. Ibrahim Tassan, General

Born about 1893 in the Nejd but brought up in Asir. Once in the Ottoman army but later served under the Hashemites and was associated with Colonel Lawrence. Promoted in 1950 to be a full colonel and given command of the Saudi Arabian contingent in Egypt for a short time after the Palestine fighting. His appointment was probably due more to his good personal relations with the royal family than to military talent. On his return he was re-appointed Commander of the garrison at Jedda and also in July 1950 resumed his position as Director of Civil Aviation at Jedda. Promoted General in 1952.

Though a pleasant and unassuming personality he has been remarkably successful in running the Saudi airlines with a fair degree of efficiency and has shown himself capable of making reasonable decisions without prolonged reference to higher authority. He is popular with the Americans concerned with flying.

139. Ibrahim Zahran

Born about 1907 in the Sudan where he was educated. Worked for many years in the Netherlands Trading Society in Jedda and became their chief Arab clerk but became richer than his office warranted and left the Dutch to establish with his cousin Ahmed Ashmawi (96) a new banking and business enterprise. His banking activities are probably not important except in so far as they give him facilities for his sometimes rather dubious exchange transactions. He has many connexions in the Sudan where he is well-regarded officially, and through which he seems to have a channel not available to other bankers for repatriating Egyptian money. He has close connexions with many of the Amirs especially Amir Mitaab, the Assistant Minister of Defence (36). He has travelled extensively abroad both with members of the royal family and on his own account. Has important business connexions in Britain where he recently bought a yacht from a member of the peerage. He is also the agent for Saudi Arabian Air Lines in Jedda.

He is shrewd and friendly and has had much experience of business in Jedda. Speaks English perfectly and is able to appear at ease in western society which he enjoys.

140. Idrisi Family

Founded by Ahmed al Idrisi, a native of Fez, who became a notable teacher at Mecca and created a Tariqa, or school of religious doctrine. Moved on to Sabya, in Asir, where he acquired land and died in the odour of sanctity about 1837 and where his tomb is still venerated. The Idrisis supplanted the Sherifian family, which had ruled at Abuarish in the time of his son Mohammed and Mohammed's son Ali.

All members of the family have the title of Seyyid. There is a close connexion between the family and the Senusis, whose founder was a disciple of the original Ahmed al Idrisi. The spiritual relationship has been reinforced by inter-marriage at various times. The Idrisis have also a connexion with the Mirghani family, whose head resides in the Sudan, and is chief of yet another Tariqa, once powerful and still important.

For a fuller account of the family, see Personalities Report for 1946.

141. Izzedin Shawa

Born about 1905 in Gaza. Palestinian of a well-known family. Educated at St. Catherine's College, Cambridge, where he took a diploma in agriculture. Speaks flawless English. Joined the Palestine administration and as District Officer at Jenin earned the reputation of a very capable civil servant. He was caught, however, in 1937 betraying to the Arab rebels the secrets of an anti-rebel conference he had been attending half an hour previously; he then joined the rebels and took an active part against the British during the Palestine troubles in 1937-38. Was at one time private secretary to the Mufti. Violently anti-Jew. Came to Iraq in 1940 with his wife, who is French, and joined Rashid Ali's rebel army in May 1941. Escaped after rebellion had been crushed and was granted asylum by Ibn Saud provided he refrained from political activities. He kept his word. Appointed Director of Agriculture at al Kharj early in 1944 and in April, Director of the Office of Public Works at Jedda in succession to Najib Salha (161). He found the task of cleaning out the Augean Stables of the Directorate of Transport while fighting against Nejd and Syrian influence too much for him and in June 1945, resigned. After lecturing in the United States in 1946 and becoming the representative in London of the Arab Higher Committee (1948) he returned unexpectedly to Saudi Arabia at the end of 1949. In February 1950 he was appointed the Assistant Governor of Tapline under Mohammed as Sidayri (67). Though enjoying good relations with his chief their personalities are in considerable contrast for Izzedin is an intellectual and not well suited to dealing with Bedouin. In fact his functions are not well-defined, since most of the important work and decisions connected with Tapline are handled in Jedda.

It is reported that in 1953 he was seriously considered for the top administrative post in the new Ministry of Communications but was not, however, successful. His education and tastes make him rather a misfit in the Saudi administrative structure and he is unlikely to rise much above his present position. He is a pleasant personality, sympathetic to western minds though he is a sincere nationalist. His son was educated at Victoria College.

142-146. Kaaki Family

The war has brought into the limelight the previously unknown family of Kaaki. Reputedly of Syrian origin but long resident in the Hejaz, this family followed the traditional family calling of baking, as their name suggests. They dabbled in the money market and various members of the family were small independent money-changers. They are now the real financiers of Saudi Arabia, and no large money transaction ever takes place now without the Kaakis being directly concerned. They owe their present position first to Najib Salha (161), the venal right-hand man of Abdullah Suleiman and former Director of Public Works, and to Abdullah Suleiman himself. While His Majesty's Government were paying an annual subsidy to Ibn Saud the Kaakis made money at will. A high proportion of the subsidy goods that came into the country were dealt with by this family, and through their machinations and those of Najib and of Abdullah Suleiman (81) much of the gold presented by His Majesty's Government eventually found its way into the coffers of one or other of the various Kaaki firms. In 1944, Sadaka and Siraj Kaaki, the most important combination, were discovered in an attempt to smuggle 25,000 Saudi sovereigns to Egypt. This money was confiscated and there were rumours of dire reprisals on the law-breakers. These however gradually faded into the background and when Ibn Saud arrived in Jedda after meeting King Farouk at Yenbo. Sadaka and Siraj Kaaki petitioned His Majesty on the

grounds that they did not know they were doing wrong and the King, fresh from his successful entertainment of King Farouk, pardoned the Kaakis and returned them the money. It is certain that Abdullah Suleiman arranged this, Sadaka and Siraj having advanced the money by which Ibn Saud was able so royally to entertain King Farouk. A rough estimate of the family fortune is about 300,000 Saudi sovereigns of which Sadaka and Siraj have, at the very least, 175,000 Saudi sovereigns besides valuable property in Mecca. In April 1945 they started to interest themselves in real estate and began by purchasing from the Minister of Finance, Abdullah Suleiman, the Banque Misr Hotel and several other buildings in Mecca. The Banque Misr building alone cost 30,000 Saudi sovereigns.

The most important members of this family are:—

142. Sadaka Kaaki and**143. Siraj Kaaki**

Brothers, these two are partners in the most lucrative business in the country. They are the Government brokers and are represented in every town in the Hejaz and the Nejd with the exception of Medina where the financial activities of Sheikh Mohammed al Khuraji (156) are protected by his son-in-law, Sheikh Abdullah Suleiman. The firm of S. & S. Kaaki is by far the most important of the Kaaki firms. Its 1940 capital was about 10,000 Saudi sovereigns—and is now at least 175,000 Saudi sovereigns. (See also remarks above.)

In 1949, they celebrated the opening of the Coca Cola factory at Jedda which, apart from threatening to change the drinking habits of half the country and consuming one-tenth of Jedda's daily water supply, is the first modern industrial plant in Saudi Arabia other than those connected with oil or gold. The newly-formed parent company, the Saudi Industries Corporation, in which the Chase National Bank of New York has a large share, also had the construction of a cement factory at Dammam planned but the Minister of Finance insisted on concession terms which were too extortionate and the project has fallen through.

144. Abdul Aziz Kaaki

Started his career as a money-changer and is now a very wealthy man, his properties including a bakery and a large garage. In partnership with Salem bin Mahfouz established a highly-unorthodox local bank in 1952 now known as the National Commercial Bank with an office in Jedda and Riyadh and many local agents and which operates as a principal money-lender to the Government and indulges in profitable exchange business.

145. Salah Musa Kaaki and**146. Abdullah Musa Kaaki**

Before the war these two were the most affluent of the Kaaki family and flourished in Mecca with a capital of something like 15,000 Saudi sovereigns. Their present capital exceeds 60,000 Saudi sovereigns—and from their partnership with Abdul Aziz Kaaki (144) they have a share of a business which hardly existed before the war but is now worth 15,000 Saudi sovereigns.

147. Kanaan Khatib

A Syrian of western appearance with an almost perfect English accent. His appearance and smoothness of manner appear to be his main assets, for his moral reputation has long been dubious. He became a lecturer in the Arab language at the American University at Beirut where he is said to have made contacts with visiting Saudi notables and to have acted as a pimp for certain of them. Shortly after the war he joined the Superior Oil Company, who, at that time, held a concession for a sea-bed area in the

Persian Gulf. The reason for his leaving the company is not known but they do not appear to have parted on the best of terms. Kanaan Khatib next attached himself to the routine of the Amir Mohammed (24) on the latter's visit to America. His various talents were appreciated by the Amir who brought him back to Saudi Arabia and recommended him to various leading personages, including Abdullah Suleiman. Kanaan Khatib is an adventurer who is looking for a lucrative position. He attempted to secure a post as adviser to the young Abdul Aziz Suleiman, but he failed in this, partly owing to the opposition of some who insisted that only true Saudis should hold such positions. At present he is fobbed off with a position of minor importance in the broadcasting administration. He does not appear to be possessed of any particular financial knowledge or experience.

148. Khairuddin az Zuraikli

A Syrian born about 1880. Editor of *Al Qibla*, official journal of King Hussein. Later was Hashemite propagandist in Jeddah. Go-between between King Ali and Ibn Saud. Joined the latter. Adviser to the Saudi Agency in Cairo in 1935. A crony of Sheikh Yusuf Yasin (182) and Najib Salha (161). Attended the Preparatory Committee meeting of the Arab Conference in Alexandria in October 1944 with Yusuf Yasin and also the discussions which led up to the signing of the Covenant of the Arab League in March 1945. In 1947 accompanied the Amir Nawwaf (41) on a trip to the United States. In 1950 appointed Saudi permanent representative in Cairo in the Arab League.

Khairuddin does not carry much political weight though probably rather more than Taher Redhwan (180), whom he replaces in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs when the latter is on leave. He has maintained good relations with the British Embassy and is anxious to take part in any discussions which might give him kudos or show him as possessing influence but in fact would probably shy off any serious decision. Speaks French.

149. Khalid al Qarqani (alias al Hud, alias Abu Walid)

Born about 1890 in Tripolitania, the son of a well-known Arab mathematician. Is said to have served under the Senussi and fought the Italians. He lived in Italy for two years probably as a political detainee. Introduced to Ibn Saud by Hafiz Wahba (126) in 1930 when he was made First Assistant to the Viceroy. He held the post only for a brief period and then became a member of the King's privy council. He went into business with the German merchant, afterwards honorary German Consul, de Haas. In 1930 the Government ordered a consignment of arms from Poland through him. Was appointed by the Government to accompany the American engineer Twitchell on his tours of survey for water and minerals. In 1932 was sent with Hamid Suleiman (83) on an abortive expedition to investigate the dispute between the Idrisi and Ibn Saud's governor. In the following year was part of an equally unsuccessful delegation to Sana before the outbreak of the Saudi-Yemen war. Was a Saudi delegate to the Bahrain Transit Dues and Kuwait Blockade Conference in 1935. Was also a Saudi representative at the negotiations over the Red Sea oil concession with Petroleum Concessions (Limited). Accompanied Dr. Mahmud Hammuda to London and Paris in 1939 in connexion with the proposed amendment of the Sanitary Convention. Also visited Germany before the outbreak of war. Had an interview with Hitler but was unsuccessful to attempting to purchase arms for Saudi Arabia. Has travelled extensively including, it is said, to Russia. In 1945 when given only two years to live, this Embassy tried unsuccessfully to obtain permission for him to rejoin his family in Egypt. Since then he

has remained in good health and plays an active part in the King's inner council where he is considered an expert on European affairs. He fulfils the duties of Head of Political Section during the absences of Yusuf Yasin (182).

Khalid has a pleasant manner and is a good conversationalist though there is sometimes a nationalistic sting in what he says. Forms a negotiating team with Yusuf Yasin, particularly in regard to the frontier dispute, and is the milder and more conciliatory partner but at bottom his opinion and attitude is little different from that of Yusuf. Speaks French, Turkish and Italian.

150-151. Mazi Family

An important Nejd family which has provided loyal and relatively efficient provincial Governors.

150. Turki ibn Mazi

Born about 1913. In 1932, Inspector-General of Asir and was associated with Zahid bin Zuayr in efforts to make Ibn Saud realise the gravity of the situation preceding the open revolt of the Idrisi at the end of October. Took part in negotiations with the Imam. Accompanied Khalid al Qarqany (149) and Hamid Suleiman (83) on their fruitless mission to Sana in 1933 before the outbreak of the Saudi-Yemen war. Visited the Yemen again in 1943 and 1944 as Ibn Saud's special envoy to the Imam. He reported the people of the Yemen to be groaning under the yoke of the Imam and anxious to transfer their allegiance to Ibn Saud. He would appear to be an expert on the Asir and Yemen. In 1948 appointed Amir of Najran and in 1952 promoted to Amir of Abha and the Asir. He is extremely popular in his Amirate and is reputed to be one of the best Governors in the country.

151. Hamid ibn Mazi

Brother to Turki and succeeded him in 1952 as Amir of Najran. Is likely to continue his brother's ambitious projects for the development of this small port.

152. Mohammed ba Harith

Chef de Cabinet to the Minister of Finance. In February 1953 was appointed Director-General of the First Degree. At a time of comparative affluence had the power of signing cheques for the Minister. He remains the Minister's private secretary in chief and is believed to be largely responsible for influencing him towards encouraging German influence in Saudi Arabia. Of the permanent officials in the Ministry of Finance he seems to have the greatest influence. Speaks little English.

153. Mohammed Hussein Nazif

Born about 1882 of a prosperous and well-known Jeddah family of Egyptian origin. He is said to have lost favour with King Hussein and at that time to have been desirous of British naturalisation. Of sincerely religious views he was probably a Wahhabi before the Saudi conquest of the Hejaz, and was a delegate at the Moslem Congress in Mecca in 1926. He owns the largest of the old houses in Jeddah and therefore had the honour of accommodating King Ibn Saud on his visits to Jeddah in the early years of the Kingdom. Said to be the only man in Saudi Arabia who has ever refused the hand of a daughter in marriage to Ibn Saud. Though he has never held office—perhaps partly because he was suspected of not being whole-heartedly Saudi—he is a much respected older figure and is reputed to have the best private library in the country.

154. Mohammed Ibrahim al Ghazzawi

A Hejazi with a sonorous voice and an impressive bearing who is the official poet laureate. He reads

his own poems, chiefly eulogistic of the royal family, on all State occasions. He resides in Mecca, and in 1952 was appointed Second Vice-President of the Consultative Assembly.

155. Mohammed Effendi Ibrahim Masoud

Born about 1915. A Hejazi who was educated in the Lebanon but not at the American University as he likes to have it thought. When a United States Mission was established in Jeddah he was appointed Arab consultant a post which he still holds. In the summer of 1952 accompanied Abdullah Feisal (62) on his visit to Britain and America. In November 1952 awarded a certificate by the State Department for meritorious service. Invariably accompanies the head of the American mission to discussions with Arabs and has even been entrusted himself with messages to King Ibn Saud.

Is very smooth and speaks English well, though his literary style is poor. Is probably more loyal to the Saudi than to the American Government. This has been suggested to the Americans who nevertheless place great confidence in him and usually accept his opinion without reserve. He has grown wealthy partly through renting a large house to the United States Embassy. Since he has now got all he can expect from the Americans it would not be surprising if he were to leave them for Saudi Government service. He may hanker after a position in the Saudi foreign service.

156. Mohammed al Khuraiji

Father-in-law to Sheikh Abdullah Suleiman (81), to whose influence is attributed the fact that he has become the wealthiest man in Medina.

His two sons, Mohammed and Abdul Aziz, have also become influential men in the Hejaz, as Government agents in Medina and as wealthy merchants and builders.

157. Mohammed Sheikhho

Born 1908 of a Nejd father and a Syrian mother. Distinguished himself as a bright young man in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and was present at some of the early negotiations on the eastern frontiers of Saudi Arabia. Accompanied the present King to the United Kingdom for the Silver Jubilee in 1935. Assisted Yusuf Yasin (182) in negotiating the Saudi-Kuwait Agreements at Jeddah, 1941-42, and was sent to Beirut to complete his education at Government expense. In 1945 was appointed chief permanent official at the Ministry of Defence. In 1950 appointed a Minister Plenipotentiary. Seems to have lost influence in 1953 and to have lost say in policy.

He is conceited, jealous of his authority and a poor Moslem but he works hard and is one of the most efficient of Saudi civil servants. He virtually runs the Ministry of Defence but is not popular with senior army officers. Apt for intrigue but cautious and able. Has amassed a considerable fortune in his present post.

158. Mohammed Surur as Sabban

Minister of State and Financial Adviser to the King. Born about 1902, son of a slave of the Sabban merchant family of Mecca (his mother is said to have been an Ethiopian). Began in business as the moving spirit in the family hide and skin trade. A clerk in the municipality of Jeddah under King Hussein, he is said to have tried to assassinate King Ibn Saud during his conquest of the Hejaz in 1925 and to have been subsequently incarcerated in Riyadh. Returned to the Hejaz about 1929 and was taken up by the Minister of Finance; rose rapidly with the latter's support and since 1934 has been effectively second in command in the Ministry in spite of a loss of influence in 1939, falling out with the Minister in 1945 and a temporary eclipse in 1949. His principal

achievement has been the organisation of pilgrimage affairs as well as being Director of Broadcasting. Since 1951 he has acted increasingly as financial adviser in the Ministry generally, with increasing influence with Amir Feisal and King Saud. Appointed Financial Adviser to the King and Minister of State immediately following King Ibn Saud's death in November 1953. Although his health is not good, he is widely recognised and respected as easily the ablest and most experienced man in the Ministry of Finance next to the Minister himself, and as a possible successor to the latter. Pleasant, generous, hard-working and most capable. As a business man he is very wealthy with interests in property (including land on the east coast) and a share in almost every major enterprise in Jeddah. Owns the *Bilad as Saudia*, the only daily newspaper in the country. Has a younger brother Abdullah (of no importance) and two sons Hassan and Abdur Rahman who manage a large building contracting firm and other interests including the local Jeddah athletics and football field.

159. Mohammed bin Ladin

Born about 1913. A Nejd. Believed to have worked as a mason for Aramco in Dhahran until about 1942 when he set up as a small building contractor on his own account. With the field then virtually to himself he attracted royal attention because of the speed with which he executed projects, his prodigious memory for detail and his comparative honesty, and by 1951 had attained the position of Government Director of Building entrusted with the task of repairing and rebuilding the Holy Places in Mecca and Medina and carrying out, mostly by subcontracting, many other public works and royal commissions, usually without proper financial allocation. His position was regulated to some extent in 1953 and his scope limited; in spite of a chaotic office administration he remains principal Government contractor. Extremely elusive and constantly on the move; yet has never been known to break his word once he can be induced to give it. Now a very wealthy man.

160. Muwaffaq Bey al Alusi

Born about 1894, a Sunni of Bagdad. After education in France he became professor at the Bagdad Law School in 1926. Director-General Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1928. Withdrew to Beirut after a quarrel with the Minister 1930. Accompanied Nuri Said to Mecca to negotiate the Iraqi-Nejd Bon Voisenage Agreement in 1931. Became Judicial Adviser to Ibn Saud, 1932. Returned to Bagdad, 1933 and held positions in the Iraqi Foreign Service at Tehran, Beirut and Bombay. He was dismissed in 1937, but reinstated in 1939 and served at Paris, Damascus and Istanbul. Recalled November 1941. Again dismissed, 1943. Since then he has been used by Ibn Saud and in 1949 was sent to Syria to intrigue against Iraqi-Syrian union. In 1950 appointed Saudi Minister at Rome.

Muwaffaq is an unprincipled adventurer. He drinks heavily and his habits are unsavoury.

161. Najib Ibrahim Salha

Born about 1902 of Syrian parents: educated at the American University of Beirut. Came to the Hejaz in 1927 as employee of Messrs. Gellatly Hankey, Ltd., but soon parted from them in troubled circumstances and joined the Ministry of Finance where his conspicuous talents gained him the post of secretary to the Minister. In 1936 he was placed in charge of a department in the Ministry styled the Office of Public Works. By 1936 he had largely supplanted Mohammed Surur (158) in the confidence of Abdullah Suleiman (81) and was empowered as Purchasing Agent for the Government, an office in which he acquired a large fortune. He became

increasingly indispensable to the Ministry of Finance and was specially commanded by the King to deal with supply matters which, after the outbreak of war, became a major problem. He worked hard and had the confidence of the British Legation. In April 1944, however, it transpired that he was deliberately misinforming the Legation about the financial and supply position in the country in order to maintain the British subsidy and to increase his personal fortune. The King was furious and dismissed him. He went to Cairo where he started a transport company and apparently continued as a buying agent for the Saudi Government, and kept in close touch with affairs in Riyadh. He is a partner with Ibrahim Shaker (137), Hussein Aweini (132) and Mohammed Awwadi in the Saudi Arab Trading Company formed in January 1945. In December 1949 he was recalled to Saudi Arabia to cope with a more than usually serious financial crisis. Once again he largely eclipsed Surur. He was appointed Minister Plenipotentiary, and was largely responsible for the new fifty-fifty Aramco concession agreement signed on December 30, 1950. During 1950, 1951 and 1952 he transacted single-handed the bulk of the important business of the Ministry of Finance. His efficiency was remarkable but it bred unpopularity. Rumours were rife that he was about to be dismissed. He left for a holiday in the Lebanon early in 1953, largely for health reasons (though most people believed it was also for political reasons), but returned for a few days in August 1953 as adviser to the Ministry of Finance at the request of Sheikh Abdullah Suleiman (81) but the Crown Prince, now King Saud (1), an old enemy of his, is said to have ordered him to leave; he is now back in the Lebanon.

Nejib Salha is probably the most efficient civil servant that Saudi Arabia has had. His capacity for work is enormous. He speaks English fluently and is confident in his handling of foreigners. For the sake of his efficiency Aramco first welcomed him and then largely because of his maddening insistence on points of detail came to regard him as a nuisance. He has made many enemies in this country but still enjoys the confidence of the Minister of Finance and it is always possible that in a crisis he might be recalled. He would, however, almost certainly require sweeping powers. He has acquired even for Saudi officials a remarkable large personal fortune which is invested partly in Egypt but mainly in the Lebanon. His health has probably suffered from over-work. (For more details see Personalities Report, 1950).

162. Qusaibi Family

An important merchant family in the Persian Gulf. The Qusaibis formerly had great influence owing to their position as agents of Ibn Saud in Bahrain and buyers of his requirements for Nejd, as well as to their wealth and their hold on many to whom they had lent money. Their most distinguished debtor was the late King himself, who owed them in 1930 something like £80,000. The then Amir Saud frequently employed the Qusaibis to buy goods for him in Bombay, but was said in April 1942 to have become dissatisfied with them and to be employing other agents.

Abdur Rahman is now acting in Bahrain as unofficial Saudi trade and general agent and, shortly after a visit to Riyadh in late 1950 was, to general surprise, given the title of Minister of the Interior; the appointment apparently carries no portfolio.

163. Rashid Family

Formerly hereditary rulers of Hail. In the latter part of the nineteenth century they were supreme in northern and central Arabia and drove the Saudis into exile. In the early years of this century the family was riven with faction and was accounted infamous, even in such a land of violence as Arabia, for its

record of domestic murders. Its power was totally extinguished in November 1921 when Ibn Saud captured Hail. It is possible, however, that their name may still retain some influence with the Shammar tribes in northern Arabia.

163. Mohammed ibn Talal ar Rashid

The last of the rulers of Hail, he was captured there in 1921. Ever since he has been a guest at Ibn Saud's court and is now allowed to travel since he is believed to be innocuous. He is a sick man. The King married one of his daughters in 1938.

Several other members of the Beni Rashid live at Riyadh and are treated almost as members of the King's family. Little is known about them but none seem to have unusual talent. Two of them, Saud and Abdul Aziz, fled in October 1947 to Iraq an event which considerably upset the King. They were well received in Iraq and have made various statements hostile to Ibn Saud. Another member of the family, Mohammed bin Abdul Muhsin ar Rashid, born about 1910, has long lived at Bagdad but has never done anything effective though he is believed to have planned to raise the Shammar.

164. Razim Bey al Khalidi

Deputy Governor of the Saudi Monetary Agency. Born in Palestine, he is said to have begun his career as a teacher and deviated into banking later, but at the time of the Arab troubles in the 1930's he devoted his whole attention to political matters and is said to have been one of the most rabid and energetic of the Arab leaders. He became extremely popular with the Government of Palestine. After the war in Palestine in 1948 he went to Egypt and then became manager of the Arab bank in Jeddah, from when he went to his present appointment. He speaks English fluently, but does not mix much with Europeans and American populations. He refrains, at least publicly, from extreme political opinions. He is said to be a competent banker, but local European bankers do not relish the prospect of his becoming Governor of the Monetary Agency on the retirement of Blowers (186).

165. Rifada Family

Chief of the Billi tribe with property at Wejh. Hamid ar Rifada led the 1932 revolt in the Hejaz during which he was killed.

166. Rushdi Malhas

Born about 1890. A Palestinian from Nadaus. Edited *Umm al Qura*, the Government gazette, for many years. In about 1937 was appointed Assistant Director of the Political Section of the Royal Diwan, a position which he still holds. In 1950, appointed a Minister Plenipotentiary. He has no influence on policy and is concerned only with the administrative functioning of the Diwan and in this capacity acted as a sort of secretary to King Ibn Saud. He is likely to decline in importance under the reign of King Saud, and especially so since he is not on good terms with Yusuf Yasin (182). Well versed in Arabic literature and history. Speaks Turkish and French. In appearance like a dormouse, he is a pleasant personality, anxious to stand well with everyone and maintain his present position.

167. Said al Atas

Born about 1905. Of Indonesian origin, now Saudi. Has worked for many years as principal contact man and intermediary with the Government for the Netherlands Trading Society in Jeddah, including the period when the Society acted as Government bankers. Now also one of the directors of the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (founded 1952) and a

wealthy man. A gentle, quiet, urbane and disillusioned individual with great experience of the country and a good brain.

168. Said Binzagr

A local Jeddah merchant of very good repute, formerly Vice-President of the Jeddah Chamber of Commerce. Has expanding interests and is one of the few merchants who has had the enterprise to set up an office of his own on the east coast. Pleasant and trustworthy.

169. Said al Gauda

Born about 1893 of Kurdish origin. Believed to have had military training in Iraq in his youth, but it is unlikely that he has ever made a serious study of military science. Though the senior officer in the Saudi army he plays no part in its administration or training. He commands the Royal Guard and acts as the King's A.D.C. and major-domo. He has a most friendly manner, but speaks no English.

170. Samir Shamma

Born at Safad in Palestine about 1911. He left school early for financial reasons and became a teacher. Studied law in his spare time and in 1935 became Chief Assistant in the Public Prosecutor's Office. In 1942 he left this post which he had filled with success, and established his own law practice which became one of the most lucrative in Acre. In 1946 he went to Britain and America as a member of the Arab offices in these countries. While in Britain he seriously considered studying at the London School of Economics. Having lost his property and practice in the Israeli war he went to Syria, where he became a member of the Syrian bar. About 1950 he was appointed legal adviser to the Saudi Arabian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and is at present the second highest paid member of the Ministry in Jeddah. Speaks and writes English fluently and is a charming, intelligent conversationalist. He is convinced that conditions will very shortly force Saudi Arabia to enact legislation which is not covered by the Sharia. He believes that he will have a large part in the drafting of such legislation and is anxious to fit himself for this task. He has applied for a scholarship at Harvard University to study public administration and international law for one or two years.

171. Sayid Sami Kutubi

A Hejazi merchant who has from time to time been employed in the Ministry of Finance. In 1953 when Abdul Aziz Suleiman (82) was appointed Deputy Minister of Finance it was evident that he would need some experienced adviser. There was considerable competition for this post and it seems that the Hejazi notables fearful of further foreign infiltration, combined to support Sami Kutubi who was appointed Director-General under Abdul Aziz Suleiman in March 1953.

He is a pleasant, genial man who speaks English easily and has always been on excellent terms with the British and American Embassies. In business he is enterprising and has a good reputation. He is experienced and has some understanding of the ills of Saudi Arabia of which he is critical, but it is very doubtful whether he has the strength of character and the determination required to overcome them.

172. Shaibi Family

Important in Mecca as the Keepership of the Key of the Kaaba is hereditary in the family. The prerogative is very lucrative because all persons entering the Kaaba are supposed to make a present to the Keeper according to their means. The family are admittedly descendants of the Quraysh tribe, but not of the Prophet. It is claimed that the pedigree is continuous from pre-Islamic times and that the right

to keep the key also dates from that early period. According to one story, there was a blot on the escutcheon in the nineteenth century, when the male descent failed and the succession passed through a lady of the family who married a slave. Another branch of the family claiming similar descent, formerly lived in Tunis, but now resides in Mecca. The present Keeper of the Key is Ibrahim al Shaibi who has a good reputation.

173. Sharif Muhsin

Born in 1897 of a family known for their loyalty to the Hashemite cause. After training in the Military College at Bagdad he rose to the rank of captain in the Iraqi army. Joined the Saudi army and though keeping aloof from politics rose to become Chief of Staff. In January 1949 relegated to Commander of the Military School. He since became head of the Plane and Operations Branch in the Ministry of Defence. He has a considerable and humorous personality and is intelligent. The British Military Mission in Saudi Arabia considered him as probably the most efficient of all the senior Saudi officers and the only one with any staff training.

174-175. Sherifian Family

Also called Hashemites by virtue of descent from the great-grandfather of the Prophet, but this name seems to be more particularly affected by the family of King Hussein. There have been in the past and are in the present numerous families claiming this descent through one or other of the sons of Ali, the fourth Caliph and son-in-law of the Prophet. There are in Arabia itself many individuals bearing the title of Sherif, which is held to imply descent from Hasan, the elder son of Ali, and the whole clan is known collectively as Ashraf. The strains most conspicuous in the Hejaz trace this descent through an intermediate common ancestor Hasan ibn Abu Numey, who was Grand Sherif of Mecca in the latter part of the sixteenth century. Three groups of his descendants are accounted specially important, viz.:—

The Dhawi Zeyd,
The Abadila, a particular branch of whom are the
Dhawi Aun, and
The Dhawi Barakat.

All Grand Sherifs of Mecca in the seventeenth century were drawn from the rival Dhawi Zeyd and Dhawi Aun. The last Grand Sherif belonging to the former was Abdul Mutallib, who held the post three times at long intervals. The majority belonged to the Dhawi Aun, of whom came the late King Hussein and his sons. The most important members of the Sherifian family now live outside Saudi Arabia. Perhaps of the others the two following deserve mention.

174. Sharaf Ridha

One of the Dhawi Zeyd branch, usually called Sherif Sharaf tout court. Appointed Acting Minister of Finance under Ibn Saud in January 1926. Resides in Mecca and is now a member of the Legislative Council. In 1936 appointed to be a member of the King's suite. Appears to spend all his time at Mecca and Taif. A courteous, dignified man, rather silent and with something of a brooding air.

175. Abdul Hamid al Aun

One of the Dhawi Aun branch. Understood to be a grandson of Ali bin Abdullah, formerly Grand Sherif of Mecca until his dismissal by the Turks in 1907. Chiefly noteworthy as being the principal figure in the Sherifian plot against Ibn Saud in 1940. Arrested and sentenced to death, he was pardoned (King Abdullah of Transjordan interceded for him) After a period of detention at Riyadh he was allowed

to leave the country with the two younger brothers and some other relatives who were also implicated. Now believed to be in Egypt.

176-178. Sheikh al Ardh Family.

176. Midhat Sheikh al Ardh

A Syrian and the eldest of three brothers. Studied medicine at Damascus and has probably also had some training in France. Has been doctor to the royal family for about twenty years during which time he has amassed a large fortune. He accompanied the Crown Prince to England for the Silver Jubilee in 1935 and the Amir Mansour to Egypt in 1942. Lost his post for a brief period in 1943. Has been useful to the royal family in a number of ways and has probably provided slaves from Syria.

He has a charming manner and speaks French easily. He had the courage to call in many foreign specialists to attend to Ibn Saud's health yet despite this competition he maintained himself as Ibn Saud's principal medical adviser. His influence is likely to decline under King Saud.

177. Fakhri al Ardh

Has prospered in the wake of his brother Midhat. Has turned his hand to a number of lucrative enterprises to which he has been helped by the royal family. At one time served in the Saudi mission to Iraq.

178. Neshat al Ardh

Whether or not he is the most disreputable of the brothers he has acquired the greatest notoriety. It seems fairly certain that he was a principal channel through which Saudi bribes were disseminated in Syria. In 1953 accompanied Abdullah Suleiman (81) on his trip to Germany.

179. Suleiman Nunaih

A Nejd. Director of Coastguards. Dismissed in May 1944 for incompetence in dealing with the smuggling of gold from the Hejaz, but was reinstated shortly after. Friendly and helpful.

180. Taher Redhwan

Born about 1910. A Syrian and a relation of Yusuf Yasin (182). In 1950 appointed a Minister Plenipotentiary. He is normally the official in charge of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Jedda but is liable to alternate in this position with Khairuddin az Zuraikli (148).

In his official relations he was at first most uncooperative and surly mainly because he was afraid of giving anything away. He has become more friendly as he has become more sure of himself and he has shown a disposition to be friendly, but obstinacy is engrained in his nature. He is without serious political influence and his future probably depends largely upon that of Yusuf Yasin. He has a deformed foot and speaks no English, except "goodbye."

181. Turki bin Ataishan

The second son of a prominent Nejd family, he is in his mid-forties. He was Amir of Ras Tanura from about 1945 until 1952, when he was succeeded in this post by his brother Salim. At the end of August 1952 he arrived in the Buraimi oasis accompanied by forty followers and established himself in the village of Hamasa, thus precipitating a crisis in the long-drawn-out dispute concerning the south-eastern frontier of Saudi Arabia. The village of Hamasa belongs to the Sultan of Muscat and most of the rest of the oasis to the Ruler of Abu Dhabi. Ibn Saud laid claim to the whole area of which Buraimi is the strategic centre and declared that Turki was his legally-appointed Amir to govern this part of his Kingdom. Despite a Standstill Agreement which provided for the cessation of provocative actions, Turki continued

unashamedly his attempts to suborn the neighbouring tribes and to encourage revolts against the local rulers. His tendentious and unreliable reporting to Riyadh contributed to heightening the tension.

Turki is well educated in the Arab style and is an assiduous reader. He keeps in close touch with current affairs. He is exceptionally agile mentally and fertile in devising workable schemes. He speaks no English though he understands some. Turki is one of the most impressive and capable of the top Saudi administrators and is particularly good in handling Bedouin, for his imposing figure, his accomplishments in the field and his knowledge of Arabic poetry show him to possess the traditional qualities of an Arab leader. He is ambitious and is well thought of by the powerful Saud bin Jiluwi (79), but it is difficult to see what post he could obtain which would fully satisfy his ambition.

182. Yusuf Yasin

Born about 1890. A Syrian from Latakia. Was once a schoolmaster in Jerusalem. Joined King Feisal at Aqaba and went with him to Damascus. Left on the approach of the French and joined King Hussein in Mecca. Attached by him to the Amir Abdullah at Amman, with whom he remained for six months but of whom he formed such a low opinion that according to his own account he transferred his allegiance to Ibn Saud. Came to Mecca in 1925 and started *Um al Qura* the official Government gazette of which he remained editor for some years. The Nejd delegate at the Moslem Congress of 1926. Director of Publicity. Took part in negotiations with Sir G. Clayton in 1925, 1927 and 1928. Acted as Minister for Foreign Affairs in the absence of the Minister for part of most years from 1926 onwards. Went to Bagdad at the end of 1935 to negotiate the Saudi-Iraq Treaty of Brotherhood and Alliance. Accompanied King Saud, then the Crown Prince, to London for George VI's coronation. Negotiated with His Majesty's Minister the Saudi-Kuwait Agreement which he signed in Jedda in April 1942. In 1944 joined Abdullah Suleiman (81) in opposing the re-organisation of Saudi finances and economy suggested by His Majesty's Minister. Was the Saudi delegate at the Preparatory Committee meeting of the Arab Conference at Alexandria in October 1944 and signed the Covenant of the Arab League on behalf of Saudi Arabia in March 1945. Accompanied Ibn Saud on his visit to Egypt for the meetings with President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill in February 1945. Again accompanied the King on his State visit to Egypt later in 1945, when he added to his fortune through his handling of the King's expenses. Accompanied the Amir Feisal to London for frontier discussions at the Foreign Office. Saudi delegate at the Damascus Conference on the Eastern Frontiers in February 1952. Principal Saudi negotiator in all frontier discussions since the departure and subsequent death of Fuad Hamza. Appointed a Minister of State in 1946. Deputy Foreign Minister. Head of the Political Department of the Royal Diwan and private secretary to King Ibn Saud. He had been at pains for some time to show his regard for King Saud before the latter's accession and had kept him well-informed on foreign affairs. It is not yet certain whether he will hold all his previous positions in the new reign but it is unlikely that his influence will suddenly or seriously diminish.

Politics are the breath of life to Yusuf Yasin. Throughout his career he has been an Arab nationalist and as such is to a considerable extent anti-British though he is equally opposed to any other foreign influence. He will certainly seize any opportunity to decrease British influence in the Arabian peninsula. Though he has a legalistic mind and is fond of scoring debating points he nevertheless has a keen sense of realities and is a great respecter of power. He proves amenable in relation to the power and

influence which he thinks his opponent wields. Obstinance is part of his nature. In argument (which he enjoys) he is always persistent, dogmatic and sometimes excited. He is an indefatigable worker and tries to engross all subjects of importance into his own hands. He is also a devout and puritanical Moslem. These qualities have made him the ideal confidential servant of a despot. There is no reason to suppose that the present King will find Yusuf less useful than did his father who probably considered him only a little less valuable than Abdullah Suleiman. There has always been jealousy between the latter and Yusuf who is very fond of intrigue, but both have proved indispensable.

He can be entertaining in conversation and is imperturbable in the face of the many shafts of wit directed against his reputed meanness, gluttony and monogamy by intimates of the court. He has remarked that he expects to be one of the richest men in Syria, but he fears that the Syrian Government will not permit him to hand this wealth on to his sons, the eldest of whom has studied the oil business in America. His children have all been to English schools in Egypt though he himself speaks little English. Though very vigorous he is probably not in good health.

183-185. Zahid Family.

(Family tree on page 24.)

183. Mohammed Mahmoud Zahid

The eldest of the five brothers who between them manage Zahid Bros., with its highly lucrative General Motors Agency supplying Cadillacs to all who can afford them (including many who fail to pay). Speaks no English and is now more concerned with managing the family's property than anything else.

184. Ahmed Zahid


Financial manager for Zahid Bros. Speaks little English and is not a particularly attractive character.

185. Yousuf Zahid


Born about 1920 and educated in the United States. A glad-hander ("call me Joe") who acts as principal travelling representative for the firm of Zahid Bros. Quite intelligent and possessing more polish than his brothers.

186. George Blowers


An American citizen. First Governor of the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency. Blowers is a banker of considerable experience who began his career with the National City Bank in China. He left them at about the time of the depression and became a Governor of the State Bank in Liberia. He is said on good authority to have made notable success of this very difficult task and it was there that he came to the notice of the Emperor of Ethiopia, who invited him in about 1943 to come to Addis Ababa as second Governor of the Ethiopian National Bank—the first, an Englishman, having proved unsatisfactory. Blowers liked Ethiopia and is said to have done a very competent piece of work there. He left Ethiopia to become assistant to Mr. Hoffman, the E.C.A. administrator for Europe. Mr. Hoffman's office closed down and Blowers transferred to the World Bank, and it was as an employee of theirs that he went to Libya where he overhauled the financial structure of the country and brought it into the sterling area. Early in his career Blowers had become acquainted with Dr. Young, who became the Point 4 Financial Adviser to the Saudi Government. It was upon Dr. Young's advice that the Saudi Government asked for Mr. Blowers to be loaned from the World Bank as the first Governor of the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency. Blowers has shown considerable ability in his varied career and seems to have gained the confidence of the Ministry of Finance and other leading Saudis to such an extent that he is allowed a free hand in all but matters of the highest policy, and in this he is influential. He is in his early fifties, and it is said that he contemplates retiring in a year or two to his orange groves in Florida.



The above genealogical table is based on that in Philby's "Arabian Jubilee" (1950).



Family tree of Zahids and Ali Rezas (numbers in brackets refer to text)



ES 1902/1

No. 50

SAUDI ARABIA: HEADS OF FOREIGN MISSIONS

Mr. Phillips to Mr. Eden. (Received October 6)

(No. 113. Confidential) *Jeddu,*
Sir, *October 3, 1954.*

I have the honour to send you herewith the annual report on the heads of foreign missions in Jedda.

2. I have ventured to delay this report beyond July 1 in order to be able to include several changes then known to be imminent in the following few weeks.

I have, &c.
H. PHILLIPS.

Enclosure

Saudi Arabia: Heads of Missions Resident in Jedda

Afghanistan

Mohammed Nauroz Khan, Ambassador.
Presented his credentials on June 24, 1954; the first resident Afghan representative here—despite the existence of a Saudi Arabian mission in Kabul for some years past. Formerly Ambassador in Tehran and later in Moscow. Has held a number of governmental posts in Afghanistan, the latest being that of Minister of the Interior, in which post he incurred some criticism for inefficiency.
Pleasant if rather heavy, socially; fairly friendly towards Britain. Speaks moderate English and French.

Belgium

See Netherlands.

Egypt

Al-Hussaini al-Khateeb, Ambassador.
Presented his credentials as Minister on August 14, 1951, and as Ambassador on December 3, 1952. Formerly Consul in Bombay and Chargé d'Affaires in Karachi. Is rumoured to be about to be transferred to Ottawa.
Fairly affable; professes to be anxious for close friendship with Britain and thinks it possible now that agreement has been reached on the Suez Canal. Speaks fluent English and French.

Finland

Said Binzagr (Saudi Arabian), Honorary Consul.
Appointed on September 7, 1950. A local merchant of very good repute. Pleasant and trustworthy. Speaks only Arabic.

France

Georges Gueyraud, Ambassador.
Presented his credentials as Minister on June 13, 1949, and as Ambassador on September 17, 1952.

Is also accredited to the Yemen, which he visits annually. Served in Venice, Zagreb and Ankara, and as head of the Eastern European department at the Quai d'Orsay before coming to Jedda. Is shortly being posted back to Paris.

Is shy and somewhat awkward in manner, and does not give the impression of being forceful or effectual in negotiation. But is a friendly, if rather too protocolaire, colleague. He appears to be dominated by his forceful and attractive wife, who is said to have direct contact with the Quai d'Orsay through acquaintances there. As a pair the Gueyrauds are popular in the European community. She speaks excellent English, German and Italian, and he halting English but better Italian.

Indonesia

Radhan Sulaiman, Minister.
Presented his credentials on March 31, 1952. A Javanese educated at Leyden, where he also taught from 1930 to 1945. Returned to Java after Independence and held posts in the Indonesian Ministry of Religion and Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Friendly socially, but rather quiet. An intelligent man; a student of Oriental languages and literature. Speaks Dutch and German and a little English.

Iraq

Amin al-Mumaiyiz, Minister.
Presented his credentials on June 1, 1954, the first Iraqi Minister to reside in Jedda. Educated at the American University of Beirut and is a career diplomatist of considerable experience. Has served in London and Washington and latterly as head of the Department of Arab Affairs at the Foreign Ministry in Bagdad.

A man of polish and urbanity who despises the backwardness of Saudi Arabia. Most friendly towards Britain. Perfectly at home in European society, where he can converse intelligently and amusingly in excellent English or French.

Italy

Giuseppe Capece Galeota, Duca di Regina, Minister.
Presented his credentials on February 2, 1953. Is also accredited to the Yemen, which he has visited once so far. His previous diplomatic service includes pre-war experience in Bulgaria. During the last war he was from 1941 Italian consul-general in Munich—which would imply Axis sympathies. Although he himself seldom mentions this period, it is said that he was a Fascist supporter, and his subsequent career has apparently been blighted by this.

Does not appear to have much to do, his main interest being protection of the large colony of Italian artisans in Saudi Arabia who have come mainly from Eritrea. A friendly, unassuming man with a sense of humour. With the Duchessa (although rather heavy and somewhat boring) he is a popular asset to the small European community. Both speak good English and better French.

Jordan

Al-Sharif Hamid Sa'ad-ud-din, Chargé d'Affaires. Appointed on August 1, 1954. Was formerly in the Royal Diwan in Amman, and before that (until 1951) Chargé d'Affaires in Kabul for some years.

A fat man with less personality than his predecessor, and probably not so well liked by the Saudis. Is a member of the old Sharifian family of Mecca, and makes no secret to me of his contention that he and his people ought by rights still to be ruling in Jedda. Is faintly conspiratorial when he talks about this, and gives the impression of wanting to start some kind of irredentist movement. Possibly to that end goes out of his way to be friendly to the British. Is probably living very much in the past. Withal, friendly. Speaks fluent Turkish and moderate Persian, but no English.

Lebanon

Ghaleb Turc, Minister.

Chargé d'Affaires from October 28, 1950, until May 27, 1953, when he presented his credentials as Minister on promotion. Goes back to Beirut as often as possible to try (it is said) and have himself transferred from Jedda and appointed to a home post. Was said recently to have fished for the post of Director-General of the Ministry of Communications, but failed.

It is doubtful if he has the ability to hold a ministerial post. Is pleasant, hospitable, well educated, and very close to the European diplomatic community in Jedda. But finds it difficult to think things out for himself, and tends to pick the brains of his foreign colleagues. His relations with the Saudis are good and he is usually well informed about local goings-on; but, equally, he probably passes on to the Saudis any indiscreet remark let fall by a colleague. Is ably partnered by a charming and modernist Lebanese wife probably more intelligent than himself. Both speak excellent French and good English, and are a popular couple in the community.

Netherlands and Belgium

S. F. Sant (Dutch), Honorary Consul.

Appointed on December 30, 1953, but is due to leave shortly on transfer to another branch of the Netherlands Trading Society, of which he is at present Jedda branch director.

A friendly bachelor, fond of sports, but just a little stiff in social gatherings. Speaks excellent English and French.

Persia

Hossein Diba, Minister.

Presented his credentials on August 15, 1954. Formerly Minister in Brussels, and not too happy about being posted to Jedda. A man of considerable experience in Europe.

Is a most likeable and friendly man, courteous and civilised and fond of things European. It is too early yet to assess his professional ability, but the chances are that he is not very forceful when it comes to arguing with the Saudis. However, there is probably little to argue about, since Persian affairs here are limited more or less to those connected with the Pilgrimage. He speaks fluent French and Turkish and a little English and hopes to have his wife join him here soon.

Siam

Ekachai Raktiprakon, acting Consul-General.

Appointed on July 22, 1953. Formerly a consular officer in several places in the Far East. His only work here is connected with the several hundred Siamese pilgrims and resident students in Mecca.

An inoffensive little man who makes painful efforts to please. Speaks English that might be understandable if it were not spoken with a staccato clipped accent.

Syria

Omar Baha-ud-din al-Amiri, Ambassador.

Presented his credentials on September 15, 1954, the first resident Syrian Ambassador, and the first Syrian head of mission here since 1952. Was a lawyer and school instructor in Syria until appointed Minister to Pakistan in 1950. Did not favour the Shishakli régime, and was recalled; but stayed in Jordan and Iraq for some time as a refugee. Was reinstated after the fall of Shishakli. Has for some years past been a prominent member of the Moslem Brotherhood and has held high office in the organisation in Syria since 1947.

Is a pleasant and easy talker, well read and intelligent. Aspires to political office, and was a candidate in the recent Syrian elections. Speaks fluent French and Turkish and adequate English.

Turkey

Kemal Aziz Payman, Minister.

Presented his credentials on November 10, 1952.

A pleasant but undistinguished little man. Always most anxious to identify himself with his Western colleagues—even to the point of being rather indiscreet in his outspokenly scathing remarks about Saudi Arabia and its rulers. Could be more useful to his Western colleagues if, as a Moslem, he were on better terms with the Saudis and his Moslem colleagues and, for example, visited Mecca and Medina now and again and came back with a first-hand view of conditions there—especially during the Pilgrimage. But he makes no secret of his dislike of the country. Speaks fluent Turkish and French and German, but only a few words of English.

United States

George Wadsworth, Ambassador.

Presented his credentials on January 9, 1954. Is also accredited to the Yemen, where he has just presented his credentials. A career diplomatist who has seen wide service, latterly in the Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Turkey and Czechoslovakia. In his short time here he has established good relations with the Saudi rulers, with whom he can talk direct in passable Arabic on everyday affairs.

Has a colourful personality with that forthrightness of manner which is so often the prerogative of men in the sixties. At times takes this attitude to the point of boring his listeners; yet he can be a good listener too. Has a shrewd way of summing up events around him, but is not above giving weight to the point of view of any of his colleagues. On the whole a sound representative of his country and a sincere friend of the British. Besides some Arabic, speaks good French.

Heads of Missions not Resident in Jedda**Argentina**

Carlos Zamboni, Minister: Cairo.

Greece

Michel Melas, Minister: Cairo.

Spain

José Fernández-Villaverde y Roca de Togores, Marqués de Santa Cruz, Minister: Cairo.